CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8330 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-GHP8-52VX-77J4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-22 15:30 – Updated: 2025-03-17 21:33A flaw was found in pgAdmin. This issue occurs when the pgAdmin server HTTP API validates the path a user selects to external PostgreSQL utilities such as pg_dump and pg_restore. Versions of pgAdmin prior to 7.7 failed to properly control the server code executed on this API, allowing an authenticated user to run arbitrary commands on the server.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pgadmin4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5002"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-09-22T20:35:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-22T14:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in pgAdmin. This issue occurs when the pgAdmin server HTTP API validates the path a user selects to external PostgreSQL utilities such as pg_dump and pg_restore. Versions of pgAdmin prior to 7.7 failed to properly control the server code executed on this API, allowing an authenticated user to run arbitrary commands on the server.",
"id": "GHSA-ghp8-52vx-77j4",
"modified": "2025-03-17T21:33:27Z",
"published": "2023-09-22T15:30:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/6763"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/35f05e49b3632a0a674b9b36535a7fe2d93dd0c2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2239164"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/2S24D3S2GVNGTDNE6SF2OQSOPU3H72UW"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/VIRTMQZEE6K7RD37ERZ2UFYFLEUXLQU3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pgAdmin failed to properly control the server code "
}
GHSA-GHPJ-82W3-3HGH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-06 03:30 – Updated: 2024-05-06 03:30A vulnerability was found in Ruijie RG-UAC up to 20240428. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file /view/IPV6/ipv6StaticRoute/static_route_edit_ipv6.php. The manipulation of the argument oldipmask/oldgateway/olddevname leads to os command injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-263112. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-4508"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-06T01:15:48Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in Ruijie RG-UAC up to 20240428. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file /view/IPV6/ipv6StaticRoute/static_route_edit_ipv6.php. The manipulation of the argument oldipmask/oldgateway/olddevname leads to os command injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-263112. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-ghpj-82w3-3hgh",
"modified": "2024-05-06T03:30:46Z",
"published": "2024-05-06T03:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4508"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/h0e4a0r1t/-2x3J-1rPc-1-0-/blob/main/Ruijie%20RG-UAC%20Unified%20Internet%20Behavior%20Management%20Audit%20System%20Backend%20RCE%20Vulnerability-static_route_edit_ipv6.php.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.263112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.263112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.323818"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GHRW-6HF4-XX3C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-24 06:30 – Updated: 2025-06-20 21:31Active debug code exists in Yamaha wireless LAN access point devices. If a logged-in user who knows how to use the debug function accesses the device's management page, this function can be enabled by performing specific operations. As a result, an arbitrary OS command may be executed and/or configuration settings of the device may be altered. Affected products and versions are as follows: WLX222 firmware Rev.24.00.03 and earlier, WLX413 firmware Rev.22.00.05 and earlier, WLX212 firmware Rev.21.00.12 and earlier, WLX313 firmware Rev.18.00.12 and earlier, and WLX202 firmware Rev.16.00.18 and earlier.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-22366"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-24T05:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Active debug code exists in Yamaha wireless LAN access point devices. If a logged-in user who knows how to use the debug function accesses the device\u0027s management page, this function can be enabled by performing specific operations. As a result, an arbitrary OS command may be executed and/or configuration settings of the device may be altered. Affected products and versions are as follows: WLX222 firmware Rev.24.00.03 and earlier, WLX413 firmware Rev.22.00.05 and earlier, WLX212 firmware Rev.21.00.12 and earlier, WLX313 firmware Rev.18.00.12 and earlier, and WLX202 firmware Rev.16.00.18 and earlier.",
"id": "GHSA-ghrw-6hf4-xx3c",
"modified": "2025-06-20T21:31:52Z",
"published": "2024-01-24T06:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22366"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU99896362"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.rtpro.yamaha.co.jp/RT/FAQ/Security/JVNVU99896362.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GHXF-76C7-3C47
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:21 – Updated: 2023-02-02 15:30A flaw was found in the CloudForms management engine version 5.10 and CloudForms management version 5.11, which triggered remote code execution through NFS schedule backup. An attacker logged into the management console could use this flaw to execute arbitrary shell commands on the CloudForms server as root.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-14894"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-06-22T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in the CloudForms management engine version 5.10 and CloudForms management version 5.11, which triggered remote code execution through NFS schedule backup. An attacker logged into the management console could use this flaw to execute arbitrary shell commands on the CloudForms server as root.",
"id": "GHSA-ghxf-76c7-3c47",
"modified": "2023-02-02T15:30:27Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:21:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-14894"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:0588"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:0589"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2019-14894"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1769411"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2019-14894"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GJ73-RF58-HPFW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-25 19:00 – Updated: 2022-10-26 19:00An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the sysupgrade command injection functionality of Robustel R1510 3.1.16 and 3.3.0. A specially-crafted network request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-32765"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-25T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the sysupgrade command injection functionality of Robustel R1510 3.1.16 and 3.3.0. A specially-crafted network request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-gj73-rf58-hpfw",
"modified": "2022-10-26T19:00:39Z",
"published": "2022-10-25T19:00:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32765"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2022-1576"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GJ7G-WM3J-X5FH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-25 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:13Infoblox NIOS through 8.5.1 has a faulty component that accepts malicious input without sanitization, resulting in shell access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-37249"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-25T20:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Infoblox NIOS through 8.5.1 has a faulty component that accepts malicious input without sanitization, resulting in shell access.",
"id": "GHSA-gj7g-wm3j-x5fh",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:13:18Z",
"published": "2023-08-25T21:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37249"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.infoblox.com/t5/trending-kb-articles/nios-is-vulnerable-to-cve-2023-37249/ba-p/32190"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://infoblox.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GJ8W-MVPF-X27X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 23:20 – Updated: 2026-06-26 23:20Maintainer Action Plan
This report is ready to review with the shared patch branch. Start with the PR and the expected fixed behavior, then use the detailed exploit narrative below only if you want to replay the original path.
- Advisory:
CAND-PNPM-097/GHSA-gj8w-mvpf-x27x - Advisory URL: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-gj8w-mvpf-x27x
- Shared patch PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-j2hc-m6cf-6jm8/pull/1
- Shared patch branch:
security/ghsa-batch-2026-06-09 - Patch commit:
a93449314f398cf4bdf2e28d033c02d37395ad22 - Base commit:
origin/main55a4035abf1ae3fe7208ba1f5ef43c5eff58ccec - Maintainer priority:
start-here - Component:
pnpm configDependencies / pacquet delegation - Patch area: pacquet/configDependency lifecycle execution is not used as install engine without trust
- Affected packages:
npm:pnpm,npm:@pnpm/config.reader,npm:@pnpm/installing.commands - CWE IDs:
CWE-829,CWE-78,CWE-494 - Conservative CVSS:
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Next action: review the shared patch branch for this component, set the final affected version range, merge and release the fix, then publish or close the advisory.
Expected Patched Behavior
config-dependency pacquet install engines are not selected unless the trusted allowlist is set outside the repository; the marker file is not created.
Files And Tests To Review
config/reader/src/Config.tsconfig/reader/src/types.tsconfig/reader/src/configFileKey.tsconfig/reader/src/index.tsconfig/reader/test/index.tsinstalling/commands/src/installDeps.tsinstalling/commands/test/runPacquet.tspnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts.changeset/lucky-config-plugin-pnpmfiles.md
Focused Validation
Run these from a checkout of the shared patch branch. They are the useful maintainer commands with machine-local artifact paths removed.
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build config/reader/tsconfig.json
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/commands/tsconfig.json
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json
NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/runPacquet.ts --runInBand
NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/index.ts -t "config dependency code allowlists|user-level preference settings" --runInBand
./node_modules/.bin/eslint config/reader/src/Config.ts config/reader/src/types.ts config/reader/src/configFileKey.ts config/reader/src/index.ts config/reader/test/index.ts installing/commands/src/installDeps.ts installing/commands/test/runPacquet.ts pnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts
git diff --check
The full patched replay for the shared branch passed with all 20 candidates marked fixed. This candidate's replay evidence is results/CAND-PNPM-097-patched-result.json.
Summary
pnpm can install configDependencies declared in pnpm-workspace.yaml before command dispatch. Before the patch, a repository could declare pacquet or @pnpm/pacquet as a config dependency and pnpm treated that repository-controlled dependency as an install-engine opt-in. During install, pnpm resolved a platform-specific @pacquet/<platform>-<arch>/pacquet binary from node_modules/.pnpm-config/<packageName> and spawned it as the developer or CI user.
Details
The vulnerable source-to-sink path was:
config/reader/src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.tscopies repositorypnpm-workspace.yamlconfigDependenciesinto config.pnpm/src/getConfig.tsinstalls config dependencies before command dispatch.installing/env-installer/src/resolveAndInstallConfigDeps.tsresolves the repository-declared dependency and its optional platform subdependencies.installing/env-installer/src/installConfigDeps.tsfetches, imports, and symlinks the config dependency tree undernode_modules/.pnpm-config.installing/commands/src/installDeps.tsselected pacquet delegation wheneverconfigDependenciescontainedpacquetor@pnpm/pacquet.installing/deps-installer/src/install/index.tscalledopts.runPacquetfrom frozen and materialization paths.installing/commands/src/runPacquet.tsresolved@pacquet/${process.platform}-${process.arch}/pacquetfrom the installed config dependency package and executed it withspawn().
Exact-version, integrity, and platform filters only proved which bytes package resolution selected; they did not establish that the repository was trusted to choose a native install engine.
PoC
Standalone PoC and verification script:
Repository fixture:
packages:
- .
configDependencies:
pacquet: 0.2.2
Registry package shape:
{
"name": "pacquet",
"version": "0.2.2",
"optionalDependencies": {
"@pacquet/darwin-arm64": "0.2.2"
}
}
Platform package payload:
#!/bin/sh
echo "$PWD" > /tmp/pacquet-engine-ran
env > /tmp/pacquet-engine-env
Pre-patch exploit model:
- The victim runs a dependency-management command such as
pnpm installin the repository. - pnpm installs the repository-declared config dependency and its host-compatible optional platform dependency into
.pnpm-config. installDeps()treats the presence ofconfigDependencies.pacquetorconfigDependencies["@pnpm/pacquet"]as authorization to delegate install materialization.runPacquet()resolves the platform binary from the installed config dependency tree and spawns it in the lockfile directory.
Observed PoC output:
{
"primitive": "repository-selected pacquet config dependency reaches native process execution when selected",
"patchedWithoutAllowlist": "blocked",
"trustedAllowlist": "allows explicit opt-in"
}
Focused validation commands:
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build config/reader/tsconfig.json
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/commands/tsconfig.json
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json
NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/runPacquet.ts --runInBand
NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/index.ts -t "config dependency code allowlists|user-level preference settings" --runInBand
./node_modules/.bin/eslint config/reader/src/Config.ts config/reader/src/types.ts config/reader/src/configFileKey.ts config/reader/src/index.ts config/reader/test/index.ts installing/commands/src/installDeps.ts installing/commands/test/runPacquet.ts pnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts
git diff --check
Validation result:
- The PoC confirmed a selected pacquet config dependency reaches native process execution.
- Patched
getPacquetConfigDependencyName()returnsundefinedwithout a trusted allowlist. - Patched
getPacquetConfigDependencyName()allows exactpacquet, exact@pnpm/pacquet, and wildcard*trusted opt-in. - Config reader regressions prove user/global config can set
configDependencyInstallEngineAllowlist, whilepnpm-workspace.yamlcannot grant this permission to itself. - E2E fixtures that intentionally delegate to pacquet now pass the trusted allowlist through environment config.
- TypeScript builds passed for
@pnpm/config.reader,@pnpm/installing.commands, andpnpm. - Focused
installing/commands/test/runPacquet.ts: 3 passed. - Focused
config/reader/test/index.ts: 2 passed, 132 skipped under the focused pattern. - ESLint passed with warnings only for existing skipped tests in
config/reader/test/index.tsandpnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts. git diff --check: passed.
Impact
A malicious repository can cause pnpm to execute a registry-selected native binary while handling dependency-management commands. The binary runs with the victim developer or CI user's filesystem, environment, registry credentials, git/SSH credentials, and network access.
Affected products
Ecosystem: npm
Package name: pnpm, @pnpm/config.reader, @pnpm/installing.commands
Affected versions: current main before this patch, when configDependencies contains pacquet or @pnpm/pacquet and install paths delegate to pacquet.
Patched versions: 10.34.2, 11.5.3.
Severity
Severity: High
Vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Base score: 8.8
Rationale: attacker input is delivered through a repository and registry package, exploitation is low complexity once the victim runs pnpm, no attacker privileges are required, and user interaction is required. Successful exploitation executes a native binary in the victim user's context, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.
Weaknesses
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check
Patch
The patch adds a trusted opt-in gate for config-dependency install-engine delegation:
- New setting:
configDependencyInstallEngineAllowlist. - The allowlist can be set from trusted user-controlled config such as global config, CLI config, or environment config.
pnpm-workspace.yamlcannot grant this permission to itself; workspace-provided values are discarded after workspace settings are merged.installDeps()delegates to pacquet only whenpacquet,@pnpm/pacquet, or*is present in the trusted allowlist.- Repositories can still install
pacquetas a config dependency, but pnpm will not spawn it as an install engine unless trusted config opts in. - Existing tests that intentionally exercise pacquet delegation were updated to pass the trusted allowlist via environment config.
Changed files:
config/reader/src/Config.tsconfig/reader/src/types.tsconfig/reader/src/configFileKey.tsconfig/reader/src/index.tsconfig/reader/test/index.tsinstalling/commands/src/installDeps.tsinstalling/commands/test/runPacquet.tspnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts
Changeset:
.changeset/lucky-config-plugin-pnpmfiles.md
Pacquet parity:
No pacquet-side code-execution sink exists for this finding. The Rust port parses and records configDependencies for workspace-state compatibility, but it does not install config dependencies or select/spawn an alternate install engine from them. The user-visible trust setting is TypeScript-side today because it gates pnpm's pacquet delegation path.
CVSS Reassessment
Initial CVSS remains correct for vulnerable versions: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H / 8.8 High.
Final CVSS after patch: not vulnerable after patch / 0.0. The PoC no longer reaches pacquet install-engine selection or native process execution unless the victim has set a trusted allowlist outside the repository's own workspace settings.
Remaining Risk
Users can explicitly trust pacquet install-engine delegation through the new allowlist. That is intentional behavior; the closed issue is repository self-authorization of a registry-provided native install engine.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 10.34.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pnpm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.5.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pnpm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.5.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55697"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-494",
"CWE-78",
"CWE-829"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T23:20:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T18:16:40Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\u003c!-- maintainer-action:start --\u003e\n## Maintainer Action Plan\n\nThis report is ready to review with the shared patch branch. Start with the PR and the expected fixed behavior, then use the detailed exploit narrative below only if you want to replay the original path.\n\n- Advisory: `CAND-PNPM-097` / `GHSA-gj8w-mvpf-x27x`\n- Advisory URL: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-gj8w-mvpf-x27x\n- Shared patch PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-j2hc-m6cf-6jm8/pull/1\n- Shared patch branch: `security/ghsa-batch-2026-06-09`\n- Patch commit: `a93449314f398cf4bdf2e28d033c02d37395ad22`\n- Base commit: `origin/main` `55a4035abf1ae3fe7208ba1f5ef43c5eff58ccec`\n- Maintainer priority: `start-here`\n- Component: `pnpm configDependencies / pacquet delegation`\n- Patch area: pacquet/configDependency lifecycle execution is not used as install engine without trust\n- Affected packages: `npm:pnpm`, `npm:@pnpm/config.reader`, `npm:@pnpm/installing.commands`\n- CWE IDs: `CWE-829`, `CWE-78`, `CWE-494`\n- Conservative CVSS: `7.5` / `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n- Next action: review the shared patch branch for this component, set the final affected version range, merge and release the fix, then publish or close the advisory.\n\n### Expected Patched Behavior\n\nconfig-dependency pacquet install engines are not selected unless the trusted allowlist is set outside the repository; the marker file is not created.\n\n### Files And Tests To Review\n\n- `config/reader/src/Config.ts`\n- `config/reader/src/types.ts`\n- `config/reader/src/configFileKey.ts`\n- `config/reader/src/index.ts`\n- `config/reader/test/index.ts`\n- `installing/commands/src/installDeps.ts`\n- `installing/commands/test/runPacquet.ts`\n- `pnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts`\n- `.changeset/lucky-config-plugin-pnpmfiles.md`\n\n### Focused Validation\n\nRun these from a checkout of the shared patch branch. They are the useful maintainer commands with machine-local artifact paths removed.\n\n```bash\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build config/reader/tsconfig.json\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/commands/tsconfig.json\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json\nNODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/runPacquet.ts --runInBand\nNODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/index.ts -t \"config dependency code allowlists|user-level preference settings\" --runInBand\n./node_modules/.bin/eslint config/reader/src/Config.ts config/reader/src/types.ts config/reader/src/configFileKey.ts config/reader/src/index.ts config/reader/test/index.ts installing/commands/src/installDeps.ts installing/commands/test/runPacquet.ts pnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts\ngit diff --check\n```\n\nThe full patched replay for the shared branch passed with all 20 candidates marked fixed. This candidate\u0027s replay evidence is `results/CAND-PNPM-097-patched-result.json`.\n\u003c!-- maintainer-action:end --\u003e\n\n### Summary\n\npnpm can install `configDependencies` declared in `pnpm-workspace.yaml` before command dispatch. Before the patch, a repository could declare `pacquet` or `@pnpm/pacquet` as a config dependency and pnpm treated that repository-controlled dependency as an install-engine opt-in. During install, pnpm resolved a platform-specific `@pacquet/\u003cplatform\u003e-\u003carch\u003e/pacquet` binary from `node_modules/.pnpm-config/\u003cpackageName\u003e` and spawned it as the developer or CI user.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable source-to-sink path was:\n\n- `config/reader/src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts` copies repository `pnpm-workspace.yaml` `configDependencies` into config.\n- `pnpm/src/getConfig.ts` installs config dependencies before command dispatch.\n- `installing/env-installer/src/resolveAndInstallConfigDeps.ts` resolves the repository-declared dependency and its optional platform subdependencies.\n- `installing/env-installer/src/installConfigDeps.ts` fetches, imports, and symlinks the config dependency tree under `node_modules/.pnpm-config`.\n- `installing/commands/src/installDeps.ts` selected pacquet delegation whenever `configDependencies` contained `pacquet` or `@pnpm/pacquet`.\n- `installing/deps-installer/src/install/index.ts` called `opts.runPacquet` from frozen and materialization paths.\n- `installing/commands/src/runPacquet.ts` resolved `@pacquet/${process.platform}-${process.arch}/pacquet` from the installed config dependency package and executed it with `spawn()`.\n\nExact-version, integrity, and platform filters only proved which bytes package resolution selected; they did not establish that the repository was trusted to choose a native install engine.\n\n### PoC\n\nStandalone PoC and verification script:\n\nRepository fixture:\n\n```yaml\npackages:\n - .\nconfigDependencies:\n pacquet: 0.2.2\n```\n\nRegistry package shape:\n\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"pacquet\",\n \"version\": \"0.2.2\",\n \"optionalDependencies\": {\n \"@pacquet/darwin-arm64\": \"0.2.2\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nPlatform package payload:\n\n```sh\n#!/bin/sh\necho \"$PWD\" \u003e /tmp/pacquet-engine-ran\nenv \u003e /tmp/pacquet-engine-env\n```\n\nPre-patch exploit model:\n\n1. The victim runs a dependency-management command such as `pnpm install` in the repository.\n2. pnpm installs the repository-declared config dependency and its host-compatible optional platform dependency into `.pnpm-config`.\n3. `installDeps()` treats the presence of `configDependencies.pacquet` or `configDependencies[\"@pnpm/pacquet\"]` as authorization to delegate install materialization.\n4. `runPacquet()` resolves the platform binary from the installed config dependency tree and spawns it in the lockfile directory.\n\nObserved PoC output:\n\n```json\n{\n \"primitive\": \"repository-selected pacquet config dependency reaches native process execution when selected\",\n \"patchedWithoutAllowlist\": \"blocked\",\n \"trustedAllowlist\": \"allows explicit opt-in\"\n}\n```\n\nFocused validation commands:\n\n```bash\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build config/reader/tsconfig.json\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/commands/tsconfig.json\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json\nNODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/runPacquet.ts --runInBand\nNODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/index.ts -t \"config dependency code allowlists|user-level preference settings\" --runInBand\n./node_modules/.bin/eslint config/reader/src/Config.ts config/reader/src/types.ts config/reader/src/configFileKey.ts config/reader/src/index.ts config/reader/test/index.ts installing/commands/src/installDeps.ts installing/commands/test/runPacquet.ts pnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts\ngit diff --check\n```\n\nValidation result:\n\n- The PoC confirmed a selected pacquet config dependency reaches native process execution.\n- Patched `getPacquetConfigDependencyName()` returns `undefined` without a trusted allowlist.\n- Patched `getPacquetConfigDependencyName()` allows exact `pacquet`, exact `@pnpm/pacquet`, and wildcard `*` trusted opt-in.\n- Config reader regressions prove user/global config can set `configDependencyInstallEngineAllowlist`, while `pnpm-workspace.yaml` cannot grant this permission to itself.\n- E2E fixtures that intentionally delegate to pacquet now pass the trusted allowlist through environment config.\n- TypeScript builds passed for `@pnpm/config.reader`, `@pnpm/installing.commands`, and `pnpm`.\n- Focused `installing/commands/test/runPacquet.ts`: 3 passed.\n- Focused `config/reader/test/index.ts`: 2 passed, 132 skipped under the focused pattern.\n- ESLint passed with warnings only for existing skipped tests in `config/reader/test/index.ts` and `pnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts`.\n- `git diff --check`: passed.\n\n### Impact\n\nA malicious repository can cause pnpm to execute a registry-selected native binary while handling dependency-management commands. The binary runs with the victim developer or CI user\u0027s filesystem, environment, registry credentials, git/SSH credentials, and network access.\n\n## Affected products\n\nEcosystem: npm\n\nPackage name: `pnpm`, `@pnpm/config.reader`, `@pnpm/installing.commands`\n\nAffected versions: current main before this patch, when `configDependencies` contains `pacquet` or `@pnpm/pacquet` and install paths delegate to pacquet.\n\nPatched versions: 10.34.2, 11.5.3.\n\n## Severity\n\nSeverity: High\n\nVector string: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nBase score: 8.8\n\nRationale: attacker input is delivered through a repository and registry package, exploitation is low complexity once the victim runs pnpm, no attacker privileges are required, and user interaction is required. Successful exploitation executes a native binary in the victim user\u0027s context, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.\n\n## Weaknesses\n\nCWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere\n\nCWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command\n\nCWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check\n\n## Patch\n\nThe patch adds a trusted opt-in gate for config-dependency install-engine delegation:\n\n- New setting: `configDependencyInstallEngineAllowlist`.\n- The allowlist can be set from trusted user-controlled config such as global config, CLI config, or environment config.\n- `pnpm-workspace.yaml` cannot grant this permission to itself; workspace-provided values are discarded after workspace settings are merged.\n- `installDeps()` delegates to pacquet only when `pacquet`, `@pnpm/pacquet`, or `*` is present in the trusted allowlist.\n- Repositories can still install `pacquet` as a config dependency, but pnpm will not spawn it as an install engine unless trusted config opts in.\n- Existing tests that intentionally exercise pacquet delegation were updated to pass the trusted allowlist via environment config.\n\nChanged files:\n\n- `config/reader/src/Config.ts`\n- `config/reader/src/types.ts`\n- `config/reader/src/configFileKey.ts`\n- `config/reader/src/index.ts`\n- `config/reader/test/index.ts`\n- `installing/commands/src/installDeps.ts`\n- `installing/commands/test/runPacquet.ts`\n- `pnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts`\n\nChangeset:\n\n- `.changeset/lucky-config-plugin-pnpmfiles.md`\n\nPacquet parity:\n\nNo pacquet-side code-execution sink exists for this finding. The Rust port parses and records `configDependencies` for workspace-state compatibility, but it does not install config dependencies or select/spawn an alternate install engine from them. The user-visible trust setting is TypeScript-side today because it gates pnpm\u0027s pacquet delegation path.\n\n## CVSS Reassessment\n\nInitial CVSS remains correct for vulnerable versions: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` / 8.8 High.\n\nFinal CVSS after patch: not vulnerable after patch / 0.0. The PoC no longer reaches pacquet install-engine selection or native process execution unless the victim has set a trusted allowlist outside the repository\u0027s own workspace settings.\n\n## Remaining Risk\n\nUsers can explicitly trust pacquet install-engine delegation through the new allowlist. That is intentional behavior; the closed issue is repository self-authorization of a registry-provided native install engine.",
"id": "GHSA-gj8w-mvpf-x27x",
"modified": "2026-06-26T23:20:47Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T23:20:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-gj8w-mvpf-x27x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55697"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pnpm: Repository-controlled configDependencies can select a pacquet native install engine"
}
GHSA-GJC3-4W5C-43MC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:23 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:23An issue was discovered on Motorola C1 and M2 devices with firmware 1.01 and 1.07 respectively. This issue is a Command Injection allowing a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code, and get a root shell. A command Injection vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted /HNAP1 POST request. This occurs when any HNAP API function triggers a call to the system function with untrusted input from the request body for the SetNetworkTomographySettings API function, as demonstrated by shell metacharacters in the tomography_ping_number field.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-9117"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-03-07T23:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered on Motorola C1 and M2 devices with firmware 1.01 and 1.07 respectively. This issue is a Command Injection allowing a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code, and get a root shell. A command Injection vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted /HNAP1 POST request. This occurs when any HNAP API function triggers a call to the system function with untrusted input from the request body for the SetNetworkTomographySettings API function, as demonstrated by shell metacharacters in the tomography_ping_number field.",
"id": "GHSA-gjc3-4w5c-43mc",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:23:15Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:23:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9117"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lieanu/vuls/blob/master/motorola/M2_C1/SetNetworkTomographySettings.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GJFW-29FG-W4VQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-05 00:30 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:33Edimax IC-7100 does not properly neutralize requests. An attacker can create specially crafted requests to achieve remote code execution on the device
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-1316"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-05T00:15:35Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Edimax IC-7100 does not properly neutralize requests. An attacker can create specially crafted requests to achieve remote code execution on the device",
"id": "GHSA-gjfw-29fg-w4vq",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:33:13Z",
"published": "2025-03-05T00:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1316"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-1316"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-063-08"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-GJHP-RRWF-M3PX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:45 – Updated: 2023-04-26 21:30In the /HNAP1/SetWiFiVerifyAlpha message, the WPSPIN parameter is vulnerable, and the vulnerability affects D-Link DIR-822 B1 202KRb06 devices. In the SetWiFiVerifyAlpha.php source code, the WPSPIN parameter is saved in the $rphyinf1."/media/wps/enrollee/pin" and $rphyinf2."/media/wps/enrollee/pin" and $rphyinf3."/media/wps/enrollee/pin" internal configuration memory without any regex checking. And in the do_wps function of the wps.php source code, the data in $rphyinf3."/media/wps/enrollee/pin" is used with the wpatalk command without any regex checking. A vulnerable /HNAP1/SetWiFiVerifyAlpha XML message could have shell metacharacters in the WPSPIN element such as the telnetd string.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-19990"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-05-13T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the /HNAP1/SetWiFiVerifyAlpha message, the WPSPIN parameter is vulnerable, and the vulnerability affects D-Link DIR-822 B1 202KRb06 devices. In the SetWiFiVerifyAlpha.php source code, the WPSPIN parameter is saved in the $rphyinf1.\"/media/wps/enrollee/pin\" and $rphyinf2.\"/media/wps/enrollee/pin\" and $rphyinf3.\"/media/wps/enrollee/pin\" internal configuration memory without any regex checking. And in the do_wps function of the wps.php source code, the data in $rphyinf3.\"/media/wps/enrollee/pin\" is used with the wpatalk command without any regex checking. A vulnerable /HNAP1/SetWiFiVerifyAlpha XML message could have shell metacharacters in the WPSPIN element such as the `telnetd` string.",
"id": "GHSA-gjhp-rrwf-m3px",
"modified": "2023-04-26T21:30:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:45:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-19990"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pr0v3rbs/CVE/tree/master/CVE-2018-19986%20-%2019990"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.