CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8251 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-9M5C-7X86-6G8R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:57 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:57A command injection vulnerability was found in the web administration console in SoftNAS Cloud before 4.0.3. In particular, the snserv script did not sanitize the 'recentVersion' parameter from the snserv endpoint, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root permissions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-14417"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-08-04T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A command injection vulnerability was found in the web administration console in SoftNAS Cloud before 4.0.3. In particular, the snserv script did not sanitize the \u0027recentVersion\u0027 parameter from the snserv endpoint, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root permissions.",
"id": "GHSA-9m5c-7x86-6g8r",
"modified": "2022-05-14T02:57:53Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:57:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14417"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.softnas.com/display/SD/Release+Notes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/softnas-cloud-os-command-injection"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45097"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/Jul/85"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/104914"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9M7H-5C58-3PM4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:53 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:53For some Iomega, Lenovo, LenovoEMC NAS devices versions 4.1.402.34662 and earlier, when changing the name of a share, an attacker can craft a command injection payload using backtick "``" characters in the share : name parameter. As a result, arbitrary commands may be executed as the root user. The attack requires a value __c and iomega parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-9077"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-09-28T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "For some Iomega, Lenovo, LenovoEMC NAS devices versions 4.1.402.34662 and earlier, when changing the name of a share, an attacker can craft a command injection payload using backtick \"``\" characters in the share : name parameter. As a result, arbitrary commands may be executed as the root user. The attack requires a value __c and iomega parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-9m7h-5c58-3pm4",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:53:51Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:53:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-9077"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/solutions/LEN-24224"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9M7W-VP93-X7HQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-04 12:30 – Updated: 2026-06-04 12:30This vulnerability exists in GX Earth ONT models due to improper handling of user-supplied input in multiple diagnostic functions in its web management interface. An authenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting arbitrary and executing OS commands on the targeted device.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow the attacker to perform remote code execution with root privileges on the targeted device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45431"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T12:16:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "This vulnerability exists in GX Earth ONT models due to improper handling of user-supplied input in multiple diagnostic functions in its web management interface. An authenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting arbitrary and executing OS commands on the targeted device.\n\n\t\n\nSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow the attacker to perform remote code execution with root privileges on the targeted device.",
"id": "GHSA-9m7w-vp93-x7hq",
"modified": "2026-06-04T12:30:26Z",
"published": "2026-06-04T12:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45431"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=PUBVLNOTES01\u0026VLCODE=CIVN-2026-0288"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9M9X-65P9-XH4V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-21 19:01 – Updated: 2022-10-24 19:00Dell PowerScale OneFS, versions 8.2.2-9.3.0, contain an OS command injection vulnerability. A privileged local malicious user could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to a full system compromise. This impacts compliance mode clusters.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-34437"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-21T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Dell PowerScale OneFS, versions 8.2.2-9.3.0, contain an OS command injection vulnerability. A privileged local malicious user could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to a full system compromise. This impacts compliance mode clusters.",
"id": "GHSA-9m9x-65p9-xh4v",
"modified": "2022-10-24T19:00:22Z",
"published": "2022-10-21T19:01:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34437"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000204053/dsa-2022-245-dell-emc-powerscale-onefs-security-update-for-multiple-security-updates"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9MC3-HFJ9-6XG7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:27 – Updated: 2022-05-17 05:27The Johnson Controls CK721-A controller with firmware before SSM4388_03.1.0.14_BB allows remote attackers to perform arbitrary actions via crafted packets to TCP port 41014 (aka the download port).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2012-2607"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2012-07-16T20:49:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Johnson Controls CK721-A controller with firmware before SSM4388_03.1.0.14_BB allows remote attackers to perform arbitrary actions via crafted packets to TCP port 41014 (aka the download port).",
"id": "GHSA-9mc3-hfj9-6xg7",
"modified": "2022-05-17T05:27:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:27:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2607"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/977312"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/MORO-8UYN8P"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-9MH9-7P8C-GR7G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-28 18:30 – Updated: 2025-04-28 18:30SEPPmail through 12.1.17 allows command injection within the Admin Portal. An authenticated attacker is able to execute arbitrary code in the context of the user root.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-41871"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-28T16:15:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SEPPmail through 12.1.17 allows command injection within the Admin Portal. An authenticated attacker is able to execute arbitrary code in the context of the user root.",
"id": "GHSA-9mh9-7p8c-gr7g",
"modified": "2025-04-28T18:30:55Z",
"published": "2025-04-28T18:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41871"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://code-white.com/public-vulnerability-list"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.seppmail.com/products"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9MMC-QWFM-WJ5F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-01 18:30 – Updated: 2023-11-01 18:30Multiple vulnerabilities in the web management interface of Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system. The attacker would need valid device credentials but does not require administrator privileges to exploit this vulnerability. These vulnerabilities are due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input for certain configuration options. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by using crafted input within the device configuration GUI. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the device including the underlying operating system which could also affect the availability of the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-20219"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-01T18:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in the web management interface of Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system. The attacker would need valid device credentials but does not require administrator privileges to exploit this vulnerability. These vulnerabilities are due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input for certain configuration options. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by using crafted input within the device configuration GUI. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the device including the underlying operating system which could also affect the availability of the device.",
"id": "GHSA-9mmc-qwfm-wj5f",
"modified": "2023-11-01T18:30:33Z",
"published": "2023-11-01T18:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-fmc-cmdinj-bTEgufOX"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9MRW-6XPV-33MX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-10 15:31 – Updated: 2024-06-10 15:31Command injection vulnerability in Comtrend router WLD71-T1_v2.0.201820, affecting the GRG-4280us version. This vulnerability could allow an authenticated user to execute commands inside the router by making a POST request to the URL “/boaform/admin/formUserTracert”.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5785"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-10T13:15:51Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Command injection vulnerability in Comtrend router WLD71-T1_v2.0.201820, affecting the GRG-4280us version. This vulnerability could allow an authenticated user to execute commands inside the router by making a POST request to the URL \u201c/boaform/admin/formUserTracert\u201d.",
"id": "GHSA-9mrw-6xpv-33mx",
"modified": "2024-06-10T15:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-06-10T15:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5785"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-comtrend-router"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9MVM-4GWG-V8MP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 13:59 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:30Summary
GET /environments/{id}/volumes/{volumeName}/browse accepts a path query parameter that is passed to a shell command (sh -c "find … | while …") inside an Arcane helper container. The path sanitiser blocks ../ traversal but does not strip Bourne-shell metacharacters such as $() or backticks, and strconv.Quote only escapes Go string metacharacters, not shell substitution sequences. Any authenticated user with access to a browseable volume can execute arbitrary commands inside the helper container; command output is reflected back in the 500 error body.
Details
The execution flow is:
BrowseDirectoryInput.Path(query:path) —backend/internal/huma/handlers/volumes.go:148VolumeHandler.BrowseDirectorycallsvolumeService.ListDirectory(ctx, volumeName, input.Path)—backend/internal/huma/handlers/volumes.go:858-865. Note the route registration at line 412–419 only declaresBearerAuth/ApiKeyAuth; there is nocheckAdmin(ctx)call (compare withcustomize.go,system.go,swarm.go, etc., which do enforce admin).VolumeService.ListDirectoryruns the user-supplied path throughsanitizeBrowsePathInternal, then joins it under/volume, quotes it withstrconv.Quote, and embeds it into ash -ccommand:
// backend/internal/services/volume_service.go:286-300
sanitizedPath, err := s.sanitizeBrowsePathInternal(dirPath)
...
targetPath := path.Join("/volume", sanitizedPath)
quotedPath := strconv.Quote(targetPath)
cmd := []string{"sh", "-c", fmt.Sprintf(
"find %s -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 | while IFS= read -r f; do out=$(stat -c \"%%s %%Y %%f %%A\" -- \"$f\" 2>/dev/null) || continue; printf \"%%s\\0%%s\\0\" \"$f\" \"$out\"; done",
quotedPath)}
stdout, _, err := s.execInContainerInternal(ctx, containerID, cmd)
The sanitiser is insufficient (backend/internal/services/volume_service.go:1448-1467):
func (s *VolumeService) sanitizeBrowsePathInternal(input string) (string, error) {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(input)
if trimmed == "" || trimmed == "/" { return "/", nil }
cleaned := path.Clean(trimmed)
if !path.IsAbs(cleaned) { cleaned = "/" + cleaned }
if strings.Contains(cleaned, "/../") || strings.HasSuffix(cleaned, "/..") || cleaned == "/.." {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid path: path traversal not allowed")
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(cleaned, "/") { return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid path: must be absolute") }
return cleaned, nil
}
Only ../ patterns are filtered. $(...), backticks, ;, &, |, >, etc. all pass through unchanged. strconv.Quote then wraps the path in Go-style double quotes, which sh -c interprets as a regular double-quoted string — and bash performs $(...) command substitution inside double quotes.
For the input /$( id):
- sanitizeBrowsePathInternal returns /$( id) (no ../ present).
- path.Join("/volume", "/$( id)") → /volume/$( id).
- strconv.Quote(...) → "/volume/$( id)".
- The shell runs find "/volume/$( id)" …, which expands to find "/volume/uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)" …. find fails because that path does not exist; the stderr containing the substituted command output is propagated by execInContainerInternal (volume_service.go:910-918) into a command exited with code N: … error, then re-wrapped by ListDirectory and returned to the client as a 500 response body.
Errors from the handler at volumes.go:863-864 are returned via huma.Error500InternalServerError(err.Error()), so the substituted output is reflected in plaintext.
Blast radius / mitigations actually present:
- The helper container is created by createTempContainerInternal with NetworkDisabled: true, no privileged mode, no Docker socket mount, only the target Docker volume bind-mounted (:ro for browse). It is auto-removed.
- Therefore the injection executes inside an isolated, network-disabled container that already has read access to the same files the browse API exposes.
- However: the injection grants arbitrary command execution within that container (well beyond the find/stat/readlink/head primitives the API exposes), enables data exfiltration via error-message side channel, and lets an attacker probe the helper image / volume in ways the legitimate API forbids (e.g. read symlink targets the API explicitly censors at volume_service.go:336-356, read past size limits, etc.).
- A non-admin authenticated Arcane user is sufficient (no role check on the volumes browser routes), which makes this a privilege/capability extension for users who otherwise cannot run arbitrary docker exec.
Secondary issue (same sanitiser): DeleteFile (volume_service.go:924-963) defends against deleting volume root with if sanitizedPath == "/". Input path=. yields path.Clean(".") == "." → prefixed to /., which fails the == "/" check, then path.Join("/volume", "/.") == "/volume", so the executed command is rm -rf /volume, recursively deleting all volume contents. This is a separate logic flaw worth fixing alongside the sanitiser hardening but is reported here only for completeness.
Impact
- Authenticated user (any role, including non-admin) can execute arbitrary shell commands inside the per-volume helper container.
- Output of those commands is reflected in HTTP 500 error bodies — usable as an exfiltration channel.
- Attacker gains capabilities the legitimate API withholds: bypass the symlink-target censoring at
volume_service.go:336-356, bypass per-file byte limits, enumerate the helper image, mount-time inspection, etc. - No host compromise: the container has
NetworkDisabled: true, no privileged flag, no Docker socket; the volume is bind-mounted read-only for browse. Confidentiality/integrity/availability impact is therefore limited (CVSS C:L / I:L / A:L) but real. - The same insufficient sanitiser additionally permits a destructive
rm -rf /volumeby sendingpath=.toDELETE /environments/{id}/volumes/{volumeName}/browse, which any authenticated user can also reach.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.18.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45626"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T13:59:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T18:17:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`GET /environments/{id}/volumes/{volumeName}/browse` accepts a `path` query parameter that is passed to a shell command (`sh -c \"find \u2026 | while \u2026\"`) inside an Arcane helper container. The path sanitiser blocks `../` traversal but does not strip Bourne-shell metacharacters such as `$()` or backticks, and `strconv.Quote` only escapes Go string metacharacters, not shell substitution sequences. Any authenticated user with access to a browseable volume can execute arbitrary commands inside the helper container; command output is reflected back in the 500 error body.\n\n## Details\n\nThe execution flow is:\n\n1. `BrowseDirectoryInput.Path` (query: `path`) \u2014 `backend/internal/huma/handlers/volumes.go:148`\n2. `VolumeHandler.BrowseDirectory` calls `volumeService.ListDirectory(ctx, volumeName, input.Path)` \u2014 `backend/internal/huma/handlers/volumes.go:858-865`. Note the route registration at line 412\u2013419 only declares `BearerAuth`/`ApiKeyAuth`; there is no `checkAdmin(ctx)` call (compare with `customize.go`, `system.go`, `swarm.go`, etc., which do enforce admin).\n3. `VolumeService.ListDirectory` runs the user-supplied path through `sanitizeBrowsePathInternal`, then joins it under `/volume`, quotes it with `strconv.Quote`, and embeds it into a `sh -c` command:\n\n```go\n// backend/internal/services/volume_service.go:286-300\nsanitizedPath, err := s.sanitizeBrowsePathInternal(dirPath)\n...\ntargetPath := path.Join(\"/volume\", sanitizedPath)\nquotedPath := strconv.Quote(targetPath)\ncmd := []string{\"sh\", \"-c\", fmt.Sprintf(\n \"find %s -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 | while IFS= read -r f; do out=$(stat -c \\\"%%s %%Y %%f %%A\\\" -- \\\"$f\\\" 2\u003e/dev/null) || continue; printf \\\"%%s\\\\0%%s\\\\0\\\" \\\"$f\\\" \\\"$out\\\"; done\",\n quotedPath)}\nstdout, _, err := s.execInContainerInternal(ctx, containerID, cmd)\n```\n\nThe sanitiser is insufficient (`backend/internal/services/volume_service.go:1448-1467`):\n\n```go\nfunc (s *VolumeService) sanitizeBrowsePathInternal(input string) (string, error) {\n trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(input)\n if trimmed == \"\" || trimmed == \"/\" { return \"/\", nil }\n cleaned := path.Clean(trimmed)\n if !path.IsAbs(cleaned) { cleaned = \"/\" + cleaned }\n if strings.Contains(cleaned, \"/../\") || strings.HasSuffix(cleaned, \"/..\") || cleaned == \"/..\" {\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid path: path traversal not allowed\")\n }\n if !strings.HasPrefix(cleaned, \"/\") { return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid path: must be absolute\") }\n return cleaned, nil\n}\n```\n\nOnly `../` patterns are filtered. `$(...)`, backticks, `;`, `\u0026`, `|`, `\u003e`, etc. all pass through unchanged. `strconv.Quote` then wraps the path in Go-style double quotes, which `sh -c` interprets as a regular double-quoted string \u2014 and bash performs `$(...)` command substitution inside double quotes.\n\nFor the input `/$( id)`:\n- `sanitizeBrowsePathInternal` returns `/$( id)` (no `../` present).\n- `path.Join(\"/volume\", \"/$( id)\")` \u2192 `/volume/$( id)`.\n- `strconv.Quote(...)` \u2192 `\"/volume/$( id)\"`.\n- The shell runs `find \"/volume/$( id)\" \u2026`, which expands to `find \"/volume/uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\" \u2026`. `find` fails because that path does not exist; the stderr containing the substituted command output is propagated by `execInContainerInternal` (volume_service.go:910-918) into a `command exited with code N: \u2026` error, then re-wrapped by `ListDirectory` and returned to the client as a 500 response body.\n\nErrors from the handler at `volumes.go:863-864` are returned via `huma.Error500InternalServerError(err.Error())`, so the substituted output is reflected in plaintext.\n\n**Blast radius / mitigations actually present:**\n- The helper container is created by `createTempContainerInternal` with `NetworkDisabled: true`, no privileged mode, no Docker socket mount, only the target Docker volume bind-mounted (`:ro` for browse). It is auto-removed.\n- Therefore the injection executes inside an isolated, network-disabled container that already has read access to the same files the browse API exposes.\n- However: the injection grants arbitrary command execution within that container (well beyond the find/stat/readlink/head primitives the API exposes), enables data exfiltration via error-message side channel, and lets an attacker probe the helper image / volume in ways the legitimate API forbids (e.g. read symlink targets the API explicitly censors at `volume_service.go:336-356`, read past size limits, etc.).\n- A non-admin authenticated Arcane user is sufficient (no role check on the volumes browser routes), which makes this a privilege/capability extension for users who otherwise cannot run arbitrary `docker exec`.\n\n**Secondary issue (same sanitiser):** `DeleteFile` (`volume_service.go:924-963`) defends against deleting volume root with `if sanitizedPath == \"/\"`. Input `path=.` yields `path.Clean(\".\") == \".\"` \u2192 prefixed to `/.`, which fails the `== \"/\"` check, then `path.Join(\"/volume\", \"/.\") == \"/volume\"`, so the executed command is `rm -rf /volume`, recursively deleting all volume contents. This is a separate logic flaw worth fixing alongside the sanitiser hardening but is reported here only for completeness.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Authenticated user (any role, including non-admin) can execute arbitrary shell commands inside the per-volume helper container.\n- Output of those commands is reflected in HTTP 500 error bodies \u2014 usable as an exfiltration channel.\n- Attacker gains capabilities the legitimate API withholds: bypass the symlink-target censoring at `volume_service.go:336-356`, bypass per-file byte limits, enumerate the helper image, mount-time inspection, etc.\n- No host compromise: the container has `NetworkDisabled: true`, no privileged flag, no Docker socket; the volume is bind-mounted read-only for browse. Confidentiality/integrity/availability impact is therefore limited (CVSS C:L / I:L / A:L) but real.\n- The same insufficient sanitiser additionally permits a destructive `rm -rf /volume` by sending `path=.` to `DELETE /environments/{id}/volumes/{volumeName}/browse`, which any authenticated user can also reach.",
"id": "GHSA-9mvm-4gwg-v8mp",
"modified": "2026-06-09T10:30:26Z",
"published": "2026-05-18T13:59:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/security/advisories/GHSA-9mvm-4gwg-v8mp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45626"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Arcane Backend: OS Command Injection in Volume Browser ListDirectory via path query parameter"
}
GHSA-9MW5-W2J2-3F45
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:15 – Updated: 2022-10-24 19:00A vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco IOS XE SD-WAN Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to inject arbitrary commands to be executed with root-level privileges on the underlying operating system. This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation on certain CLI commands. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to an affected device and submitting crafted input to the CLI. The attacker must be authenticated as an administrative user to execute the affected commands. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute commands with root-level privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-34725"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-23T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco IOS XE SD-WAN Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to inject arbitrary commands to be executed with root-level privileges on the underlying operating system. This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation on certain CLI commands. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to an affected device and submitting crafted input to the CLI. The attacker must be authenticated as an administrative user to execute the affected commands. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute commands with root-level privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-9mw5-w2j2-3f45",
"modified": "2022-10-24T19:00:23Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:15:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34725"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-maapi-privesc-KSUg7QSS"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.