CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8362 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-2J3G-RXWP-8RQ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:50 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:15LuaUPnP in Vera Edge Home Controller 1.7.4452 allows remote unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary OS commands via the code parameter to /port_3480/data_request because the "No unsafe lua allowed" code block is skipped.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-13598"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-07-14T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "LuaUPnP in Vera Edge Home Controller 1.7.4452 allows remote unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary OS commands via the code parameter to /port_3480/data_request because the \"No unsafe lua allowed\" code block is skipped.",
"id": "GHSA-2j3g-rxwp-8rq5",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:15:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:50:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13598"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://distributedcompute.com/2019/07/13/vera-edge-home-controller-rce-via-unauthenticated-command-injection"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2J4F-52M8-XQ9H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-24 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:39The post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the CLI command of Zyxel ATP series firmware versions 4.32 through 5.35, USG FLEX series firmware versions 4.50 through 5.35, USG FLEX 50(W) firmware versions 4.16 through 5.35, USG20(W)-VPN firmware versions 4.16 through 5.35, and VPN series firmware versions 4.30 through 5.35, which could allow an authenticated attacker to execute some OS commands remotely.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-27991"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-24T18:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the CLI command of Zyxel ATP series firmware versions 4.32 through 5.35, USG FLEX series firmware versions 4.50 through 5.35, USG FLEX 50(W) firmware versions 4.16 through 5.35, USG20(W)-VPN firmware versions 4.16 through 5.35, and VPN series firmware versions 4.30 through 5.35, which could allow an authenticated attacker to execute some OS commands remotely.",
"id": "GHSA-2j4f-52m8-xq9h",
"modified": "2024-04-04T03:39:47Z",
"published": "2023-04-24T18:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27991"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zyxel.com/global/en/support/security-advisories/zyxel-security-advisory-for-xss-vulnerability-and-post-authentication-command-injection-vulnerability-in-firewalls"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2J5Q-8VP4-FJW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:44 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:44TP-Link TL-WVR and TL-WAR devices allow remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the interface field of an admin/wportal command to cgi-bin/luci, related to the get_device_byif function in /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/wportal.lua in uhttpd.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-17757"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-12-19T07:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "TP-Link TL-WVR and TL-WAR devices allow remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the interface field of an admin/wportal command to cgi-bin/luci, related to the get_device_byif function in /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/wportal.lua in uhttpd.",
"id": "GHSA-2j5q-8vp4-fjw9",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:44:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:44:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-17757"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/L1ZhaoXin/Router-Vulnerability-Research/blob/master/Tplink_LUCI_Wechat_Authenticated_RCE_Record.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2J63-R66V-JWPQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-27 15:30 – Updated: 2023-07-27 15:30OS Command Injection in GitHub repository jgraph/drawio prior to 21.4.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-3974"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-27T15:15:12Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "OS Command Injection in GitHub repository jgraph/drawio prior to 21.4.0.",
"id": "GHSA-2j63-r66v-jwpq",
"modified": "2023-07-27T15:30:37Z",
"published": "2023-07-27T15:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3974"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jgraph/drawio/commit/9d6532de36496e77d872d91b1947bb696607d623"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/ce75aa04-e4d6-4e0a-9db0-ae84c46ae9e2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2J64-WXJ4-5FR9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-23 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-27 00:00Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV110W, RV130, RV130W, and RV215W Routers could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on an affected device or cause the device to restart unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. These vulnerabilities are due to insufficient validation of user fields within incoming HTTP packets. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending a crafted request to the web-based management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on an affected device with root-level privileges or to cause the device to restart unexpectedly, resulting in a DoS condition. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker would need to have valid Administrator credentials on the affected device. Cisco has not released software updates that address these vulnerabilities.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-20910"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-22T04:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV110W, RV130, RV130W, and RV215W Routers could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on an affected device or cause the device to restart unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. These vulnerabilities are due to insufficient validation of user fields within incoming HTTP packets. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending a crafted request to the web-based management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on an affected device with root-level privileges or to cause the device to restart unexpectedly, resulting in a DoS condition. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker would need to have valid Administrator credentials on the affected device. Cisco has not released software updates that address these vulnerabilities.",
"id": "GHSA-2j64-wxj4-5fr9",
"modified": "2022-07-27T00:00:44Z",
"published": "2022-07-23T00:00:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20910"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sb-rv-rce-overflow-ygHByAK"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2J8M-RMQ4-RCW5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-01 00:30 – Updated: 2025-12-01 18:30By providing a command-line argument starting with a semi-colon ; to an API endpoint created by the EnhancedCommandExecutor class of the HexStrike AI MCP server, the resultant composed command is executed directly in the context of the MCP server’s normal privilege; typically, this is root. There is no attempt to sanitize these arguments in the default configuration of this MCP server at the affected version (as of commit 2f3a5512 in September of 2025).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-35028"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-30T22:15:46Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "By providing a command-line argument starting with a semi-colon ; to an API endpoint created by the EnhancedCommandExecutor class of the HexStrike AI MCP server, the resultant composed command is executed directly in the context of the MCP server\u2019s normal privilege; typically, this is root. There is no attempt to sanitize these arguments in the default configuration of this MCP server at the affected version (as of commit 2f3a5512 in September of 2025).",
"id": "GHSA-2j8m-rmq4-rcw5",
"modified": "2025-12-01T18:30:37Z",
"published": "2025-12-01T00:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-35028"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0x4m4/hexstrike-ai/issues/115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://takeonme.org/gcves/GCVE-1337-2025-00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000111111111111111111111111000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000011"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2JC5-4G6P-2928
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:49 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:49TP-Link TL-WA850RE Wi-Fi Range Extender with hardware version 5 allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the wps_setup_pin parameter to /data/wps.setup.json.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-12692"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-23T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "TP-Link TL-WA850RE Wi-Fi Range Extender with hardware version 5 allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the wps_setup_pin parameter to /data/wps.setup.json.",
"id": "GHSA-2jc5-4g6p-2928",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:49:38Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:49:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-12692"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/advisability/the-in-security-of-the-tp-link-technologies-tl-wa850re-wi-fi-range-extender-26db87a7a0cc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44912"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2JFF-6G6P-WR79
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 09:32 – Updated: 2026-05-21 09:32A logic error involving bitwise OR operations in Netatalk 3.1.4 through 4.4.2 allows a remote authenticated attacker to inject OS commands and execute arbitrary code.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44055"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-21T08:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A logic error involving bitwise OR operations in Netatalk 3.1.4 through 4.4.2 allows a remote authenticated attacker to inject OS commands and execute arbitrary code.",
"id": "GHSA-2jff-6g6p-wr79",
"modified": "2026-05-21T09:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T09:32:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44055"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://netatalk.io/security/CVE-2026-44055"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2JH5-G5CH-43Q5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-23 22:25 – Updated: 2025-04-24 19:20Summary
This vulnerability only apply when running on a Windows OS.
An unsafe conversion of arguments allows the injection of a malicous commands when starting yt-dlp from a commands prompt.
[!CAUTION] NOTE THAT DEPENDING ON THE CONTEXT AND WHERE THE LIBRARY IS USED, THIS MAY HAVE MORE SEVERE CONSEQUENCES. FOR EXAMPLE, A USER USING THE LIBRARY LOCALLY IS A LOT LESS VULNERABLE THAN AN ASP.NET APPLICATION ACCEPTING INPUTS FROM A NETWORK/INTERNET.
Details
The vulnerability have been implemented in a commit (https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/commit/fdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50) 3 year ago to fix a issue with unicode characters on Windows. ( In the latest version at the time of writing this, the code seems to have moved here : https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/blob/b2f7968a2ef06a9c7b2c212785cfeac0b187b6d8/YoutubeDLSharp/YoutubeDLProcess.cs#L87 ) In this commit, a new way of starting yt-dlp was implemented, method that was defined as the default behaviour.
When the internal method ConvertToArgs get called, the application will test multiples conditions to decide on how the yt-dlp application should be started. The condition we are interesed in, as well a the default one on Windows, is at line 99 . Inside the if statement, we can see that insead of directly calling the yt-dlp binary, a command prompt is opened to run yt-dlp.
The problem arises when you realize that both arguments in the ConvertToArgs method may be provided by an untrusted client. Since the documentation of YoutubeDLSharp does not warn developers about this behavior, they might assume that the library handles this safely by ensuring that the arguments are secure to run inside a command prompt. Instead, the two potentially malicious arguments are directly appended to the command string without any sanitization (see line 104 and 107).
PoC
For this example, I'm going to use the version 1.1.1 and a method inside YoutubeDL.cs. Assuming you are running on a Windows OS, this method will by default use a CMD to open yt-dlp.
using YoutubeDLSharp;
public async Task<RunResult<VideoData>> GetMediaInformation()
{
YoutubeDL youtubeDl = new YoutubeDL();
// Fetch media information using a badly crafted "url" (escaped)
return await youtubeDl.RunVideoDataFetch("https://example.com/\" & start calc.exe");
}
At the call of GetMediaInformation, the method RunVideoDataFetch will be called, internally this method will call the vulnerable method [ConvertToArgs] resulting in the following string:
/C chcp 65001 >nul 2>&1 && "yt-dlp.exe" --external-downloader "m3u8:native" --external-downloader-args "ffmpeg:-nostats -loglevel 0" -o "C:\Users\<hidden>\Documents\GitHub\<hidden>\<hidden>\bin\Release\net8.0\%(title)s [%(id)s]_%(epoch)s.%(ext)s" --force-overwrites --no-part -i --ignore-config --ffmpeg-location "ffmpeg.exe" --exec "echo outfile: {}" -- "https://example.com/" & start calc.exe"
[!NOTE] Some text have been replaced by
<hidden>inside the command.
The important part here is at the end of the command, we can see "https://example.com/" & start calc.exe", if we compare it with our
malicious URL https://example.com/" & start calc.exe, we can see that the method added quotes at the start and the end of the string. However, our additional quote in the URL followed by the & character made it so the CMD interprets what follows the & as a new command, thus executing yt-dlp AND the very dangerous start calc.exe 😊.
Here is a screenshot of the processes using another malicious url https://example.com/" & start msinfo32
Impact
Every users running a effected version on a Windows OS with the UseWindowsEncodingWorkaround value defined to true (default behaviour). If you are using build-in methods form the YoutubeDL.cs file, the value is true by default and you cannot disable it from theses methods.
Patch
Upgrade to v.1.1.2 or higher of YoutubeDLSharp. The UseWindowsEncodingWorkaround property has been removed entirely in v.1.1.2.
Workaround
(only for v1.1.1 or lower, please upgrade to the latest version)
Using YoutubeDLProcess
If you are using a YoutubeDLProcess object directly to communicate with yt-dlp, you can disable UseWindowsEncodingWorkaround to mitigate the vulnerability. Doing so will execute the yt-dlp binary directly. However, you will lose support for Unicode characters.
Example:
YoutubeDLProcess youtubeDLProc = new YoutubeDLProcess()
{
UseWindowsEncodingWorkaround = false
};
Sanitizing url
If you want to keep support for Unicode characters or are using methods from the YoutubeDL.cs file, you would need to manually sanitize your inputs until a version with a fix is released. For URL sanitization, I managed to prevent the exploitation of the PoC by creating this method. However, I can't guarantee it would work in every case.
public static string? SanitizeUrl(string url)
{
// Parse the URL using Uri
if (Uri.TryCreate(url, UriKind.Absolute, out Uri? urlUri))
{
// According to the microsoft docs getting the absolute url append
// all of the others fields, theses fields get URI escaped when you GET them
// (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.uri.query?view=net-8.0#remarks)
return urlUri.AbsoluteUri;
}
// Invalid url format
return null;
}
This works because Uri properties have special characters like spaces and " escaped into percent numbers like %20, thus turning our malicous url into https://example.com/%22%20&%20start%20calc.exe.
Note, however, that if you modify the options with which yt-dlp is run, you need to ensure every option is also sanitized (assuming they are taken from a untrusted user input). This method won't work as these options are not URLs.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "YoutubeDLSharp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-beta4"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-43858"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-23T22:25:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-24T18:15:20Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\nThis vulnerability only apply when running on a Windows OS.\nAn unsafe conversion of arguments allows the injection of a malicous commands when starting `yt-dlp` from a commands prompt.\n\n\u003e [!CAUTION]\n\u003e **NOTE THAT DEPENDING ON THE CONTEXT AND WHERE THE LIBRARY IS USED, THIS MAY HAVE MORE SEVERE CONSEQUENCES. FOR EXAMPLE, A USER USING THE LIBRARY LOCALLY IS A LOT LESS VULNERABLE THAN AN ASP.NET APPLICATION ACCEPTING INPUTS FROM A NETWORK/INTERNET.**\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability have been implemented in a commit (https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/commit/fdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50) 3 year ago to fix a issue with unicode characters on Windows. ( In the latest version at the time of writing this, the code seems to have moved here : https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/blob/b2f7968a2ef06a9c7b2c212785cfeac0b187b6d8/YoutubeDLSharp/YoutubeDLProcess.cs#L87 )\nIn this commit, a new way of starting yt-dlp was implemented, method that was defined as the default behaviour. \n\nWhen the internal method [`ConvertToArgs`](https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/commit/fdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50#diff-8ec44b4ade6ce6ed38ebf7e765dc86c426984a18304cd1cd320bf92500133c88R64) get called, the application will test multiples conditions to decide on how the yt-dlp application should be started. The condition we are interesed in, as well a the default one on Windows, is at [line 99](https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/commit/fdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50#diff-8ec44b4ade6ce6ed38ebf7e765dc86c426984a18304cd1cd320bf92500133c88R99) . Inside the `if` statement, we can see that insead of directly calling the `yt-dlp` binary, a command prompt is opened to run `yt-dlp`. \n\n**The problem arises when you realize that both arguments in the `ConvertToArgs` method may be provided by an untrusted client.** Since the documentation of YoutubeDLSharp does not warn developers about this behavior, they might assume that the library handles this safely by ensuring that the arguments are secure to run inside a command prompt. Instead, the two potentially malicious arguments are directly appended to the command string without any sanitization (see line [104](https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/commit/fdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50#diff-8ec44b4ade6ce6ed38ebf7e765dc86c426984a18304cd1cd320bf92500133c88R104) and [107](https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/commit/fdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50#diff-8ec44b4ade6ce6ed38ebf7e765dc86c426984a18304cd1cd320bf92500133c88R107)).\n\n\n\n## PoC\nFor this example, I\u0027m going to use the version `1.1.1` and a method inside [YoutubeDL.cs](https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/blob/b2f7968a2ef06a9c7b2c212785cfeac0b187b6d8/YoutubeDLSharp/YoutubeDL.cs). Assuming you are running on a Windows OS, this method will by default use a CMD to open yt-dlp.\n\n```c#\nusing YoutubeDLSharp;\n\npublic async Task\u003cRunResult\u003cVideoData\u003e\u003e GetMediaInformation()\n{\n YoutubeDL youtubeDl = new YoutubeDL();\n\t// Fetch media information using a badly crafted \"url\" (escaped)\n\treturn await youtubeDl.RunVideoDataFetch(\"https://example.com/\\\" \u0026 start calc.exe\");\n}\n```\nAt the call of `GetMediaInformation`, the method `RunVideoDataFetch` will be called, internally this method will call the vulnerable method [`ConvertToArgs`] resulting in the following string: \n```\n/C chcp 65001 \u003enul 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\u0026 \"yt-dlp.exe\" --external-downloader \"m3u8:native\" --external-downloader-args \"ffmpeg:-nostats -loglevel 0\" -o \"C:\\Users\\\u003chidden\u003e\\Documents\\GitHub\\\u003chidden\u003e\\\u003chidden\u003e\\bin\\Release\\net8.0\\%(title)s [%(id)s]_%(epoch)s.%(ext)s\" --force-overwrites --no-part -i --ignore-config --ffmpeg-location \"ffmpeg.exe\" --exec \"echo outfile: {}\" -- \"https://example.com/\" \u0026 start calc.exe\"\n```\n\u003e[!NOTE]\n\u003e Some text have been replaced by `\u003chidden\u003e` inside the command.\n\nThe important part here is at the end of the command, we can see `\"https://example.com/\" \u0026 start calc.exe\"`, if we compare it with our \nmalicious URL `https://example.com/\" \u0026 start calc.exe`, we can see that the method added quotes at the start and the end of the string. However, our additional quote in the URL followed by the `\u0026` character made it so the CMD interprets what follows the `\u0026` as a new command, thus executing `yt-dlp` **AND** the *very* dangerous `start calc.exe` \ud83d\ude0a.\n\nHere is a screenshot of the processes using another malicious url `https://example.com/\" \u0026 start msinfo32`\n\n\n## Impact\nEvery users running a effected version on a Windows OS with the [`UseWindowsEncodingWorkaround`](https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/commit/fdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50#diff-8ec44b4ade6ce6ed38ebf7e765dc86c426984a18304cd1cd320bf92500133c88R44) value defined to true (default behaviour). If you are using build-in methods form the [YoutubeDL.cs](https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/blob/b2f7968a2ef06a9c7b2c212785cfeac0b187b6d8/YoutubeDLSharp/YoutubeDL.cs) file, the value is `true` by default and **you cannot disable it from theses methods**.\n\n## Patch\n\nUpgrade to **v.1.1.2 or higher** of YoutubeDLSharp. The `UseWindowsEncodingWorkaround` property has been removed entirely in v.1.1.2.\n\n## Workaround\n(only for v1.1.1 or lower, please upgrade to the latest version)\n\n### Using `YoutubeDLProcess`\nIf you are using a `YoutubeDLProcess` object directly to communicate with yt-dlp, you can disable `UseWindowsEncodingWorkaround` to mitigate the vulnerability. Doing so will execute the yt-dlp binary directly. However, you will lose support for Unicode characters.\n**Example:**\n```c#\nYoutubeDLProcess youtubeDLProc = new YoutubeDLProcess()\n{\n UseWindowsEncodingWorkaround = false\n};\n```\n\n### Sanitizing url\nIf you want to keep support for Unicode characters or are using methods from the [YoutubeDL.cs](https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/blob/b2f7968a2ef06a9c7b2c212785cfeac0b187b6d8/YoutubeDLSharp/YoutubeDL.cs) file, you would need to manually sanitize your inputs until a version with a fix is released. For URL sanitization, I managed to prevent the exploitation of the PoC by creating this method. However, I can\u0027t guarantee it would work in every case.\n```c#\n\t\tpublic static string? SanitizeUrl(string url)\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t// Parse the URL using Uri\n\t\t\tif (Uri.TryCreate(url, UriKind.Absolute, out Uri? urlUri))\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t// According to the microsoft docs getting the absolute url append\n\t\t\t\t// all of the others fields, theses fields get URI escaped when you GET them\n\t\t\t\t// (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.uri.query?view=net-8.0#remarks) \n\t\t\t\treturn urlUri.AbsoluteUri;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// Invalid url format\n\t\t\treturn null;\n\t\t}\n```\nThis works because Uri properties have special characters like spaces and `\"` escaped into percent numbers like `%20`, thus turning our malicous url into `https://example.com/%22%20\u0026%20start%20calc.exe`.\n**Note, however, that if you modify the options with which yt-dlp is run, you need to ensure every option is also sanitized (assuming they are taken from a untrusted user input). This method won\u0027t work as these options are not URLs.**",
"id": "GHSA-2jh5-g5ch-43q5",
"modified": "2025-04-24T19:20:03Z",
"published": "2025-04-23T22:25:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-2jh5-g5ch-43q5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43858"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/commit/b6051372bd5af30f95f73de47d9bc71c3a07de0f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp/commit/fdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Bluegrams/YoutubeDLSharp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "YoutubeDLSharp allows command injection on windows system due to non sanitized arguments"
}
GHSA-2JMV-XWCH-PCQF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-06 18:31 – Updated: 2025-10-06 21:30OS Command Injection vulnerability in EndRun Technologies Sonoma D12 Network Time Server (GPS) F/W 6010-0071-000 Ver 4.00 allows attackers to gain sensitive information, and possibly other unspecified impacts.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-60962"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-06T17:16:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OS Command Injection vulnerability in EndRun Technologies Sonoma D12 Network Time Server (GPS) F/W 6010-0071-000 Ver 4.00 allows attackers to gain sensitive information, and possibly other unspecified impacts.",
"id": "GHSA-2jmv-xwch-pcqf",
"modified": "2025-10-06T21:30:45Z",
"published": "2025-10-06T18:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60962"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://xdiv-sec.github.io/vulnerability-research/advisories/2025-10-03-sonoma-d12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://endrun.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://sonoma.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.