Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-770

Allowed

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

3049 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-MX64-MJ3Q-7PRJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 12:59 – Updated: 2026-05-18 12:59
VLAI
Summary
iskorotkov/avro: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in Decoder
Details

Memory Exhaustion via Unbounded Map Allocations in Avro Decoder

Summary

The Avro map decoder accepted attacker-controlled block-element counts from the wire format and grew the destination map without enforcing an upper bound. The slice decoder already had Config.MaxSliceAllocSize for the equivalent attack against arrays; the map decoder had no analogous limit, so a producer could declare an arbitrarily large map (in one block, or chunked across many sub-limit blocks) and exhaust process memory until the OOM killer fired.

The fix introduces Config.MaxMapAllocSize with cumulative enforcement across block boundaries. The new limit is opt-in: the field defaults to zero, which preserves the previous unbounded behavior for backward compatibility. Upgrading to v2.33.0 alone does not mitigate the issue — consumers of untrusted Avro data must explicitly set MaxMapAllocSize on their avro.Config.

Description

Avro maps are encoded as a sequence of blocks; each block declares a long element count followed by that many key/value pairs. The decoder uses these counts both to size the destination map and as the loop bound for reading entries.

Pre-fix, the map decoder enforced no upper limit at any layer:

  • No per-block element-count check.
  • No cumulative across-block element-count check.
  • No memory-budget check before make(map[...]..., n) or before growing the map.

The slice decoder had been hardened via Config.MaxSliceAllocSize and tracked cumulatively across blocks; the map decoder was a missing-by-symmetry gap. Even a partial per-block bound on maps would have been insufficient on its own — Avro permits encoding a logical map as many small blocks, so a producer could split a 10 GB map into 10,000 sub-MaxMapAllocSize blocks and still drive total allocation past any single-block threshold. The fix tracks cumulative entry count at block-header boundaries — before the block's entries are decoded into the map — and errors out before allocation when the running total would exceed the configured cap.

Two decoder variants were affected, both in codec_map.go:

  • mapDecoder.Decode — string-keyed maps.
  • mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode — encoding.TextUnmarshaler-keyed maps (e.g. map[CustomKey]V where *CustomKey implements UnmarshalText).

Affected components

File Symbol Pre-fix behavior Post-fix behavior
config.go Config.MaxMapAllocSize Field did not exist New int field; default zero means unlimited (back-compat)
codec_map.go mapDecoder.Decode Read block count, grew map unbounded Validates cumulative count against MaxMapAllocSize at each block header
codec_map.go mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode Same Same

PR #5 (fix/map-alloc-chunking-bypass) covers both decoders and adds chunking-attack tests for both. The same PR also adds the previously-missing chunking-attack test coverage for the slice path in 534c7518 — the slice logic was already correct, only its test coverage was incomplete.

Technical details

The fix mirrors the slice decoder's pattern:

  1. At each block header, read the element count as int64.
  2. Add it to a running total maintained across the block loop.
  3. If the running total exceeds Config.MaxMapAllocSize (when nonzero), return an error before allocating any of that block's entries.
  4. Otherwise, decode the block's entries into the map.

Per-block enforcement alone would be bypassable by chunking; cumulative tracking closes that. The check sits at the block-header read, before per-entry allocation, so a single oversized block also cannot allocate first and then fail post-hoc.

Config.MaxMapAllocSize semantics match Config.MaxSliceAllocSize: zero means unlimited, any positive value is the cumulative cap on element count (not byte size).

Fixed behavior

v2.33.0 adds the MaxMapAllocSize configuration field and the cumulative-enforcement logic in both map decoders. Both decoders return a descriptive error when the cumulative entry count would exceed the configured cap; no entries are allocated past the limit.

Tests added in PR #5 cover, for both mapDecoder and mapDecoderUnmarshaler:

  • Single-block allocation exceeding the limit (rejected before allocation).
  • Chunking attack: multiple sub-limit blocks whose cumulative count exceeds the limit (rejected at the block-header that crosses the threshold).
  • Multi-block under the limit (decoded normally).

Affected versions

  • github.com/hamba/avro/v2 — all versions up to and including v2.31.0 (repository is read-only upstream).
  • github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 — all versions prior to v2.33.0. Note: v2.33.0 and later are vulnerable by default and only protected when MaxMapAllocSize is explicitly configured — see Mitigation.

Fixed versions

github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0 and later, with Config.MaxMapAllocSize explicitly set to a non-zero value.

A bare upgrade to v2.33.0 without setting MaxMapAllocSize leaves the decoder in the same unbounded state as v2.32.0. This is a backward-compatibility choice; a future major version may flip the default. Until then, treat this advisory as requiring both an upgrade and a configuration change.

There is no upstream fix for github.com/hamba/avro/v2 — module path is archived. Migrate to the fork as described under Mitigation.

Mitigation

Migrate from github.com/hamba/avro/v2 to github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 >= v2.33.0 and configure an allocation cap appropriate for your schema. The recommended approach for processes that decode untrusted input is a dedicated frozen config, used at every relevant call site, rather than mutating avro.DefaultConfig:

cfg := avro.Config{
    MaxByteSliceSize:  102_400,
    MaxSliceAllocSize: 10_000,
    MaxMapAllocSize:   10_000,
}.Freeze()

decoder := cfg.NewDecoder(schema, reader)

Choose the values based on the largest legitimate map your schema produces; a value 2–10× that ceiling provides headroom for benign variance while still bounding worst-case memory.

For consumers that prefer the original import path, a replace directive in go.mod is supported:

replace github.com/hamba/avro/v2 => github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0

replace is honoured only for the main module of a build — transitive consumers must add their own replace, or migrate the import path directly.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, the only structural workarounds are out-of-band: run decoders in memory-constrained child processes or cgroups so an OOM is contained, reject inputs from sources without resource controls, and apply per-request decode deadlines so a runaway decode at least times out before the OOM killer fires.

Proof-of-concept input

Two attack shapes, both targeting map[string]int:

Single-block, oversize block count. Emit one block header declaring n = 2³¹ − 1 (or any value whose n × averageEntrySize exceeds available memory) followed by truncated entries. Pre-fix, the decoder pre-allocates make(map[string]int, n), which fails or stalls long before EOF is reached.

Chunking bypass. Emit k blocks each declaring n / k elements, with n / k below any plausible per-block threshold but n itself well into the GB range. Pre-fix, the decoder happily grows the map block-by-block until the OS kills the process. Post-fix with MaxMapAllocSize = 10_000, the decoder rejects whichever block-header read pushes cumulative count past 10,000.

Either shape can be produced by hand-crafting the wire bytes; no iskorotkov/avro writer is needed to generate them.

References

Credits

  • Fix author (commit 5192df9, PR #5 — MaxMapAllocSize config field, cumulative enforcement in both map decoders, chunking-attack tests for slices and maps): Ivan Korotkov (@iskorotkov)
  • Review (commit a5fbddcb, "address review comments"): Daniel Błażewicz (@klajok)

Timeline

  • 2026-04-30 — MaxMapAllocSize introduced (5192df9); chunking-attack test coverage for slices added (534c7518).
  • 2026-05-01 — PR #5 merged into main.
  • 2026-05-06 — v2.33.0 tagged and released.
  • 2026-05-07 — Advisory published.
  • 2026-05-15 — Advisory revised.
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.33.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1284",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770",
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T12:59:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Memory Exhaustion via Unbounded Map Allocations in Avro Decoder\n\n## Summary\n\nThe Avro map decoder accepted attacker-controlled block-element counts from the wire format and grew the destination map without enforcing an upper bound. The slice decoder already had `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize` for the equivalent attack against arrays; the map decoder had no analogous limit, so a producer could declare an arbitrarily large map (in one block, or chunked across many sub-limit blocks) and exhaust process memory until the OOM killer fired.\n\nThe fix introduces `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` with cumulative enforcement across block boundaries. **The new limit is opt-in**: the field defaults to zero, which preserves the previous unbounded behavior for backward compatibility. **Upgrading to `v2.33.0` alone does not mitigate the issue** \u2014 consumers of untrusted Avro data must explicitly set `MaxMapAllocSize` on their `avro.Config`.\n\n## Description\n\nAvro maps are encoded as a sequence of blocks; each block declares a `long` element count followed by that many key/value pairs. The decoder uses these counts both to size the destination map and as the loop bound for reading entries.\n\nPre-fix, the map decoder enforced no upper limit at any layer:\n\n- No per-block element-count check.\n- No cumulative across-block element-count check.\n- No memory-budget check before `make(map[...]..., n)` or before growing the map.\n\nThe slice decoder had been hardened via `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize` and tracked cumulatively across blocks; the map decoder was a missing-by-symmetry gap. Even a partial per-block bound on maps would have been insufficient on its own \u2014 Avro permits encoding a logical map as many small blocks, so a producer could split a 10 GB map into 10,000 sub-MaxMapAllocSize blocks and still drive total allocation past any single-block threshold. The fix tracks cumulative entry count at block-header boundaries \u2014 *before* the block\u0027s entries are decoded into the map \u2014 and errors out before allocation when the running total would exceed the configured cap.\n\nTwo decoder variants were affected, both in `codec_map.go`:\n\n- `mapDecoder.Decode` \u2014 string-keyed maps.\n- `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode` \u2014 `encoding.TextUnmarshaler`-keyed maps (e.g. `map[CustomKey]V` where `*CustomKey` implements `UnmarshalText`).\n\n## Affected components\n\n| File | Symbol | Pre-fix behavior | Post-fix behavior |\n|------|--------|------------------|-------------------|\n| `config.go` | `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` | Field did not exist | New `int` field; default zero means unlimited (back-compat) |\n| `codec_map.go` | `mapDecoder.Decode` | Read block count, grew map unbounded | Validates cumulative count against `MaxMapAllocSize` at each block header |\n| `codec_map.go` | `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode` | Same | Same |\n\nPR [#5](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/pull/5) (`fix/map-alloc-chunking-bypass`) covers both decoders and adds chunking-attack tests for both. The same PR also adds the previously-missing chunking-attack test coverage for the slice path in `534c7518` \u2014 the slice *logic* was already correct, only its test coverage was incomplete.\n\n## Technical details\n\nThe fix mirrors the slice decoder\u0027s pattern:\n\n1. At each block header, read the element count as `int64`.\n2. Add it to a running total maintained across the block loop.\n3. If the running total exceeds `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` (when nonzero), return an error before allocating any of that block\u0027s entries.\n4. Otherwise, decode the block\u0027s entries into the map.\n\nPer-block enforcement alone would be bypassable by chunking; cumulative tracking closes that. The check sits at the block-header read, *before* per-entry allocation, so a single oversized block also cannot allocate first and then fail post-hoc.\n\n`Config.MaxMapAllocSize` semantics match `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize`: zero means unlimited, any positive value is the cumulative cap on element count (not byte size).\n\n## Fixed behavior\n\n`v2.33.0` adds the `MaxMapAllocSize` configuration field and the cumulative-enforcement logic in both map decoders. Both decoders return a descriptive error when the cumulative entry count would exceed the configured cap; no entries are allocated past the limit.\n\nTests added in PR #5 cover, for both `mapDecoder` and `mapDecoderUnmarshaler`:\n\n- Single-block allocation exceeding the limit (rejected before allocation).\n- Chunking attack: multiple sub-limit blocks whose cumulative count exceeds the limit (rejected at the block-header that crosses the threshold).\n- Multi-block under the limit (decoded normally).\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` \u2014 all versions up to and including `v2.31.0` (repository is read-only upstream).\n- `github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2` \u2014 all versions prior to `v2.33.0`. Note: `v2.33.0` and later are vulnerable *by default* and only protected when `MaxMapAllocSize` is explicitly configured \u2014 see Mitigation.\n\n## Fixed versions\n\n`github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2` `v2.33.0` and later, **with `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` explicitly set to a non-zero value**.\n\nA bare upgrade to `v2.33.0` without setting `MaxMapAllocSize` leaves the decoder in the same unbounded state as `v2.32.0`. This is a backward-compatibility choice; a future major version may flip the default. Until then, treat this advisory as requiring both an upgrade *and* a configuration change.\n\nThere is no upstream fix for `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` \u2014 module path is archived. Migrate to the fork as described under Mitigation.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nMigrate from `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` to `github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 \u003e= v2.33.0` **and** configure an allocation cap appropriate for your schema. The recommended approach for processes that decode untrusted input is a dedicated frozen config, used at every relevant call site, rather than mutating `avro.DefaultConfig`:\n\n```go\ncfg := avro.Config{\n    MaxByteSliceSize:  102_400,\n    MaxSliceAllocSize: 10_000,\n    MaxMapAllocSize:   10_000,\n}.Freeze()\n\ndecoder := cfg.NewDecoder(schema, reader)\n```\n\nChoose the values based on the largest legitimate map your schema produces; a value 2\u201310\u00d7 that ceiling provides headroom for benign variance while still bounding worst-case memory.\n\nFor consumers that prefer the original import path, a `replace` directive in `go.mod` is supported:\n\n```\nreplace github.com/hamba/avro/v2 =\u003e github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0\n```\n\n`replace` is honoured only for the **main** module of a build \u2014 transitive consumers must add their own `replace`, or migrate the import path directly.\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, the only structural workarounds are out-of-band: run decoders in memory-constrained child processes or cgroups so an OOM is contained, reject inputs from sources without resource controls, and apply per-request decode deadlines so a runaway decode at least times out before the OOM killer fires.\n\n## Proof-of-concept input\n\nTwo attack shapes, both targeting `map[string]int`:\n\n**Single-block, oversize block count.** Emit one block header declaring `n = 2\u00b3\u00b9 \u2212 1` (or any value whose `n \u00d7 averageEntrySize` exceeds available memory) followed by truncated entries. Pre-fix, the decoder pre-allocates `make(map[string]int, n)`, which fails or stalls long before EOF is reached.\n\n**Chunking bypass.** Emit `k` blocks each declaring `n / k` elements, with `n / k` below any plausible per-block threshold but `n` itself well into the GB range. Pre-fix, the decoder happily grows the map block-by-block until the OS kills the process. Post-fix with `MaxMapAllocSize = 10_000`, the decoder rejects whichever block-header read pushes cumulative count past 10,000.\n\nEither shape can be produced by hand-crafting the wire bytes; no `iskorotkov/avro` writer is needed to generate them.\n\n## References\n\n- Fix PR: [iskorotkov/avro#5](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/pull/5)\n- Fix commit: [`5192df9`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/commit/5192df96a158999344ac96ebcb1f7461d626f6d7) (`codec_map.go`, `config.go`, tests)\n- Slice-path chunking-attack test coverage added in the same PR: [`534c7518`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/commit/534c7518152a893d8b4dea962669bd1123308a00)\n- Release: [`v2.33.0`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/releases/tag/v2.33.0)\n- Security policy: [`SECURITY.md`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/blob/main/SECURITY.md)\n- Related advisories on this fork: [`GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv) (integer overflow), [`GHSA-w8j3-pq8g-8m7w`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-w8j3-pq8g-8m7w) (CPU exhaustion \u2014 the same chunked-payload shape may trigger both before allocation pressure kicks in)\n- Cross-module precedent on `hamba/avro`: [`GO-2023-1930`](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2023-1930) / `CVE-2023-37475` / `GHSA-9x44-9pgq-cf45`\n- Upstream (read-only): [`hamba/avro`](https://github.com/hamba/avro)\n\n## Credits\n\n- **Fix author** (commit `5192df9`, PR #5 \u2014 `MaxMapAllocSize` config field, cumulative enforcement in both map decoders, chunking-attack tests for slices and maps): Ivan Korotkov ([@iskorotkov](https://github.com/iskorotkov))\n- **Review** (commit `a5fbddcb`, \"address review comments\"): Daniel B\u0142a\u017cewicz ([@klajok](https://github.com/klajok))\n\n## Timeline\n\n- **2026-04-30** \u2014 `MaxMapAllocSize` introduced (`5192df9`); chunking-attack test coverage for slices added (`534c7518`).\n- **2026-05-01** \u2014 PR #5 merged into `main`.\n- **2026-05-06** \u2014 `v2.33.0` tagged and released.\n- **2026-05-07** \u2014 Advisory published.\n- **2026-05-15** \u2014 Advisory revised.",
  "id": "GHSA-mx64-mj3q-7prj",
  "modified": "2026-05-18T12:59:58Z",
  "published": "2026-05-18T12:59:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-mx64-mj3q-7prj"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "iskorotkov/avro: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in Decoder"
}

GHSA-MX8M-V8QM-XWR8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-02-27 22:05
VLAI
Summary
Mattermost is vulnerable to DoS due to infinite re-renders on API errors
Details

Mattermost versions 10.11.x <= 10.11.8, 11.1.x <= 11.1.1, 11.0.x <= 11.0.6 fail to prevent infinite re-renders on API errors which allows authenticated users to cause application-level DoS via triggering unbounded component re-render loops.

Severity
6.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.11.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.11.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.11.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "11.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.0.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "11.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-14435"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-16T20:58:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-16T12:15:49Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Mattermost versions 10.11.x \u003c= 10.11.8, 11.1.x \u003c= 11.1.1, 11.0.x \u003c= 11.0.6 fail to prevent infinite re-renders on API errors which allows authenticated users to cause application-level DoS via triggering unbounded component re-render loops.",
  "id": "GHSA-mx8m-v8qm-xwr8",
  "modified": "2026-02-27T22:05:47Z",
  "published": "2026-01-16T12:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14435"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/613bb616cd62c584a606919e6978688e7b87d81e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/9f7629504bc93f79af8d606329c025a687e143cd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/cc6b77b271324796b72f1e6b82dba85a86462f9f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4326"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mattermost is vulnerable to DoS due to infinite re-renders on API errors"
}

GHSA-MX9X-FHQG-GGRP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-05 15:32 – Updated: 2025-02-05 21:32
VLAI
Details

An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 15.7 prior to 16.9.7, starting from 16.10 prior to 16.10.5, and starting from 16.11 prior to 16.11.2. It was possible for an attacker to cause a denial of service by crafting unusual search terms for branch names.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-2878"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-05T13:15:22Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 15.7 prior to 16.9.7, starting from 16.10 prior to 16.10.5, and starting from 16.11 prior to 16.11.2. It was possible for an attacker to cause a denial of service by crafting unusual search terms for branch names.",
  "id": "GHSA-mx9x-fhqg-ggrp",
  "modified": "2025-02-05T21:32:35Z",
  "published": "2025-02-05T15:32:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2878"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2416356"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2024/05/08/patch-release-gitlab-16-11-2-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/451918"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MXPF-9V3V-24P5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:52 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:52
VLAI
Details

In PoDoFo 0.9.5, there is an uncontrolled memory allocation in the PoDoFo::PdfVecObjects::Reserve function (base/PdfVecObjects.h). Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted pdf file.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-5783"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-01-19T08:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In PoDoFo 0.9.5, there is an uncontrolled memory allocation in the PoDoFo::PdfVecObjects::Reserve function (base/PdfVecObjects.h). Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted pdf file.",
  "id": "GHSA-mxpf-9v3v-24p5",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:52:55Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:52:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-5783"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1536179"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sourceforge.net/p/podofo/tickets/27"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P22V-GX7Q-2Q9R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:04 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:04
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in the Binary File Descriptor (BFD) library (aka libbfd), as distributed in GNU Binutils 2.32. It is an attempted excessive memory allocation in _bfd_elf_slurp_version_tables in elf.c.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-9073"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-02-24T00:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in the Binary File Descriptor (BFD) library (aka libbfd), as distributed in GNU Binutils 2.32. It is an attempted excessive memory allocation in _bfd_elf_slurp_version_tables in elf.c.",
  "id": "GHSA-p22v-gx7q-2q9r",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:04:40Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:04:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9073"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202107-24"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20190314-0003"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=24233"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K37121474"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/4336-1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P24M-863F-FM6Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-15 17:42 – Updated: 2024-10-28 14:38
VLAI
Summary
Denial of service vulnerability when parsing multipart request body
Details

Summary

The request body parsing in starlite allows a potentially unauthenticated attacker to consume a large amount of CPU time and RAM.

Details

The multipart body parser processes an unlimited number of file parts. The multipart body parser processes an unlimited number of field parts.

Impact

This is a remote, potentially unauthenticated Denial of Service vulnerability.

This vulnerability affects applications with a request handler that accepts a Body(media_type=RequestEncodingType.MULTI_PART).

The large amount of CPU time required for processing requests can block all available worker processes and significantly delay or slow down the processing of legitimate user requests. The large amount of RAM accumulated while processing requests can lead to Out-Of-Memory kills. Complete DoS is achievable by sending many concurrent multipart requests in a loop.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "starlite"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.51.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-25578"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-02-15T17:42:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-15T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe request body parsing in `starlite` allows a potentially unauthenticated\n attacker to consume a large amount of CPU time and RAM.\n\n### Details\n\nThe multipart body parser processes an unlimited number of file parts.\nThe multipart body parser processes an unlimited number of field parts.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a remote, potentially unauthenticated Denial of Service vulnerability.\n\nThis vulnerability affects applications with a request handler that accepts\n a `Body(media_type=RequestEncodingType.MULTI_PART)`.\n\nThe large amount of CPU time required for processing requests can block all\n available worker processes and significantly delay or slow down the processing\n of legitimate user requests.\nThe large amount of RAM accumulated while processing requests can lead to\n Out-Of-Memory kills.\nComplete DoS is achievable by sending many concurrent multipart requests in a\n loop.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-p24m-863f-fm6q",
  "modified": "2024-10-28T14:38:20Z",
  "published": "2023-02-15T17:42:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/starlite-api/starlite/security/advisories/GHSA-p24m-863f-fm6q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25578"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/starlite-api/starlite/commit/9674fe803628f986c03fe60769048cbc55b5bf83"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/starlite/PYSEC-2023-49.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/starlite-api/starlite"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/starlite-api/starlite/releases/tag/v1.51.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Denial of service vulnerability when parsing multipart request body"
}

GHSA-P2G6-3QPG-4V6H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 21:31 – Updated: 2026-01-13 21:31
VLAI
Details

Improper Input Validation (CWE-20) in Kibana's Email Connector can allow an attacker to cause an Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130) through a specially crafted email address parameter. This requires an attacker to have authenticated access with view-level privileges sufficient to execute connector actions. The application attempts to process specially crafted email format, resulting in complete service unavailability for all users until manual restart is performed.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-0543"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T21:15:51Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper Input Validation (CWE-20) in Kibana\u0027s Email Connector can allow an attacker to cause an Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130) through a specially crafted email address parameter. This requires an attacker to have authenticated access with view-level privileges sufficient to execute connector actions. The application attempts to process specially crafted email format, resulting in complete service unavailability for all users until manual restart is performed.",
  "id": "GHSA-p2g6-3qpg-4v6h",
  "modified": "2026-01-13T21:31:46Z",
  "published": "2026-01-13T21:31:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0543"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/kibana-8-19-10-9-1-10-9-2-4-security-update-esa-2026-08/384523"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P2G7-XWVR-RRW3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-16 18:49 – Updated: 2022-09-16 18:49
VLAI
Summary
Helm Controller denial of service
Details

Helm controller is tightly integrated with the Helm SDK. A vulnerability found in the Helm SDK allows for specific data inputs to cause high memory consumption, which in some platforms could cause the controller to panic and stop processing reconciliations.

Impact

In a shared cluster multi-tenancy environment, a tenant could create a HelmRelease that makes the controller panic, denying all other tenants from their Helm releases being reconciled.

Credits

The initial crash bug was reported by oss-fuzz. The Flux Security team produced the first exploit and worked together with the Helm Security team to ensure that both projects were patched timely.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Open an issue in any of the affected repositories. - Contact us at the CNCF Flux Channel.

References

  • https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=48360
  • https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=44996
  • https://github.com/helm/helm/security/advisories/GHSA-7hfp-qfw3-5jxh
Severity
7.7 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fluxcd/helm-controller"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.4"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.23.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fluxcd/flux2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.17"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.32.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-36049"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-16T18:49:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-07T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Helm controller is tightly integrated with the Helm SDK. [A vulnerability](https://github.com/helm/helm/security/advisories/GHSA-7hfp-qfw3-5jxh) found in the Helm SDK allows for specific data inputs to cause high memory consumption, which in some platforms could cause the controller to panic and stop processing reconciliations.\n\n### Impact\nIn a shared cluster multi-tenancy environment, a tenant could create a HelmRelease that makes the controller panic, denying all other tenants from their Helm releases being reconciled.\n\n### Credits\n\nThe initial crash bug was reported by [oss-fuzz](https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz). The Flux Security team produced the first exploit and worked together with the Helm Security team to ensure that both projects were patched timely.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n- Open an issue in any of the affected repositories.\n- Contact us at the CNCF Flux Channel.\n\n### References\n\n- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=48360\n- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=44996\n- https://github.com/helm/helm/security/advisories/GHSA-7hfp-qfw3-5jxh\n",
  "id": "GHSA-p2g7-xwvr-rrw3",
  "modified": "2022-09-16T18:49:48Z",
  "published": "2022-09-16T18:49:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fluxcd/flux2/security/advisories/GHSA-p2g7-xwvr-rrw3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/helm/helm/security/advisories/GHSA-7hfp-qfw3-5jxh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36049"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=44996"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=48360"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fluxcd/flux2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Helm Controller denial of service"
}

GHSA-P2Q6-PWH5-M6JR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-07 19:03 – Updated: 2025-04-08 17:50
VLAI
Summary
Apollo Gateway Query Planner Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Optimization Bypass
Details

Impact

Summary

A vulnerability in Apollo Gateway allowed queries with deeply nested and reused named fragments to be prohibitively expensive to query plan, specifically due to internal optimizations being frequently bypassed. This could lead to excessive resource consumption and denial of service.

Details

The query planner includes an optimization that significantly speeds up planning for applicable GraphQL selections. However, queries with deeply nested and reused named fragments can generate many selections where this optimization does not apply, leading to significantly longer planning times. Because the query planner does not enforce a timeout, a small number of such queries can render gateway inoperable.

Fix/Mitigation

  • A new Query Optimization Limit metric has been added:
  • This metric approximates the number of selections that cannot be skipped by the existing optimization.
  • The metric is checked against a limit to prevent excessive computation.

Given the complexity of query planning optimizations, we will continue refining these solutions based on real-world performance and accuracy tests.

Patches

This has been remediated in @apollo/gateway version 2.10.1.

Workarounds

No known direct workarounds exist.

References

Query Planning Documentation

Acknowledgements

We appreciate the efforts of the security community in identifying and improving the performance and security of query planning mechanisms.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@apollo/gateway"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-32031"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-07T19:03:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-07T21:15:43Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Impact\n\n## Summary\n\nA vulnerability in Apollo Gateway allowed queries with deeply nested and reused named fragments to be prohibitively expensive to query plan, specifically due to internal optimizations being frequently bypassed. This could lead to excessive resource consumption and denial of service.\n\n## Details\n\nThe query planner includes an optimization that significantly speeds up planning for applicable GraphQL selections. However, queries with deeply nested and reused named fragments can generate many selections where this optimization does not apply, leading to significantly longer planning times. Because the query planner does not enforce a timeout, a small number of such queries can render gateway inoperable.\n\n## Fix/Mitigation\n\n- A new **Query Optimization Limit** metric has been added:\n  - This metric approximates the number of selections that cannot be skipped by the existing optimization.\n  - The metric is checked against a limit to prevent excessive computation.\n\nGiven the complexity of query planning optimizations, we will continue refining these solutions based on real-world performance and accuracy tests.\n\n# Patches\n\nThis has been remediated in `@apollo/gateway` version 2.10.1.\n\n# Workarounds\n\nNo known direct workarounds exist.\n\n# References\n\n[Query Planning Documentation](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/reference/federation/query-plans)\n\n## Acknowledgements\n\nWe appreciate the efforts of the security community in identifying and improving the performance and security of query planning mechanisms.",
  "id": "GHSA-p2q6-pwh5-m6jr",
  "modified": "2025-04-08T17:50:52Z",
  "published": "2025-04-07T19:03:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/federation/security/advisories/GHSA-p2q6-pwh5-m6jr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32031"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/federation/pull/3236"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/federation"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/federation/releases/tag/%40apollo%2Fgateway%402.10.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apollo Gateway Query Planner Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Optimization Bypass"
}

GHSA-P2R4-R5H4-FMWQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:43 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:43
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the Android media framework (libhevc) related to handling ps_codec_obj memory allocation failures. Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-68299873.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-13190"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-01-12T23:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the Android media framework (libhevc) related to handling ps_codec_obj memory allocation failures. Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1. Android ID: A-68299873.",
  "id": "GHSA-p2r4-r5h4-fmwq",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:43:06Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:43:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-13190"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libhevc/+/3ed3c6b79a7b9a60c475dd4936ad57b0b92fd600"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2018-01-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Requirements

Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation MIT-38.1
Architecture and Design Implementation
  • If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
  • Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Operation Architecture and Design

Strategy: Resource Limitation

  • Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
  • When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
  • Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding

An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.

CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation

An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion

An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.

CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup

This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.

CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads

Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.

CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads

An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.

CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS

An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.

CAPEC-482: TCP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.

CAPEC-486: UDP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.

CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.

CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.

CAPEC-489: SSL Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.

CAPEC-490: Amplification

An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.

CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion

An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.

CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.

CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation

An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.

CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation

An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.

CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation

An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.

CAPEC-528: XML Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.

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