CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
913 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8HF9-3Q64-Q2QF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-12 15:08 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:50Summary
When dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the output, output-all, and debug fields in model.Options are JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker's request body, then propagated unchanged through dalfox.Initialize into the scan engine's logging path. The logger opens the attacker-supplied path with os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY and writes scan log lines to it. Critically, this file write block lives outside the IsLibrary guard in DalLog, so it executes even in server/library mode where file output was never intended to operate. Because no API key is required in the default configuration, an unauthenticated network caller can create or append to any file writable by the dalfox process on the host filesystem.
Severity
High (CVSS 3.1: 8.2)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
- Attack Vector: Network — server binds to
0.0.0.0:6664by default. - Attack Complexity: Low — no preconditions; all trigger options (
output,output-all,debug) are fully attacker-supplied in the JSON body. - Privileges Required: None —
--api-keydefaults to"", so the auth middleware is never registered. - User Interaction: None.
- Scope: Unchanged — the file write stays within the dalfox process's OS authority.
- Confidentiality Impact: None — this is a write-only primitive; no data is returned to the caller.
- Integrity Impact: High — the attacker has full control over which file path is opened, enabling creation of new files or corruption of existing files anywhere the dalfox process has write permission. While the log content format is semi-fixed, the file path is entirely attacker-determined, making the integrity violation complete with respect to file targeting.
- Availability Impact: Low — corrupting application configuration files or log files on the host can degrade the availability of other services relying on those files.
Affected Component
cmd/server.go—init()(line 51):--api-keydefaults to""— no auth by defaultpkg/server/server.go—setupEchoServer()(line 68): auth middleware only registered whenAPIKey != ""pkg/server/server.go—postScanHandler()(lines 173–191):rq.Options(includingOutputFile,OutputAll,Debug) passed toScanFromAPIwithout sanitizationlib/func.go—Initialize()(line 107):OutputFileexplicitly propagated from caller options;OutputAll(line 167) andDebug(line 176) likewiseinternal/printing/logger.go—DalLog()(lines 230–244):os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)executes outside theIsLibraryguard
CWE
- CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path
- CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type (write-path variant)
Description
output, output-all, and debug Are Fully Attacker-Controlled
model.Options exposes all three trigger fields with JSON tags:
// pkg/model/options.go:88,85,88
OutputFile string `json:"output,omitempty"`
OutputAll bool `json:"output-all,omitempty"`
Debug bool `json:"debug,omitempty"`
postScanHandler binds the entire Req.Options from the JSON body and passes it directly to ScanFromAPI:
// pkg/server/server.go:173-191
rq := new(Req)
if err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }
go ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)
Initialize explicitly copies all three fields into newOptions:
// lib/func.go:107, 167, 176
"OutputFile": {&newOptions.OutputFile, options.OutputFile},
...
"OutputAll": {&newOptions.OutputAll, options.OutputAll},
...
"Debug": {&newOptions.Debug, options.Debug},
The File Write Is Not Guarded by IsLibrary
Initialize always sets IsLibrary: true (line 20) and Silence: true (line 44) in its returned options — the intent being that the scan engine runs in embedded/library mode during API calls, suppressing terminal I/O. DalLog does respect this for stderr output: lines 203–228 route logs to ScanResult.Logs (not stderr) when IsLibrary is true. However, the file write block at lines 230–244 is positioned after and outside that if-else:
// internal/printing/logger.go
mutex.Lock()
if options.IsLibrary {
options.ScanResult.Logs = append(options.ScanResult.Logs, text) // API path
} else {
// stderr printing (CLI path)
}
// ← file write is here, unconditionally — no IsLibrary check
if options.OutputFile != "" {
var fdtext string
if ftext != "" {
fdtext = ftext
f, err := os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile,
os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "output file error (file)")
}
defer f.Close()
if _, err := f.WriteString(fdtext + "\n"); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "output file error (write)")
}
}
}
mutex.Unlock()
The ftext variable is populated whenever allWrite is true (options.Debug || options.OutputAll). Since both are attacker-supplied, both conditions are trivially satisfied.
What Gets Written
Log lines of the form:
[*] Starting scan [SID:<id>] / URL: <attacker-supplied-url>
[I] Checking BAV
[E] connection refused
[DEBUG] <internal state>
...
The URL appears verbatim in log messages, giving the attacker partial influence over the written content. While the format is not fully arbitrary (fixed prefixes like [*], [I], [E]), the file path is entirely attacker-controlled. The flags O_CREATE (creates the file if absent) and O_APPEND (never truncates) mean the attacker can:
- Create new files at arbitrary paths
- Append log content to existing files (corrupting configs, auth files, cron entries if the line happens to match syntax)
No Defense at Any Layer
The same opt-in API key gap applies here as in all prior findings:
// pkg/server/server.go:68-70
if options.ServerType == "rest" && options.APIKey != "" {
e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))
}
There is no path allowlist, no IsLibrary guard on the file write, and no stripping of OutputFile from API-sourced requests anywhere in the codebase.
Proof of Concept
# Step 1 — Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)
go run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest
# Step 2 — Verify health (unauthenticated)
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:16664/health
# Expected: {"code":200,"msg":"ok"}
# Step 3 — Trigger arbitrary file creation with attacker-controlled path
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:1/?x=1",
"options": {
"output": "/tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log",
"output-all": true,
"debug": true,
"use-headless": false
}
}'
# Step 4 — Verify file was created and written to by the dalfox process
sleep 2
cat /tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log
# Expected:
# [*] Starting scan [SID:...] / URL: http://127.0.0.1:1/?x=1
# [I] Checking BAV
# [E] ...
No X-API-KEY header is required. Replace /tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log with any path writable by the dalfox process: /var/www/html/injected.txt, /etc/cron.d/dalfox, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (appending log lines that won't break key format but pollute the file), etc.
Impact
- Arbitrary file creation: The attacker can create files at any path on the dalfox host filesystem accessible to the dalfox process, including web-serving directories, cron drop-in directories, and application config directories.
- Arbitrary file append/corruption: Existing files can have log-format lines appended, degrading parsers that expect strict formats (sshd_config, crontab, /etc/hosts, application config files).
- Partial content control via URL: The scan target URL appears verbatim in log output; combined with creative path targeting, this may enable injection into certain file formats.
- No authentication required in the default deployment.
- When dalfox runs under a privileged account (e.g., in a CI pipeline or as root in a container), the blast radius extends to system-wide files.
Recommended Remediation
Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)
Nullify all fields that touch the local filesystem before passing options to ScanFromAPI. This is the same remediation recommended for the found-action RCE and custom-payload-file file-read findings and should be applied as a single consolidated patch:
// pkg/server/server.go — in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:
rq.Options.OutputFile = ""
rq.Options.OutputAll = false // safe to leave user value; file write is blocked by OutputFile=""
rq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.FoundAction = ""
rq.Options.FoundActionShell = ""
rq.Options.HarFilePath = ""
Option 2: Guard the file write with IsLibrary in DalLog
Move the OutputFile write block inside the else branch so it only executes in non-library (CLI) mode:
// internal/printing/logger.go — restructure the if-else:
if options.IsLibrary {
options.ScanResult.Logs = append(options.ScanResult.Logs, text)
} else {
// existing stderr printing logic...
// file write belongs here, not after the if-else
if options.OutputFile != "" && ftext != "" {
f, err := os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)
...
}
}
This fix addresses the root structural cause — the file write was intended for CLI mode only, and gating it on !IsLibrary matches that intent. Option 1 is still recommended as the primary fix; Option 2 adds defence-in-depth but requires care to not break legitimate CLI usage.
Option 3: Require --api-key at server startup
As with the other server-mode findings, making authentication mandatory eliminates the unauthenticated attack surface entirely:
// cmd/server.go — in runServerCmd:
if serverType == "rest" && apiKey == "" {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.")
os.Exit(1)
}
All three options should be applied together.
Credit
Emmanuel David
Github:- https://github.com/drmingler.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.12.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.13.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45089"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-434",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:08:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T18:16:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the `output`, `output-all`, and `debug` fields in `model.Options` are JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker\u0027s request body, then propagated unchanged through `dalfox.Initialize` into the scan engine\u0027s logging path. The logger opens the attacker-supplied path with `os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY` and writes scan log lines to it. Critically, this file write block lives outside the `IsLibrary` guard in `DalLog`, so it executes even in server/library mode where file output was never intended to operate. Because no API key is required in the default configuration, an unauthenticated network caller can create or append to any file writable by the dalfox process on the host filesystem.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: 8.2)\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network \u2014 server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default.\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low \u2014 no preconditions; all trigger options (`output`, `output-all`, `debug`) are fully attacker-supplied in the JSON body.\n- **Privileges Required:** None \u2014 `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"`, so the auth middleware is never registered.\n- **User Interaction:** None.\n- **Scope:** Unchanged \u2014 the file write stays within the dalfox process\u0027s OS authority.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** None \u2014 this is a write-only primitive; no data is returned to the caller.\n- **Integrity Impact:** High \u2014 the attacker has full control over which file path is opened, enabling creation of new files or corruption of existing files anywhere the dalfox process has write permission. While the log content format is semi-fixed, the file path is entirely attacker-determined, making the integrity violation complete with respect to file targeting.\n- **Availability Impact:** Low \u2014 corrupting application configuration files or log files on the host can degrade the availability of other services relying on those files.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `cmd/server.go` \u2014 `init()` (line 51): `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"` \u2014 no auth by default\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `setupEchoServer()` (line 68): auth middleware only registered when `APIKey != \"\"`\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `postScanHandler()` (lines 173\u2013191): `rq.Options` (including `OutputFile`, `OutputAll`, `Debug`) passed to `ScanFromAPI` without sanitization\n- `lib/func.go` \u2014 `Initialize()` (line 107): `OutputFile` explicitly propagated from caller options; `OutputAll` (line 167) and `Debug` (line 176) likewise\n- `internal/printing/logger.go` \u2014 `DalLog()` (lines 230\u2013244): `os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)` executes outside the `IsLibrary` guard\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-306**: Missing Authentication for Critical Function\n- **CWE-73**: External Control of File Name or Path\n- **CWE-434**: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type (write-path variant)\n\n## Description\n\n### `output`, `output-all`, and `debug` Are Fully Attacker-Controlled\n\n`model.Options` exposes all three trigger fields with JSON tags:\n\n```go\n// pkg/model/options.go:88,85,88\nOutputFile string `json:\"output,omitempty\"`\nOutputAll bool `json:\"output-all,omitempty\"`\nDebug bool `json:\"debug,omitempty\"`\n```\n\n`postScanHandler` binds the entire `Req.Options` from the JSON body and passes it directly to `ScanFromAPI`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:173-191\nrq := new(Req)\nif err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }\ngo ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)\n```\n\n`Initialize` explicitly copies all three fields into `newOptions`:\n\n```go\n// lib/func.go:107, 167, 176\n\"OutputFile\": {\u0026newOptions.OutputFile, options.OutputFile},\n...\n\"OutputAll\": {\u0026newOptions.OutputAll, options.OutputAll},\n...\n\"Debug\": {\u0026newOptions.Debug, options.Debug},\n```\n\n### The File Write Is Not Guarded by `IsLibrary`\n\n`Initialize` always sets `IsLibrary: true` (line 20) and `Silence: true` (line 44) in its returned options \u2014 the intent being that the scan engine runs in embedded/library mode during API calls, suppressing terminal I/O. `DalLog` does respect this for stderr output: lines 203\u2013228 route logs to `ScanResult.Logs` (not stderr) when `IsLibrary` is true. However, the file write block at lines 230\u2013244 is positioned **after and outside** that `if-else`:\n\n```go\n// internal/printing/logger.go\nmutex.Lock()\nif options.IsLibrary {\n options.ScanResult.Logs = append(options.ScanResult.Logs, text) // API path\n} else {\n // stderr printing (CLI path)\n}\n\n// \u2190 file write is here, unconditionally \u2014 no IsLibrary check\nif options.OutputFile != \"\" {\n var fdtext string\n if ftext != \"\" {\n fdtext = ftext\n f, err := os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile,\n os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)\n if err != nil {\n fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"output file error (file)\")\n }\n defer f.Close()\n if _, err := f.WriteString(fdtext + \"\\n\"); err != nil {\n fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"output file error (write)\")\n }\n }\n}\nmutex.Unlock()\n```\n\nThe `ftext` variable is populated whenever `allWrite` is true (`options.Debug || options.OutputAll`). Since both are attacker-supplied, both conditions are trivially satisfied.\n\n### What Gets Written\n\nLog lines of the form:\n\n```\n[*] Starting scan [SID:\u003cid\u003e] / URL: \u003cattacker-supplied-url\u003e\n[I] Checking BAV\n[E] connection refused\n[DEBUG] \u003cinternal state\u003e\n...\n```\n\nThe URL appears verbatim in log messages, giving the attacker partial influence over the written content. While the format is not fully arbitrary (fixed prefixes like `[*] `, `[I] `, `[E] `), the **file path is entirely attacker-controlled**. The flags `O_CREATE` (creates the file if absent) and `O_APPEND` (never truncates) mean the attacker can:\n- Create new files at arbitrary paths\n- Append log content to existing files (corrupting configs, auth files, cron entries if the line happens to match syntax)\n\n### No Defense at Any Layer\n\nThe same opt-in API key gap applies here as in all prior findings:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:68-70\nif options.ServerType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 options.APIKey != \"\" {\n e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))\n}\n```\n\nThere is no path allowlist, no `IsLibrary` guard on the file write, and no stripping of `OutputFile` from API-sourced requests anywhere in the codebase.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Step 1 \u2014 Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)\ngo run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest\n\n# Step 2 \u2014 Verify health (unauthenticated)\ncurl -s http://127.0.0.1:16664/health\n# Expected: {\"code\":200,\"msg\":\"ok\"}\n\n# Step 3 \u2014 Trigger arbitrary file creation with attacker-controlled path\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n --data \u0027{\n \"url\": \"http://127.0.0.1:1/?x=1\",\n \"options\": {\n \"output\": \"/tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log\",\n \"output-all\": true,\n \"debug\": true,\n \"use-headless\": false\n }\n }\u0027\n\n# Step 4 \u2014 Verify file was created and written to by the dalfox process\nsleep 2\ncat /tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log\n# Expected:\n# [*] Starting scan [SID:...] / URL: http://127.0.0.1:1/?x=1\n# [I] Checking BAV\n# [E] ...\n```\n\nNo `X-API-KEY` header is required. Replace `/tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log` with any path writable by the dalfox process: `/var/www/html/injected.txt`, `/etc/cron.d/dalfox`, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` (appending log lines that won\u0027t break key format but pollute the file), etc.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary file creation**: The attacker can create files at any path on the dalfox host filesystem accessible to the dalfox process, including web-serving directories, cron drop-in directories, and application config directories.\n- **Arbitrary file append/corruption**: Existing files can have log-format lines appended, degrading parsers that expect strict formats (sshd_config, crontab, /etc/hosts, application config files).\n- **Partial content control via URL**: The scan target URL appears verbatim in log output; combined with creative path targeting, this may enable injection into certain file formats.\n- **No authentication required** in the default deployment.\n- When dalfox runs under a privileged account (e.g., in a CI pipeline or as root in a container), the blast radius extends to system-wide files.\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)\n\nNullify all fields that touch the local filesystem before passing options to `ScanFromAPI`. This is the same remediation recommended for the `found-action` RCE and `custom-payload-file` file-read findings and should be applied as a single consolidated patch:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go \u2014 in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:\nrq.Options.OutputFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.OutputAll = false // safe to leave user value; file write is blocked by OutputFile=\"\"\nrq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundAction = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundActionShell = \"\"\nrq.Options.HarFilePath = \"\"\n```\n\n### Option 2: Guard the file write with `IsLibrary` in `DalLog`\n\nMove the `OutputFile` write block inside the `else` branch so it only executes in non-library (CLI) mode:\n\n```go\n// internal/printing/logger.go \u2014 restructure the if-else:\nif options.IsLibrary {\n options.ScanResult.Logs = append(options.ScanResult.Logs, text)\n} else {\n // existing stderr printing logic...\n\n // file write belongs here, not after the if-else\n if options.OutputFile != \"\" \u0026\u0026 ftext != \"\" {\n f, err := os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)\n ...\n }\n}\n```\n\nThis fix addresses the root structural cause \u2014 the file write was intended for CLI mode only, and gating it on `!IsLibrary` matches that intent. Option 1 is still recommended as the primary fix; Option 2 adds defence-in-depth but requires care to not break legitimate CLI usage.\n\n### Option 3: Require `--api-key` at server startup\n\nAs with the other server-mode findings, making authentication mandatory eliminates the unauthenticated attack surface entirely:\n\n```go\n// cmd/server.go \u2014 in runServerCmd:\nif serverType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 apiKey == \"\" {\n fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.\")\n os.Exit(1)\n}\n```\n\nAll three options should be applied together.\n\n##Credit\n\nEmmanuel David\n\nGithub:- https://github.com/drmingler.",
"id": "GHSA-8hf9-3q64-q2qf",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:50:06Z",
"published": "2026-05-12T15:08:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-8hf9-3q64-q2qf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45089"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dalfox Server Mode has an Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Create/Append via `output` Option"
}
GHSA-8J7V-6G8V-2256
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-27 15:33 – Updated: 2025-08-27 15:33A weakness has been identified in Campcodes Payroll Management System 1.0. The affected element is the function include of the file /index.php. This manipulation of the argument page causes file inclusion. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-9529"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-27T14:15:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A weakness has been identified in Campcodes Payroll Management System 1.0. The affected element is the function include of the file /index.php. This manipulation of the argument page causes file inclusion. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited.",
"id": "GHSA-8j7v-6g8v-2256",
"modified": "2025-08-27T15:33:15Z",
"published": "2025-08-27T15:33:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9529"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chenjunjie3/cve/issues/6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.321548"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.321548"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.635551"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.campcodes.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8JPV-7GWW-9R9J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-15 00:31 – Updated: 2026-05-06 15:32Unisys WebPerfect Image Suite versions 3.0.3960.22810 and 3.0.3960.22604 expose an unauthenticated WCF SOAP endpoint on TCP port 1208 that accepts unsanitized file paths in the ReadLicense action's LFName parameter, allowing remote attackers to trigger SMB connections and leak NTLMv2 machine-account hashes. Attackers can submit crafted SOAP requests with UNC paths to force the server to initiate outbound SMB connections, exposing authentication credentials that may be relayed for privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39907"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-14T22:16:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unisys WebPerfect Image Suite versions 3.0.3960.22810 and 3.0.3960.22604 expose an unauthenticated WCF SOAP endpoint on TCP port 1208 that accepts unsanitized file paths in the ReadLicense action\u0027s LFName parameter, allowing remote attackers to trigger SMB connections and leak NTLMv2 machine-account hashes. Attackers can submit crafted SOAP requests with UNC paths to force the server to initiate outbound SMB connections, exposing authentication credentials that may be relayed for privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.",
"id": "GHSA-8jpv-7gww-9r9j",
"modified": "2026-05-06T15:32:33Z",
"published": "2026-04-15T00:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39907"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/VAMorales/be3e4ed472c51794493c1256cce16129"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.unisys.com/solutions/cai/applications"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/unisys-webperfect-image-suite-ntlmv2-hash-leakage-via-wcf-soap"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8MV6-Q53Q-HQJ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-06 09:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:31The Media Library Assistant plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion and Remote Code Execution in versions up to, and including, 3.09. This is due to insufficient controls on file paths being supplied to the 'mla_stream_file' parameter from the ~/includes/mla-stream-image.php file, where images are processed via Imagick(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to supply files via FTP that will make directory lists, local file inclusion, and remote code execution possible.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-4634"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-06T09:15:08Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Media Library Assistant plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion and Remote Code Execution in versions up to, and including, 3.09. This is due to insufficient controls on file paths being supplied to the \u0027mla_stream_file\u0027 parameter from the ~/includes/mla-stream-image.php file, where images are processed via Imagick(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to supply files via FTP that will make directory lists, local file inclusion, and remote code execution possible.",
"id": "GHSA-8mv6-q53q-hqj8",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:31:31Z",
"published": "2023-09-06T09:30:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4634"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Patrowl/CVE-2023-4634"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/174508/wpmla309-lfiexec.tgz"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patrowl.io/blog-wordpress-media-library-rce-cve-2023-4634"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=2955933%40media-library-assistant\u0026new=2955933%40media-library-assistant\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=#file4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/05c68377-feb6-442d-a3a0-1fbc246c7cbf?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8PM6-3CPV-XJV2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-12 18:30 – Updated: 2026-05-12 18:30External control of file name or path in Azure Monitor Agent allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32204"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-610",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T18:17:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Azure Monitor Agent allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.",
"id": "GHSA-8pm6-3cpv-xjv2",
"modified": "2026-05-12T18:30:42Z",
"published": "2026-05-12T18:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32204"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-32204"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8RX5-XM8F-W3W5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-12 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:33NTLM Hash Disclosure Spoofing Vulnerability
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43451"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-12T18:15:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "NTLM Hash Disclosure Spoofing Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-8rx5-xm8f-w3w5",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:33:11Z",
"published": "2024-11-12T18:30:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43451"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-43451"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-43451"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8V7X-7WJW-JMQC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-11 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-11 18:30An arbitrary file rename vulnerability in the /admin/filer.php component of EasyImages 2.0 v2.8.6 and below allows attackers with Administrator privileges to execute arbitrary code via injecting a crafted payload into an uploaded file name.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-65473"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-11T17:15:57Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An arbitrary file rename vulnerability in the /admin/filer.php component of EasyImages 2.0 v2.8.6 and below allows attackers with Administrator privileges to execute arbitrary code via injecting a crafted payload into an uploaded file name.",
"id": "GHSA-8v7x-7wjw-jmqc",
"modified": "2025-12-11T18:30:45Z",
"published": "2025-12-11T18:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65473"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://congsec.cn?id=20251103235610-7t4en7j"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/CongSec/107b9cab6dd1cb297a738f11e2b2dbb6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8VCC-CGHX-67PJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-10 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 21:31An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php image upload functionality of WWBN AVideo dev master commit 15fed957fb. A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary file read.This vulnerability is triggered by the downloadURL_gifimage parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-49862"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-610",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-10T16:15:48Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php image upload functionality of WWBN AVideo dev master commit 15fed957fb. A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary file read.This vulnerability is triggered by the `downloadURL_gifimage` parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-8vcc-cghx-67pj",
"modified": "2025-11-04T21:31:01Z",
"published": "2024-01-10T18:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49862"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1880"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1880"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8X7G-6CJV-9W4W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-20 15:32 – Updated: 2024-08-05 18:31An issue in Advanced Plugins reportsstatistics v1.3.20 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the Sales Reports, Statistics, Custom Fields & Export module.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-28394"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-19T20:15:07Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue in Advanced Plugins reportsstatistics v1.3.20 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the Sales Reports, Statistics, Custom Fields \u0026 Export module.",
"id": "GHSA-8x7g-6cjv-9w4w",
"modified": "2024-08-05T18:31:42Z",
"published": "2024-03-20T15:32:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-28394"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://addons.prestashop.com/en/customer-administration/28379-sales-reports-statistics-custom-fields-export.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.friendsofpresta.org/modules/2024/03/14/reportsstatistics.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8XWF-RJM4-XVHV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 21:43 – Updated: 2026-07-01 21:43The file content store in oras-go attempts to confine writes to workingDir when AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false, but the guard is lexical and does not account for symlink traversal. If workingDir contains a symlink path component and an attacker-controlled blob title (via ocispec.AnnotationTitle) targets a path under that symlink, pushFile() can create a file outside workingDir.
relevant links
- repository: https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go
- commit: 03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1
- callsite: content/file/file.go:609
resolveWritePath()(used bypushFile())
vulnerability details
pins: oras-project/oras-go@03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1
as-of: 2026-02-17
policy: GitHub Security Advisory (oras-project/oras-go)
callsite: content/file/file.go:609 resolveWritePath() → pushFile()
attacker control: Attacker controls the pushed name (ocispec.AnnotationTitle) and can select a path with a symlink path component under workingDir → resolveWritePath() blocks .. via filepath.Rel but does not prevent symlink traversal → pushFile() opens/creates the final path and follows the symlink → a file is created outside workingDir
root cause
resolveWritePath() enforces the write boundary using a filepath.Rel-style check against workingDir. This prevents ../ escapes but is purely lexical and does not resolve symlinks. If a path component under workingDir is a symlink to an external location, the subsequent filesystem operation in pushFile() follows that symlink and performs the write outside workingDir while still passing the lexical boundary check.
attack path
- Attacker provides a blob title (via
ocispec.AnnotationTitle) that contains a path likeout/pwn.txt. - Victim uses
oras-gofile store withAllowPathTraversalOnWrite=falseand aworkingDirthat contains a symlink directoryout -> /some/outside/dir. - The lexical boundary check accepts
out/pwn.txtas being underworkingDir. - The write follows the symlink and creates
/some/outside/dir/pwn.txt.
impact
This is a filesystem boundary bypass that permits writes outside workingDir when a symlink path component exists under workingDir. The concrete security impact depends on the runtime environment (what filesystem locations are writable by the process and what downstream consumers do with the written file), but the intended confinement guarantee is violated.
proof of concept
the attached poc.zip contains a small, self-contained go harness that demonstrates:
- canonical (vulnerable): prints
[CALLSITE_HIT]and[PROOF_MARKER]and shows the file is created outsideworkingDir - control (no symlink component): prints
[NC_MARKER]and confirms no outside write occurs
run:
unzip -q -o poc.zip -d /tmp
cd /tmp/poc-F-ORAS-SYMLINK-WRITE-001
make test
expected: when AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false, file store writes should not be able to escape workingDir, including via symlink traversal.
actual: A symlink path component under workingDir allows writes to escape workingDir even when AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false.
recommended fix
ensure confinement checks account for symlink traversal. Options include rejecting symlinks in any path component (walk components with os.Lstat), validating the resolved parent directory via EvalSymlinks and enforcing it remains under the resolved workingDir, or using an openat()-style approach so the check and open happen relative to a trusted directory file descriptor.
fix accepted when: The canonical PoC no longer prints [PROOF_MARKER] for the same attacker-controlled inputs.
cheers, Oleh
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "oras.land/oras-go/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50162"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T21:43:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The file content store in `oras-go` attempts to confine writes to `workingDir` when `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false`, but the guard is lexical and does not account for symlink traversal. If `workingDir` contains a symlink path component and an attacker-controlled blob title (via `ocispec.AnnotationTitle`) targets a path under that symlink, `pushFile()` can create a file outside `workingDir`.\n\n## relevant links\n\n- repository: https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go\n- commit: 03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1\n- callsite: content/file/file.go:609 `resolveWritePath()` (used by `pushFile()`)\n\n## vulnerability details\n\n**pins:** oras-project/oras-go@03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1\n\n**as-of:** 2026-02-17\n\n**policy:** GitHub Security Advisory (oras-project/oras-go)\n\n**callsite:** content/file/file.go:609 `resolveWritePath()` \u2192 `pushFile()`\n\n**attacker control:** Attacker controls the pushed name (`ocispec.AnnotationTitle`) and can select a path with a symlink path component under `workingDir` \u2192 `resolveWritePath()` blocks `..` via `filepath.Rel` but does not prevent symlink traversal \u2192 `pushFile()` opens/creates the final path and follows the symlink \u2192 a file is created outside `workingDir`\n\n### root cause\n\n`resolveWritePath()` enforces the write boundary using a `filepath.Rel`-style check against `workingDir`. This prevents `../` escapes but is purely lexical and does not resolve symlinks. If a path component under `workingDir` is a symlink to an external location, the subsequent filesystem operation in `pushFile()` follows that symlink and performs the write outside `workingDir` while still passing the lexical boundary check.\n\n### attack path\n\n1. Attacker provides a blob title (via `ocispec.AnnotationTitle`) that contains a path like `out/pwn.txt`.\n2. Victim uses `oras-go` file store with `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false` and a `workingDir` that contains a symlink directory `out -\u003e /some/outside/dir`.\n3. The lexical boundary check accepts `out/pwn.txt` as being under `workingDir`.\n4. The write follows the symlink and creates `/some/outside/dir/pwn.txt`.\n\n## impact\n\nThis is a filesystem boundary bypass that permits writes outside `workingDir` when a symlink path component exists under `workingDir`. The concrete security impact depends on the runtime environment (what filesystem locations are writable by the process and what downstream consumers do with the written file), but the intended confinement guarantee is violated.\n\n## proof of concept\n\nthe attached `poc.zip` contains a small, self-contained go harness that demonstrates:\n\n- canonical (vulnerable): prints `[CALLSITE_HIT]` and `[PROOF_MARKER]` and shows the file is created outside `workingDir`\n- control (no symlink component): prints `[NC_MARKER]` and confirms no outside write occurs\n\nrun:\n\n```bash\nunzip -q -o poc.zip -d /tmp\ncd /tmp/poc-F-ORAS-SYMLINK-WRITE-001\nmake test\n```\n\n**expected:** when `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false`, file store writes should not be able to escape `workingDir`, including via symlink traversal.\n\n**actual:** A symlink path component under `workingDir` allows writes to escape `workingDir` even when `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false`.\n\n## recommended fix\n\nensure confinement checks account for symlink traversal. Options include rejecting symlinks in any path component (walk components with `os.Lstat`), validating the resolved parent directory via `EvalSymlinks` and enforcing it remains under the resolved `workingDir`, or using an `openat()`-style approach so the check and open happen relative to a trusted directory file descriptor.\n\n**fix accepted when:** The canonical PoC no longer prints `[PROOF_MARKER]` for the same attacker-controlled inputs.\n\n\ncheers,\nOleh",
"id": "GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv",
"modified": "2026-07-01T21:43:11Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T21:43:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/cc323e564d90c6b5b4bdd71d3c8d2ee2713b37e5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "oras-go has file store write outside workingDir via symlink traversal"
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.