CWE-627
AllowedDynamic Variable Evaluation
Abstraction: Variant · Status: Incomplete
In a language where the user can influence the name of a variable at runtime, if the variable names are not controlled, an attacker can read or write to arbitrary variables, or access arbitrary functions.
12 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MV9G-VP7W-XQ67
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-03-02 21:31Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name} is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer's name for the final email. This mechanism contained a security-relevant bug:
It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {{event.init.code.co_filename}}. This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates (usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive information from the system configuration, including even database passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were not fully effective for this plugin.
Out of caution, we recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/ file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-2452"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-627"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-16T11:15:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name}\n is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer\u0027s \nname for the final email. This mechanism contained a security-relevant bug:\n\nIt was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}.\n This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates \n(usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive \ninformation from the system configuration, including even database \npasswords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such \nmalicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were \nnot fully effective for this plugin.\n\nOut of caution, we recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/ \u00a0file.",
"id": "GHSA-mv9g-vp7w-xq67",
"modified": "2026-03-02T21:31:20Z",
"published": "2026-02-16T12:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2452"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pretix.eu/about/en/blog/20260216-release-2026-1-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:L/U:Red",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-R8P8-QW9W-J9QV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-03-13 16:04Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name} is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer's name for the final email. This mechanism contained two security-relevant bugs:
-
It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as
{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}. This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates (usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive information from the system configuration, including even database passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were not fully effective for the email subject. -
Placeholders in subjects and plain text bodies of emails were wrongfully evaluated twice. Therefore, if the first evaluation of a placeholder again contains a placeholder, this second placeholder was rendered. This allows the rendering of placeholders controlled by the ticket buyer, and therefore the exploitation of the first issue as a ticket buyer. Luckily, the only buyer-controlled placeholder available in pretix by default (that is not validated in a way that prevents the issue) is
{invoice_company}, which is very unusual (but not impossible) to be contained in an email subject template. In addition to broadening the attack surface of the first issue, this could theoretically also leak information about an order to one of the attendees within that order. However, we also consider this scenario very unlikely under typical conditions.
Out of caution, pretix recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/ file.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pretix"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pretix"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2025.10.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2025.10.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pretix"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2025.9.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-2415"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-627"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T21:44:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-16T11:15:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when `{name}` is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer\u0027s name for the final email. This mechanism contained two security-relevant bugs:\n\n - It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as `{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}`. This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates (usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive information from the system configuration, including even database passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were not fully effective for the email subject.\n\n - Placeholders in subjects and plain text bodies of emails were wrongfully evaluated twice. Therefore, if the first evaluation of a placeholder again contains a placeholder, this second placeholder was rendered. This allows the rendering of placeholders controlled by the ticket buyer, and therefore the exploitation of the first issue as a ticket buyer. Luckily, the only buyer-controlled placeholder available in pretix by default (that is not validated in a way that prevents the issue) is `{invoice_company}`, which is very unusual (but not impossible) to be contained in an email subject template. In addition to broadening the attack surface of the first issue, this could theoretically also leak information about an order to one of the attendees within that order. However, we also consider this scenario very unlikely under typical conditions.\n\nOut of caution, pretix recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/ \u00a0file.",
"id": "GHSA-r8p8-qw9w-j9qv",
"modified": "2026-03-13T16:04:01Z",
"published": "2026-02-16T12:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2415"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pretix/pretix/commit/ba11d24f8dfa4e9d8f03493e56fd8b43983fe297"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pretix/pretix/commit/c85afbc621b5f0b1afa618627c45f89323eb0154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pretix/pretix/commit/edac35ed4c5466eb63a202575c337d117ddf1c8e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pretix/pretix"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pretix.eu/about/en/blog/20260216-release-2026-1-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P/RE:L/U:Red",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "pretix unsafely evaluates variables in emails"
}
Mitigation
Strategy: Refactoring
Refactor the code to avoid dynamic variable evaluation whenever possible.
Mitigation
Strategy: Input Validation
Use only allowlists of acceptable variable or function names.
Mitigation
For function names, ensure that you are only calling functions that accept the proper number of arguments, to avoid unexpected null arguments.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.