Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-601

Allowed

URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect.

2552 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-34R6-Q8C8-23MX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-26 21:31 – Updated: 2025-06-26 21:31
VLAI
Details

When a URL was provided in a link querystring parameter, Firefox for Android would follow that URL instead of the correct URL, potentially leading to phishing attacks. This bug only affects Firefox for Android. Other versions of Firefox are unaffected. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 140.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-6428"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-24T13:15:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "When a URL was provided in a link querystring parameter, Firefox for Android would follow that URL instead of the correct URL, potentially leading to phishing attacks.\n*This bug only affects Firefox for Android. Other versions of Firefox are unaffected.* This vulnerability affects Firefox \u003c 140.",
  "id": "GHSA-34r6-q8c8-23mx",
  "modified": "2025-06-26T21:31:06Z",
  "published": "2025-06-26T21:31:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6428"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1970151"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2025-51"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3573-4C68-G8CC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-06 19:22 – Updated: 2026-01-08 21:19
VLAI
Summary
Directus has open redirect in SAML
Details

Security Advisory: Open Redirect in Directus SAML Authentication

Summary

An open redirect vulnerability exists in the Directus SAML authentication callback endpoint. The RelayState parameter is used in redirects without proper validation against an allowlist of permitted domains.

Vulnerability Description

During SAML authentication, the RelayState parameter is intended to preserve the user's original destination. However, while the login initiation flow validates redirect targets against allowed domains, this validation is not applied to the callback endpoint. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious authentication request that redirects users to an arbitrary external URL upon completion.

The vulnerability is present in both the success and error handling paths of the callback.

Impact

  • Phishing: Users can be redirected to attacker-controlled sites that mimic legitimate login pages
  • Credential theft: Chained attacks may leverage the redirect to capture OAuth tokens or authorization codes
  • Trust erosion: Users may lose confidence in the application's security posture

This vulnerability can be exploited without authentication.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "directus"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.14.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@directus/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "32.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22032"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-06T19:22:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-08T15:15:45Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Security Advisory: Open Redirect in Directus SAML Authentication\n\n### Summary\n\nAn open redirect vulnerability exists in the Directus SAML authentication callback endpoint. The `RelayState` parameter is used in redirects without proper validation against an allowlist of permitted domains.\n\n### Vulnerability Description\n\nDuring SAML authentication, the `RelayState` parameter is intended to preserve the user\u0027s original destination. However, while the login initiation flow validates redirect targets against allowed domains, this validation is not applied to the callback endpoint. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious authentication request that redirects users to an arbitrary external URL upon completion.\n\nThe vulnerability is present in both the success and error handling paths of the callback.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Phishing**: Users can be redirected to attacker-controlled sites that mimic legitimate login pages\n- **Credential theft**: Chained attacks may leverage the redirect to capture OAuth tokens or authorization codes\n- **Trust erosion**: Users may lose confidence in the application\u0027s security posture\n\nThis vulnerability can be exploited without authentication.",
  "id": "GHSA-3573-4c68-g8cc",
  "modified": "2026-01-08T21:19:04Z",
  "published": "2026-01-06T19:22:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-3573-4c68-g8cc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22032"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/dad9576ea9362905cc4de8028d3877caff36dc23"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Directus has open redirect in SAML"
}

GHSA-35GF-XJGF-96C5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-12 18:30 – Updated: 2023-07-12 22:31
VLAI
Summary
Jenkins OpenShift Login Plugin vulnerable to Open Redirect
Details

Jenkins OpenShift Login Plugin 1.1.0.227.v27e08dfb_1a_20 and earlier improperly determines that a redirect URL after login is legitimately pointing to Jenkins.

This allows attackers to perform phishing attacks by having users go to a Jenkins URL that will forward them to a different site after successful authentication.

OpenShift Login Plugin 1.1.0.230.v5d7030b_f5432 only redirects to relative (Jenkins) URLs.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.openshift.jenkins:openshift-login"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.0.230.v5d7030b"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-37947"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-12T22:31:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-07-12T16:15:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Jenkins OpenShift Login Plugin 1.1.0.227.v27e08dfb_1a_20 and earlier improperly determines that a redirect URL after login is legitimately pointing to Jenkins.\n\nThis allows attackers to perform phishing attacks by having users go to a Jenkins URL that will forward them to a different site after successful authentication.\n\nOpenShift Login Plugin 1.1.0.230.v5d7030b_f5432 only redirects to relative (Jenkins) URLs.",
  "id": "GHSA-35gf-xjgf-96c5",
  "modified": "2023-07-12T22:31:12Z",
  "published": "2023-07-12T18:30:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37947"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2023-07-12/#SECURITY-2999"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/07/12/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Jenkins OpenShift Login Plugin vulnerable to Open Redirect"
}

GHSA-35VC-W93W-75C2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-21 16:24 – Updated: 2023-10-02 12:09
VLAI
Summary
JWT leak via Open Redirect in Programmatic access
Details

Impact

Using programmatic access on protected sites, one can get a signed login URL with pomerium_redirect_uri set to an arbitrary URL. Then, if the user has already logged into Pomerium, they will be redirected to the specified pomerium_redirect_uri with a JWT attached. This allows an outside attacker to get a signed login URL that, upon visiting it, will redirect a victim to the attacker’s site. This creates an issue of Open Redirect and, more seriously, JWT leakage.

With a leaked JWT, the attacker will be able to unveil the victim’s identity (.e.g. email address) by supplying the JWT to the authenticate service or verify.pomerium.com. In addition, if an application integrating Pomerium only verifies the iss claim and others but not the aud claim, the attacker will be able to access it as the victim.

Specific Go Packages Affected

github.com/pomerium/pomerium/proxy

Patches

Patched in Pomerium v0.13.4

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory * Open an issue in pomerium * Email us at security@pomerium.com

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/pomerium/pomerium"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.13.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-29651"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-20T20:25:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nUsing programmatic access on protected sites, one can get a signed login URL with pomerium_redirect_uri set to an arbitrary URL. Then, if the user has already logged into Pomerium, they will be redirected to the specified pomerium_redirect_uri with a JWT attached. This allows an outside attacker to get a signed login URL that, upon visiting it, will redirect a victim to the attacker\u2019s site. This creates an issue of Open Redirect and, more seriously, JWT leakage.\n\nWith a leaked JWT, the attacker will be able to unveil the victim\u2019s identity (.e.g. email address) by supplying the JWT to the authenticate service or verify.pomerium.com. In addition, if an application integrating Pomerium only verifies the iss claim and others but not the aud claim, the attacker will be able to access it as the victim.\n\n### Specific Go Packages Affected\ngithub.com/pomerium/pomerium/proxy\n\n### Patches\nPatched in Pomerium v0.13.4\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory\n* Open an issue in [pomerium](http://github.com/pomerium/pomerium)\n* Email us at [security@pomerium.com](mailto:security@pomerium.com)",
  "id": "GHSA-35vc-w93w-75c2",
  "modified": "2023-10-02T12:09:08Z",
  "published": "2021-05-21T16:24:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/security/advisories/GHSA-35vc-w93w-75c2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29651"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/pull/2049"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "JWT leak via Open Redirect in Programmatic access"
}

GHSA-368M-GH85-CQ79

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-29 06:30 – Updated: 2026-08-30 03:31
VLAI
Details

The MasterStudy LMS WordPress Plugin WordPress plugin before 3.7.43 does not validate a redirect parameter supplied during user registration before using it, allowing unauthenticated attackers to redirect users to arbitrary external URLs.

Severity
4.7 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-81342"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-29T06:17:58Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The MasterStudy LMS WordPress Plugin  WordPress plugin before 3.7.43 does not validate a redirect parameter supplied during user registration before using it, allowing unauthenticated attackers to redirect users to arbitrary external URLs.",
  "id": "GHSA-368m-gh85-cq79",
  "modified": "2026-08-30T03:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-08-29T06:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81342"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/f6f89b50-3087-4fb6-ba12-93fdc1bcc9ed"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-36F2-FCRX-FP4J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-16 16:04 – Updated: 2023-03-16 16:04
VLAI
Summary
Authelia allows open redirects on the logout endpoint
Details

Impact

Utilizing a HTTP query parameter an attacker is able to redirect users from the web application to any domain. The URL of the intended redirect should always be checked for safety prior to forwarding the user. Other endpoints of the web application already do this, they check both that the domain is using the HTTPS protocol and that it exists on a domain associated with the application.

An attacker is able to use this unintended functionality to redirect users to malicious sites. This particular security issue allows the attacker to make a phishing attempt seem much more trustworthy to a user of the web application as the initial site before redirection is familiar to them, as well as the actual URL which they have theoretically visited frequently.

While this security issue does not directly impact the security of the web application, it is still not an acceptable scenario for the reasons mentioned above.

Patches

f0cb75e1e102f95f91e9254c66c797e821857690 fix(handlers): logout redirection validation (#1908) v4.28.0

Workarounds

Using a reverse proxy to strip the query parameter from the affected endpoint.

References

https://github.com/authelia/authelia/pull/1908

CWE-601

Authelia v4.28.0

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact us. You may also contact us to request creating a back-ported fix for this if you are able to explain why you cannot upgrade; however upgrading is highly preferable.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/authelia/authelia/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.28.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-29456"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-16T16:04:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-04-21T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nUtilizing a HTTP query parameter an attacker is able to redirect users from the web application to any domain. The URL of the intended redirect should always be checked for safety prior to forwarding the user. Other endpoints of the web application already do this, they check both that the domain is using the HTTPS protocol and that it exists on a domain associated with the application.\n\nAn attacker is able to use this unintended functionality to redirect users to malicious sites. This particular security issue allows the attacker to make a phishing attempt seem much more trustworthy to a user of the web application as the initial site before redirection is familiar to them, as well as the actual URL which they have theoretically visited frequently. \n\nWhile this security issue does not directly impact the security of the web application, it is still not an acceptable scenario for the reasons mentioned above. \n\n### Patches\nf0cb75e1e102f95f91e9254c66c797e821857690 fix(handlers): logout redirection validation (#1908) [v4.28.0](https://github.com/authelia/authelia/releases/tag/v4.28.0)\n\n### Workarounds\nUsing a reverse proxy to strip the query parameter from the affected endpoint. \n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/authelia/authelia/pull/1908\n\n[CWE-601](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/601.html)\n\n[Authelia v4.28.0](https://github.com/authelia/authelia/tree/v4.28.0)\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [contact us](https://github.com/authelia/authelia#contact-options). You may also contact us to request creating a back-ported fix for this if you are able to explain why you cannot upgrade; however upgrading is highly preferable. ",
  "id": "GHSA-36f2-fcrx-fp4j",
  "modified": "2023-03-16T16:04:56Z",
  "published": "2023-03-16T16:04:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/authelia/authelia/security/advisories/GHSA-36f2-fcrx-fp4j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29456"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/authelia/authelia"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Authelia allows open redirects on the logout endpoint"
}

GHSA-36H2-95GJ-W488

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-09 00:00 – Updated: 2022-02-14 23:00
VLAI
Summary
Open redirect in Gitea
Details

Gitea before 1.4.3 is affected by URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect') via internal URLs.

Severity
6.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-45328"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-02-14T23:00:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-02-08T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Gitea before 1.4.3 is affected by URL Redirection to Untrusted Site (\u0027Open Redirect\u0027) via internal URLs.",
  "id": "GHSA-36h2-95gj-w488",
  "modified": "2022-02-14T23:00:49Z",
  "published": "2022-02-09T00:00:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45328"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/4332"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.gitea.io/2018/06/release-of-1.4.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open redirect in Gitea"
}

GHSA-36P9-4JQP-QVG9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-19 21:30 – Updated: 2025-08-20 18:30
VLAI
Details

The URL scheme used by Firefox to facilitate searching of text queries could incorrectly allow attackers to open arbitrary website URLs or internal pages if a user was tricked into clicking a link This vulnerability affects Firefox for iOS < 141.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-54144"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-19T21:15:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The URL scheme used by Firefox to facilitate searching of text queries could incorrectly allow attackers to open arbitrary website URLs or internal pages if a user was tricked into clicking a link This vulnerability affects Firefox for iOS \u003c 141.",
  "id": "GHSA-36p9-4jqp-qvg9",
  "modified": "2025-08-20T18:30:20Z",
  "published": "2025-08-19T21:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54144"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1946062"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2025-60"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-36RG-GFQ2-3H56

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-07 22:13 – Updated: 2025-07-07 22:13
VLAI
Summary
Better Auth Open Redirect Vulnerability in originCheck Middleware Affects Multiple Routes
Details

Summary

An open redirect has been found in the originCheck middleware function, which affects the following routes: /verify-email, /reset-password/:token, /delete-user/callback, /magic-link/verify, /oauth-proxy-callback.

Details

In the matchesPattern function, url.startsWith( can be deceived with a url that starts with one of the trustedOrigins.

        const matchesPattern = (url: string, pattern: string): boolean => {
            if (url.startsWith("/")) {
                return false;
            }
            if (pattern.includes("*")) {
                return wildcardMatch(pattern)(getHost(url));
            }
            return url.startsWith(pattern);
        };

Open Redirect PoCs

export const auth = betterAuth({
    baseURL: 'http://localhost:3000',
    trustedOrigins: [
        "http://trusted.com"
    ],
    emailAndPassword: {
        ...
    },
})

/reset-password/:token

image
image 1

/verify-email

image
image

/delete-user/callback

image
image

/magic-link/verify

image
image

/oauth-proxy-callback

image
image

Impact

Untrusted open redirects in various routes.

Severity
2.1 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.2.9"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "better-auth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53535"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-07T22:13:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-07T18:15:28Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAn open redirect has been found in the `originCheck` middleware function, which affects the following routes: `/verify-email`, `/reset-password/:token`, `/delete-user/callback`, `/magic-link/verify`, `/oauth-proxy-callback`.\n\n### Details\n\nIn the `matchesPattern` function, `url.startsWith(` can be deceived with a `url` that starts with one of the `trustedOrigins`.\n\n```jsx\n\t\tconst matchesPattern = (url: string, pattern: string): boolean =\u003e {\n\t\t\tif (url.startsWith(\"/\")) {\n\t\t\t\treturn false;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (pattern.includes(\"*\")) {\n\t\t\t\treturn wildcardMatch(pattern)(getHost(url));\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn url.startsWith(pattern);\n\t\t};\n```\n\n### Open Redirect PoCs\n\n```jsx\nexport const auth = betterAuth({\n\tbaseURL: \u0027http://localhost:3000\u0027,\n\ttrustedOrigins: [\n\t\t\"http://trusted.com\"\n\t],\n\temailAndPassword: {\n\t\t...\n\t},\n})\n```\n\n#### `/reset-password/:token`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"481\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/46e7871a-1dad-4375-af94-0446e29aaab6\" /\u003e\n\u003cbr/\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"518\" alt=\"image 1\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/83abfb53-6fc9-4d1f-918d-9b4ce093c808\" /\u003e\n\n#### `/verify-email`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"549\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7dd424b7-42a4-4616-aa73-fcc2e3eeb309\" /\u003e\n\u003cbr/\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"436\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/54f11636-0a3e-4e83-9a09-57c5e8ba98cd\" /\u003e\n\n#### `/delete-user/callback`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"545\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2ff1b217-d069-48fb-81c1-f8c8792d34a4\" /\u003e\n\u003cbr/\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"492\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/71df11db-9d38-4f34-abe1-add9d60b3486\" /\u003e\n\n#### `/magic-link/verify`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"379\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6b6b6a8a-59b6-4a65-9df3-57d5b2f6eb0f\" /\u003e\n\u003cbr/\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"413\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/82a5c9c6-2ea0-44eb-af48-40732657b59e\" /\u003e\n\n#### `/oauth-proxy-callback`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"548\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d8d2ee51-e9fd-4337-bec3-a70afd1ceacb\" /\u003e\n\u003cbr/\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"544\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f097d406-b965-4f85-b124-9b0ef1cc2689\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nUntrusted open redirects in various routes.",
  "id": "GHSA-36rg-gfq2-3h56",
  "modified": "2025-07-07T22:13:14Z",
  "published": "2025-07-07T22:13:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-36rg-gfq2-3h56"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53535"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/commit/9801d1be53d9da04686b94c6286c53ec97496740"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Better Auth Open Redirect Vulnerability in originCheck Middleware Affects Multiple Routes"
}

GHSA-3735-5339-XFWX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-28 16:40 – Updated: 2026-07-28 16:40
VLAI
Summary
Poweradmin has Host Header Injection in OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO URL, and Logout Redirect Construction.
Details

Summary

Poweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled HTTP_HOST request header as the authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the redirect_uri sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full account takeover with no credentials required.

Three independent code paths are affected:

  • Primary (Critical): OidcService::getCallbackUrl() - redirect_uri poisoning
  • Secondary (High): SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl() - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning
  • Tertiary (Medium): LogoutController::getBaseUrl() - post-logout redirect poisoning

Details

Root Cause

The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from HTTP_HOST rather than from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not validated before use in any authentication flow.

Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern - DocsController::getValidatedHost() (line 244) calls isValidHostname() before using the value - but this was never applied to authentication flows.

### Primary: lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php (~line 460)

```php private function getCallbackUrl(): string { $scheme = $this->detectScheme(); // HTTP_HOST taken directly with zero validation $host = $this->request->getServerParam('HTTP_HOST', 'localhost'); $basePrefix = $this->configManager->get('interface', 'base_url_prefix', ''); return $scheme . '://' . $host . $basePrefix . '/oidc/callback'; }

HTTP_HOST is embedded verbatim as redirect_uri in the OAuth 2.0 authorization request sent to the IdP. HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO is similarly used unvalidated for scheme detection.

Secondary: lib/Application/Service/SamlConfigurationService.php (~line 134)

private function getBaseUrl(): string { $configuredBaseUrl = $this->configManager->get('interface', 'base_url', ''); if (!empty($configuredBaseUrl)) { return rtrim($configuredBaseUrl, '/'); // safe path - rarely configured } // Falls through on every default installation $host = $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] ?? 'localhost'; ... return $scheme . '://' . $host . $prefix; }

Used to construct SAML ACS URL, SLO URL, and entity ID - all poisonable via Host header. The safe fallback only activates when interface.base_url is explicitly set, which is optional and empty by default.

Tertiary: lib/Application/Controller/LogoutController.php (~line 272)

Same $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] pattern used for post-logout redirect URL construction.

PoC

Environment: Poweradmin v4.3.2, Docker, PHP 8.2, OIDC enabled, interface.base_url empty (default).

docker exec poweradmin-container php -r " require '/app/vendor/autoload.php'; putenv('PA_CONFIG_PATH=/app/config/settings.php');

use PowerAdmin\Application\Service\OidcService; use PowerAdmin\Infrastructure\Configuration\ConfigurationManager; use PowerAdmin\Infrastructure\Web\Request;

\$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] = 'attacker.com'; \$_SERVER['HTTPS'] = '';

\$config = ConfigurationManager::getInstance(); \$request = new Request(); \$oidcService = new OidcService(\$config, \$request); \$authUrl = \$oidcService->initiateAuthFlow('test');

parse_str(parse_url(\$authUrl, PHP_URL_QUERY), \$p); echo 'redirect_uri: ' . urldecode(\$p['redirect_uri']) . PHP_EOL;

if (str_contains(\$p['redirect_uri'], 'attacker.com')) { echo '[CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful' . PHP_EOL; } "

Output:

redirect_uri: http://attacker.com/oidc/callback

[CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful - redirect_uri contains attacker.com

The redirect_uri in the authorization request sent to the Identity Provider is http://attacker.com/oidc/callback. The victim's authorization code will be delivered to this URL upon successful authentication.

Note on PKCE: PKCE does not mitigate this attack. The attacker initiates the flow themselves and controls both code_challenge and code_verifier.

Impact

Direct Impact

An attacker who can send a request with a spoofed Host header - directly or via a misconfigured reverse proxy (proxy_set_header Host $http_host is the nginx default) - can steal any user's authorization code and gain full authenticated access to Poweradmin. No credentials, malware, or prior access required.

DNS Infrastructure Impact

Poweradmin manages PowerDNS. A compromised administrator account grants full DNS zone control, enabling:

  • MX hijacking - redirect all inbound email to attacker's mail server; intercept password reset emails and 2FA codes for any third-party service registered with the domain
  • SPF/DKIM manipulation - add attacker's IP to SPF, publish attacker's DKIM key → send cryptographically authenticated email as the organization (passes DMARC)
  • Subdomain takeover - point mail., vpn., app. to attacker infrastructure
  • SSL certificate theft - remove CAA records and complete ACME DNS-01 challenge to obtain wildcard certificate *.company.com from any CA
  • Full domain delegation - delegate subdomains to attacker nameserver

CVSS v3.1

┌──────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────┐ │ Scenario │ Vector │ Score │ ├──────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────┤ │ Standard deployment │ AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L │ 8.2 High │ ├──────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────┤ │ Proxy misconfigured ($http_host) │ AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L │ 9.3 Critical │ └──────────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────┘

Recommended Fix

Immediate mitigation: Set interface.base_url in config/settings.php - activates the safe branch in SamlConfigurationService immediately.

Code fix for OidcService: Prefer the configured base URL; if absent, validate HTTP_HOST via filter_var($hostname, FILTER_VALIDATE_DOMAIN, FILTER_FLAG_HOSTNAME) before use - the same pattern already implemented in DocsController::getValidatedHost().

Severity
9.6 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "poweradmin/poweradmin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "poweradmin/poweradmin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54588"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T16:40:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T23:16:49Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nPoweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the\n  authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout\n  authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison\n  the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the\n  victim\u0027s authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full\n  account takeover with no credentials required.\n\n  Three independent code paths are affected:\n\n  - **Primary (Critical):** `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` - `redirect_uri` poisoning\n  - **Secondary (High):** `SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl()` - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning\n  - **Tertiary (Medium):** `LogoutController::getBaseUrl()` - post-logout redirect poisoning\n\n### Details\n\n***Root Cause***\n\n  The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from `HTTP_HOST` rather than\n  from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not\n  validated before use in any authentication flow.\n\n  Poweradmin\u0027s own codebase contains the correct pattern -\n  `DocsController::getValidatedHost()` (line 244) calls `isValidHostname()` before\n  using the value - but this was never applied to authentication flows.\n\n  ### Primary: `lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php` (~line 460)\n\n  ```php\n  private function getCallbackUrl(): string\n  {\n      $scheme = $this-\u003edetectScheme();\n      // HTTP_HOST taken directly with zero validation\n      $host = $this-\u003erequest-\u003egetServerParam(\u0027HTTP_HOST\u0027, \u0027localhost\u0027);\n      $basePrefix = $this-\u003econfigManager-\u003eget(\u0027interface\u0027, \u0027base_url_prefix\u0027, \u0027\u0027);\n      return $scheme . \u0027://\u0027 . $host . $basePrefix . \u0027/oidc/callback\u0027;\n  }\n\n  HTTP_HOST is embedded verbatim as redirect_uri in the OAuth 2.0 authorization\n  request sent to the IdP. HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO is similarly used unvalidated\n  for scheme detection.\n\n  Secondary: lib/Application/Service/SamlConfigurationService.php (~line 134)\n\n  private function getBaseUrl(): string\n  {\n      $configuredBaseUrl = $this-\u003econfigManager-\u003eget(\u0027interface\u0027, \u0027base_url\u0027, \u0027\u0027);\n      if (!empty($configuredBaseUrl)) {\n          return rtrim($configuredBaseUrl, \u0027/\u0027);  // safe path - rarely configured\n      }\n      // Falls through on every default installation\n      $host = $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_HOST\u0027] ?? \u0027localhost\u0027;\n      ...\n      return $scheme . \u0027://\u0027 . $host . $prefix;\n  }\n\n  Used to construct SAML ACS URL, SLO URL, and entity ID - all poisonable via Host header.\n  The safe fallback only activates when interface.base_url is explicitly set, which is\n  optional and empty by default.\n\n  Tertiary: lib/Application/Controller/LogoutController.php (~line 272)\n\n  Same $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_HOST\u0027] pattern used for post-logout redirect URL construction.\n\n### PoC\nEnvironment: Poweradmin v4.3.2, Docker, PHP 8.2, OIDC enabled, interface.base_url empty (default).\n\n  docker exec poweradmin-container php -r \"\n  require \u0027/app/vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\n  putenv(\u0027PA_CONFIG_PATH=/app/config/settings.php\u0027);\n\n  use PowerAdmin\\Application\\Service\\OidcService;\n  use PowerAdmin\\Infrastructure\\Configuration\\ConfigurationManager;\n  use PowerAdmin\\Infrastructure\\Web\\Request;\n\n  \\$_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_HOST\u0027] = \u0027attacker.com\u0027;\n  \\$_SERVER[\u0027HTTPS\u0027]     = \u0027\u0027;\n\n  \\$config      = ConfigurationManager::getInstance();\n  \\$request     = new Request();\n  \\$oidcService = new OidcService(\\$config, \\$request);\n  \\$authUrl     = \\$oidcService-\u003einitiateAuthFlow(\u0027test\u0027);\n\n  parse_str(parse_url(\\$authUrl, PHP_URL_QUERY), \\$p);\n  echo \u0027redirect_uri: \u0027 . urldecode(\\$p[\u0027redirect_uri\u0027]) . PHP_EOL;\n\n  if (str_contains(\\$p[\u0027redirect_uri\u0027], \u0027attacker.com\u0027)) {\n      echo \u0027[CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful\u0027 . PHP_EOL;\n  }\n  \"\n\n  Output:\n\n  redirect_uri: http://attacker.com/oidc/callback\n\n  [CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful - redirect_uri contains attacker.com\n\n  The redirect_uri in the authorization request sent to the Identity Provider is\n  http://attacker.com/oidc/callback. The victim\u0027s authorization code will be\n  delivered to this URL upon successful authentication.\n\n  Note on PKCE: PKCE does not mitigate this attack. The attacker initiates the\n  flow themselves and controls both code_challenge and code_verifier.\n\n### Impact\nDirect Impact\n\n  An attacker who can send a request with a spoofed Host header - directly or via a\n  misconfigured reverse proxy (proxy_set_header Host $http_host is the nginx default) -\n  can steal any user\u0027s authorization code and gain full authenticated access to Poweradmin.\n  No credentials, malware, or prior access required.\n\n  DNS Infrastructure Impact\n\n  Poweradmin manages PowerDNS. A compromised administrator account grants full DNS zone\n  control, enabling:\n\n  - MX hijacking - redirect all inbound email to attacker\u0027s mail server; intercept\n  password reset emails and 2FA codes for any third-party service registered with the domain\n  - SPF/DKIM manipulation - add attacker\u0027s IP to SPF, publish attacker\u0027s DKIM key \u2192\n  send cryptographically authenticated email as the organization (passes DMARC)\n  - Subdomain takeover - point mail., vpn., app. to attacker infrastructure\n  - SSL certificate theft - remove CAA records and complete ACME DNS-01 challenge\n  to obtain wildcard certificate *.company.com from any CA\n  - Full domain delegation - delegate subdomains to attacker nameserver\n\n  CVSS v3.1\n\n  \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n  \u2502             Scenario             \u2502               Vector                \u2502    Score     \u2502\n  \u251c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2524\n  \u2502 Standard deployment              \u2502 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L \u2502 8.2 High     \u2502\n  \u251c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2524\n  \u2502 Proxy misconfigured ($http_host) \u2502 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L \u2502 9.3 Critical \u2502\n  \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518\n\n  Recommended Fix\n\n  Immediate mitigation: Set interface.base_url in config/settings.php -\n  activates the safe branch in SamlConfigurationService immediately.\n\n  Code fix for OidcService: Prefer the configured base URL; if absent, validate\n  HTTP_HOST via filter_var($hostname, FILTER_VALIDATE_DOMAIN, FILTER_FLAG_HOSTNAME)\n  before use - the same pattern already implemented in DocsController::getValidatedHost().",
  "id": "GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T16:40:05Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T16:40:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54588"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/releases/tag/v4.2.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/releases/tag/v4.3.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Poweradmin has Host Header Injection in OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO URL, and Logout Redirect Construction."
}
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Use a list of approved URLs or domains to be used for redirection.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Use an intermediate disclaimer page that provides the user with a clear warning that they are leaving the current site. Implement a long timeout before the redirect occurs, or force the user to click on the link. Be careful to avoid XSS problems (CWE-79) when generating the disclaimer page.

Mitigation MIT-21.2
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

  • When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • For example, ID 1 could map to "/login.asp" and ID 2 could map to "http://www.example.com/". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that no externally-supplied requests are honored by requiring that all redirect requests include a unique nonce generated by the application [REF-483]. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330).

Mitigation MIT-6
Architecture and Design Implementation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

  • Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
  • Many open redirect problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, such as cookies and hidden form fields.
Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

CAPEC-178: Cross-Site Flashing

An attacker is able to trick the victim into executing a Flash document that passes commands or calls to a Flash player browser plugin, allowing the attacker to exploit native Flash functionality in the client browser. This attack pattern occurs where an attacker can provide a crafted link to a Flash document (SWF file) which, when followed, will cause additional malicious instructions to be executed. The attacker does not need to serve or control the Flash document. The attack takes advantage of the fact that Flash files can reference external URLs. If variables that serve as URLs that the Flash application references can be controlled through parameters, then by creating a link that includes values for those parameters, an attacker can cause arbitrary content to be referenced and possibly executed by the targeted Flash application.

← Back to the CWE list