CWE-598

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mlflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-6014"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-598"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-17T22:49:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-16T21:15:09Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An attacker is able to arbitrarily create an account in MLflow bypassing any authentication requirement.",
  "id": "GHSA-4qq5-mxxx-m6gg",
  "modified": "2024-03-01T21:26:17Z",
  "published": "2023-11-16T21:30:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6014"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/issues/9669"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/pull/9700"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/32de2154ef9f946160e5dc01a4d8a449dd0bd259"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/releases/tag/v2.8.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/3e64df69-ddc2-463e-9809-d07c24dc1de4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MLflow authentication requirement bypass can allow a user to arbitrarily create an account"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "openssl-encrypt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-598"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T21:12:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nRefresh tokens are accepted as URL query parameters in the keyserver and telemetry server routes.\n\n### Affected Code\n\n```python\n# openssl_encrypt_server/modules/keyserver/routes.py:214-215\n# openssl_encrypt_server/modules/telemetry/routes.py:90-91\nasync def refresh_token(\n    request: Request,\n    refresh_token: str = Query(..., description=\"Refresh token\")\n):\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nTokens in URL query parameters are exposed in:\n- Server access logs\n- Proxy/CDN logs\n- Browser history\n- HTTP Referer headers\n- Network monitoring tools\n\nThis creates significant token leakage risk.\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n- Accept refresh tokens in the request body (POST) instead of query parameters\n- Use `Body(...)` instead of `Query(...)`\n\n### Fix\n\nFixed in commit `4b2adb0` on branch `releases/1.4.x` \u2014 moved refresh token from Query parameter to POST body via RefreshRequest Pydantic model.",
  "id": "GHSA-4rh7-jwg9-m28m",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T21:12:19Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T21:12:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt/security/advisories/GHSA-4rh7-jwg9-m28m"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt/commit/4b2adb05cde8a7ee03cdd271755da3b377c68011"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "openssl-encrypt accepts refresh tokens as URL query parameters causing token leakage"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-26058"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-598"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-18T18:15:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Webkul QloApps v1.6.1 exposes authentication tokens in URLs during redirection. When users access the admin panel or other protected areas, the application appends sensitive authentication tokens directly to the URL.",
  "id": "GHSA-569q-p62w-x28h",
  "modified": "2025-02-19T21:31:37Z",
  "published": "2025-02-18T18:33:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26058"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mano257200/QloApps-VUL"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-2237"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-598"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T09:16:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A use of get request method with sensitive query strings vulnerability in volume encryption of Synology Storage Manager package before 1.0.1-1100 allows local attackers to obtain sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-5v68-527q-prqv",
  "modified": "2026-05-27T09:31:16Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T09:31:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2237"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43875"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-598"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T19:08:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T22:22:11Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php` completes an OAuth login by sending an HTTP 302 `Location: oauth2Success.php?user=\u003cemail\u003e\u0026pass=\u003cHASH\u003e` where `\u003cHASH\u003e` is the victim\u0027s stored password hash (`md5(hash(\"whirlpool\", sha1(password)))`) read directly from the `users` table. AVideo\u0027s own login endpoint (`objects/login.json.php`) accepts an `encodedPass=1` flag that bypasses hashing and performs a direct string comparison between the supplied value and the stored hash. Anyone who captures the redirect URL \u2014 via server logs, referrer leakage, or browser history \u2014 therefore obtains a credential equivalent to the plaintext password and can fully take over the account, including admin accounts.\n\n## Details\n\n### Sink: hash inlined in a GET redirect\n\n`plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php:98-102`:\n\n```php\n$pass = rand();\n$users_id = User::createUserIfNotExists($user, $pass, $name, $email, $photoURL);\n$adapter-\u003edisconnect();\n$userObject = new User($users_id);\nheader(\"Location: oauth2Success.php?user=\" . $userObject-\u003egetUser() . \"\u0026pass=\" . $userObject-\u003egetPassword());\n```\n\n`$userObject-\u003egetPassword()` returns the raw database column (`objects/user.php:159-162`):\n\n```php\npublic function getPassword()\n{\n    return strip_tags($this-\u003epassword);\n}\n```\n\nThe returned value is the stored password hash for the account (existing or freshly-created). It is transported to the browser as a query-string parameter in the `Location:` header, so it is written to:\n\n* Web-server access logs (`combined` / `main` log formats record the full request line including query string).\n* Upstream proxy / CDN / WAF logs.\n* Any error monitoring / APM that captures request URLs (Sentry, Datadog, New Relic defaults).\n* The victim\u0027s browser history (persistent local artifact).\n* The `Referer` header on subsequent navigation from the rendered `oauth2Success.php` page if the page or its assets load any external origin and the browser\u0027s `Referrer-Policy` is not strict.\n\n### Hash equals plaintext for login\n\n`objects/login.json.php:182-209`:\n\n```php\nif (!empty($_GET[\u0027user\u0027])) {\n    $_POST[\u0027user\u0027] = $_GET[\u0027user\u0027];\n}\nif (!empty($_GET[\u0027pass\u0027])) {\n    $_POST[\u0027pass\u0027] = $_GET[\u0027pass\u0027];\n}\nif (!empty($_GET[\u0027encodedPass\u0027])) {\n    $_POST[\u0027encodedPass\u0027] = $_GET[\u0027encodedPass\u0027];\n}\n...\n$user = new User(0, $_POST[\u0027user\u0027], $_POST[\u0027pass\u0027]);\n...\n$resp = $user-\u003elogin(false, @$_POST[\u0027encodedPass\u0027]);\n```\n\n`objects/user.php:1272-1279` passes `$encodedPass` to `find()`:\n\n```php\nif (strtolower($encodedPass) === \u0027false\u0027) {\n    $encodedPass = false;\n}\n...\n$user = $this-\u003efind($this-\u003euser, $this-\u003epassword, true, $encodedPass);\n```\n\n`objects/user.php:1785-1794`:\n\n```php\nif ($pass !== false) {\n    if (!encryptPasswordVerify($pass, $result[\u0027password\u0027], $encodedPass)) {\n        ...\n        return false;\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`objects/functions.php:2312-2331`:\n\n```php\nfunction encryptPasswordVerify(#[\\SensitiveParameter] $password, $hash, $encodedPass = false)\n{\n    global $advancedCustom, $global;\n    if (!$encodedPass || $encodedPass === \u0027false\u0027) {\n        $passwordSalted  = encryptPassword($password);\n        $passwordUnSalted = encryptPassword($password, true);\n    } else {\n        $passwordSalted  = $password;   // \u003c- direct use, no hashing\n        $passwordUnSalted = $password;\n    }\n    $isValid = $passwordSalted === $hash || $passwordUnSalted === $hash;\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nWhen `encodedPass` is truthy, the supplied value is compared as-is against the stored hash. The captured redirect parameter `pass=\u003cHASH\u003e` is therefore a valid login credential when replayed with `encodedPass=1`.\n\n### Compounding factors\n\n* The redirect is a raw `Location:` (GET), not a POST \u2014 the secret is placed in a URL which is by definition non-confidential transport.\n* No CSRF token, no `state` parameter tied to the session, and no single-use token is used on `/plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php`.\n* `login.json.php` does not require a CSRF token or captcha on the first attempt (`checkLoginAttempts()` at `objects/user.php:1282` only rate-limits after failures, and the attacker succeeds on the first try).\n* By contrast, the non-plugin flow in `objects/login.json.php:144-145` already sets session state server-side (`$userObject-\u003elogin(true)`), demonstrating the project already has a safer pattern available.\n\n## PoC\n\nPrerequisites: `MobileManager` plugin enabled and at least one supported login provider (e.g. `LoginGoogle`) configured with valid keys \u2014 both are common production settings for this product.\n\n1. Victim initiates the mobile OAuth flow:\n\n   ```\n   GET /plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php?type=Google\n   ```\n\n2. After the victim authorizes at the provider, the server sends:\n\n   ```\n   HTTP/1.1 302 Found\n   Location: oauth2Success.php?user=victim%40example.com\u0026pass=9d7ab4...stored-hash...\n   ```\n\n   This request-line \u2014 including the password hash \u2014 is written to the web server\u0027s access log (default `combined` format) and to any upstream proxy/CDN log. It also appears in the victim\u0027s browser history.\n\n3. Attacker obtains `\u003cHASH\u003e` from any of those channels.\n\n4. Attacker logs in as the victim without knowing the plaintext password:\n\n   ```\n   curl -i -c cookies.txt \\\n     \u0027https://target.example.com/objects/login.json.php?user=victim@example.com\u0026pass=\u003cHASH\u003e\u0026encodedPass=1\u0027\n   ```\n\n   Expected response: `200 OK` with JSON containing `id`, `user`, `PHPSESSID`, `isAdmin`, `email`, and a `Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=...` that grants full account access. The attacker can now browse, upload, modify the victim\u0027s channel, or \u2014 if the victim is an admin \u2014 access `/mvideos` and all admin endpoints.\n\n## Impact\n\n* Full account takeover of any user who has ever logged in through the MobileManager OAuth endpoint.\n* If the victim is an administrator, the attacker gains administrative control of the AVideo instance (user management, plugin config, site-wide content).\n* The exposed hash works indefinitely: it remains valid for as long as the victim does not change their password, so a one-time log/history/referrer capture yields a persistent credential.\n* Passes silently \u2014 from the application\u0027s perspective, the attacker is just a legitimate login with `encodedPass=1` (a flag the product itself uses for mobile-app \"remember me\" flows).\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. Never place the password hash (or any credential-equivalent material) in a URL. In `plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php`, mirror what `objects/login.json.php:143-146` already does for the web flow \u2014 establish the session server-side and redirect to a URL with no credentials:\n\n   ```php\n   $userObject = new User(0, $user, $pass);\n   $userObject-\u003elogin(true);   // server-side session\n   header(\"Location: oauth2Success.php\");\n   ```\n\n2. Additionally, remove or hard-restrict the `encodedPass` branch in `objects/functions.php:2319-2329`. If a \"hash-equivalent\" credential must exist for the mobile app, replace it with a short-lived, single-use, server-issued bearer token bound to the session, rather than the persistent database hash.\n\n3. Add a `state` parameter and CSRF protection on `/plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php` so the redirect cannot be initiated from a third-party origin.\n\n4. For defense-in-depth, strip query strings containing `pass=` from access-log formats and ensure `oauth2Success.php` sets `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` while it is being deprecated.",
  "id": "GHSA-5w8w-26ch-v5cw",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T14:19:29Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T19:08:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-5w8w-26ch-v5cw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43875"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/977cd6930a97571a26da4239e25c8096dd4ecbc1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: Password Hash Leak in MobileManager OAuth Redirect URL Enables Account Takeover"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-51651"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-598"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-14T17:15:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An authenticated arbitrary file download vulnerability in the component /admin/Backups.php of Mccms v2.7.0 allows attackers to download arbitrary files via a crafted GET request.",
  "id": "GHSA-5xj4-3cf7-r6mm",
  "modified": "2025-07-14T21:31:45Z",
  "published": "2025-07-14T18:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-51651"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Y4y17/CVE/blob/main/Arbitrary%20file%20download%20vulnerability.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-62317"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-598"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T17:16:19Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "HCL AION is affected by a vulnerability where sensitive information may be included in URL parameters. Passing sensitive data in URLs may expose it through browser history, logs, or intermediary systems, potentially leading to unintended information disclosure under certain conditions.",
  "id": "GHSA-63f7-76jf-xf93",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T18:32:56Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T18:32:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62317"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.hcl-software.com/csm?id=kb_article\u0026sysparm_article=KB0130636"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dectalk-tts"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.0.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-31206"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-300",
      "CWE-319",
      "CWE-598"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-04T14:21:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-04T23:15:15Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nIn `dectalk-tts@1.0.0`, network requests to the third-party API are sent over HTTP, which is unencrypted. Unencrypted traffic can be easily intercepted and modified by attackers. Anyone who uses the package could be the victim of a [man-in-the-middle (MITM)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack) attack.\n\n\u003cins\u003eTheft\u003c/ins\u003e\n\nBecause `dectalk-tts` is a text-to-speech package, user requests are expected to only contain natural language. The package [README](https://github.com/JstnMcBrd/dectalk-tts/blob/main/README.md) warns that user input is sent to a third-party API, so users should not send sensitive information regardless.\n\nBut if users ignore the warnings and send sensitive information anyway, that information could be stolen by attackers.\n\n\u003cins\u003eModification\u003c/ins\u003e\n\nAttackers could manipulate requests to the API. However, the worst a modified request could do is return an incorrect audio file or bad request rejection.\n\nAttackers could also manipulate responses from the API, returning malicious output to the user. Output is expected to be a wav-encoded buffer, which users will likely save to a file. This could be a dangerous entrypoint to the user\u0027s filesystem.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe network request was upgraded to HTTPS in version `1.0.1`. No other changes were made, so updating is risk-free.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds, but here are some precautions:\n\n- Do not send any sensitive information.\n\n- Carefully verify the API response before saving it.\n\n### References\n\n[Vulnerable code](https://github.com/JstnMcBrd/dectalk-tts/blob/b3e92156cbb699218ac9b9c7d8979abd0e635767/src/index.ts#L18)\n[Original report](https://github.com/JstnMcBrd/dectalk-tts/issues/3)\n[Patch pull request](https://github.com/JstnMcBrd/dectalk-tts/pull/4)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-6cf6-8hvr-r68w",
  "modified": "2024-04-05T15:44:23Z",
  "published": "2024-04-04T14:21:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/JstnMcBrd/dectalk-tts/security/advisories/GHSA-6cf6-8hvr-r68w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31206"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/JstnMcBrd/dectalk-tts/issues/3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/JstnMcBrd/dectalk-tts/pull/4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/JstnMcBrd/dectalk-tts/commit/3600d8ac156f27da553ac4ead46d16989a350105"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/JstnMcBrd/dectalk-tts"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/JstnMcBrd/dectalk-tts/blob/b3e92156cbb699218ac9b9c7d8979abd0e635767/src/index.ts#L18"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "dectalk-tts Uses Unencrypted HTTP Request"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "ray"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-6020"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-598",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-27T23:21:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-16T21:15:09Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "LFI in Ray\u0027s /static/ directory allows attackers to read any file on the server without authentication. The issue is fixed in version 2.8.1+. Ray maintainers response can be found here: https://www.anyscale.com/blog/update-on-ray-cves-cve-2023-6019-cve-2023-6020-cve-2023-6021-cve-2023-48022-cve-2023-48023",
  "id": "GHSA-6cxr-8q3m-jwrr",
  "modified": "2025-01-09T23:39:13Z",
  "published": "2023-11-16T21:30:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6020"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ray-project/ray"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ray-project/ray/releases/tag/ray-2.8.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/83dd8619-6dc3-4c98-8f1b-e620fedcd1f6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.anyscale.com/blog/update-on-ray-cves-cve-2023-6019-cve-2023-6020-cve-2023-6021-cve-2023-48022-cve-2023-48023"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ray Missing Authorization vulnerability"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-1738"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-598"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-27T13:15:11Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A Password Transmitted over Query String vulnerability has been found in Trivision Camera NC227WF v5.8.0 from TrivisionSecurity, exposing this sensitive information to a third party.",
  "id": "GHSA-6rjw-935f-mw9q",
  "modified": "2025-02-27T15:31:51Z",
  "published": "2025-02-27T15:31:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1738"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-trivision-camera-nc227wf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}