Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-306

Allowed

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

3492 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-6QG9-WX75-QW25

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 22:28 – Updated: 2023-11-09 18:34
VLAI
Details

SITEL CAP/PRX firmware version 5.2.01 allows an attacker with access to the local network, to access via HTTP to the internal configuration database of the device without any authentication. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability in order to obtain information about the device´s configuration.

Severity
3.3 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-32453"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-05-17T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "SITEL CAP/PRX firmware version 5.2.01 allows an attacker with access to the local network, to access via HTTP to the internal configuration database of the device without any authentication. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability in order to obtain information about the device\u00b4s configuration.",
  "id": "GHSA-6qg9-wx75-qw25",
  "modified": "2023-11-09T18:34:53Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T22:28:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32453"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe-cert.es/en/early-warning/ics-advisories/sitel-capprx-information-exposure"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso-sci/sitel-capprx-information-exposure"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6QJ6-GV54-XG63

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-27 00:30 – Updated: 2025-11-27 00:30
VLAI
Details

Tellion HN-2204AP routers contain an unauthenticated configuration disclosure vulnerability in the /cgi-bin/system_config_file management endpoint. The endpoint allows remote retrieval of a compressed configuration archive without requiring authentication or authorization. The exposed configuration may include administrative credentials, wireless keys, and other sensitive settings, enabling an unauthenticated attacker to obtain information that can facilitate further compromise of the device or network.

Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-25227"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-26T23:15:46Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Tellion HN-2204AP routers contain an unauthenticated configuration disclosure vulnerability in the /cgi-bin/system_config_file management endpoint. The endpoint allows remote retrieval of a compressed configuration archive without requiring authentication or authorization. The exposed configuration may include administrative credentials, wireless keys, and other sensitive settings, enabling an unauthenticated attacker to obtain information that can facilitate further compromise of the device or network.",
  "id": "GHSA-6qj6-gv54-xg63",
  "modified": "2025-11-27T00:30:26Z",
  "published": "2025-11-27T00:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-25227"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://packetstorm.news/files/id/154752"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190525010559/https://www.tellion.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/tellion-hn2204ap-unauthenticated-config-disclosure"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6QMF-MGWV-P87X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:36 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:36
VLAI
Details

ACTi cameras including the D, B, I, and E series using firmware version A1D-500-V6.11.31-AC fail to properly restrict access to the factory reset page. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by directly accessing the http://x.x.x.x/setup/setup_maintain_firmware-default.html page. This will allow an attacker to perform a factory reset on the device, leading to a denial of service condition or the ability to make use of default credentials (CVE-2017-3186).

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-3184"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-798"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-12-16T02:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "ACTi cameras including the D, B, I, and E series using firmware version A1D-500-V6.11.31-AC fail to properly restrict access to the factory reset page. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by directly accessing the http://x.x.x.x/setup/setup_maintain_firmware-default.html page. This will allow an attacker to perform a factory reset on the device, leading to a denial of service condition or the ability to make use of default credentials (CVE-2017-3186).",
  "id": "GHSA-6qmf-mgwv-p87x",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:36:45Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:36:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-3184"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://twitter.com/Hfuhs/status/839252357221330944"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://twitter.com/hack3rsca/status/839599437907386368"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/355151"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/96720/info"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6QQJ-V86P-PCPJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-02 15:32
VLAI
Details

Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in TR7 Cyber ​​Defense Inc. WAF-ASP allows Authentication Abuse.

This issue affects WAF-ASP: from v1.0.324.900 before v1.4.0.117.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-4767"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T14:16:25Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in TR7 Cyber \u200b\u200bDefense Inc. WAF-ASP allows Authentication Abuse.\n\nThis issue affects WAF-ASP: from v1.0.324.900 before v1.4.0.117.",
  "id": "GHSA-6qqj-v86p-pcpj",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T15:32:12Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T15:32:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4767"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-26-0487"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6QR9-G2XW-CW92

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-19 22:04 – Updated: 2026-02-20 21:44
VLAI
Summary
Dagu affected by unauthenticated RCE via inline DAG spec in default configuration
Details

Summary

Dagu's default configuration ships with authentication disabled. The POST /api/v2/dag-runs endpoint accepts an inline YAML spec and executes its shell commands immediately with no credentials required — any dagu instance reachable over the network is fully compromised by default.

Details

internal/service/app/config/loader.go:226 sets AuthModeNone as the default. With no auth mode configured, internal/frontend/api/v2/handlers/api.go:520 returns nil from requireExecute() — all permission checks pass without a valid session.

The POST /api/v2/dag-runs endpoint accepts a spec field containing a full YAML DAG definition. The spec is parsed and the commands execute immediately on the host with no validation beyond YAML parsing.

PoC

curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/v2/dag-runs \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"poc","spec":"steps:\n  - name: rce\n    command: id > /tmp/pwned\n"}'
# Response: {"dagRunId":"<uuid>"}
# /tmp/pwned contains: uid=1000(dagu) gid=1000(dagu)

Confirmed on ghcr.io/dagu-org/dagu:latest with no configuration changes.

Impact

Every dagu deployment using default settings — every Docker deployment, every install following the documentation, every instance without explicit DAGU_AUTH_MODE configuration — is fully compromised without credentials. An attacker with network access gets OS command execution as the dagu process user.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/dagu-org/dagu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.30.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-19T22:04:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nDagu\u0027s default configuration ships with authentication disabled. The `POST /api/v2/dag-runs` endpoint accepts an inline YAML spec and executes its shell commands immediately with no credentials required \u2014 any dagu instance reachable over the network is fully compromised by default.\n\n### Details\n`internal/service/app/config/loader.go:226` sets `AuthModeNone` as the default. With no auth mode configured, `internal/frontend/api/v2/handlers/api.go:520` returns `nil` from `requireExecute()` \u2014 all permission checks pass without a valid session.\n\nThe `POST /api/v2/dag-runs` endpoint accepts a `spec` field containing a full YAML DAG definition. The spec is parsed and the commands execute immediately on the host with no validation beyond YAML parsing.\n\n### PoC\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/v2/dag-runs \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"poc\",\"spec\":\"steps:\\n  - name: rce\\n    command: id \u003e /tmp/pwned\\n\"}\u0027\n# Response: {\"dagRunId\":\"\u003cuuid\u003e\"}\n# /tmp/pwned contains: uid=1000(dagu) gid=1000(dagu)\n```\nConfirmed on `ghcr.io/dagu-org/dagu:latest` with no configuration changes.\n\n### Impact\nEvery dagu deployment using default settings \u2014 every Docker deployment, every install following the documentation, every instance without explicit `DAGU_AUTH_MODE` configuration \u2014 is fully compromised without credentials. An attacker with network access gets OS command execution as the dagu process user.",
  "id": "GHSA-6qr9-g2xw-cw92",
  "modified": "2026-02-20T21:44:24Z",
  "published": "2026-02-19T22:04:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dagu-org/dagu/security/advisories/GHSA-6qr9-g2xw-cw92"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dagu-org/dagu"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dagu affected by unauthenticated RCE via inline DAG spec in default configuration"
}

GHSA-6R8J-2F85-XR6C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-17 18:31 – Updated: 2024-10-17 18:31
VLAI
Details

The affected product is vulnerable to an attacker being able to use commands without providing a password which may allow an attacker to leak information.

Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-49399"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-17T17:15:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The affected product is vulnerable to an attacker being able to use commands without providing a password which may allow an attacker to leak information.",
  "id": "GHSA-6r8j-2f85-xr6c",
  "modified": "2024-10-17T18:31:36Z",
  "published": "2024-10-17T18:31:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49399"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-291-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6RHM-R8WQ-WGM6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-11 00:02 – Updated: 2022-03-20 00:00
VLAI
Details

Power Line Communications PLC4TRUCKS J2497 trailer brake controllers implement diagnostic functions which can be invoked by replaying J2497 messages. There is no authentication or authorization for these functions.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-25922"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-10T17:47:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Power Line Communications PLC4TRUCKS J2497 trailer brake controllers implement diagnostic functions which can be invoked by replaying J2497 messages. There is no authentication or authorization for these functions.",
  "id": "GHSA-6rhm-r8wq-wgm6",
  "modified": "2022-03-20T00:00:37Z",
  "published": "2022-03-11T00:02:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25922"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-063-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6RJF-JV9R-JJ4V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 19:24 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:30
VLAI
Details

Delta Electronics InfraSuite Device Master versions 00.00.01a and prior allow unauthenticated users to access the aprunning endpoint, which could allow an attacker to retrieve any file from the “RunningConfigs” directory. The attacker could then view and modify configuration files such as UserListInfo.xml, which would allow them to see existing administrative passwords.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-41629"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-31T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Delta Electronics InfraSuite Device Master versions 00.00.01a and prior allow unauthenticated users to access the aprunning endpoint, which could allow an attacker to retrieve any file from the \u201cRunningConfigs\u201d directory. The attacker could then view and modify configuration files such as UserListInfo.xml, which would allow them to see existing administrative passwords.",
  "id": "GHSA-6rjf-jv9r-jj4v",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T05:30:04Z",
  "published": "2023-07-06T19:24:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41629"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-298-07"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6RMH-7XCM-CPXJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 13:56 – Updated: 2026-05-11 13:56
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI ships and generates a legacy API server with authentication disabled by default, allowing unauthenticated workflow execution
Details

Summary

PraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access /agents and trigger the configured agents.yaml workflow through /chat without providing a token.

Details

The vulnerable server is the shipped src/praisonai/api_server.py entrypoint.

The deploy subsystem keeps the same insecure authentication default:

For scope clarity: the newer serve agents command is safer by default, because it binds to 127.0.0.1 and supports --api-key in [src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:155). This report is about the shipped legacy API server and the generated/sample API deployment path above.

Version scope:

  • v2.5.6 already ships the same src/praisonai/api_server.py implementation.
  • The current PyPI release on May 1, 2026 is 4.6.33, and it still ships the same unauthenticated server logic.

PoC

The following route-level reproduction was verified locally and proves that the shipped api_server.py exposes /agents and /chat without authentication.

  1. From the repository root, create a throwaway environment with the server's direct Flask dependencies:
python3 -m venv /tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv
/tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv/bin/pip install flask flask-cors
  1. Execute the shipped src/praisonai/api_server.py under a minimal stub for praisonai.PraisonAI so only the server auth logic is exercised:
/tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv/bin/python - <<'PY'
import importlib.util
import pathlib
import sys
import types

stub = types.ModuleType("praisonai")

class DummyPraisonAI:
    def __init__(self, agent_file="agents.yaml"):
        self.agent_file = agent_file
    def run(self):
        return {"ran": True, "agent_file": self.agent_file}

stub.PraisonAI = DummyPraisonAI
sys.modules["praisonai"] = stub

path = pathlib.Path("src/praisonai/api_server.py").resolve()
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("api_server_local", path)
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)

client = mod.app.test_client()
print(client.get("/agents").status_code, client.get("/agents").get_data(as_text=True))
print(client.post("/chat", json={"message": "hello"}).status_code, client.post("/chat", json={"message": "hello"}).get_data(as_text=True))
PY
  1. Observed result:
200 {"agent_file":"agents.yaml","agents":["default"]}
200 {"response":{"agent_file":"agents.yaml","ran":true},"status":"success"}

Both endpoints succeed without any Authorization header.

Impact

Any reachable caller can invoke the legacy API server's protected functionality without a token.

At minimum, this allows:

  • unauthenticated enumeration of the configured agent file through /agents
  • unauthenticated triggering of the locally configured agents.yaml workflow through /chat
  • repeated consumption of model/API quota and any other side effects performed by that workflow
  • exposure of whatever result PraisonAI.run() returns to the unauthenticated caller

This is not the same as arbitrary prompt injection by itself, because the current /chat handler ignores the submitted message value and simply runs the configured workflow. The impact therefore depends on what the operator's agents.yaml is allowed to do, but the authentication bypass is unconditional in the shipped legacy server.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.33"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "PraisonAI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.5.6"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.34"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44338"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-668"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T13:56:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T14:16:46Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nPraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access `/agents` and trigger the configured `agents.yaml` workflow through `/chat` without providing a token.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable server is the shipped `src/praisonai/api_server.py` entrypoint.\n\n- `AUTH_ENABLED = False` and `AUTH_TOKEN = None` are hard-coded at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15).\n- `check_auth()` returns `True` whenever authentication is disabled, so both protected routes fail open by design at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18).\n- `POST /chat` only checks that the request JSON contains a `message` key and then runs `PraisonAI(agent_file=\"agents.yaml\").run()` at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31).\n- `GET /agents` is guarded by the same no-op authentication check and returns agent metadata at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:55)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:66):55).\n- When launched directly, the same script binds to `0.0.0.0:8080` at [src/praisonai/api_server.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:66).\n\nThe deploy subsystem keeps the same insecure authentication default:\n\n- `APIConfig` defaults `auth_enabled` to `False` in [[src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/models.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/models.py:23)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/models.py:23).\n- The generated sample API deployment YAML recommends `host: 0.0.0.0` together with `auth_enabled: false` in [[src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/schema.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/schema.py:108)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/schema.py:108).\n\nFor scope clarity: the newer `serve agents` command is safer by default, because it binds to `127.0.0.1` and supports `--api-key` in [[src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:155)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:155). This report is about the shipped legacy API server and the generated/sample API deployment path above.\n\nVersion scope:\n\n- `v2.5.6` already ships the same `src/praisonai/api_server.py` implementation.\n- The current PyPI release on May 1, 2026 is `4.6.33`, and it still ships the same unauthenticated server logic.\n\n### PoC\nThe following route-level reproduction was verified locally and proves that the shipped `api_server.py` exposes `/agents` and `/chat` without authentication.\n\n1. From the repository root, create a throwaway environment with the server\u0027s direct Flask dependencies:\n\n```bash\npython3 -m venv /tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv\n/tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv/bin/pip install flask flask-cors\n```\n\n2. Execute the shipped `src/praisonai/api_server.py` under a minimal stub for `praisonai.PraisonAI` so only the server auth logic is exercised:\n\n```bash\n/tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv/bin/python - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport importlib.util\nimport pathlib\nimport sys\nimport types\n\nstub = types.ModuleType(\"praisonai\")\n\nclass DummyPraisonAI:\n    def __init__(self, agent_file=\"agents.yaml\"):\n        self.agent_file = agent_file\n    def run(self):\n        return {\"ran\": True, \"agent_file\": self.agent_file}\n\nstub.PraisonAI = DummyPraisonAI\nsys.modules[\"praisonai\"] = stub\n\npath = pathlib.Path(\"src/praisonai/api_server.py\").resolve()\nspec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"api_server_local\", path)\nmod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\nspec.loader.exec_module(mod)\n\nclient = mod.app.test_client()\nprint(client.get(\"/agents\").status_code, client.get(\"/agents\").get_data(as_text=True))\nprint(client.post(\"/chat\", json={\"message\": \"hello\"}).status_code, client.post(\"/chat\", json={\"message\": \"hello\"}).get_data(as_text=True))\nPY\n```\n\n3. Observed result:\n\n```text\n200 {\"agent_file\":\"agents.yaml\",\"agents\":[\"default\"]}\n200 {\"response\":{\"agent_file\":\"agents.yaml\",\"ran\":true},\"status\":\"success\"}\n```\n\nBoth endpoints succeed without any `Authorization` header.\n\n### Impact\nAny reachable caller can invoke the legacy API server\u0027s protected functionality without a token.\n\nAt minimum, this allows:\n\n- unauthenticated enumeration of the configured agent file through `/agents`\n- unauthenticated triggering of the locally configured `agents.yaml` workflow through `/chat`\n- repeated consumption of model/API quota and any other side effects performed by that workflow\n- exposure of whatever result `PraisonAI.run()` returns to the unauthenticated caller\n\nThis is not the same as arbitrary prompt injection by itself, because the current `/chat` handler ignores the submitted `message` value and simply runs the configured workflow. The impact therefore depends on what the operator\u0027s `agents.yaml` is allowed to do, but the authentication bypass is unconditional in the shipped legacy server.",
  "id": "GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj",
  "modified": "2026-05-11T13:56:16Z",
  "published": "2026-05-11T13:56:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44338"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI ships and generates a legacy API server with authentication disabled by default, allowing unauthenticated workflow execution"
}

GHSA-6RQJ-RWR9-WWM7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:47 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:55
VLAI
Details

Several web pages provided SAP NetWeaver Process Integration (versions: SAP_XIESR: 7.10 to 7.11, 7.20, 7.30, 7.31, 7.40, 7.50 and SAP_XITOOL: 7.10 to 7.11, 7.30, 7.31, 7.40, 7.50) are not password protected. An attacker could access landscape information like host names, ports or other technical data in the absence of restrictive firewall and port settings.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-0312"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-06-12T17:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Several web pages provided SAP NetWeaver Process Integration (versions: SAP_XIESR: 7.10 to 7.11, 7.20, 7.30, 7.31, 7.40, 7.50 and SAP_XITOOL: 7.10 to 7.11, 7.30, 7.31, 7.40, 7.50) are not password protected. An attacker could access landscape information like host names, ports or other technical data in the absence of restrictive firewall and port settings.",
  "id": "GHSA-6rqj-rwr9-wwm7",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T00:55:31Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:47:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0312"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/2744086"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=521864242"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
  • Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
  • In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
  • In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation System Configuration Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier

This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.

CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values

An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.

CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation

An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.

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