Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-306

Allowed

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

3465 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-4WPH-9VRM-6V3W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-16 19:00 – Updated: 2024-10-26 18:41
VLAI
Summary
Rdiffweb vulnerable to Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Details

Missing Authentication for Critical Function in GitHub repository ikus060/rdiffweb prior to 2.5.0a6.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "rdiffweb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.0a6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-4018"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-11-22T00:18:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-16T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authentication for Critical Function in GitHub repository ikus060/rdiffweb prior to 2.5.0a6.",
  "id": "GHSA-4wph-9vrm-6v3w",
  "modified": "2024-10-26T18:41:06Z",
  "published": "2022-11-16T19:00:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4018"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb/commit/f2a32f2a9f3fb8be1a9432ac3d81d3aacdb13095"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/rdiffweb/PYSEC-2022-43001.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/5340c2f6-0252-40f6-8929-cca5d64958a5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Rdiffweb vulnerable to Missing Authentication for Critical Function"
}

GHSA-4WQG-2GVP-C2C4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:52 – Updated: 2023-03-03 18:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the Virtual Network Computing (VNC) console implementation of Cisco Enterprise NFV Infrastructure Software (NFVIS) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access the VNC console session of an administrative user on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to an insufficient authentication mechanism used to establish a VNC session. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by intercepting an administrator VNC session request prior to login. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to watch the administrator console session or interact with it, allowing admin access to the affected device.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-1895"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-08-07T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the Virtual Network Computing (VNC) console implementation of Cisco Enterprise NFV Infrastructure Software (NFVIS) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access the VNC console session of an administrative user on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to an insufficient authentication mechanism used to establish a VNC session. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by intercepting an administrator VNC session request prior to login. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to watch the administrator console session or interact with it, allowing admin access to the affected device.",
  "id": "GHSA-4wqg-2gvp-c2c4",
  "modified": "2023-03-03T18:30:27Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:52:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1895"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190807-nfvis-vnc-authbypass"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4WR3-F4P3-5WJH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 19:24 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:24
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Allow-List Manipulation Bypasses Agent Tool Approval Safety Controls
Details

Summary

The gateway's /api/approval/allow-list endpoint permits unauthenticated modification of the tool approval allowlist when no auth_token is configured (the default). By adding dangerous tool names (e.g., shell_exec, file_write) to the allowlist, an attacker can cause the ExecApprovalManager to auto-approve all future agent invocations of those tools, bypassing the human-in-the-loop safety mechanism that the approval system is specifically designed to enforce.

Details

The vulnerability arises from the interaction of three components:

1. Authentication bypass in default config

_check_auth() in server.py:243-246 returns None (no error) when self.config.auth_token is falsy:

# server.py:243-246
def _check_auth(request) -> Optional[JSONResponse]:
    if not self.config.auth_token:
        return None  # No auth configured → allow everything

GatewayConfig defaults auth_token to None (config.py:61):

# config.py:61
auth_token: Optional[str] = None

2. Unrestricted allowlist modification

The approval_allowlist handler at server.py:381-420 calls _check_auth() and proceeds when it returns None:

# server.py:388-410
auth_err = _check_auth(request)
if auth_err:
    return auth_err
# ...
if request.method == "POST":
    _approval_mgr.allowlist.add(tool_name)  # No validation on tool_name
    return JSONResponse({"added": tool_name})

There is no validation that tool_name corresponds to a real tool, no restriction on which tools can be allowlisted, and no rate limiting.

3. Auto-approval fast path

When GatewayApprovalBackend.request_approval() is called by an agent (gateway_approval.py:87), it calls ExecApprovalManager.register(), which checks the allowlist first (exec_approval.py:141-144):

# exec_approval.py:140-144
# Fast path: already permanently allowed
if tool_name in self.allowlist:
    future.set_result(Resolution(approved=True, reason="allow-always"))
    return ("auto", future)

The tool executes immediately without any human review.

Complete data flow: 1. Attacker POSTs {"tool_name": "shell_exec"} to /api/approval/allow-list 2. _check_auth() returns None (no auth token configured) 3. _approval_mgr.allowlist.add("shell_exec") adds to the PermissionAllowlist set 4. Agent later calls shell_execGatewayApprovalBackend.request_approval()ExecApprovalManager.register() 5. register() hits the fast path: "shell_exec" in self.allowlistTrue 6. Returns Resolution(approved=True) — no human review occurs 7. Agent executes the dangerous tool

PoC

# Step 1: Verify the gateway is running with default config (no auth)
curl http://127.0.0.1:8765/health
# Response: {"status": "healthy", ...}

# Step 2: Check current allow-list (empty by default)
curl http://127.0.0.1:8765/api/approval/allow-list
# Response: {"allow_list": []}

# Step 3: Add dangerous tools to allow-list without authentication
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8765/api/approval/allow-list \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"tool_name": "shell_exec"}'
# Response: {"added": "shell_exec"}

curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8765/api/approval/allow-list \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"tool_name": "file_write"}'
# Response: {"added": "file_write"}

curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8765/api/approval/allow-list \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"tool_name": "code_execution"}'
# Response: {"added": "code_execution"}

# Step 4: Verify tools are now permanently auto-approved
curl http://127.0.0.1:8765/api/approval/allow-list
# Response: {"allow_list": ["code_execution", "file_write", "shell_exec"]}

# Step 5: Any agent using GatewayApprovalBackend will now auto-approve
# these tools via ExecApprovalManager.register() fast path at
# exec_approval.py:141 without human review.

Impact

  • Bypasses human-in-the-loop safety controls: The approval system is the primary safety mechanism preventing agents from executing dangerous operations (shell commands, file writes, code execution) without human review. Once the allowlist is manipulated, all safety gates for the specified tools are permanently disabled for the lifetime of the gateway process.
  • Enables arbitrary agent tool execution: Any tool can be added to the allowlist, including tools that execute shell commands, write files, or perform other privileged operations.
  • Persistent within process: The allowlist is stored in-memory and persists for the entire gateway lifetime. There is no audit log of allowlist modifications.
  • Local attack surface: Default binding to 127.0.0.1 limits this to local attackers, but any process on the same host (malicious scripts, compromised dependencies, SSRF from other local services) can exploit this. When combined with the separately-reported CORS wildcard origin (CWE-942), this becomes exploitable from any website via the user's browser.

Recommended Fix

The approval allowlist endpoint is a security-critical function and should always require authentication, even in development mode. Apply one of these mitigations:

Option A: Require auth_token for approval endpoints (recommended)

# server.py - modify _check_auth or add a separate check for approval endpoints
def _check_auth_required(request) -> Optional[JSONResponse]:
    """Validate auth token - ALWAYS required for security-critical endpoints."""
    if not self.config.auth_token:
        return JSONResponse(
            {"error": "auth_token must be configured to use approval endpoints"},
            status_code=403,
        )
    return _check_auth(request)

# Then in approval_allowlist():
async def approval_allowlist(request):
    auth_err = _check_auth_required(request)  # Always require auth
    if auth_err:
        return auth_err

Option B: Restrict allowlist additions to known safe tools

# exec_approval.py - add a tool safety classification
ALLOWLIST_BLOCKED_TOOLS = {"shell_exec", "file_write", "code_execution", "bash", "terminal"}

# server.py - validate tool_name before adding
if tool_name in ALLOWLIST_BLOCKED_TOOLS:
    return JSONResponse(
        {"error": f"'{tool_name}' cannot be added to allow-list (high-risk tool)"},
        status_code=403,
    )
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "PraisonAI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.128"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40149"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-396"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:24:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T22:16:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe gateway\u0027s `/api/approval/allow-list` endpoint permits unauthenticated modification of the tool approval allowlist when no `auth_token` is configured (the default). By adding dangerous tool names (e.g., `shell_exec`, `file_write`) to the allowlist, an attacker can cause the `ExecApprovalManager` to auto-approve all future agent invocations of those tools, bypassing the human-in-the-loop safety mechanism that the approval system is specifically designed to enforce.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability arises from the interaction of three components:\n\n**1. Authentication bypass in default config**\n\n`_check_auth()` in `server.py:243-246` returns `None` (no error) when `self.config.auth_token` is falsy:\n\n```python\n# server.py:243-246\ndef _check_auth(request) -\u003e Optional[JSONResponse]:\n    if not self.config.auth_token:\n        return None  # No auth configured \u2192 allow everything\n```\n\n`GatewayConfig` defaults `auth_token` to `None` (`config.py:61`):\n\n```python\n# config.py:61\nauth_token: Optional[str] = None\n```\n\n**2. Unrestricted allowlist modification**\n\nThe `approval_allowlist` handler at `server.py:381-420` calls `_check_auth()` and proceeds when it returns `None`:\n\n```python\n# server.py:388-410\nauth_err = _check_auth(request)\nif auth_err:\n    return auth_err\n# ...\nif request.method == \"POST\":\n    _approval_mgr.allowlist.add(tool_name)  # No validation on tool_name\n    return JSONResponse({\"added\": tool_name})\n```\n\nThere is no validation that `tool_name` corresponds to a real tool, no restriction on which tools can be allowlisted, and no rate limiting.\n\n**3. Auto-approval fast path**\n\nWhen `GatewayApprovalBackend.request_approval()` is called by an agent (`gateway_approval.py:87`), it calls `ExecApprovalManager.register()`, which checks the allowlist first (`exec_approval.py:141-144`):\n\n```python\n# exec_approval.py:140-144\n# Fast path: already permanently allowed\nif tool_name in self.allowlist:\n    future.set_result(Resolution(approved=True, reason=\"allow-always\"))\n    return (\"auto\", future)\n```\n\nThe tool executes immediately without any human review.\n\n**Complete data flow:**\n1. Attacker POSTs `{\"tool_name\": \"shell_exec\"}` to `/api/approval/allow-list`\n2. `_check_auth()` returns `None` (no auth token configured)\n3. `_approval_mgr.allowlist.add(\"shell_exec\")` adds to the `PermissionAllowlist` set\n4. Agent later calls `shell_exec` \u2192 `GatewayApprovalBackend.request_approval()` \u2192 `ExecApprovalManager.register()`\n5. `register()` hits the fast path: `\"shell_exec\" in self.allowlist` \u2192 `True`\n6. Returns `Resolution(approved=True)` \u2014 no human review occurs\n7. Agent executes the dangerous tool\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Verify the gateway is running with default config (no auth)\ncurl http://127.0.0.1:8765/health\n# Response: {\"status\": \"healthy\", ...}\n\n# Step 2: Check current allow-list (empty by default)\ncurl http://127.0.0.1:8765/api/approval/allow-list\n# Response: {\"allow_list\": []}\n\n# Step 3: Add dangerous tools to allow-list without authentication\ncurl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8765/api/approval/allow-list \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"tool_name\": \"shell_exec\"}\u0027\n# Response: {\"added\": \"shell_exec\"}\n\ncurl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8765/api/approval/allow-list \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"tool_name\": \"file_write\"}\u0027\n# Response: {\"added\": \"file_write\"}\n\ncurl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8765/api/approval/allow-list \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"tool_name\": \"code_execution\"}\u0027\n# Response: {\"added\": \"code_execution\"}\n\n# Step 4: Verify tools are now permanently auto-approved\ncurl http://127.0.0.1:8765/api/approval/allow-list\n# Response: {\"allow_list\": [\"code_execution\", \"file_write\", \"shell_exec\"]}\n\n# Step 5: Any agent using GatewayApprovalBackend will now auto-approve\n# these tools via ExecApprovalManager.register() fast path at\n# exec_approval.py:141 without human review.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Bypasses human-in-the-loop safety controls**: The approval system is the primary safety mechanism preventing agents from executing dangerous operations (shell commands, file writes, code execution) without human review. Once the allowlist is manipulated, all safety gates for the specified tools are permanently disabled for the lifetime of the gateway process.\n- **Enables arbitrary agent tool execution**: Any tool can be added to the allowlist, including tools that execute shell commands, write files, or perform other privileged operations.\n- **Persistent within process**: The allowlist is stored in-memory and persists for the entire gateway lifetime. There is no audit log of allowlist modifications.\n- **Local attack surface**: Default binding to `127.0.0.1` limits this to local attackers, but any process on the same host (malicious scripts, compromised dependencies, SSRF from other local services) can exploit this. When combined with the separately-reported CORS wildcard origin (CWE-942), this becomes exploitable from any website via the user\u0027s browser.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nThe approval allowlist endpoint is a security-critical function and should always require authentication, even in development mode. Apply one of these mitigations:\n\n**Option A: Require auth_token for approval endpoints (recommended)**\n\n```python\n# server.py - modify _check_auth or add a separate check for approval endpoints\ndef _check_auth_required(request) -\u003e Optional[JSONResponse]:\n    \"\"\"Validate auth token - ALWAYS required for security-critical endpoints.\"\"\"\n    if not self.config.auth_token:\n        return JSONResponse(\n            {\"error\": \"auth_token must be configured to use approval endpoints\"},\n            status_code=403,\n        )\n    return _check_auth(request)\n\n# Then in approval_allowlist():\nasync def approval_allowlist(request):\n    auth_err = _check_auth_required(request)  # Always require auth\n    if auth_err:\n        return auth_err\n```\n\n**Option B: Restrict allowlist additions to known safe tools**\n\n```python\n# exec_approval.py - add a tool safety classification\nALLOWLIST_BLOCKED_TOOLS = {\"shell_exec\", \"file_write\", \"code_execution\", \"bash\", \"terminal\"}\n\n# server.py - validate tool_name before adding\nif tool_name in ALLOWLIST_BLOCKED_TOOLS:\n    return JSONResponse(\n        {\"error\": f\"\u0027{tool_name}\u0027 cannot be added to allow-list (high-risk tool)\"},\n        status_code=403,\n    )\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-4wr3-f4p3-5wjh",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T19:24:11Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T19:24:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-4wr3-f4p3-5wjh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40149"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.128"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Allow-List Manipulation Bypasses Agent Tool Approval Safety Controls"
}

GHSA-4X43-FWGV-CQ8J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-25 18:32 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:55
VLAI
Details

A first-factor authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the PingFederate with PingID Radius PCV when a MSCHAP authentication request is sent via a maliciously crafted RADIUS client request.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-39930"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:29Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A first-factor authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the PingFederate with PingID Radius PCV when a MSCHAP authentication request is sent via a maliciously crafted RADIUS client request.",
  "id": "GHSA-4x43-fwgv-cq8j",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T08:55:05Z",
  "published": "2023-10-25T18:32:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39930"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.pingidentity.com/r/en-us/pingid/pingid_integration_kit_2_26_rn"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.pingidentity.com/en/resources/downloads/pingfederate.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4X74-RJV6-JFFP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:16 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:16
VLAI
Details

The outdoor unit of Customer Premise Equipment (CPE) product B2338-168 V100R001C00 has a no authentication vulnerability on a certain port. After accessing the network between the indoor and outdoor units of the CPE, an attacker can deliver commands to the specific port of the outdoor unit and execute them without authentication. Successful exploit could allow the attacker to take control over the outdoor unit.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-8155"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-11-22T19:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The outdoor unit of Customer Premise Equipment (CPE) product B2338-168 V100R001C00 has a no authentication vulnerability on a certain port. After accessing the network between the indoor and outdoor units of the CPE, an attacker can deliver commands to the specific port of the outdoor unit and execute them without authentication. Successful exploit could allow the attacker to take control over the outdoor unit.",
  "id": "GHSA-4x74-rjv6-jffp",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T00:16:42Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T00:16:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8155"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/2017/huawei-sa-20170920-01-cpe-en"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4X7R-2G5V-6XMQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:36 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:36
VLAI
Details

Improper Authentication vulnerability in Gallagher Command Centre Server allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to create items with invalid configuration, potentially causing the server to crash and fail to restart. This issue affects: Gallagher Command Centre 8.30 versions prior to 8.30.XXX(MRX); 8.20 versions prior to 8.20.XXX(MRX); 8.10 versions prior to 8.10.XXX(MRX); 8.00 versions prior to 8.00.XXX(MRX); version 7.90 and prior versions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-16102"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-12-14T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Authentication vulnerability in Gallagher Command Centre Server allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to create items with invalid configuration, potentially causing the server to crash and fail to restart. This issue affects: Gallagher Command Centre 8.30 versions prior to 8.30.XXX(MRX); 8.20 versions prior to 8.20.XXX(MRX); 8.10 versions prior to 8.10.XXX(MRX); 8.00 versions prior to 8.00.XXX(MRX); version 7.90 and prior versions.",
  "id": "GHSA-4x7r-2g5v-6xmq",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:36:16Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:36:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-16102"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gallagher.com/Security-Advisories/CVE-2020-16102"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-4X83-3VJM-FC98

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-01 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-01 18:30
VLAI
Details

A denial of service vulnerability exists in the Modbus TCP and Modbus RTU over TCP functionality of Socomec DIRIS Digiware M-70 1.6.9. A specially crafted series of network requests can lead to a denial of service. An attacker can send a sequence of unauthenticated packets to trigger this vulnerability.An attacker can trigger this denial-of-service condition by sending a single Modbus TCP message to port 502 using the Write Single Register function code (6) to write the value 1 to register 4352. This action changes the Modbus address to 15. After this message is sent, the device will be in a denial-of-service state.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-54849"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-01T16:15:53Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A denial of service vulnerability exists in the Modbus TCP and Modbus RTU over TCP functionality of Socomec DIRIS Digiware M-70 1.6.9. A specially crafted series of network requests can lead to a denial of service. An attacker can send a sequence of unauthenticated packets to trigger this vulnerability.An attacker can trigger this denial-of-service condition by sending a single Modbus TCP message to port 502 using the Write Single Register function code (6) to write the value 1 to register 4352. This action changes the Modbus address to 15. After this message is sent, the device will be in a denial-of-service state.",
  "id": "GHSA-4x83-3vjm-fc98",
  "modified": "2025-12-01T18:30:37Z",
  "published": "2025-12-01T18:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54849"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2025-2248"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4XHC-V448-J5JX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:24 – Updated: 2023-04-26 21:30
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered on D-Link DIR-816L devices 2.x before 1.10b04Beta02. There exists an exposed administration function in getcfg.php, which can be used to call various services. It can be utilized by an attacker to retrieve various sensitive information, such as admin login credentials, by setting the value of _POST_SERVICES in the query string to DEVICE.ACCOUNT.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-15894"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-07-22T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered on D-Link DIR-816L devices 2.x before 1.10b04Beta02. There exists an exposed administration function in getcfg.php, which can be used to call various services. It can be utilized by an attacker to retrieve various sensitive information, such as admin login credentials, by setting the value of _POST_SERVICES in the query string to DEVICE.ACCOUNT.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xhc-v448-j5jx",
  "modified": "2023-04-26T21:30:35Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:24:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15894"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://research.loginsoft.com/bugs/multiple-vulnerabilities-discovered-in-the-d-link-firmware-dir-816l"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10169"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4XP2-W642-7MCX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-27 00:35 – Updated: 2023-10-02 20:13
VLAI
Summary
Cilium vulnerable to bypass of namespace restrictions in CiliumNetworkPolicy
Details

Impact

An attacker with the ability to create or modify CiliumNetworkPolicy objects in a particular namespace is able to affect traffic on an entire Cilium cluster, potentially bypassing policy enforcement in other namespaces.

By using a crafted endpointSelector that uses the DoesNotExist operator on the reserved:init label, the attacker can create policies that bypass namespace restrictions and affect the entire Cilium cluster. This includes potentially allowing or denying all traffic.

This attack requires API server access, as described in the Kubernetes API Server Attacker section of the Cilium Threat Model.

Patches

This issue was patched in https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/28007

This issue affects:

  • Cilium <= v1.14.1
  • Cilium <= v1.13.6
  • Cilium <= v1.12.13

This issue has been resolved in:

  • Cilium v1.14.2
  • Cilium v1.13.7
  • Cilium v1.12.14

Workarounds

An admission webhook can be used to prevent the use of endpointSelectors that use the DoesNotExist operator on the reserved:init label in CiliumNetworkPolicies.

Acknowledgements

The Cilium community has worked together with members of Palantir and Isovalent to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to @odinuge for reporting this issue and @joestringer for the fix.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on Slack.

If you think you have found a vulnerability in Cilium, we strongly encourage you to report it to our private security mailing list at security@cilium.io first, before disclosing it in any public forum. This is a private mailing list for Cilium's internal security team, and your report will be treated as top priority.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.14.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.14.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.13.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.13.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.12.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-41333"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-09-27T00:35:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-09-27T15:19:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nAn attacker with the ability to create or modify CiliumNetworkPolicy objects in a particular namespace is able to affect traffic on an entire Cilium cluster, potentially bypassing policy enforcement in other namespaces.\n\nBy using a crafted `endpointSelector` that uses the `DoesNotExist` operator on the `reserved:init` label, the attacker can create policies that bypass namespace restrictions and affect the entire Cilium cluster. This includes potentially allowing or denying all traffic.\n\nThis attack requires API server access, as described in the [Kubernetes API Server Attacker](https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/threat-model/#kubernetes-api-server-attacker) section of the Cilium Threat Model.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue was patched in https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/28007\n\nThis issue affects:\n\n- Cilium \u003c= v1.14.1\n- Cilium \u003c= v1.13.6\n- Cilium \u003c= v1.12.13\n\nThis issue has been resolved in:\n\n- Cilium v1.14.2\n- Cilium v1.13.7\n- Cilium v1.12.14\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAn admission webhook can be used to prevent the use of `endpointSelector`s that use the `DoesNotExist` operator on the `reserved:init` label in CiliumNetworkPolicies.\n\n### Acknowledgements\nThe Cilium community has worked together with members of Palantir and Isovalent to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to @odinuge for reporting this issue and @joestringer for the fix.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on [Slack](https://docs.cilium.io/en/latest/community/community/#slack).\n\nIf you think you have found a vulnerability in Cilium, we strongly encourage you to report it to our private security mailing list at [security@cilium.io](mailto:security@cilium.io) first, before disclosing it in any public forum. This is a private mailing list for Cilium\u0027s internal security team, and your report will be treated as top priority. ",
  "id": "GHSA-4xp2-w642-7mcx",
  "modified": "2023-10-02T20:13:42Z",
  "published": "2023-09-27T00:35:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/security/advisories/GHSA-4xp2-w642-7mcx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41333"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/28007"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/threat-model/#kubernetes-api-server-attacker"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Cilium vulnerable to bypass of namespace restrictions in CiliumNetworkPolicy "
}

GHSA-522H-49X4-XQ7R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-18 09:31 – Updated: 2024-11-18 09:31
VLAI
Details

A low privileged remote attacker may modify the configuration of the CODESYS V3 service through a missing authentication vulnerability which could lead to full system access and/or DoS.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-41969"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-18T09:15:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A low privileged remote attacker may\u00a0modify the configuration of the CODESYS V3 service through a missing authentication vulnerability which could lead to full system access and/or DoS.",
  "id": "GHSA-522h-49x4-xq7r",
  "modified": "2024-11-18T09:31:13Z",
  "published": "2024-11-18T09:31:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41969"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2024-047"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
  • Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
  • In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
  • In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation System Configuration Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier

This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.

CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values

An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.

CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation

An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.