CVE-2026-2391 (GCVE-0-2026-2391)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-12 04:39 – Updated: 2026-02-12 17:32
VLAI?
Title
qs's arrayLimit bypass in comma parsing allows denial of service
Summary
### Summary
The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).
### Details
When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.
**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
return val.split(',');
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).
### PoC
**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**
```
npm install qs
```
```js
const qs = require('qs');
const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)
const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };
try {
const result = qs.parse(payload, options);
console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)
} catch (e) {
console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown
}
```
**Configuration:**
- `comma: true`
- `arrayLimit: 5`
- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`
Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error.
Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.
### Impact
Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.
Severity ?
CWE
- CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation
Assigner
References
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"value": "### Summary\u003cbr\u003eThe `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e### Details\u003cbr\u003eWhen the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `[\u0027a\u0027, \u0027b\u0027, \u0027c\u0027]`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):\u003cbr\u003e```js\u003cbr\u003eif (val \u0026amp;\u0026amp; typeof val === \u0027string\u0027 \u0026amp;\u0026amp; options.comma \u0026amp;\u0026amp; val.indexOf(\u0027,\u0027) \u0026gt; -1) {\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; return val.split(\u0027,\u0027);\u003cbr\u003e}\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eif (options.throwOnLimitExceeded \u0026amp;\u0026amp; currentArrayLength \u0026gt;= options.arrayLimit) {\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; throw new RangeError(\u0027Array limit exceeded. Only \u0027 + options.arrayLimit + \u0027 element\u0027 + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? \u0027\u0027 : \u0027s\u0027) + \u0027 allowed in an array.\u0027);\u003cbr\u003e}\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003ereturn val;\u003cbr\u003e```\u003cbr\u003eThe `split(\u0027,\u0027)` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e### PoC\u003cbr\u003e**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**\u003cbr\u003e```\u003cbr\u003enpm install qs\u003cbr\u003e```\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e```js\u003cbr\u003econst qs = require(\u0027qs\u0027);\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003econst payload = \u0027a=\u0027 + \u0027,\u0027.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)\u003cbr\u003econst options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003etry {\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp; const result = qs.parse(payload, options);\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp; console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)\u003cbr\u003e} catch (e) {\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp; console.log(\u0027Limit enforced:\u0027, e.message); // Not thrown\u003cbr\u003e}\u003cbr\u003e```\u003cbr\u003e**Configuration:**\u003cbr\u003e- `comma: true`\u003cbr\u003e- `arrayLimit: 5`\u003cbr\u003e- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eExpected: Throws \"Array limit exceeded\" error.\u003cbr\u003eActual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e### Impact\u003cbr\u003eDenial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.\u003cbr\u003e"
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"containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-2391\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"poc\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"yes\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-02-12T15:00:21.359233Z\"}}}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-w7fw-mjwx-w883\", \"tags\": [\"exploit\"]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-02-12T15:00:12.364Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"qs\u0027s arrayLimit bypass in comma parsing allows denial of service\", \"source\": {\"discovery\": \"UNKNOWN\"}, \"impacts\": [{\"capecId\": \"CAPEC-130\", \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CAPEC-130 Excessive Allocation\"}]}], \"metrics\": [{\"format\": \"CVSS\", \"cvssV4_0\": {\"Safety\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"version\": \"4.0\", \"Recovery\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"baseScore\": 6.3, \"Automatable\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"MEDIUM\", \"valueDensity\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N\", \"exploitMaturity\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"providerUrgency\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackRequirements\": \"PRESENT\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"subIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"subAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnAvailabilityImpact\": \"LOW\", \"subConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\": \"NOT_DEFINED\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}, {\"format\": \"CVSS\", \"cvssV3_1\": {\"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"version\": \"3.1\", \"baseScore\": 3.7, \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"LOW\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L\", \"integrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"HIGH\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"LOW\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"repo\": \"https://github.com/ljharb/qs\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"6.7.0\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.14.1\"}], \"packageName\": \"qs\", \"collectionURL\": \"https://npmjs.com/qs\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\"}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-w7fw-mjwx-w883\", \"tags\": [\"vendor-advisory\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/ljharb/qs/commit/f6a7abff1f13d644db9b05fe4f2c98ada6bf8482\", \"tags\": [\"patch\"]}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"Vulnogram 0.5.0\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"### Summary\\nThe `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).\\n\\n### Details\\nWhen the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `[\u0027a\u0027, \u0027b\u0027, \u0027c\u0027]`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.\\n\\n**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):\\n```js\\nif (val \u0026\u0026 typeof val === \u0027string\u0027 \u0026\u0026 options.comma \u0026\u0026 val.indexOf(\u0027,\u0027) \u003e -1) {\\n\\u00a0 \\u00a0 return val.split(\u0027,\u0027);\\n}\\n\\nif (options.throwOnLimitExceeded \u0026\u0026 currentArrayLength \u003e= options.arrayLimit) {\\n\\u00a0 \\u00a0 throw new RangeError(\u0027Array limit exceeded. Only \u0027 + options.arrayLimit + \u0027 element\u0027 + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? \u0027\u0027 : \u0027s\u0027) + \u0027 allowed in an array.\u0027);\\n}\\n\\nreturn val;\\n```\\nThe `split(\u0027,\u0027)` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).\\n\\n### PoC\\n**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**\\n```\\nnpm install qs\\n```\\n\\n```js\\nconst qs = require(\u0027qs\u0027);\\n\\nconst payload = \u0027a=\u0027 + \u0027,\u0027.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)\\nconst options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };\\n\\ntry {\\n\\u00a0 const result = qs.parse(payload, options);\\n\\u00a0 console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)\\n} catch (e) {\\n\\u00a0 console.log(\u0027Limit enforced:\u0027, e.message); // Not thrown\\n}\\n```\\n**Configuration:**\\n- `comma: true`\\n- `arrayLimit: 5`\\n- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`\\n\\nExpected: Throws \\\"Array limit exceeded\\\" error.\\nActual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.\\n\\n\\n### Impact\\nDenial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"### Summary\u003cbr\u003eThe `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e### Details\u003cbr\u003eWhen the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `[\u0027a\u0027, \u0027b\u0027, \u0027c\u0027]`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):\u003cbr\u003e```js\u003cbr\u003eif (val \u0026amp;\u0026amp; typeof val === \u0027string\u0027 \u0026amp;\u0026amp; options.comma \u0026amp;\u0026amp; val.indexOf(\u0027,\u0027) \u0026gt; -1) {\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; return val.split(\u0027,\u0027);\u003cbr\u003e}\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eif (options.throwOnLimitExceeded \u0026amp;\u0026amp; currentArrayLength \u0026gt;= options.arrayLimit) {\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; throw new RangeError(\u0027Array limit exceeded. Only \u0027 + options.arrayLimit + \u0027 element\u0027 + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? \u0027\u0027 : \u0027s\u0027) + \u0027 allowed in an array.\u0027);\u003cbr\u003e}\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003ereturn val;\u003cbr\u003e```\u003cbr\u003eThe `split(\u0027,\u0027)` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e### PoC\u003cbr\u003e**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**\u003cbr\u003e```\u003cbr\u003enpm install qs\u003cbr\u003e```\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e```js\u003cbr\u003econst qs = require(\u0027qs\u0027);\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003econst payload = \u0027a=\u0027 + \u0027,\u0027.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)\u003cbr\u003econst options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003etry {\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp; const result = qs.parse(payload, options);\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp; console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)\u003cbr\u003e} catch (e) {\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp; console.log(\u0027Limit enforced:\u0027, e.message); // Not thrown\u003cbr\u003e}\u003cbr\u003e```\u003cbr\u003e**Configuration:**\u003cbr\u003e- `comma: true`\u003cbr\u003e- `arrayLimit: 5`\u003cbr\u003e- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eExpected: Throws \\\"Array limit exceeded\\\" error.\u003cbr\u003eActual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e### Impact\u003cbr\u003eDenial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.\u003cbr\u003e\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-20\", \"description\": \"CWE-20 Improper Input Validation\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"7ffcee3d-2c14-4c3e-b844-86c6a321a158\", \"shortName\": \"harborist\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-02-12T17:32:05.953Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-2391\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-02-12T17:32:05.953Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-02-12T03:52:09.332Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"7ffcee3d-2c14-4c3e-b844-86c6a321a158\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-02-12T04:39:42.914Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"harborist\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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