ID CVE-2020-15811
Summary An issue was discovered in Squid before 4.13 and 5.x before 5.0.4. Due to incorrect data validation, HTTP Request Splitting attacks may succeed against HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This leads to cache poisoning. This allows any client, including browser scripts, to bypass local security and poison the browser cache and any downstream caches with content from an arbitrary source. Squid uses a string search instead of parsing the Transfer-Encoding header to find chunked encoding. This allows an attacker to hide a second request inside Transfer-Encoding: it is interpreted by Squid as chunked and split out into a second request delivered upstream. Squid will then deliver two distinct responses to the client, corrupting any downstream caches.
References
Vulnerable Configurations
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:5.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:5.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:5.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:5.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:5.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:5.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.5.stable14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable3:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable3:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable4:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable4:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable5:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable5:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable6:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable6:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable7:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable7:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable8:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable8:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable9:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:2.7:stable9:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre1:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre1:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre2:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre2:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre3:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre3:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre4:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre4:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre5:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre5:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre6:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre6:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre7:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:-:pre7:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable11:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable11:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable16:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable16:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable20:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable20:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable22:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable22:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable24:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable24:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable25:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.0.stable25:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.0.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.12.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.12.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.12.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.12.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.12.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.12.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.22:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.22:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.1.23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.0.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.2.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.3.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.4.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.20:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.20:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.22:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.22:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.24:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.24:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.25:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.25:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.26:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.26:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.27:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.27:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.28:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:3.5.28:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.20:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.20:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.22:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.22:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.24:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.24:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.25:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.0.25:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:squid-cache:squid:4.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:16.04:*:*:*:lts:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:16.04:*:*:*:lts:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:18.04:*:*:*:lts:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:18.04:*:*:*:lts:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:20.04:*:*:*:lts:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:20.04:*:*:*:lts:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:31:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:31:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:32:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:32:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:33:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:33:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:15.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:15.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:15.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:15.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
CVSS
Base: 4.0 (as of 02-02-2024 - 03:04)
Impact:
Exploitability:
CWE CWE-697
CAPEC
  • Blind SQL Injection
    Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.
  • Overflow Variables and Tags
    This type of attack leverages the use of tags or variables from a formatted configuration data to cause buffer overflow. The attacker crafts a malicious HTML page or configuration file that includes oversized strings, thus causing an overflow.
  • Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash
    If a string is passed through a filter of some kind, then a terminal NULL may not be valid. Using alternate representation of NULL allows an attacker to embed the NULL mid-string while postfixing the proper data so that the filter is avoided. One example is a filter that looks for a trailing slash character. If a string insertion is possible, but the slash must exist, an alternate encoding of NULL in mid-string may be used.
  • Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
    An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that is not Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the classifying mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request. That may allow the attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter and/or possibly cause the application to route the request incorrectly.
  • OS Command Injection
    In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.
  • Buffer Overflow in an API Call
    This attack targets libraries or shared code modules which are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. An attacker who has access to an API may try to embed malicious code in the API function call and exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability in the function's implementation. All clients that make use of the code library thus become vulnerable by association. This has a very broad effect on security across a system, usually affecting more than one software process.
  • HTTP Response Splitting
    This attack uses a maliciously-crafted HTTP request in order to cause a vulnerable web server to respond with an HTTP response stream that will be interpreted by the client as two separate responses instead of one. This is possible when user-controlled input is used unvalidated as part of the response headers. The target software, the client, will interpret the injected header as being a response to a second request, thereby causing the maliciously-crafted contents be displayed and possibly cached.
  • Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
    This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
  • Embedding NULL Bytes
    An attacker embeds one or more null bytes in input to the target software. This attack relies on the usage of a null-valued byte as a string terminator in many environments. The goal is for certain components of the target software to stop processing the input when it encounters the null byte(s).
  • String Format Overflow in syslog()
    This attack targets the format string vulnerabilities in the syslog() function. An attacker would typically inject malicious input in the format string parameter of the syslog function. This is a common problem, and many public vulnerabilities and associated exploits have been posted.
  • Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
    This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An attacker can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the attacker tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
  • Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables
    This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment variables.
  • Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow
    In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an oversized transaction. An attacker may try to feed overly long input strings to the program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing a buffer overflow) and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e. the user input is let into the system unfiltered).
  • Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion
    In this attack, the target software is given input that the attacker knows will be modified and expanded in size during processing. This attack relies on the target software failing to anticipate that the expanded data may exceed some internal limit, thereby creating a buffer overflow.
  • Argument Injection
    An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
  • Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
    This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.
  • Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities
    This attack targets command-line utilities available in a number of shells. An attacker can leverage a vulnerability found in a command-line utility to escalate privilege to root.
  • SQL Injection
    This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input. When specially crafted user-controlled input consisting of SQL syntax is used without proper validation as part of SQL queries, it is possible to glean information from the database in ways not envisaged during application design. Depending upon the database and the design of the application, it may also be possible to leverage injection to have the database execute system-related commands of the attackers' choice. SQL Injection enables an attacker to talk directly to the database, thus bypassing the application completely. Successful injection can cause information disclosure as well as ability to add or modify data in the database. In order to successfully inject SQL and retrieve information from a database, an attacker:
  • Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
    This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An attacker would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the attacker many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
  • Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow
    This type of attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in targeted client software through injection of malicious content from a custom-built hostile service.
  • Command Delimiters
    An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or a blacklist input validation, as opposed to whitelist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or blacklist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
  • Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads
    This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs. Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email header information by default, however the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can contain scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's system.
  • Overflow Binary Resource File
    An attack of this type exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in the handling of binary resources. Binary resources may include music files like MP3, image files like JPEG files, and any other binary file. These attacks may pass unnoticed to the client machine through normal usage of files, such as a browser loading a seemingly innocent JPEG file. This can allow the attacker access to the execution stack and execute arbitrary code in the target process. This attack pattern is a variant of standard buffer overflow attacks using an unexpected vector (binary files) to wrap its attack and open up a new attack vector. The attacker is required to either directly serve the binary content to the victim, or place it in a locale like a MP3 sharing application, for the victim to download. The attacker then is notified upon the download or otherwise locates the vulnerability opened up by the buffer overflow.
  • Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
    This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An attacker can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
  • Double Encoding
    The adversary utilizes a repeating of the encoding process for a set of characters (that is, character encoding a character encoding of a character) to obfuscate the payload of a particular request. This may allow the adversary to bypass filters that attempt to detect illegal characters or strings, such as those that might be used in traversal or injection attacks. Filters may be able to catch illegal encoded strings, but may not catch doubly encoded strings. For example, a dot (.), often used in path traversal attacks and therefore often blocked by filters, could be URL encoded as %2E. However, many filters recognize this encoding and would still block the request. In a double encoding, the % in the above URL encoding would be encoded again as %25, resulting in %252E which some filters might not catch, but which could still be interpreted as a dot (.) by interpreters on the target.
  • Flash Injection
    An attacker tricks a victim to execute malicious flash content that executes commands or makes flash calls specified by the attacker. One example of this attack is cross-site flashing, an attacker controlled parameter to a reference call loads from content specified by the attacker.
  • Leverage Alternate Encoding
    An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
  • Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters
    Some APIs will strip certain leading characters from a string of parameters. An adversary can intentionally introduce leading "ghost" characters (extra characters that don't affect the validity of the request at the API layer) that enable the input to pass the filters and therefore process the adversary's input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent semantic way, while the filter does not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms acceptable to the targeted API.
  • Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
    An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
  • User-Controlled Filename
    An attack of this type involves an adversary inserting malicious characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these vulnerabilities.
  • Forced Integer Overflow
    This attack forces an integer variable to go out of range. The integer variable is often used as an offset such as size of memory allocation or similarly. The attacker would typically control the value of such variable and try to get it out of range. For instance the integer in question is incremented past the maximum possible value, it may wrap to become a very small, or negative number, therefore providing a very incorrect value which can lead to unexpected behavior. At worst the attacker can execute arbitrary code.
Access
VectorComplexityAuthentication
NETWORK LOW SINGLE
Impact
ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability
NONE PARTIAL NONE
cvss-vector via4 AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:P/A:N
redhat via4
advisories
bugzilla
id 1871702
title CVE-2020-15811 squid: HTTP Request Splitting could result in cache poisoning
oval
OR
  • comment Red Hat Enterprise Linux must be installed
    oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20070304026
  • AND
    • comment Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 is installed
      oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20193384074
    • comment Module squid:4 is enabled
      oval oval:com.redhat.rhsa:tst:20192593011
    • OR
      • AND
        • comment libecap is earlier than 0:1.0.1-2.module+el8.1.0+4044+36416a77
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhsa:tst:20193476001
        • comment libecap is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhsa:tst:20192593002
      • AND
        • comment libecap-debugsource is earlier than 0:1.0.1-2.module+el8.1.0+4044+36416a77
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhsa:tst:20193476003
        • comment libecap-debugsource is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhsa:tst:20192593004
      • AND
        • comment libecap-devel is earlier than 0:1.0.1-2.module+el8.1.0+4044+36416a77
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhsa:tst:20193476005
        • comment libecap-devel is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhsa:tst:20192593006
      • AND
        • comment squid is earlier than 7:4.4-8.module+el8.2.0+7834+b8ecaeef.2
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhsa:tst:20203623007
        • comment squid is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhsa:tst:20110545002
      • AND
        • comment squid-debugsource is earlier than 7:4.4-8.module+el8.2.0+7834+b8ecaeef.2
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhsa:tst:20203623009
        • comment squid-debugsource is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhsa:tst:20192593010
rhsa
id RHSA-2020:3623
released 2020-09-03
severity Important
title RHSA-2020:3623: squid:4 security update (Important)
rpms
  • libecap-0:1.0.1-2.module+el8.0.0+4045+70edde92
  • libecap-0:1.0.1-2.module+el8.1.0+4044+36416a77
  • libecap-debuginfo-0:1.0.1-2.module+el8.0.0+4045+70edde92
  • libecap-debuginfo-0:1.0.1-2.module+el8.1.0+4044+36416a77
  • libecap-debugsource-0:1.0.1-2.module+el8.0.0+4045+70edde92
  • libecap-debugsource-0:1.0.1-2.module+el8.1.0+4044+36416a77
  • libecap-devel-0:1.0.1-2.module+el8.0.0+4045+70edde92
  • libecap-devel-0:1.0.1-2.module+el8.1.0+4044+36416a77
  • squid-7:4.4-5.module+el8.0.0+7838+974c4845.2
  • squid-7:4.4-8.module+el8.1.0+7837+e38d3ca0.2
  • squid-7:4.4-8.module+el8.2.0+7834+b8ecaeef.2
  • squid-debuginfo-7:4.4-5.module+el8.0.0+7838+974c4845.2
  • squid-debuginfo-7:4.4-8.module+el8.1.0+7837+e38d3ca0.2
  • squid-debuginfo-7:4.4-8.module+el8.2.0+7834+b8ecaeef.2
  • squid-debugsource-7:4.4-5.module+el8.0.0+7838+974c4845.2
  • squid-debugsource-7:4.4-8.module+el8.1.0+7837+e38d3ca0.2
  • squid-debugsource-7:4.4-8.module+el8.2.0+7834+b8ecaeef.2
  • squid-7:3.5.20-17.el7_9.4
  • squid-debuginfo-7:3.5.20-17.el7_9.4
  • squid-migration-script-7:3.5.20-17.el7_9.4
  • squid-sysvinit-7:3.5.20-17.el7_9.4
refmap via4
debian DSA-4751
fedora
  • FEDORA-2020-63f3bd656e
  • FEDORA-2020-6c58bff862
  • FEDORA-2020-73af8655eb
misc https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/security/advisories/GHSA-c7p8-xqhm-49wv
mlist [debian-lts-announce] 20201002 [SECURITY] [DLA 2394-1] squid3 security update
suse
  • openSUSE-SU-2020:1346
  • openSUSE-SU-2020:1369
ubuntu
  • USN-4477-1
  • USN-4551-1
Last major update 02-02-2024 - 03:04
Published 02-09-2020 - 17:15
Last modified 02-02-2024 - 03:04
Back to Top