Search criteria
9 vulnerabilities found for xapi by xen
FKIE_CVE-2024-31144
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-02-14 21:15 - Updated: 2026-01-08 14:44
Severity ?
Summary
For a brief summary of Xapi terminology, see:
https://xapi-project.github.io/xen-api/overview.html#object-model-overview
Xapi contains functionality to backup and restore metadata about Virtual
Machines and Storage Repositories (SRs).
The metadata itself is stored in a Virtual Disk Image (VDI) inside an
SR. This is used for two purposes; a general backup of metadata
(e.g. to recover from a host failure if the filer is still good), and
Portable SRs (e.g. using an external hard drive to move VMs to another
host).
Metadata is only restored as an explicit administrator action, but
occurs in cases where the host has no information about the SR, and must
locate the metadata VDI in order to retrieve the metadata.
The metadata VDI is located by searching (in UUID alphanumeric order)
each VDI, mounting it, and seeing if there is a suitable metadata file
present. The first matching VDI is deemed to be the metadata VDI, and
is restored from.
In the general case, the content of VDIs are controlled by the VM owner,
and should not be trusted by the host administrator.
A malicious guest can manipulate its disk to appear to be a metadata
backup.
A guest cannot choose the UUIDs of its VDIs, but a guest with one disk
has a 50% chance of sorting ahead of the legitimate metadata backup. A
guest with two disks has a 75% chance, etc.
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security@xen.org | https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-459.html | Patch, Vendor Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/07/16/4 | Mailing List, Third Party Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-459.html | Patch, Vendor Advisory |
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"value": "For a brief summary of Xapi terminology, see:\n\n https://xapi-project.github.io/xen-api/overview.html#object-model-overview \n\nXapi contains functionality to backup and restore metadata about Virtual\nMachines and Storage Repositories (SRs).\n\nThe metadata itself is stored in a Virtual Disk Image (VDI) inside an\nSR. This is used for two purposes; a general backup of metadata\n(e.g. to recover from a host failure if the filer is still good), and\nPortable SRs (e.g. using an external hard drive to move VMs to another\nhost).\n\nMetadata is only restored as an explicit administrator action, but\noccurs in cases where the host has no information about the SR, and must\nlocate the metadata VDI in order to retrieve the metadata.\n\nThe metadata VDI is located by searching (in UUID alphanumeric order)\neach VDI, mounting it, and seeing if there is a suitable metadata file\npresent. The first matching VDI is deemed to be the metadata VDI, and\nis restored from.\n\nIn the general case, the content of VDIs are controlled by the VM owner,\nand should not be trusted by the host administrator.\n\nA malicious guest can manipulate its disk to appear to be a metadata\nbackup.\n\nA guest cannot choose the UUIDs of its VDIs, but a guest with one disk\nhas a 50% chance of sorting ahead of the legitimate metadata backup. A\nguest with two disks has a 75% chance, etc."
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"value": "Para obtener un breve resumen de la terminolog\u00eda de Xapi, consulte: https://xapi-project.github.io/xen-api/overview.html#object-model-overview Xapi contiene funcionalidad para realizar copias de seguridad y restaurar metadatos sobre m\u00e1quinas virtuales y repositorios de almacenamiento (SR). Los metadatos en s\u00ed se almacenan en una imagen de disco virtual (VDI) dentro de un SR. Esto se utiliza para dos prop\u00f3sitos: una copia de seguridad general de metadatos (por ejemplo, para recuperarse de una falla del host si el archivador a\u00fan est\u00e1 en buen estado) y SR port\u00e1tiles (por ejemplo, usar un disco duro externo para mover m\u00e1quinas virtuales a otro host). Los metadatos solo se restauran como una acci\u00f3n expl\u00edcita del administrador, pero ocurre en los casos en que el host no tiene informaci\u00f3n sobre el SR y debe ubicar el VDI de metadatos para recuperar los metadatos. El VDI de metadatos se ubica buscando (en orden alfanum\u00e9rico UUID) cada VDI, mont\u00e1ndolo y viendo si hay un archivo de metadatos adecuado presente. El primer VDI coincidente se considera el VDI de metadatos y se restaura desde \u00e9l. En general, el propietario de la m\u00e1quina virtual controla el contenido de las VDI y el administrador del host no deber\u00eda confiar en ellas. Un invitado malintencionado puede manipular su disco para que parezca una copia de seguridad de metadatos. Un invitado no puede elegir los UUID de sus VDI, pero un invitado con un disco tiene un 50 % de posibilidades de clasificarse antes que la copia de seguridad de metadatos leg\u00edtima. Un invitado con dos discos tiene un 75 % de posibilidades, etc."
}
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FKIE_CVE-2022-33749
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2022-10-11 13:15 - Updated: 2024-11-21 07:08
Severity ?
Summary
XAPI open file limit DoS It is possible for an unauthenticated client on the network to cause XAPI to hit its file-descriptor limit. This causes XAPI to be unable to accept new requests for other (trusted) clients, and blocks XAPI from carrying out any tasks that require the opening of file descriptors.
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security@xen.org | http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/10/11/4 | Mailing List, Patch, Third Party Advisory | |
| security@xen.org | http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-413.html | Patch, Vendor Advisory | |
| security@xen.org | https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202402-07 | ||
| security@xen.org | https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-413.txt | Patch, Vendor Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/10/11/4 | Mailing List, Patch, Third Party Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-413.html | Patch, Vendor Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202402-07 | ||
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-413.txt | Patch, Vendor Advisory |
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},
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"value": "Es posible que un cliente no autenticado en la red cause que XAPI alcance su l\u00edmite de descriptores de archivo. Esto causa que XAPI no pueda aceptar nuevas peticiones de otros clientes (confiables), y bloquea a XAPI de llevar a cabo cualquier tarea que requiera la apertura de descriptores de archivo"
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"lastModified": "2024-11-21T07:08:27.957",
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FKIE_CVE-2020-29487
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2020-12-15 18:15 - Updated: 2024-11-21 05:24
Severity ?
Summary
An issue was discovered in Xen XAPI before 2020-12-15. Certain xenstore keys provide feedback from the guest, and are therefore watched by toolstack. Specifically, keys are watched by xenopsd, and data are forwarded via RPC through message-switch to xapi. The watching logic in xenopsd sends one RPC update containing all data, any time any single xenstore key is updated, and therefore has O(N^2) time complexity. Furthermore, message-switch retains recent (currently 128) RPC messages for diagnostic purposes, yielding O(M*N) space complexity. The quantity of memory a single guest can monopolise is bounded by xenstored quota, but the quota is fairly large. It is believed to be in excess of 1G per malicious guest. In practice, this manifests as a host denial of service, either through message-switch thrashing against swap, or OOMing entirely, depending on dom0's configuration. (There are no quotas in xenopsd to limit the quantity of keys that result in RPC traffic.) A buggy or malicious guest can cause unreasonable memory usage in dom0, resulting in a host denial of service. All versions of XAPI are vulnerable. Systems that are not using the XAPI toolstack are not vulnerable.
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| cve@mitre.org | https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202107-30 | Third Party Advisory | |
| cve@mitre.org | https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-354.html | Patch, Vendor Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202107-30 | Third Party Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-354.html | Patch, Vendor Advisory |
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},
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"value": "Se detect\u00f3 un problema en Xen XAPI antes del 15/12/2020. Determinadas claves de xenstore proporcionan comentarios del invitado y, por lo tanto, son supervisadas por toolstack. Espec\u00edficamente, las claves son supervisadas por xenopsd y los datos son reenviados por medio de RPC mediante message-switch hacia xapi. La l\u00f3gica de observaci\u00f3n en xenopsd env\u00eda una actualizaci\u00f3n RPC que contiene todos los datos, cada vez que una sola clave de xenstore es actualizada y, por lo tanto, presenta una complejidad de tiempo O(N^2). Adem\u00e1s, message-switch conserva los mensajes RPC recientes (actualmente 128) con prop\u00f3sitos de diagn\u00f3stico, lo que genera una complejidad de espacio O(M*N). La cantidad de memoria que un solo invitado puede monopolizar est\u00e1 limitada por la cuota almacenada en xen, pero la cuota es bastante grande. Se cree que supera 1G por invitado malicioso. En la pr\u00e1ctica, esto se manifiesta como una denegaci\u00f3n de servicio del host, ya sea a trav\u00e9s de message-switch contra el intercambio, o mediante OOM por completo, dependiendo de la configuraci\u00f3n de dom0. (No existen cuotas en xenopsd para limitar la cantidad de claves que resultan en tr\u00e1fico RPC.) Un invitado con errores o malicioso puede causar un uso de memoria irrazonable en dom0, resultando en una denegaci\u00f3n de servicio del host. Todas las versiones de XAPI son vulnerables. Los sistemas que no est\u00e1n usando la toolstack de XAPI no son vulnerables"
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CVE-2024-31144 (GCVE-0-2024-31144)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-02-14 20:16 – Updated: 2025-04-26 20:03
VLAI?
Title
Xapi: Metadata injection attack against backup/restore functionality
Summary
For a brief summary of Xapi terminology, see:
https://xapi-project.github.io/xen-api/overview.html#object-model-overview
Xapi contains functionality to backup and restore metadata about Virtual
Machines and Storage Repositories (SRs).
The metadata itself is stored in a Virtual Disk Image (VDI) inside an
SR. This is used for two purposes; a general backup of metadata
(e.g. to recover from a host failure if the filer is still good), and
Portable SRs (e.g. using an external hard drive to move VMs to another
host).
Metadata is only restored as an explicit administrator action, but
occurs in cases where the host has no information about the SR, and must
locate the metadata VDI in order to retrieve the metadata.
The metadata VDI is located by searching (in UUID alphanumeric order)
each VDI, mounting it, and seeing if there is a suitable metadata file
present. The first matching VDI is deemed to be the metadata VDI, and
is restored from.
In the general case, the content of VDIs are controlled by the VM owner,
and should not be trusted by the host administrator.
A malicious guest can manipulate its disk to appear to be a metadata
backup.
A guest cannot choose the UUIDs of its VDIs, but a guest with one disk
has a 50% chance of sorting ahead of the legitimate metadata backup. A
guest with two disks has a 75% chance, etc.
Severity ?
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Xen Project | Xen |
Unknown:
consult Xen advisory XSA-459
|
Credits
This issue was discovered by XenServer.
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CVE-2022-33749 (GCVE-0-2022-33749)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2022-10-11 00:00 – Updated: 2024-08-03 08:09
VLAI?
Summary
XAPI open file limit DoS It is possible for an unauthenticated client on the network to cause XAPI to hit its file-descriptor limit. This causes XAPI to be unable to accept new requests for other (trusted) clients, and blocks XAPI from carrying out any tasks that require the opening of file descriptors.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- unknown
Assigner
References
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CVE-2020-29487 (GCVE-0-2020-29487)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2020-12-15 17:30 – Updated: 2024-08-04 16:55
VLAI?
Summary
An issue was discovered in Xen XAPI before 2020-12-15. Certain xenstore keys provide feedback from the guest, and are therefore watched by toolstack. Specifically, keys are watched by xenopsd, and data are forwarded via RPC through message-switch to xapi. The watching logic in xenopsd sends one RPC update containing all data, any time any single xenstore key is updated, and therefore has O(N^2) time complexity. Furthermore, message-switch retains recent (currently 128) RPC messages for diagnostic purposes, yielding O(M*N) space complexity. The quantity of memory a single guest can monopolise is bounded by xenstored quota, but the quota is fairly large. It is believed to be in excess of 1G per malicious guest. In practice, this manifests as a host denial of service, either through message-switch thrashing against swap, or OOMing entirely, depending on dom0's configuration. (There are no quotas in xenopsd to limit the quantity of keys that result in RPC traffic.) A buggy or malicious guest can cause unreasonable memory usage in dom0, resulting in a host denial of service. All versions of XAPI are vulnerable. Systems that are not using the XAPI toolstack are not vulnerable.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- n/a
Assigner
References
| URL | Tags | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
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CVE-2024-31144 (GCVE-0-2024-31144)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2025-02-14 20:16 – Updated: 2025-04-26 20:03
VLAI?
Title
Xapi: Metadata injection attack against backup/restore functionality
Summary
For a brief summary of Xapi terminology, see:
https://xapi-project.github.io/xen-api/overview.html#object-model-overview
Xapi contains functionality to backup and restore metadata about Virtual
Machines and Storage Repositories (SRs).
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SR. This is used for two purposes; a general backup of metadata
(e.g. to recover from a host failure if the filer is still good), and
Portable SRs (e.g. using an external hard drive to move VMs to another
host).
Metadata is only restored as an explicit administrator action, but
occurs in cases where the host has no information about the SR, and must
locate the metadata VDI in order to retrieve the metadata.
The metadata VDI is located by searching (in UUID alphanumeric order)
each VDI, mounting it, and seeing if there is a suitable metadata file
present. The first matching VDI is deemed to be the metadata VDI, and
is restored from.
In the general case, the content of VDIs are controlled by the VM owner,
and should not be trusted by the host administrator.
A malicious guest can manipulate its disk to appear to be a metadata
backup.
A guest cannot choose the UUIDs of its VDIs, but a guest with one disk
has a 50% chance of sorting ahead of the legitimate metadata backup. A
guest with two disks has a 75% chance, etc.
Severity ?
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Xen Project | Xen |
Unknown:
consult Xen advisory XSA-459
|
Credits
This issue was discovered by XenServer.
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CVE-2022-33749 (GCVE-0-2022-33749)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2022-10-11 00:00 – Updated: 2024-08-03 08:09
VLAI?
Summary
XAPI open file limit DoS It is possible for an unauthenticated client on the network to cause XAPI to hit its file-descriptor limit. This causes XAPI to be unable to accept new requests for other (trusted) clients, and blocks XAPI from carrying out any tasks that require the opening of file descriptors.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- unknown
Assigner
References
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CVE-2020-29487 (GCVE-0-2020-29487)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2020-12-15 17:30 – Updated: 2024-08-04 16:55
VLAI?
Summary
An issue was discovered in Xen XAPI before 2020-12-15. Certain xenstore keys provide feedback from the guest, and are therefore watched by toolstack. Specifically, keys are watched by xenopsd, and data are forwarded via RPC through message-switch to xapi. The watching logic in xenopsd sends one RPC update containing all data, any time any single xenstore key is updated, and therefore has O(N^2) time complexity. Furthermore, message-switch retains recent (currently 128) RPC messages for diagnostic purposes, yielding O(M*N) space complexity. The quantity of memory a single guest can monopolise is bounded by xenstored quota, but the quota is fairly large. It is believed to be in excess of 1G per malicious guest. In practice, this manifests as a host denial of service, either through message-switch thrashing against swap, or OOMing entirely, depending on dom0's configuration. (There are no quotas in xenopsd to limit the quantity of keys that result in RPC traffic.) A buggy or malicious guest can cause unreasonable memory usage in dom0, resulting in a host denial of service. All versions of XAPI are vulnerable. Systems that are not using the XAPI toolstack are not vulnerable.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- n/a
Assigner
References
| URL | Tags | |||||||
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