ID CVE-2023-5366
Summary A flaw was found in Open vSwitch that allows ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement packets between virtual machines to bypass OpenFlow rules. This issue may allow a local attacker to create specially crafted packets with a modified or spoofed target IP address field that can redirect ICMPv6 traffic to arbitrary IP addresses.
References
Vulnerable Configurations
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:1.11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.5.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.6.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.7.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.8.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.9.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.10.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.11.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.12.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.12.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.12.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.12.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.12.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.12.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.12.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.12.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.12.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.12.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.13.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.14.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.15.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.16.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:2.17.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:3.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:3.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:3.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:3.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:3.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:3.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:3.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:openvswitch:openvswitch:3.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:redhat:virtualization:4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:redhat:virtualization:4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:redhat:openshift_container_platform:4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:redhat:openshift_container_platform:4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:redhat:fast_datapath:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:redhat:fast_datapath:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux:8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux:8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
CVSS
Base: None
Impact:
Exploitability:
CWE CWE-345
CAPEC
  • Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
    An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, spam-like content, or links to the attackers' code. In general, content-spoofing within an application API can be employed to stage many different types of attacks varied based on the attackers' intent. When the goal is to spread malware, deceptive content is created such as modified links, buttons, or images, that entice users to click on those items, all of which point to a malicious URI. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the destination of various application interface elements.
  • DNS Cache Poisoning
    A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
  • Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
    An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
  • Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
    An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
  • Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
    An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of MITM software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Man-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
  • Application API Navigation Remapping
    An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
  • Application API Button Hijacking
    An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
  • Cache Poisoning
    An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
  • Content Spoofing
    An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
  • JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
    An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website. An attacker gets the victim to visit his or her malicious page that contains a script tag whose source points to the vulnerable system with a URL that requests a response from the server containing a JSON object with possibly confidential information. The malicious page also contains malicious code to capture the JSON object returned by the server before any other processing on it can take place, typically by overriding the JavaScript function used to create new objects. This hook allows the malicious code to get access to the creation of each object and transmit the possibly sensitive contents of the captured JSON object to the attackers' server. There is nothing in the browser's security model to prevent the attackers' malicious JavaScript code (originating from attacker's domain) to set up an environment (as described above) to intercept a JSON object response (coming from the vulnerable target system's domain), read its contents and transmit to the attackers' controlled site. The same origin policy protects the domain object model (DOM), but not the JSON.
Access
VectorComplexityAuthentication
Impact
ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability
Last major update 23-03-2024 - 03:15
Published 06-10-2023 - 18:15
Last modified 23-03-2024 - 03:15
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