ID CVE-2008-0960
Summary SNMPv3 HMAC verification in (1) Net-SNMP 5.2.x before 5.2.4.1, 5.3.x before 5.3.2.1, and 5.4.x before 5.4.1.1; (2) UCD-SNMP; (3) eCos; (4) Juniper Session and Resource Control (SRC) C-series 1.0.0 through 2.0.0; (5) NetApp (aka Network Appliance) Data ONTAP 7.3RC1 and 7.3RC2; (6) SNMP Research before 16.2; (7) multiple Cisco IOS, CatOS, ACE, and Nexus products; (8) Ingate Firewall 3.1.0 and later and SIParator 3.1.0 and later; (9) HP OpenView SNMP Emanate Master Agent 15.x; and possibly other products relies on the client to specify the HMAC length, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass SNMP authentication via a length value of 1, which only checks the first byte.
References
Vulnerable Configurations
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:catos:7.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:catos:7.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:catos:7.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:catos:7.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:catos:7.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:catos:7.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:catos:8.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:catos:8.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.0:s:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.0:s:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.0:sy:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.0:sy:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.1:e:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.1:e:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:ewa:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:ewa:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:jk:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:jk:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sb:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sb:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sg:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sg:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sga:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sga:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sra:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sra:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:srb:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:srb:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:src:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:src:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sxb:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sxb:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sxd:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sxd:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sxf:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:sxf:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:zl:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:zl:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:zy:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.2:zy:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:ja:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:ja:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:jeb:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:jeb:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:jk:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:jk:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:jl:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:jl:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:jx:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:jx:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:t:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:t:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:xa:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:xa:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:xg:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:xg:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:xi:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:xi:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:xk:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:xk:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:xr:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:xr:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:yf:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:yf:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:yi:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:yi:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:yt:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:yt:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:yx:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.3:yx:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:t:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:t:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:xa:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:xa:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:xc:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:xc:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:xd:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:xd:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:xe:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:xe:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:xj:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:xj:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:xw:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:cisco_ios:12.4:xw:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios:11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios:11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios:11.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios:11.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios:11.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios:11.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios:12.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios:12.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ios_xr:3.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:nx_os:4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:nx_os:4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:nx_os:4.0.1:a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:nx_os:4.0.1:a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:cisco:nx_os:4.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:cisco:nx_os:4.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:ecos_sourceware:ecos:1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:ecos_sourceware:ecos:1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:ecos_sourceware:ecos:1.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:ecos_sourceware:ecos:1.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:ecos_sourceware:ecos:1.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:ecos_sourceware:ecos:1.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:ecos_sourceware:ecos:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:ecos_sourceware:ecos:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:ecos_sourceware:ecos:2.0:b1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:ecos_sourceware:ecos:2.0:b1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.3.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.3.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:net-snmp:net_snmp:5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:sun:solaris:10.0:unkown:x86:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:sun:solaris:10.0:unkown:x86:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:sun:sunos:5.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:sun:sunos:5.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_10_6504_bundle_with_4_gbps_throughput:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_10_6504_bundle_with_4_gbps_throughput:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_10_6509_bundle_with_8_gbps_throughput:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_10_6509_bundle_with_8_gbps_throughput:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_10_service_module:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_10_service_module:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_20_6504_bundle_with__4gbps_throughput:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_20_6504_bundle_with__4gbps_throughput:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_20_6509_bundle_with_8gbps_throughput:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_20_6509_bundle_with_8gbps_throughput:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_20_service_module:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_20_service_module:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_4710:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_4710:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_xml_gateway:5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_xml_gateway:5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_xml_gateway:6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:ace_xml_gateway:6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:mds_9120:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:mds_9120:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:mds_9124:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:mds_9124:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:mds_9134:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:mds_9134:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:cisco:mds_9140:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:cisco:mds_9140:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:2.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:3.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_firewall:4.6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:2.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:3.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:ingate:ingate_siparator:4.6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:juniper:session_and_resource_control:1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:juniper:session_and_resource_control:1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:juniper:session_and_resource_control:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:juniper:session_and_resource_control:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:juniper:src_pe:1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:juniper:src_pe:1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:juniper:src_pe:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:juniper:src_pe:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
CVSS
Base: 10.0 (as of 30-10-2018 - 16:25)
Impact:
Exploitability:
CWE CWE-287
CAPEC
  • Authentication Abuse
    An attacker obtains unauthorized access to an application, service or device either through knowledge of the inherent weaknesses of an authentication mechanism, or by exploiting a flaw in the authentication scheme's implementation. In such an attack an authentication mechanism is functioning but a carefully controlled sequence of events causes the mechanism to grant access to the attacker. This attack may exploit assumptions made by the target's authentication procedures, such as assumptions regarding trust relationships or assumptions regarding the generation of secret values. This attack differs from Authentication Bypass attacks in that Authentication Abuse allows the attacker to be certified as a valid user through illegitimate means, while Authentication Bypass allows the user to access protected material without ever being certified as an authenticated user. This attack does not rely on prior sessions established by successfully authenticating users, as relied upon for the "Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted Credentials" attack patterns.
  • Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible)
    An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by placing themselves in the communication channel between client and server such that communication directly to the server is possible where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
  • Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle
    This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to place man in the middle once SSL is terminated. Rest applications premise is that they leverage existing infrastructure to deliver web services functionality. An example of this is a Rest application that uses HTTP Get methods and receives a HTTP response with an XML document. These Rest style web services are deployed on existing infrastructure such as Apache and IIS web servers with no SOAP stack required. Unfortunately from a security standpoint, there frequently is no interoperable identity security mechanism deployed, so Rest developers often fall back to SSL to deliver security. In large data centers, SSL is typically terminated at the edge of the network - at the firewall, load balancer, or router. Once the SSL is terminated the HTTP request is in the clear (unless developers have hashed or encrypted the values, but this is rare). The attacker can utilize a sniffer such as Wireshark to snapshot the credentials, such as username and password that are passed in the clear once SSL is terminated. Once the attacker gathers these credentials, they can submit requests to the web service provider just as authorized user do. There is not typically an authentication on the client side, beyond what is passed in the request itself so once this is compromised, then this is generally sufficient to compromise the service's authentication scheme.
  • Man in the Middle Attack
    This type of attack targets the communication between two components (typically client and server). The attacker places himself in the communication channel between the two components. Whenever one component attempts to communicate with the other (data flow, authentication challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the attacker, who has the opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the other component as if it was never intercepted. This interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised components unaware of the potential corruption or leakage of their communications. The potential for Man-in-the-Middle attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in communication or identify between two components.
Access
VectorComplexityAuthentication
NETWORK LOW NONE
Impact
ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability
COMPLETE COMPLETE COMPLETE
cvss-vector via4 AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
oval via4
  • accepted 2013-04-29T04:09:04.048-04:00
    class vulnerability
    contributors
    • name Aharon Chernin
      organization SCAP.com, LLC
    • name Dragos Prisaca
      organization G2, Inc.
    definition_extensions
    • comment The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3
      oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:11782
    • comment CentOS Linux 3.x
      oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:16651
    • comment The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4
      oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:11831
    • comment CentOS Linux 4.x
      oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:16636
    • comment Oracle Linux 4.x
      oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:15990
    • comment The operating system installed on the system is Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5
      oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:11414
    • comment The operating system installed on the system is CentOS Linux 5.x
      oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:15802
    • comment Oracle Linux 5.x
      oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:15459
    description SNMP authentication via a length value of 1, which only checks the first byte.
    family unix
    id oval:org.mitre.oval:def:10820
    status accepted
    submitted 2010-07-09T03:56:16-04:00
    title SNMP authentication via a length value of 1, which only checks the first byte.
    version 24
  • accepted 2010-08-02T04:00:08.371-04:00
    class vulnerability
    contributors
    • name Yuzheng Zhou
      organization Hewlett-Packard
    • name KASHIF LATIF
      organization DTCC
    • name David Ries
      organization JovalCM.com
    description Multiple Cisco products contain either of two authentication vulnerabilities in the Simple Network Management Protocol version 3 (SNMPv3) feature. These vulnerabilities can be exploited when processing a malformed SNMPv3 message. These vulnerabilities could allow the disclosure of network information or may enable an attacker to perform configuration changes to vulnerable devices. The SNMP server is an optional service that is disabled by default in Cisco products. Only SNMPv3 is impacted by these vulnerabilities. Workarounds are available for mitigating the impact of the vulnerabilities described in this document. Note: SNMP versions 1, 2 and 2c are not impacted by these vulnerabilities. The United States Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) has assigned Vulnerability Note VU#878044["http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/878044"] to these vulnerabilities. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2008-0960["http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2008-0960"] has also been assigned to these vulnerabilities. This advisory is posted at http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20080610-snmpv3["http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20080610-snmpv3"].
    family ios
    id oval:org.mitre.oval:def:5785
    status accepted
    submitted 2008-05-02T11:06:36.000-04:00
    title Multiple Cisco Products Simple Network Management Protocol version 3 Hash Message Authentication Code Manipulation Vulnerability
    version 7
  • accepted 2010-05-17T04:00:16.158-04:00
    class vulnerability
    contributors
    • name Michael Wood
      organization Hewlett-Packard
    • name J. Daniel Brown
      organization DTCC
    definition_extensions
    • comment VMWare ESX Server 3.0.3 is installed
      oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:6026
    • comment VMWare ESX Server 3.0.2 is installed
      oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:5613
    • comment VMware ESX Server 3.5.0 is installed
      oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:5887
    description SNMPv3 HMAC verification in (1) Net-SNMP 5.2.x before 5.2.4.1, 5.3.x before 5.3.2.1, and 5.4.x before 5.4.1.1; (2) UCD-SNMP; (3) eCos; (4) Juniper Session and Resource Control (SRC) C-series 1.0.0 through 2.0.0; (5) NetApp (aka Network Appliance) Data ONTAP 7.3RC1 and 7.3RC2; (6) SNMP Research before 16.2; (7) multiple Cisco IOS, CatOS, ACE, and Nexus products; (8) Ingate Firewall 3.1.0 and later and SIParator 3.1.0 and later; (9) HP OpenView SNMP Emanate Master Agent 15.x; and possibly other products relies on the client to specify the HMAC length, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass SNMP authentication via a length value of 1, which only checks the first byte.
    family unix
    id oval:org.mitre.oval:def:6414
    status accepted
    submitted 2009-09-23T15:39:02.000-04:00
    title Net-snmp SNMPv3 Authentication Bug Lets Remote Users Bypass Authentication
    version 5
redhat via4
advisories
  • rhsa
    id RHSA-2008:0528
  • rhsa
    id RHSA-2008:0529
rpms
  • net-snmp-0:5.0.9-2.30E.24
  • net-snmp-devel-0:5.0.9-2.30E.24
  • net-snmp-libs-0:5.0.9-2.30E.24
  • net-snmp-perl-0:5.0.9-2.30E.24
  • net-snmp-utils-0:5.0.9-2.30E.24
  • net-snmp-0:5.1.2-11.el4_6.11.3
  • net-snmp-devel-0:5.1.2-11.el4_6.11.3
  • net-snmp-libs-0:5.1.2-11.el4_6.11.3
  • net-snmp-perl-0:5.1.2-11.el4_6.11.3
  • net-snmp-utils-0:5.1.2-11.el4_6.11.3
  • net-snmp-1:5.3.1-24.el5_2.1
  • net-snmp-devel-1:5.3.1-24.el5_2.1
  • net-snmp-libs-1:5.3.1-24.el5_2.1
  • net-snmp-perl-1:5.3.1-24.el5_2.1
  • net-snmp-utils-1:5.3.1-24.el5_2.1
refmap via4
apple APPLE-SA-2008-06-30
bid 29623
bugtraq
  • 20080609 [oCERT-2008-006] multiple SNMP implementations HMAC authentication spoofing
  • 20081031 VMSA-2008-0017 Updated ESX packages for libxml2, ucd-snmp, libtiff
cert TA08-162A
cert-vn VU#878044
cisco 20080610 SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities
confirm
debian DSA-1663
exploit-db 5790
fedora
  • FEDORA-2008-5215
  • FEDORA-2008-5218
  • FEDORA-2008-5224
gentoo GLSA-200808-02
hp
  • HPSBMA02439
  • SSRT080082
mandriva MDVSA-2008:118
misc
mlist
  • [oss-security] 20080609 [oCERT-2008-006] multiple SNMP implementations HMAC authentication spoofing
  • [productinfo] 20080611 Ingate Firewall and SIParator affected by SNMPv3 vulnerability
sectrack 1020218
secunia
  • 30574
  • 30596
  • 30612
  • 30615
  • 30626
  • 30647
  • 30648
  • 30665
  • 30802
  • 31334
  • 31351
  • 31467
  • 31568
  • 32664
  • 33003
  • 35463
sreason 3933
sunalert 238865
suse SUSE-SA:2008:039
ubuntu USN-685-1
vupen
  • ADV-2008-1787
  • ADV-2008-1788
  • ADV-2008-1797
  • ADV-2008-1800
  • ADV-2008-1801
  • ADV-2008-1836
  • ADV-2008-1981
  • ADV-2008-2361
  • ADV-2008-2971
  • ADV-2009-1612
Last major update 30-10-2018 - 16:25
Published 10-06-2008 - 18:32
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