{"vulnerability": "CVE-2023-43631", "sightings": [{"uuid": "9797b0cc-862f-404b-bdac-1e8f596e8992", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2023-43631", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/cibsecurity/70894", "content": "\u203c CVE-2023-43631 \u203c\n\nOn boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of\u00e2\u20ac\u0153/config/authorized_keys\u00e2\u20ac\ufffd.If the file is present, and contains a supported public key, the container will go on to openport 22 and enable sshd with the given keys as the authorized keys for root login.An attacker could easily add their own keys and gain full control over the system withouttriggering the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153measured boot\u00e2\u20ac\ufffd mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without markingthe device as \u00e2\u20ac\u0153UUD\u00e2\u20ac\ufffd (\u00e2\u20ac\u0153Unknown Update Detected\u00e2\u20ac\ufffd).This is because the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153/config\u00e2\u20ac\ufffd partition is not protected by \u00e2\u20ac\u0153measured boot\u00e2\u20ac\ufffd, it is mutable, andit is not encrypted in any way.An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus nottriggering the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153measured boot\u00e2\u20ac\ufffd mechanism, and having full access to the vault.Note:This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the configpartition measurement was added to PCR13:\u00e2\u20ac\u00a2 aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141\u00e2\u20ac\u00a2 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.\n\n\ud83d\udcd6 Read\n\nvia \"National Vulnerability Database\".", "creation_timestamp": "2023-09-21T18:31:06.000000Z"}]}