{"vulnerability": "CVE-2022-20465", "sightings": [{"uuid": "1bbdbb1a-4e04-45af-9642-1d309a6074c7", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2022-20465", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/true_secator/3699", "content": "\u034f\u0420\u0435\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0447\u0435\u0440 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043a\u0440\u044b\u043b \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c Android, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0430\u044f \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 \u043e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u044c \u044d\u043a\u0440\u0430\u043d \u0431\u043b\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0438 \u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u043b\u044e\u0431\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e, \u0438\u043c\u0435\u044e\u0449\u0435\u043c\u0443 \u0444\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f \u043a \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443.\n\n\u041e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043a\u0430\u043a CVE-2022-20465 \u0438 \u0431\u044b\u043b\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043c \u0414\u044d\u0432\u0438\u0434\u043e\u043c \u0428\u0443\u0442\u0446\u0435\u043c, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u043b \u0437\u0430 \u043d\u0435\u0435 \u043e\u0442 Google \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0432 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u043c\u0435\u0440\u0435 70 000 \u0434\u043e\u043b\u043b\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0432 \u0421\u0428\u0410.\n\n\u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0443 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0431\u043b\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0444\u043e\u043d Android, \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0443\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0432 \u043c\u0435\u0445\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u043c \u0441\u0431\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0430 PIN-\u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 SIM-\u043a\u0430\u0440\u0442\u044b, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0439 \u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u043e\u0442 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f \u0432\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0430 PUK-\u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430.\n\n\u0412 \u044d\u0442\u043e\u043c \u0441\u0446\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0438 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\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434 \u0432\u044b\u0437\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043c \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438\u00a0.dismiss(), \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442 \u043a \u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u0438\u044e \u044d\u043a\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0430 PIN-\u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430/\u043f\u0430\u0440\u043e\u043b\u044f \u0438 \u0432 \u0438\u0442\u043e\u0433\u0435 - \u043a \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0431\u043b\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0435 \u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0444\u043e\u043d\u0430.\n\n\u0414\u043b\u044f \u0438\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f Google \u0438\u0437\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438\u043b\u00a0\u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044e, \u0434\u043e\u0431\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0432 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0439 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0442\u0440, \u0432 \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043c \u0432\u044b\u0437\u044b\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0449\u0430\u044f \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0443\u043a\u0430\u0437\u044b\u0432\u0430\u0435\u0442, \u043a\u0430\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0442\u0438\u043f \u044d\u043a\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u044c.\n\n\u041d\u043e \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043d\u043e \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0435: \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u00a0\u0441\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0438\u043b \u043e\u0431 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0432 Google\u00a0\u0435\u0449\u0435 \u0432 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0435 \u0438\u044e\u043d\u044f. \u0427\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0443 \u043c\u0435\u0441\u044f\u0446\u0435\u0432 \u0435\u043c\u0443 \u043e\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0438\u043b\u0438, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043e\u0442\u0447\u0435\u0442 \u044f\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0434\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u043c \u0438 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0438\u043b \u0435\u0433\u043e.\n\n\u041e\u0434\u043d\u0430\u043a\u043e \u0428\u0443\u0442\u0446 \u0440\u0435\u0448\u0438\u043b \u043d\u0435 \u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f \u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043c\u043e\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0435\u043c\u0443 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u043e\u043c \u043c\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0438\u044f\u0442\u0438\u0439 ESCAL8 \u0432 \u041b\u043e\u043d\u0434\u043e\u043d\u0435, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043d\u0435 \u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0441\u044c \u043d\u0435\u0437\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u043c \u0438 \u0443\u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0438\u0437 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\u0438, \u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u044f\u0442\u043d\u043e, \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0443\u0437\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0432\u044f\u0449\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445, \u0443\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044b\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0443\u044e \u0441\u043a\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0442\u0443 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438, \u043a\u0430\u043a \u043f\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043d\u043e \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043e", "creation_timestamp": "2022-11-14T10:30:45.000000Z"}, {"uuid": "4ffbb739-9c9a-4c28-83aa-3caf8c16743a", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2022-20465", "type": "published-proof-of-concept", "source": "https://t.me/androidMalware/1697", "content": "Vulnerability affecting seemingly all Google Pixel phones allows to bypass lock screen protection (Bounty: $70K, CVE-2022-20465)\nhttps://bugs.xdavidhu.me/google/2022/11/10/accidental-70k-google-pixel-lock-screen-bypass/", "creation_timestamp": "2024-08-04T02:41:40.000000Z"}, {"uuid": "1ef5ac45-8bc6-4e89-896b-09a1179a3fdb", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2022-20465", "type": "published-proof-of-concept", "source": "https://t.me/CyberSecurityTechnologies/7151", "content": "#Threat_Research\n1. A Hard-to-Banish PackageKit Framework Vulnerability in macOS (CVE-2019-8561)\nhttps://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/k/cve-2019-8561-a-hard-to-banish-packagekit-framework-vulnerabilit.html\n2. Google Pixel\u00a0Lock Screen Bypass (CVE-2022-20465)\nhttps://bugs.xdavidhu.me/google/2022/11/10/accidental-70k-google-pixel-lock-screen-bypass", "creation_timestamp": "2022-11-12T13:12:01.000000Z"}, {"uuid": "93d8b368-5c40-4a2c-875c-c6bead900c54", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2022-20465", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/xyuriti/16", "content": "\u042f \u043f\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0448\u0435\u043b \u0432 \u0441\u0435\u0431\u044f, \u0438, \u043a\u0430\u043a \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0449\u0430\u043b, \u043f\u043e\u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0439 Pixel 4a \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043c\u0435\u0442 \u0431\u0430\u0433\u0438 CVE-2022-20465, \u043f\u0440\u043e \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0443\u044e \u044f \u043a\u0430\u043a-\u0442\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0430\u0437\u044b\u0432\u0430\u043b \u0432 \u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0438\u0437 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u0443\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432 technical.\n\u0423\u0432\u044b, \u0432 \u043b\u043e\u0431 \u043d\u0435 \u0432\u044b\u0448\u043b\u043e. \u041d\u0430 YouTube \u043d\u0430\u0448\u0435\u043b \u043f\u043e\u0445\u043e\u0436\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0435\u043c\u044b \u0441 Pixel 5, \u043d\u043e \u043c\u043d\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043f\u044b\u0442\u043a\u0438 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u043d\u0435 \u0443\u0432\u0435\u043d\u0447\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0443\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0445\u043e\u043c.\n\u041d\u043e \u0448\u0430\u043d\u0441 \u0437\u0430\u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0432\u0441\u0435 \u0436\u0435 \u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c, \u043d\u0435 \u0437\u0440\u044f \u0432\u0435\u0434\u044c \u044d\u0442\u0430 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044c \u0442\u043e\u0436\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u0432 \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043c \u0438\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0431\u0430\u0433\u0443.\n\n\u0415\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0434\u0435\u044f \u043f\u043e\u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0449\u044c\u044e Frida, \u0442\u0435\u043c \u0431\u043e\u043b\u0435\u0435 \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043d\u0435\u043e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043c\u044b\u0435 \u043a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441\u044b \u0438 \u043c\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0434\u044b \u0443\u0436\u0435 \u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0432 advisory. \n\n\u0415\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u044d\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0431\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0442 20 \u0440\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0439, \u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0438\u0442 \u0432\u0430\u043c \u0442\u043e\u0436\u0435 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043d\u043e, \u0438 \u043c\u044b \u043e\u0442\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043c\u0441\u044f \u043f\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f \u0432 \u0434\u0435\u0442\u0430\u043b\u0438 \ud83d\udc7e", "creation_timestamp": "2026-07-17T11:00:09.757634Z"}, {"uuid": "b5a17257-6304-4b96-8d96-cd650fbf5a8a", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2022-20465", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/xyuriti/16", "content": "\u042f \u043f\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0448\u0435\u043b \u0432 \u0441\u0435\u0431\u044f, \u0438, \u043a\u0430\u043a \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0449\u0430\u043b, \u043f\u043e\u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0439 Pixel 4a \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043c\u0435\u0442 \u0431\u0430\u0433\u0438 CVE-2022-20465, \u043f\u0440\u043e \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0443\u044e \u044f \u043a\u0430\u043a-\u0442\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0430\u0437\u044b\u0432\u0430\u043b \u0432 \u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0438\u0437 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u0443\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432 technical.\n\u0423\u0432\u044b, \u0432 \u043b\u043e\u0431 \u043d\u0435 \u0432\u044b\u0448\u043b\u043e. \u041d\u0430 YouTube \u043d\u0430\u0448\u0435\u043b \u043f\u043e\u0445\u043e\u0436\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0435\u043c\u044b \u0441 Pixel 5, \u043d\u043e \u043c\u043d\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043f\u044b\u0442\u043a\u0438 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u043d\u0435 \u0443\u0432\u0435\u043d\u0447\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u044c \u0443\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0445\u043e\u043c.\n\u041d\u043e \u0448\u0430\u043d\u0441 \u0437\u0430\u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0432\u0441\u0435 \u0436\u0435 \u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c, \u043d\u0435 \u0437\u0440\u044f \u0432\u0435\u0434\u044c \u044d\u0442\u0430 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044c \u0442\u043e\u0436\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u0432 \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043c \u0438\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0431\u0430\u0433\u0443.\n\n\u0415\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0434\u0435\u044f \u043f\u043e\u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0449\u044c\u044e Frida, \u0442\u0435\u043c \u0431\u043e\u043b\u0435\u0435 \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043d\u0435\u043e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043c\u044b\u0435 \u043a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441\u044b \u0438 \u043c\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0434\u044b \u0443\u0436\u0435 \u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0432 advisory. \n\n\u0415\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u044d\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0431\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0442 20 \u0440\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0439, \u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0438\u0442 \u0432\u0430\u043c \u0442\u043e\u0436\u0435 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043d\u043e, \u0438 \u043c\u044b \u043e\u0442\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043c\u0441\u044f \u043f\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f \u0432 \u0434\u0435\u0442\u0430\u043b\u0438 \ud83d\udc7e", "creation_timestamp": "2026-07-18T00:00:26.904438Z"}, {"uuid": "67295545-b1f2-4b6f-b81d-884b029d65a7", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2022-20465115", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/xhqcankao/3842", "content": "\u6709\u5f00\u53d1\u8005\u516c\u5e03\u4e86 Google Pixel \u624b\u673a\u7684\u4e00\u4e2a\u4e25\u91cd\u9501\u5c4f\u7ed5\u8fc7\u6f0f\u6d1e\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u53ea\u9700\u8981\u4ea4\u6362\u624b\u673a\u7684sim\u5361\uff0c\u6545\u610f\u8f93\u95193\u6b21SIM\u5361PIN\u7801\u4f7f\u5176\u88ab\u9501\u5b9a\uff0c\u518d\u5229\u7528PUK\u7801\u91cd\u7f6ePIN\u7801\u5c31\u80fd\u7acb\u5373\u89e3\u9501\u624b\u673a\uff0c\u83b7\u5f97\u5168\u90e8\u8bbf\u95ee\u6743\u9650\u3002\n\n\u8be5\u6f0f\u6d1e\u88ab\u8ddf\u8e2a\u4e3aCVE-2022-20465\uff0c\u5b83\u8fd8\u53ef\u80fd\u5f71\u54cd\u5176\u5b83\u54c1\u724c\u7684\u5b89\u5353\u624b\u673a\u3002\u8c37\u6b4c\u572811\u67085\u65e5\u7684\u66f4\u65b0\u4e2d\u4fee\u590d\u4e86\u8be5\u6f0f\u6d1e\u3002\u6f0f\u6d1e\u8be6\u60c5", "creation_timestamp": "2026-08-25T00:00:24.500793Z"}, {"uuid": "f5c5de68-bbcb-4e74-92fa-5b08ea92b32a", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2022-20465115", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/xhqcankao/3842", "content": "\u6709\u5f00\u53d1\u8005\u516c\u5e03\u4e86 Google Pixel \u624b\u673a\u7684\u4e00\u4e2a\u4e25\u91cd\u9501\u5c4f\u7ed5\u8fc7\u6f0f\u6d1e\uff0c\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u53ea\u9700\u8981\u4ea4\u6362\u624b\u673a\u7684sim\u5361\uff0c\u6545\u610f\u8f93\u95193\u6b21SIM\u5361PIN\u7801\u4f7f\u5176\u88ab\u9501\u5b9a\uff0c\u518d\u5229\u7528PUK\u7801\u91cd\u7f6ePIN\u7801\u5c31\u80fd\u7acb\u5373\u89e3\u9501\u624b\u673a\uff0c\u83b7\u5f97\u5168\u90e8\u8bbf\u95ee\u6743\u9650\u3002\n\n\u8be5\u6f0f\u6d1e\u88ab\u8ddf\u8e2a\u4e3aCVE-2022-20465\uff0c\u5b83\u8fd8\u53ef\u80fd\u5f71\u54cd\u5176\u5b83\u54c1\u724c\u7684\u5b89\u5353\u624b\u673a\u3002\u8c37\u6b4c\u572811\u67085\u65e5\u7684\u66f4\u65b0\u4e2d\u4fee\u590d\u4e86\u8be5\u6f0f\u6d1e\u3002\u6f0f\u6d1e\u8be6\u60c5", "creation_timestamp": "2026-08-24T10:00:03.956584Z"}, {"uuid": "e80c2f1f-1256-48db-9c0c-ee521c8b0f0c", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2022-20465", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/76164", "content": "Black Hat Ethical Hacking\nGoogle Pixel screen-lock hack with $70k bug bounty payout\n\nGoogle Pixel screen-lock hack with $70k bug bounty payoutPost Views: 64 Premium Contenthttps://www.blackhatethicalhacking.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Patreon.png Subscribe to Patreon to watch this episode.\nReading Time: 3 Minutes A security researcher scored a $70k bug bounty payout after accidentally discovering a Google Pixel\u00a0lock-screen bypass hack.The vulnerability, discovered by David Sch\u00fctz, meant an attacker could unlock any Google Pixel phone without knowing the passcode. Google fixed the issue (tracked at CVE-2022-20465) with a November update, allowing Sch\u00fctz to go public with his findings.\n\nThe vulnerability created a means for a potential hacker to bypass lock-screen protections such as fingerprint or PIN authentication and obtain physical access to a target device. The hack could be carried out with minimal technical skill against a range of mobile devices\u00a0running Android, by following a series of steps.\n\nFortunately, the exploit is not something that would lend itself to remote exploitation.\nSee Also: So you want to be a hacker? Complete Offensive Security and Ethical Hacking Course \u200bSerendipity strikesAs explained in a blog post, Sch\u00fctz came across the issue by chance when he forgot the PIN code of his Pixel phone and had to use the PUK code to regain access. After successfully completing the process, he noticed oddities in the lock screen he was confronted with.\n\n\u201cIt was a fresh boot, and instead of the usual lock icon, the fingerprint icon was showing,\u201d Sch\u00fctz recalled. \u201cIt accepted my finger, which should not happen, since after a reboot, you must enter the lock screen PIN or password at least once to decrypt the device.\u201d\n\nAfter accepting his finger, the device crashed with a weird \u201cPixel is starting\u2026\u201d message, which Sch\u00fctz addressed with a forced reboot.\n\nSch\u00fctz decided to investigate the issue over subsequent days. On one occasion he forgot to reboot the phone, and just began from a normal unlocked state, locked the device, and hot-swapped the SIM tray, before carrying out the SIM PIN reset process.\n\nAfter following this sequence before entering the PUK code and choosing a new PIN, Sch\u00fctz was presented with his unlocked home screen.\n\nThe researcher realized that he had achieved a full lock screen bypass on the fully patched Pixel 6. The same trick worked on a Pixel 5. Easy exploitationSch\u00fctz realized the hack would be easily exploited by anyone, from spies to crooks and jealous spouses.\n\n\u201cSince the attacker could just bring his/her own PIN-locked SIM card, nothing other than physical access was required for exploitation. The attacker could just swap the SIM in the victim\u2019s device, and perform the exploit with a SIM card that had a PIN lock and for which the attacker knew the correct PUK code.\u201d\nTrending: Using VPS for Bug Bounty, comparing VPS providers Trending: Offensive Security Tool: WinPwnage Patch puzzlementSch\u00fctz reported the issue to Google\u00a0and the tech giant processed and filed the bug promptly, but remediation took far longer.\n\nAfter telling Sch\u00fctz the issue was a duplicate, and therefore not normally eligible for a bug bounty, Google failed to act for some weeks, before repeated chasing by Sch\u00fctz and a demo of the exploit to Google staffers at a Google-run bug hunter event called ESCAL8 in September prompted action.\n\nShortly after this, Google said that even though Sch\u00fctz\u2019s report was a duplicate, it had only started working on a fix because of his submission, so the firm had decided to pay him a $70,000 bounty for the lock screen bypass.\n\nThe bug was fixed on November 5, allowing Sch\u00fctz to disclose his findings and a video demonstrating the flaw.\n\nThe researcher deduced[...]\n\n___________________________ \n@hacking_Attack\n@Hacking_Video", "creation_timestamp": "2026-09-01T20:01:19.252940Z"}, {"uuid": "5c74db5e-223c-4ee3-8b3e-4d9f70c5ebbe", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2022-20465", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/76164", "content": "Black Hat Ethical Hacking\nGoogle Pixel screen-lock hack with $70k bug bounty payout\n\nGoogle Pixel screen-lock hack with $70k bug bounty payoutPost Views: 64 Premium Contenthttps://www.blackhatethicalhacking.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Patreon.png Subscribe to Patreon to watch this episode.\nReading Time: 3 Minutes A security researcher scored a $70k bug bounty payout after accidentally discovering a Google Pixel\u00a0lock-screen bypass hack.The vulnerability, discovered by David Sch\u00fctz, meant an attacker could unlock any Google Pixel phone without knowing the passcode. Google fixed the issue (tracked at CVE-2022-20465) with a November update, allowing Sch\u00fctz to go public with his findings.\n\nThe vulnerability created a means for a potential hacker to bypass lock-screen protections such as fingerprint or PIN authentication and obtain physical access to a target device. The hack could be carried out with minimal technical skill against a range of mobile devices\u00a0running Android, by following a series of steps.\n\nFortunately, the exploit is not something that would lend itself to remote exploitation.\nSee Also: So you want to be a hacker? Complete Offensive Security and Ethical Hacking Course \u200bSerendipity strikesAs explained in a blog post, Sch\u00fctz came across the issue by chance when he forgot the PIN code of his Pixel phone and had to use the PUK code to regain access. After successfully completing the process, he noticed oddities in the lock screen he was confronted with.\n\n\u201cIt was a fresh boot, and instead of the usual lock icon, the fingerprint icon was showing,\u201d Sch\u00fctz recalled. \u201cIt accepted my finger, which should not happen, since after a reboot, you must enter the lock screen PIN or password at least once to decrypt the device.\u201d\n\nAfter accepting his finger, the device crashed with a weird \u201cPixel is starting\u2026\u201d message, which Sch\u00fctz addressed with a forced reboot.\n\nSch\u00fctz decided to investigate the issue over subsequent days. On one occasion he forgot to reboot the phone, and just began from a normal unlocked state, locked the device, and hot-swapped the SIM tray, before carrying out the SIM PIN reset process.\n\nAfter following this sequence before entering the PUK code and choosing a new PIN, Sch\u00fctz was presented with his unlocked home screen.\n\nThe researcher realized that he had achieved a full lock screen bypass on the fully patched Pixel 6. The same trick worked on a Pixel 5. Easy exploitationSch\u00fctz realized the hack would be easily exploited by anyone, from spies to crooks and jealous spouses.\n\n\u201cSince the attacker could just bring his/her own PIN-locked SIM card, nothing other than physical access was required for exploitation. The attacker could just swap the SIM in the victim\u2019s device, and perform the exploit with a SIM card that had a PIN lock and for which the attacker knew the correct PUK code.\u201d\nTrending: Using VPS for Bug Bounty, comparing VPS providers Trending: Offensive Security Tool: WinPwnage Patch puzzlementSch\u00fctz reported the issue to Google\u00a0and the tech giant processed and filed the bug promptly, but remediation took far longer.\n\nAfter telling Sch\u00fctz the issue was a duplicate, and therefore not normally eligible for a bug bounty, Google failed to act for some weeks, before repeated chasing by Sch\u00fctz and a demo of the exploit to Google staffers at a Google-run bug hunter event called ESCAL8 in September prompted action.\n\nShortly after this, Google said that even though Sch\u00fctz\u2019s report was a duplicate, it had only started working on a fix because of his submission, so the firm had decided to pay him a $70,000 bounty for the lock screen bypass.\n\nThe bug was fixed on November 5, allowing Sch\u00fctz to disclose his findings and a video demonstrating the flaw.\n\nThe researcher deduced[...]\n\n___________________________ \n@hacking_Attack\n@Hacking_Video", "creation_timestamp": "2026-09-02T01:01:34.168843Z"}, {"uuid": "a362466b-5a02-4563-8a92-a7d3437791e3", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2022-20465", "type": "published-proof-of-concept", "source": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/76164", "content": "Black Hat Ethical Hacking\nGoogle Pixel screen-lock hack with $70k bug bounty payout\n\nGoogle Pixel screen-lock hack with $70k bug bounty payoutPost Views: 64 Premium Contenthttps://www.blackhatethicalhacking.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Patreon.png Subscribe to Patreon to watch this episode.\nReading Time: 3 Minutes A security researcher scored a $70k bug bounty payout after accidentally discovering a Google Pixel\u00a0lock-screen bypass hack.The vulnerability, discovered by David Sch\u00fctz, meant an attacker could unlock any Google Pixel phone without knowing the passcode. Google fixed the issue (tracked at CVE-2022-20465) with a November update, allowing Sch\u00fctz to go public with his findings.\n\nThe vulnerability created a means for a potential hacker to bypass lock-screen protections such as fingerprint or PIN authentication and obtain physical access to a target device. The hack could be carried out with minimal technical skill against a range of mobile devices\u00a0running Android, by following a series of steps.\n\nFortunately, the exploit is not something that would lend itself to remote exploitation.\nSee Also: So you want to be a hacker? Complete Offensive Security and Ethical Hacking Course \u200bSerendipity strikesAs explained in a blog post, Sch\u00fctz came across the issue by chance when he forgot the PIN code of his Pixel phone and had to use the PUK code to regain access. After successfully completing the process, he noticed oddities in the lock screen he was confronted with.\n\n\u201cIt was a fresh boot, and instead of the usual lock icon, the fingerprint icon was showing,\u201d Sch\u00fctz recalled. \u201cIt accepted my finger, which should not happen, since after a reboot, you must enter the lock screen PIN or password at least once to decrypt the device.\u201d\n\nAfter accepting his finger, the device crashed with a weird \u201cPixel is starting\u2026\u201d message, which Sch\u00fctz addressed with a forced reboot.\n\nSch\u00fctz decided to investigate the issue over subsequent days. On one occasion he forgot to reboot the phone, and just began from a normal unlocked state, locked the device, and hot-swapped the SIM tray, before carrying out the SIM PIN reset process.\n\nAfter following this sequence before entering the PUK code and choosing a new PIN, Sch\u00fctz was presented with his unlocked home screen.\n\nThe researcher realized that he had achieved a full lock screen bypass on the fully patched Pixel 6. The same trick worked on a Pixel 5. Easy exploitationSch\u00fctz realized the hack would be easily exploited by anyone, from spies to crooks and jealous spouses.\n\n\u201cSince the attacker could just bring his/her own PIN-locked SIM card, nothing other than physical access was required for exploitation. The attacker could just swap the SIM in the victim\u2019s device, and perform the exploit with a SIM card that had a PIN lock and for which the attacker knew the correct PUK code.\u201d\nTrending: Using VPS for Bug Bounty, comparing VPS providers Trending: Offensive Security Tool: WinPwnage Patch puzzlementSch\u00fctz reported the issue to Google\u00a0and the tech giant processed and filed the bug promptly, but remediation took far longer.\n\nAfter telling Sch\u00fctz the issue was a duplicate, and therefore not normally eligible for a bug bounty, Google failed to act for some weeks, before repeated chasing by Sch\u00fctz and a demo of the exploit to Google staffers at a Google-run bug hunter event called ESCAL8 in September prompted action.\n\nShortly after this, Google said that even though Sch\u00fctz\u2019s report was a duplicate, it had only started working on a fix because of his submission, so the firm had decided to pay him a $70,000 bounty for the lock screen bypass.\n\nThe bug was fixed on November 5, allowing Sch\u00fctz to disclose his findings and a video demonstrating the flaw.\n\nThe researcher deduced[...]\n\n___________________________ \n@hacking_Attack\n@Hacking_Video", "creation_timestamp": "2026-09-05T05:00:04.591542Z"}, {"uuid": "733ce483-7fa4-4d57-964b-8b7667ce405f", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2022-20465", "type": "published-proof-of-concept", "source": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/76164", "content": "Black Hat Ethical Hacking\nGoogle Pixel screen-lock hack with $70k bug bounty payout\n\nGoogle Pixel screen-lock hack with $70k bug bounty payoutPost Views: 64 Premium Contenthttps://www.blackhatethicalhacking.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Patreon.png Subscribe to Patreon to watch this episode.\nReading Time: 3 Minutes A security researcher scored a $70k bug bounty payout after accidentally discovering a Google Pixel\u00a0lock-screen bypass hack.The vulnerability, discovered by David Sch\u00fctz, meant an attacker could unlock any Google Pixel phone without knowing the passcode. Google fixed the issue (tracked at CVE-2022-20465) with a November update, allowing Sch\u00fctz to go public with his findings.\n\nThe vulnerability created a means for a potential hacker to bypass lock-screen protections such as fingerprint or PIN authentication and obtain physical access to a target device. The hack could be carried out with minimal technical skill against a range of mobile devices\u00a0running Android, by following a series of steps.\n\nFortunately, the exploit is not something that would lend itself to remote exploitation.\nSee Also: So you want to be a hacker? Complete Offensive Security and Ethical Hacking Course \u200bSerendipity strikesAs explained in a blog post, Sch\u00fctz came across the issue by chance when he forgot the PIN code of his Pixel phone and had to use the PUK code to regain access. After successfully completing the process, he noticed oddities in the lock screen he was confronted with.\n\n\u201cIt was a fresh boot, and instead of the usual lock icon, the fingerprint icon was showing,\u201d Sch\u00fctz recalled. \u201cIt accepted my finger, which should not happen, since after a reboot, you must enter the lock screen PIN or password at least once to decrypt the device.\u201d\n\nAfter accepting his finger, the device crashed with a weird \u201cPixel is starting\u2026\u201d message, which Sch\u00fctz addressed with a forced reboot.\n\nSch\u00fctz decided to investigate the issue over subsequent days. On one occasion he forgot to reboot the phone, and just began from a normal unlocked state, locked the device, and hot-swapped the SIM tray, before carrying out the SIM PIN reset process.\n\nAfter following this sequence before entering the PUK code and choosing a new PIN, Sch\u00fctz was presented with his unlocked home screen.\n\nThe researcher realized that he had achieved a full lock screen bypass on the fully patched Pixel 6. The same trick worked on a Pixel 5. Easy exploitationSch\u00fctz realized the hack would be easily exploited by anyone, from spies to crooks and jealous spouses.\n\n\u201cSince the attacker could just bring his/her own PIN-locked SIM card, nothing other than physical access was required for exploitation. The attacker could just swap the SIM in the victim\u2019s device, and perform the exploit with a SIM card that had a PIN lock and for which the attacker knew the correct PUK code.\u201d\nTrending: Using VPS for Bug Bounty, comparing VPS providers Trending: Offensive Security Tool: WinPwnage Patch puzzlementSch\u00fctz reported the issue to Google\u00a0and the tech giant processed and filed the bug promptly, but remediation took far longer.\n\nAfter telling Sch\u00fctz the issue was a duplicate, and therefore not normally eligible for a bug bounty, Google failed to act for some weeks, before repeated chasing by Sch\u00fctz and a demo of the exploit to Google staffers at a Google-run bug hunter event called ESCAL8 in September prompted action.\n\nShortly after this, Google said that even though Sch\u00fctz\u2019s report was a duplicate, it had only started working on a fix because of his submission, so the firm had decided to pay him a $70,000 bounty for the lock screen bypass.\n\nThe bug was fixed on November 5, allowing Sch\u00fctz to disclose his findings and a video demonstrating the flaw.\n\nThe researcher deduced[...]\n\n___________________________ \n@hacking_Attack\n@Hacking_Video", "creation_timestamp": "2026-09-06T00:00:57.640329Z"}]}