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      <title>CVE-2026-93578 — Io.netty/netty-handler-ssl-ocsp: netty: missing extended key usage (eku) check in ocsp client allows certificate revoca…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-93578</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A flaw was found in Netty&amp;#39;s Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Client. The client fails to verify the &amp;#39;id-kp-OCSPSigning&amp;#39; Extended Key Usage (EKU) in OCSP responder certificates. A remote attacker, holding any valid certificate issued by the same Certificate Authority (CA), can exploit this by forging &amp;#39;GOOD&amp;#39; OCSP responses for revoked certificates. This bypasses certificate revocation checks, allowing applications using Netty&amp;#39;s OCSP Client to accept certificates that should have been revoked, leading to an authorization bypass.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A flaw was found in Netty&amp;#39;s Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Client. The client fails to verify the &amp;#39;id-kp-OCSPSigning&amp;#39; Extended Key Usage (EKU) in OCSP responder certificates. A remote attacker, holding any valid certificate issued by the same Certificate Authority (CA), can exploit this by forging &amp;#39;GOOD&amp;#39; OCSP responses for revoked certificates. This bypasses certificate revocation checks, allowing applications using Netty&amp;#39;s OCSP Client to accept certificates that should have been revoked, leading to an authorization bypass.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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