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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 08:46:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-90220 — ALSA: seq: Don't leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90220</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: seq: Don&amp;#39;t leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload
by pointing data.ext.ptr at it.  When that event is a queued
variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its
first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup().  The payload
goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address
reaches userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e (&amp;#34;ALSA: seq: Clear
variable event pointer on read&amp;#34;) removed from the event header.  The
read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the
payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read()
treats the header.  A stack copy is enough because delivery is
synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE,
queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and
reading the bounce back.  Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: seq: Don&amp;#39;t leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload
by pointing data.ext.ptr at it.  When that event is a queued
variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its
first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup().  The payload
goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address
reaches userspace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e (&amp;#34;ALSA: seq: Clear
variable event pointer on read&amp;#34;) removed from the event header.  The
read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the
payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read()
treats the header.  A stack copy is enough because delivery is
synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE,
queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and
reading the bounce back.  Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90220</guid>
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