https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 30 Sep 2026 03:55:41 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89700 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>nfsd: validate sockaddr length per family in listener_set</p> <p>nfsd_sock_nl_policy declares NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR as a bare NLA_BINARY attribute with no minimum length. A CAP_NET_ADMIN caller can send a 16-byte NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR with sa_family=AF_INET6, causing a 12-byte OOB read across three consumers (rpc_cmp_addr_port, svc_find_listener, kernel_bind).</p> <p>nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() also parsed and validated each listener entry inline in two separate loops, interleaved with mutating the running listener configuration. The validation was duplicated, used an open-coded &#34;nla_len &lt; sizeof(struct sockaddr)&#34; check that was too short for AF_INET6, and handled a malformed entry inconsistently depending on which loop noticed it.</p> <p>Add an nfsd_nl_validate_listeners() helper that walks the entire list once and confirms each entry parses, carries both an address and a transport name, and is long enough for its address family (sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) for AF_INET, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) for AF_INET6, -EAFNOSUPPORT otherwise). Call it before taking nfsd_mutex or creating the serv, so a malformed request fails cleanly with no side effects.</p> <p>Since every entry is known valid by the time the two existing loops run, drop the redundant presence and per-family length checks from both, leaving only the nla_parse_nested() call needed to extract the data.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>nfsd: validate sockaddr length per family in listener_set</p> <p>nfsd_sock_nl_policy declares NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR as a bare NLA_BINARY attribute with no minimum length. A CAP_NET_ADMIN caller can send a 16-byte NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR with sa_family=AF_INET6, causing a 12-byte OOB read across three consumers (rpc_cmp_addr_port, svc_find_listener, kernel_bind).</p> <p>nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() also parsed and validated each listener entry inline in two separate loops, interleaved with mutating the running listener configuration. The validation was duplicated, used an open-coded &#34;nla_len &lt; sizeof(struct sockaddr)&#34; check that was too short for AF_INET6, and handled a malformed entry inconsistently depending on which loop noticed it.</p> <p>Add an nfsd_nl_validate_listeners() helper that walks the entire list once and confirms each entry parses, carries both an address and a transport name, and is long enough for its address family (sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) for AF_INET, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) for AF_INET6, -EAFNOSUPPORT otherwise). Call it before taking nfsd_mutex or creating the serv, so a malformed request fails cleanly with no side effects.</p> <p>Since every entry is known valid by the time the two existing loops run, drop the redundant presence and per-family length checks from both, leaving only the nla_parse_nested() call needed to extract the data.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89700