<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 05:04:11 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89698 — nfsd: widen nfsd_genl_rqstp address fields to sockaddr_storage</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89698</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfsd: widen nfsd_genl_rqstp address fields to sockaddr_storage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct nfsd_genl_rqstp declares rq_daddr and rq_saddr as plain
&amp;#34;struct sockaddr&amp;#34; (16 bytes). When an IPv6 NFS client is connected,
nfsd_genl_rpc_status_compose_msg() casts these fields to
&amp;#34;struct sockaddr_in6 *&amp;#34; (28 bytes) and reads sin6_addr at offset 8..24,
which extends 8 bytes past the end of the 16-byte sockaddr field into
the adjacent rq_flags member. The 16-byte nla_put_in6_addr then ships 8
bytes of truncated IPv6 address followed by 8 bytes of rq_flags to
userspace via the NFSD_A_RPC_STATUS_SADDR6/DADDR6 netlink attributes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is reachable by any unprivileged process in the network namespace
because NFSD_CMD_RPC_STATUS_GET uses GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP without
GENL_ADMIN_PERM.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by widening rq_daddr and rq_saddr to struct sockaddr_storage so the
IPv6 casts operate within bounds, copying sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
bytes in the memcpy calls so the full address is captured, and
zero-initializing the genl_rqstp stack variable to prevent leaking
uninitialized tail bytes through netlink.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfsd: widen nfsd_genl_rqstp address fields to sockaddr_storage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct nfsd_genl_rqstp declares rq_daddr and rq_saddr as plain
&amp;#34;struct sockaddr&amp;#34; (16 bytes). When an IPv6 NFS client is connected,
nfsd_genl_rpc_status_compose_msg() casts these fields to
&amp;#34;struct sockaddr_in6 *&amp;#34; (28 bytes) and reads sin6_addr at offset 8..24,
which extends 8 bytes past the end of the 16-byte sockaddr field into
the adjacent rq_flags member. The 16-byte nla_put_in6_addr then ships 8
bytes of truncated IPv6 address followed by 8 bytes of rq_flags to
userspace via the NFSD_A_RPC_STATUS_SADDR6/DADDR6 netlink attributes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is reachable by any unprivileged process in the network namespace
because NFSD_CMD_RPC_STATUS_GET uses GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP without
GENL_ADMIN_PERM.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by widening rq_daddr and rq_saddr to struct sockaddr_storage so the
IPv6 casts operate within bounds, copying sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
bytes in the memcpy calls so the full address is captured, and
zero-initializing the genl_rqstp stack variable to prevent leaking
uninitialized tail bytes through netlink.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89698</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
