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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 20:16:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-89632 — smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89632</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;reparse_buf_ptr() reads buf-&amp;gt;ReparseDataLength before checking that
count covers the full fixed header:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;buf = (struct reparse_data_buffer *)((u8 *)io + off);
    len = sizeof(*buf);                          /* 8 bytes */
    rdlen = le16_to_cpu(buf-&amp;gt;ReparseDataLength); /* offset 4, 2 bytes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (count &amp;lt; len || count &amp;lt; rdlen + len)      /* check comes after */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct reparse_data_buffer has ReparseDataLength at offset 4.  If a
server returns OutputCount &amp;lt; 6, the read at offset 4-5 reaches past
the end of the received data.  The off+count bounds against iov_len
were already validated, but that does not protect against count being
smaller than sizeof(*buf).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Split the check: verify count &amp;gt;= sizeof(*buf) before reading
ReparseDataLength, then verify count covers the data region.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;reparse_buf_ptr() reads buf-&amp;gt;ReparseDataLength before checking that
count covers the full fixed header:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;buf = (struct reparse_data_buffer *)((u8 *)io + off);
    len = sizeof(*buf);                          /* 8 bytes */
    rdlen = le16_to_cpu(buf-&amp;gt;ReparseDataLength); /* offset 4, 2 bytes */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (count &amp;lt; len || count &amp;lt; rdlen + len)      /* check comes after */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct reparse_data_buffer has ReparseDataLength at offset 4.  If a
server returns OutputCount &amp;lt; 6, the read at offset 4-5 reaches past
the end of the received data.  The off+count bounds against iov_len
were already validated, but that does not protect against count being
smaller than sizeof(*buf).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Split the check: verify count &amp;gt;= sizeof(*buf) before reading
ReparseDataLength, then verify count covers the data region.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89632</guid>
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