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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 18:03:17 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89583 — Bluetooth: eir: Fix OOB read in eir_get_service_data()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89583</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: eir: Fix OOB read in eir_get_service_data()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;eir_get_service_data() walks the advertising data for a Service Data
field with a matching UUID.  On a mismatch it advances:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;eir += dlen;
    eir_len -= dlen;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;eir_get_data() reports dlen as the field&amp;#39;s data length, but the field
spans dlen + 2 bytes once its length and type bytes count, and more
when non-Service-Data fields were skipped to reach it.  The pointer
lands correctly on the next field.  eir_len does not, and the shortfall
compounds across fields until eir_get_data() reads the length and type
bytes of a &amp;#34;field&amp;#34; past the end of the buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For an ISO broadcast sink that buffer is hcon-&amp;gt;le_per_adv_data[], filled
from the periodic advertising reports of a remote broadcaster.  A PA
payload packed with mismatching Service Data fields walks off the array
into the rest of struct hci_conn.  A drifted field that matches the BAA
UUID puts those bytes in iso_pi(sk)-&amp;gt;base, where user space reads them
back with getsockopt(BT_ISO_BASE).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Recompute eir_len from the end of the buffer each iteration.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: eir: Fix OOB read in eir_get_service_data()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;eir_get_service_data() walks the advertising data for a Service Data
field with a matching UUID.  On a mismatch it advances:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;eir += dlen;
    eir_len -= dlen;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;eir_get_data() reports dlen as the field&amp;#39;s data length, but the field
spans dlen + 2 bytes once its length and type bytes count, and more
when non-Service-Data fields were skipped to reach it.  The pointer
lands correctly on the next field.  eir_len does not, and the shortfall
compounds across fields until eir_get_data() reads the length and type
bytes of a &amp;#34;field&amp;#34; past the end of the buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For an ISO broadcast sink that buffer is hcon-&amp;gt;le_per_adv_data[], filled
from the periodic advertising reports of a remote broadcaster.  A PA
payload packed with mismatching Service Data fields walks off the array
into the rest of struct hci_conn.  A drifted field that matches the BAA
UUID puts those bytes in iso_pi(sk)-&amp;gt;base, where user space reads them
back with getsockopt(BT_ISO_BASE).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Recompute eir_len from the end of the buffer each iteration.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89583</guid>
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