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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 06:57:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89571 — cxl/features: bound fwctl command payload to the input buffer</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89571</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cxl/features: bound fwctl command payload to the input buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fwctl_cmd_rpc() copies cmd-&amp;gt;in_len bytes into inbuf = kvzalloc(cmd-&amp;gt;in_len)
and passes inbuf and in_len to -&amp;gt;fw_rpc(). The CXL callback cxlctl_fw_rpc()
ignores in_len and never checks the user-controlled op_size against it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cxlctl_set_feature() bounds op_size only from below
(op_size &amp;lt;= sizeof(feat_in-&amp;gt;hdr)) and then reads op_size - sizeof(hdr)
bytes from feat_in-&amp;gt;feat_data via cxl_set_feature(). With a small in_len
and a large op_size the first memcpy() already reads past the
kvzalloc(in_len) buffer; the out-of-bounds bytes are placed in the mailbox
payload and sent to the device, and a large enough op_size can walk into
unmapped memory and oops the kernel. The Get paths pin op_size to a fixed
size but likewise read the input struct without checking in_len.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject, at the single dispatch point, any request whose fixed header plus
op_size does not fit in the copied-in buffer. The lower-bound test guards
the subtraction and ensures op_size was copied in before it is read.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cxl/features: bound fwctl command payload to the input buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fwctl_cmd_rpc() copies cmd-&amp;gt;in_len bytes into inbuf = kvzalloc(cmd-&amp;gt;in_len)
and passes inbuf and in_len to -&amp;gt;fw_rpc(). The CXL callback cxlctl_fw_rpc()
ignores in_len and never checks the user-controlled op_size against it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cxlctl_set_feature() bounds op_size only from below
(op_size &amp;lt;= sizeof(feat_in-&amp;gt;hdr)) and then reads op_size - sizeof(hdr)
bytes from feat_in-&amp;gt;feat_data via cxl_set_feature(). With a small in_len
and a large op_size the first memcpy() already reads past the
kvzalloc(in_len) buffer; the out-of-bounds bytes are placed in the mailbox
payload and sent to the device, and a large enough op_size can walk into
unmapped memory and oops the kernel. The Get paths pin op_size to a fixed
size but likewise read the input struct without checking in_len.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject, at the single dispatch point, any request whose fixed header plus
op_size does not fit in the copied-in buffer. The lower-bound test guards
the subtraction and ensures op_size was copied in before it is read.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89571</guid>
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