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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 20:05:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89488 — openvswitch: Fix CT limit teardown use-after-free</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89488</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;openvswitch: Fix CT limit teardown use-after-free&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Packet processing uses CT limit state under RCU, while netns teardown
frees that state under ovs_mutex. The CT limit pointer was neither removed
from readers nor protected by a grace period, allowing packet processing to
dereference the freed state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unprivileged user can trigger this bug from a user and network
namespace, causing a slab-use-after-free in ovs_ct_execute() when the
netns is torn down.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Publish the CT limit pointer through RCU, remove it before teardown, and
wait for readers before freeing its contents. Keep ovs_mutex around
individual CT limit updates, and use the RCU read-side lock while GET
traverses the RCU-protected limit lists.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Netns teardown detaches the RCU-protected CT limit state in the pernet
.pre_exit callback while holding ovs_mutex.  The pernet core guarantees an
RCU grace period between the .pre_exit and .exit callbacks, so the .exit
callback completes the teardown without adding any extra synchronization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The netlink command handlers do not need NULL checks because the userspace
netlink socket holds an active reference to its network namespace while a
request is processed. The per-netns exit path therefore cannot run
concurrently with SET, DEL, or GET for that socket&amp;#39;s namespace.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;openvswitch: Fix CT limit teardown use-after-free&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Packet processing uses CT limit state under RCU, while netns teardown
frees that state under ovs_mutex. The CT limit pointer was neither removed
from readers nor protected by a grace period, allowing packet processing to
dereference the freed state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unprivileged user can trigger this bug from a user and network
namespace, causing a slab-use-after-free in ovs_ct_execute() when the
netns is torn down.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Publish the CT limit pointer through RCU, remove it before teardown, and
wait for readers before freeing its contents. Keep ovs_mutex around
individual CT limit updates, and use the RCU read-side lock while GET
traverses the RCU-protected limit lists.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Netns teardown detaches the RCU-protected CT limit state in the pernet
.pre_exit callback while holding ovs_mutex.  The pernet core guarantees an
RCU grace period between the .pre_exit and .exit callbacks, so the .exit
callback completes the teardown without adding any extra synchronization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The netlink command handlers do not need NULL checks because the userspace
netlink socket holds an active reference to its network namespace while a
request is processed. The per-netns exit path therefore cannot run
concurrently with SET, DEL, or GET for that socket&amp;#39;s namespace.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89488</guid>
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