<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 23:48:26 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89451 — iommu/sva: Set handle-&gt;dev before the SVA handle is visible</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89451</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu/sva: Set handle-&amp;gt;dev before the SVA handle is visible&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu_attach_device_pasid() installs the new SVA attach handle in the
group PASID lookup before iommu_sva_bind_device() returns. A concurrent
bind can therefore find and reuse the same handle after iommu_sva_lock is
dropped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;handle-&amp;gt;dev was initialized after dropping iommu_sva_lock. This leaves a
window where a racing bind can return a handle whose dev pointer is still
NULL. A subsequent iommu_sva_unbind_device() can then dereference it via
handle-&amp;gt;dev-&amp;gt;iommu_group.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initialize handle-&amp;gt;dev before releasing iommu_sva_lock so any visible SVA
handle is fully initialized.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu/sva: Set handle-&amp;gt;dev before the SVA handle is visible&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iommu_attach_device_pasid() installs the new SVA attach handle in the
group PASID lookup before iommu_sva_bind_device() returns. A concurrent
bind can therefore find and reuse the same handle after iommu_sva_lock is
dropped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;handle-&amp;gt;dev was initialized after dropping iommu_sva_lock. This leaves a
window where a racing bind can return a handle whose dev pointer is still
NULL. A subsequent iommu_sva_unbind_device() can then dereference it via
handle-&amp;gt;dev-&amp;gt;iommu_group.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initialize handle-&amp;gt;dev before releasing iommu_sva_lock so any visible SVA
handle is fully initialized.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89451</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
