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      <title>CVE-2026-62993 — Smarty: SSRF via redirect bypass of trusted_uri using {fetch}</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-62993</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; smarty-php smarty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Smarty is a template engine for PHP, facilitating the separation of presentation (HTML/CSS) from application logic. Prior to 4.5.7 and 5.8.2, depending on the release line, Smarty&amp;#39;s {fetch} handling in libs/plugins/function.fetch.php and src/FunctionHandler/Fetch.php used Security::isTrustedUri() to validate only the initial remote URL against trusted_uri when a security policy was active. For resources handled by file_get_contents(), including HTTPS URLs, PHP followed HTTP redirects by default. An attacker who could supply or influence a fetch target and had an open redirect on a trusted host could redirect the request to an attacker-chosen internal endpoint, bypass the trusted_uri allowlist, and perform server-side request forgery. This issue is fixed in versions 4.5.7 and 5.8.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; smarty-php smarty&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Smarty is a template engine for PHP, facilitating the separation of presentation (HTML/CSS) from application logic. Prior to 4.5.7 and 5.8.2, depending on the release line, Smarty&amp;#39;s {fetch} handling in libs/plugins/function.fetch.php and src/FunctionHandler/Fetch.php used Security::isTrustedUri() to validate only the initial remote URL against trusted_uri when a security policy was active. For resources handled by file_get_contents(), including HTTPS URLs, PHP followed HTTP redirects by default. An attacker who could supply or influence a fetch target and had an open redirect on a trusted host could redirect the request to an attacker-chosen internal endpoint, bypass the trusted_uri allowlist, and perform server-side request forgery. This issue is fixed in versions 4.5.7 and 5.8.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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