https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 15:50:23 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55538 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.51, praisonai serve agents parses config[&#34;api_key&#34;] but _create_agents_app() does not authenticate POST /agents or POST /agents/{agent_name}. Missing or incorrect bearer and X-API-Key values still reach agent execution. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.51, praisonai serve agents parses config[&#34;api_key&#34;] but _create_agents_app() does not authenticate POST /agents or POST /agents/{agent_name}. Missing or incorrect bearer and X-API-Key values still reach agent execution. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55538 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r7v3-x45f-g7hp <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>### Summary `praisonai serve agents` exposes HTTP routes that invoke registered agents. The CLI advertises `--api-key` with help text &#34;API key for authentication&#34;, parses it, and forwards it into `ServeHandler`. But `_create_agents_app()` **never reads `config[&#34;api_key&#34;]` again** and installs no auth dependency or middleware on its direct routes. The configured key is a no-op flag. As a result, an unauthenticated network caller can invoke exposed agents (`POST /agents` and `POST /agents/{agent_name}`) even when the operator passed `--api-key`. Requests with no credentials, a wrong `Authorization: Bearer`, a wrong `X-API-Key`, or an empty bearer all reach `agent.start()`. The failure is made sharper by the fact that a **working auth dependency already exists in the same module** — `praisonai.api.agent_invoke.verify_token` guards every `/api/v1/...` route with `Depends(verify_token)` and is mounted into the very same app. The direct n8n-compat routes simply do not use it.</p> <p>## Technical Detail ### Source-to-sink trace **1. CLI advertises and forwards `--api-key`:** ```python # cli/commands/serve.py @app.command(&#34;agents&#34;) def serve_agents(..., api_key: Optional[str] = typer.Option(None, &#34;--api-key&#34;, help=&#34;API key for authentication&#34;)): ... if api_key: args.extend([&#34;--api-key&#34;, api_key]) exit_code = handle_serve_command(args) ``` **2. `cmd_agents()` parses `api_key` into the spec — and that is the last time it is touched:** ```python # cli/featur…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>### Summary `praisonai serve agents` exposes HTTP routes that invoke registered agents. The CLI advertises `--api-key` with help text &#34;API key for authentication&#34;, parses it, and forwards it into `ServeHandler`. But `_create_agents_app()` **never reads `config[&#34;api_key&#34;]` again** and installs no auth dependency or middleware on its direct routes. The configured key is a no-op flag. As a result, an unauthenticated network caller can invoke exposed agents (`POST /agents` and `POST /agents/{agent_name}`) even when the operator passed `--api-key`. Requests with no credentials, a wrong `Authorization: Bearer`, a wrong `X-API-Key`, or an empty bearer all reach `agent.start()`. The failure is made sharper by the fact that a **working auth dependency already exists in the same module** — `praisonai.api.agent_invoke.verify_token` guards every `/api/v1/...` route with `Depends(verify_token)` and is mounted into the very same app. The direct n8n-compat routes simply do not use it.</p> <p>## Technical Detail ### Source-to-sink trace **1. CLI advertises and forwards `--api-key`:** ```python # cli/commands/serve.py @app.command(&#34;agents&#34;) def serve_agents(..., api_key: Optional[str] = typer.Option(None, &#34;--api-key&#34;, help=&#34;API key for authentication&#34;)): ... if api_key: args.extend([&#34;--api-key&#34;, api_key]) exit_code = handle_serve_command(args) ``` **2. `cmd_agents()` parses `api_key` into the spec — and that is the last time it is touched:** ```python # cli/featur…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r7v3-x45f-g7hp