https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 07:18:01 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-62674 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> omnigent-ai omnigent</p> <p>Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent checks LEVEL_EDIT permission for a session but does not reject a bound shared or template agent whose agent.session_id is None. An authenticated user with edit access to a session can replace that shared agent bundle through omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py, add a stdio MCP server, and cause later sessions that use the shared agent to launch an attacker-controlled command through omnigent/tools/mcp.py. The command executes with the Omnigent runner process permissions and can expose files, credentials, workspace data, internal services, and runner availability. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> omnigent-ai omnigent</p> <p>Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent checks LEVEL_EDIT permission for a session but does not reject a bound shared or template agent whose agent.session_id is None. An authenticated user with edit access to a session can replace that shared agent bundle through omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py, add a stdio MCP server, and cause later sessions that use the shared agent to launch an attacker-controlled command through omnigent/tools/mcp.py. The command executes with the Omnigent runner process permissions and can expose files, credentials, workspace data, internal services, and runner availability. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-62674 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: omnigent</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>An authenticated user with edit access to their own session can overwrite a shared/template agent by uploading a full agent bundle through `PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent`.</p> <p>Shared/template agents are shown as not MCP-editable, but this upload path still accepts a replacement bundle. By adding a `stdio` MCP server to the shared agent, the attacker can cause future runner sessions using that shared agent to start an attacker-controlled command.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerable endpoint is the full agent bundle upload route: [`PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent`](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L18979-L19077) This route checks whether the caller can edit the session: [`LEVEL_EDIT` session permission check](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L19003-L19025) But it does not check whether the bound agent is a shared/template agent. Shared/template agents have: ```python agent.session_id is None ``` The API already exposes that these agents are not meant to be MCP-editable: [`mcp_servers_editable` is false for shared/template agents](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L18842-L18857) The direct MCP edit endpoint correctly blocks shared/template agents: [`session_mcp_servers.py` shared-agent guard](https://github.com/…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: omnigent</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>An authenticated user with edit access to their own session can overwrite a shared/template agent by uploading a full agent bundle through `PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent`.</p> <p>Shared/template agents are shown as not MCP-editable, but this upload path still accepts a replacement bundle. By adding a `stdio` MCP server to the shared agent, the attacker can cause future runner sessions using that shared agent to start an attacker-controlled command.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerable endpoint is the full agent bundle upload route: [`PUT /sessions/{session_id}/agent`](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L18979-L19077) This route checks whether the caller can edit the session: [`LEVEL_EDIT` session permission check](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L19003-L19025) But it does not check whether the bound agent is a shared/template agent. Shared/template agents have: ```python agent.session_id is None ``` The API already exposes that these agents are not meant to be MCP-editable: [`mcp_servers_editable` is false for shared/template agents](https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/blob/10f5ae3110e162f96fb99bb6662c581abdc56cd6/omnigent/server/routes/sessions.py#L18842-L18857) The direct MCP edit endpoint correctly blocks shared/template agents: [`session_mcp_servers.py` shared-agent guard](https://github.com/…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h